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This work applies the social intuitionist psychological model of moral judgment to 
explain the U.S. Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board of Education (1954) decision-making 
process. Based on an examination of the available Brown primary source material–––con-
ference notes, interchamber and private memoranda, missives to private individuals, writ-
ten brainstorms, and clerk recollections–––this work argues that most of the justices’ deci-
sion-making in Brown is captured by the model and associated psychological phenomena. 
The analysis clarifies Brown’s constitutional holding and the nature of the constitutional 
violation and harm the justices intended to proscribe. The work concludes that Brown has 
a consequentialist, not a deontological or colorblind, provenance and purpose.   
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 On May 17, 1954, in Brown v. Board of Education,1 the United States Supreme Court 
unanimously ruled that legally compelled racial segregation violates the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. On the same day, in the companion case of Bolling v. Sharpe,2 the 
Court held that enforced racial segregation was also a violation of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. At the time, segregation was implicitly authorized by Congress in its plenary 
governance of Washington, D.C., and either required or permitted by law in seventeen states–––
all either former members of the Confederacy, or (with the exception of Wyoming) so-called Bor-
der States with sizeable populations of African Americans. In declaring that the “separate but 
equal” doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson3 was not applicable to public education, Brown represented 
the turning point in the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence. Though the Court de-
clined to overrule Plessy explicitly in Brown, its May 17 decision was the beginning of the end for 
federal judicial toleration of state and national legislative action that stigmatized, subordinated, or 
otherwise burdened racial minorities. 
 Brown refers to four cases that were consolidated and argued before the Court over the 
course of three terms.4 Those cases are Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (Kansas), Gebhart 
v. Belton (Delaware), Davis v. County School Board (Virginia), Briggs v. Elliott (South Carolina). 
In each of these cases, black plaintiffs challenged state laws that (in Delaware, Virginia, and South 
Carolina) required, or (in Kansas) permitted, racial segregation in the public schools. Bolling v. 
Sharpe arose out of a challenge to the policy of the school board of the District of Columbia, dating 
                                                
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
3 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
4 October Terms (OTs) 1952-1954. 
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back to 1865, to require segregation in D.C. public schools. All five cases were financed, staffed, 
and superintended by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). 
Because the Fifth Amendment constrains action by the federal government, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment was understood at the time to constrain only action by state governments, the 
NAACP’s lines of constitutional attack differed for the two cases. The NAACP challenge to seg-
regation in the states was predicated upon the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, ratified in 1868; that to segregation in D.C., on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment, ratified in 1791. 
 Prior to the first round of oral arguments, in addition to its standard legal briefs arguing the 
constitutional merits, the NAACP filed a brief signed by 32 academics that purported to summarize 
the academic consensus on the sociological and psychological effects on blacks of enforced seg-
regation. At the first round of oral arguments in December 1952, Thurgood Marshall, as attorney 
for the plaintiffs in the South Carolina case, argued that the Court need not overturn Plessy in order 
to afford his clients relief. The Court, Marshall said, could find for the appellants in the D.C., 
Kansas, Virginia and South Carolina cases, and for the appellee in Gebhart (the NAACP had pre-
vailed before both the Delaware trial court and state Supreme Court) by adopting one of three 
rationales. First, the Court could invoke and extend the logic of the recently decided graduate and 
professional school cases, Sweatt v. Painter5 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma,6 to primary and second-
ary public schools. Second, the Court could rule that racial classifications do not have a rational 
relationship to a legitimate public purpose (what is today known as rational basis scrutiny). Or, 
                                                
5 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
6 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
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third, the Court could find that racial classifications are inherently “invidious” (i.e., adopt a deon-
tological rational invalidating state action based on race per se).7 The Court ultimately eschewed 
all three possibilities. 
 The Brown litigation was heard three times before the Court. The Court heard arguments 
on the merits twice and on the remedy once. The first merits hearing took place over three days 
from Tuesday, December 9, to Thursday, December 11, 1952, and the justices met at their weekly 
Saturday conference to discuss the cases on Saturday, December 13. I will refer to this meeting as 
the first Brown conference on the merits. At a conference on May 29 of the following year, the 
justices agreed to order reargument in the cases rather than decide on the merits. On June 8, 1953, 
in lieu of issuing a decision in Brown or Bolling, the Court issued the following order. 
NO. 8. BROWN ET AL. V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA ET AL.; 
NO. 101. BRIGGS ET AL. V. ELLIOTT ET AL., MEMBERS OF BOARD, OF TRUSTEES OF SCHOOL 
 DISTRICT #22, ET AL.; 
NO. 191. DAVIS ET AL. V. COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY ET AL.;  
NO. 413. BOLLING ET AL. V. SHARPE ET AL.; AND 
NO. 448. GEBHART ET AL. V. BELTON ET AL.  
Each of these cases is ordered restored to the docket and is assigned for reargument on 
Monday, October 12, next. In their briefs and on oral argument counsel are requested to 
discuss particularly the following questions insofar as they are relevant to the respective 
cases: 
1. What evidence is there that the Congress which submitted and the State legislatures 
and conventions which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment contemplated or did not 
                                                
7 Friedman ([1969] 2004, 45). 
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contemplate, understood or did not understand, that it would abolish segregation in 
public schools? 
2. If neither the Congress in submitting nor the States in ratifying the Fourteenth 
Amendment understood that compliance with it would require the immediate abo-
lition of segregation in public schools, was it nevertheless the understanding of the 
framers of the Amendment 
(a)  that future Congresses might, in the exercise of their power under section 5 
of the Amendment, abolish such segregation, or 
(b) that it would be within the judicial power, in light of future conditions, to 
construe the Amendment as abolishing such segregation of its own force? 
3. On the assumption that the answers to questions 2(a) and (b) do not dispose of the 
issue, is it within the judicial power, in construing the Amendment, to abolish seg-
regation in public schools? 
4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment 
(a)  would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the limits set by 
normal geographic school districting, Negro children should forthwith be 
admitted to schools of their choice, or 
(b)  may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an effective 
gradual adjustment to be brought about from existing segregated systems to 
a system not based on color distinctions? 
5. On the assumption on which questions 4(a) and (b) are based, and assuming further 
that this Court will exercise its equity powers to the end described in question 4(b), 
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(a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in this case; 
(b) if so what specific issues should the decrees reach; 
(c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear evidence with a view to 
recommending specific terms for such decree; 
(d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance with directions to 
frame decrees in this case and if so what general directions should the de-
crees of this Court include and what procedures should the courts of first 
instance follow in arriving at the specific terms of more detailed decrees? 
The Attorney General of the United States in invited to take part in the oral argument and 
to file an additional brief if he so desires.8 
In accordance with the last sentence of the order, sometime in July, the Solicitor General’s office 
of the nascent Eisenhower administration began drafting briefs of its position in the litigation and 
reached out to Chief Justice Vinson to request more time to prepare. Acting unilaterally, on August 
4 Vinson granted the request and moved the rehearings from October 12 to December 7. On Sep-
tember 8, Vinson, who had led the first Brown conference on the merits, died unexpectedly. By 
recess appointment, President Eisenhower appointed California Governor Earl Warren to replace 
Vinson as Chief Justice of the United States on October 5, 1953. The second round of Brown oral 
arguments on the merits took place, as rescheduled by the former Chief Justice, from Monday, 
December 7 to Wednesday, December 9. The justices met on Saturday, December 12 to discuss 
the cases. I will refer to this meeting as the second Brown conference on the merits. Chief Justice 
Warren was confirmed by the Senate on March 1, 1954. On May 17, 1954, the Court issued its 
                                                
8 345 U.S. 972 (1953). 
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decision on the constitutional merits in Brown and Bolling and ordered a third round of arguments 
on the remedy, specifically on question numbers 4 and 5 of the June 8, 1953 rehearing order.  
 The cases were restored to the docket for the October Term 1954. On October 9, Justice 
Robert Jackson died of a second heart attack, his first having come on March 30, and incapacitating 
him for much of the end of the Brown merits decision-making process. President Eisenhower nom-
inated John Marshal Harlan, II–––grandson and namesake of the sole dissenter in Plessy–––to the 
Court as Jackson’s replacement on January 13, 1955, and the Senate confirmed him on February 
9. The Court heard arguments on the Brown and Bolling remedy from Monday, April 11 to Thurs-
day, April 14, and met to discuss the cases on Saturday, April 16. The Court issued its remedy 
decision in a unanimous opinion on May 31, 1955. To distinguish the Court’s two decisions, the 
decision on the merits is sometimes called Brown I, and the decision on the remedy is always 
called Brown II. Unless I specify otherwise, however, “Brown” will refer to the decision on the 
merits. I will always refer to the decision on the remedy as Brown II. 
 The Supreme Court in Brown held that “segregation of children in public schools solely on 
the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other ‘tangible’ factors may be equal, 
deprive[s] the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities[.]” The Court’s 
dispositive reasoning in so ruling was as follows: “To separate [minority children] from others of 
similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to 
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely to ever be 
undone.” The Court also distinguished Plessy without overruling it. “Whatever may have been the 
extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, th[e] finding” that segrega-
 
7 
tion “generates a feeling of inferiority” that harms blacks “is amply supported by modern author-
ity.” This last statement was followed by a footnote, Footnote 11, which referenced five of the 
social science studies broached in the NAACP’s 1952 sociological brief.9 
 Though Brown was welcomed, even exalted, in many parts of the country, its constitutional 
rationale was soon criticized by legal scholars who nonetheless agreed with its outcome. Perhaps 
the most famous example was Harvard Law professor Herbert Wechsler, who, five years after 
Brown, questioned the decision’s reasoning. 
Does the validity of the decision turn then on the sufficiency of evidence or of judicial 
notice to sustain a finding that the separation harms the Negro children who may be in-
volved? … And if the harm that segregation worked was relevant, what of the benefits that 
it entailed: sense of security, the absence of hostility? Were they irrelevant? . . . Suppose 
that more Negroes in a community preferred separation than opposed it? Would that be 
relevant to whether they were hurt or aided by segregation as opposed to integration? . . . I 
find it hard to think the judgment really turned upon the facts. Rather, it seems to me, it 
must have rested on the view that racial segregation is, in principle, a denial of equality to 
the minority against whom it is directed; that is, the group that is not dominant politically 
and, therefore, does not make the choice involved. For many who support the Court's de-
cision this assuredly is the decisive ground.10 
Instead of basing the opinion on a strained reading of the Equal Protection Clause, Wechsler would 
have predicated the decision on the claim that the arbitrary denial of freedom inherent in enforced 
racial segregation amounted to a denial of due process. 
                                                
9 347 U.S. 483 (1954), at 493-494. 
10 Wechsler (1959), at 32-33. 
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 Philip Kurland was another critic of Brown’s reasoning. Yet he also pithily captured why 
the case, despite its ostensibly shoddy constitutional reasoning and apparent concern only with 
racial segregation in public schools, was so significant in the realm of constitutional law. 
“Brown v. Board of Education was the beginning” because it wiped clean the slate. It ena-
bled the Court to write its own code of equality in substitution for the equal protection 
clause which, as late as the time of Mr. Justice Holmes, was regarded as the last resort of 
desperate litigants. Professor [Laurence] Tribe’s text on constitutional law describes “the 
model of equal protection,” almost all of which is based on judicial manufacture since 
Brown.11 
Regarding the weakness of Brown’s judicial reasoning, Kurland contended: 
“Brown v. Board of Education was the beginning,” but not of new constitutional doctrine 
or, if a beginning of constitutional doctrine, only the merest adumbration of it. The opinion 
affords no principle on which to build. There is only the factual proposition that compul-
sory separation of the races in public schools is detrimental to black children because it 
“generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their 
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.” That conclusion need not be ques-
tioned except to note that the opinion's statement of the result is far clearer than its proof…. 
The logical proposition in support of an equality argument that may be derived from the 
language of the Court is: (1) adequate schooling can be afforded only in classrooms that 
contain students of the white majority; (2) white majority students are free to participate in 
schooling with other white majority students, but black minority students are precluded by 
                                                
11 Kurland (1979a, 316). Internal citations omitted. 
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state law or constitution from sharing such schooling with whites; therefore, (3) black stu-
dents are deprived of equal educational opportunity. The major premise, of course, has 
never been established and remains the subject of much controversy among scholars of 
many disciplines. Whatever one feels about the conclusion reached by the Court … the 
opinion was a shabby, disingenuous way of disposing of some of the most consequential 
cases before the Supreme Court since Dred Scott. It has been excused largely on the ground 
that the opinion was the result of desperate negotiations aimed at assuring unanimity rather 
than clarity. Most committee efforts bear the stigmata of compromise. Certainly, majority 
Supreme Court opinions frequently do, and not least in cases of great social consequence, 
when unanimity must be regarded as “a miracle of rare device.”12 
So enduring and profound has been the scholarly discontent with Brown’s “shabby, disingenuous” 
constitutional reasoning that at the turn of the century some of the nation’s elite law scholars and 
constitutional lawyers individually took a stab at rewriting Brown. Their historical-counterfactual 
judicial opinions were published in a tome entitled, What Brown v. Board of Education Should 
Have Said.13 
 This work attempts to answer two questions. The first is, Why did the Brown decision lack 
a robust and generalizable theory of equal protection and refrain from articulating the specific 
constitutional rights that segregation violated? The second is, What constitutional harms does 
Brown condemn? Studies of Brown in the law and political science literatures tend to address these 
questions only indirectly. Such partial answers as presently exist point to Warren’s stated objec-
tives in writing the Brown decision and to the effect of the pursuit of unanimity among the justices 
                                                
12 Id., at 317. 
13 Balkin (ed.) (2001). 
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on the decision-making process. These answers do not, however, adequately explain why the jus-
tices with jurisprudential philosophies to which the final Brown opinion, light as it was on the 
traditional elements of judicial reasoning, would seem to have been anathema, joined Warren’s 
final opinion. Nor do the available accounts posit or identify any causal linkages between the jus-
tices’ individual decision-making processes and the reasoning of Warren’s final opinion. Finally, 
most studies of the Brown decision-making process do not aim to clarify the decision’s holding as 
a precedent for future judicial action. In my view, ascertaining Brown’s legal meaning is of the 
utmost constitutional and practical importance and is not merely an academic question of primarily 
theoretical or epistemic utility. Brown began the modern equal protection regime, but it did not 
clearly explain in what that regime would consist, other than indicating that that regime would 
improve situation of racial minorities. Notwithstanding Kurland’s attempts to clarify the decision’s 
basis (which had been refracted through and perhaps distorted by a quarter century of subsequent 
judicial rule-manufacture), Brown did not espouse an obvious constitutional theory concerning 
racial discrimination that could be generalized to future cases, whether in desegregation or other 
areas of equal protection. It did not identify the constitutional harm in racial discrimination gener-
ally, and the harms it did impute to segregation specifically were both controvertible and contro-
verted at the time.14 Nor did the Court articulate the individual constitutional rights–––rights that 
the Court, only four years before, had in McLaurin v. Oklahoma declared to be “personal and 






                                                
14 Cf. Cahn (1955), Hand (1958), Wechsler (1959). 





 The most widely read and popular account of the Brown decision-making process is Rich-
ard Kluger’s Simple Justice.16 Kluger’s book is an exhaustive summary of the background and 
history of each of the five segregation cases, including, where relevant, the stories and backgrounds 
of key personages in the Brown drama, and includes in its last 150 pages a thorough presentation 
of much, although not all, of the Brown primary source materials that form the object of my own 
research and interpretative analysis. Kluger, a journalist, aims more to tell the story of the Brown 
decision-making process than to explain it, and his work is useful as a reference for both primary 
source information and original, historically-bounded secondary research, such as interviews with 
key participants in the Brown litigation who have passed since the book’s publication. However, 
Kluger’s magisterial work is not free of shortcomings. The most important of these is that Kluger 
does not attempt to explain, at any deep causal level beyond the justices’ own accounting of their 
decision-making, why the justices behaved the way they did, or to explore how those behaviors 
affected the eventual constitutional holding in Brown. Accordingly, while my research surveys 
much of the same materials as Kluger, it does so in order to reconcile and explain the justices’ 
decision-making with an overarching theory of judicial behavior. A second shortcoming of 
Kluger’s work was well articulated by Dennis Hutchinson, who, writing a few short years after 
Kluger, observed: 
Even for its wealth of illuminating detail, Simple Justice cannot be denominated the defin-
itive account of the decision-making process in the Brown cases. The book’s limitations 
are attributable to what one reviewer has called the “reductive” nature of the chronicle: the 
                                                
16 Kluger ([1976] 2004). 
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account “is so weighted with the knowledge of what eventually prevailed that the reader 
finds it hard to keep any flavor of the issues and risks that faced litigants and judges before 
May 17, 1954.”17 
To that observation I add that Kluger’s narrative has the feel more of hagiography than history. It 
does not approximate, by any means, a neutral or tonally even-handed exposition of the events that 
culminated in the Court’s Brown decision. Kluger’s narrative is in this respect a representative 
example of the common conception among scholars of Brown as the Court’s finest hour and great-
est moral triumph. One virtue of my work, in contrast, is that it does not approach Brown from 
such an obvious position of celebration and exaltation, but from a desire to understand and explain.  
 Hutchinson also deprecates Kluger’s over-emphasis of Earl Warren’s arrival and leader-
ship in narrating the final outcome of the Brown decision-making process. “The Court is made to 
appear tangled in a political and doctrinal Gordian Knot one Term, only to be delivered by the 
master stroke of one man–––in this instance, Earl Warren–––the next.” Hutchinson accepts that 
Warren’s leadership played a role in the Brown outcome but suggests that the role of no justice, 
nor that of any group of justices, can alone account for the Brown outcome. 
Over forty years ago, Felix Frankfurter, then a law professor, warned against characterizing 
decision-making in the Supreme Court in such a fashion: “The reduction of history to the 
efforts of a very few personalities is an expression of the ineradicable romantic element in 
man. We want to dramatize life, and also to simplify it.” Despite vastly richer data, it is no 
easier now to “disentangle individual influences in the combined work of a Court” than it 
was when Frankfurter wrote in 1937.18 
                                                
17 Hutchinson (1980). 
18 Id., at 34. Internal citations omitted. 
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Two ways in which my work remedies this problem is by identifying the effects of the justices’ 
social milieu upon the inputs to their judicial decision-making, and by highlighting common fea-
tures in the justices’ individual Brown decision-making processes. History might be more than 
“the efforts of a very few personalities,” but historical causality can nevertheless be, in part, illu-
minated through an examination of those personalities. 
 A refinement of Kluger’s account is Dennis Hutchinson’s work on the Brown decision-
making process.19 Hutchinson contends that the justices’ pursuit of unanimity in the desegregation 
cases defines and explains the content of those decisions, including the ambiguities in Brown and 
the Court’s confrontation with high-profile non-compliance, as in the Little Rock integration crisis 
and the justices’ subsequent decision in Cooper v. Aaron.20 In his own words, Hutchinson  
tell[s] the story of the rise and fall of unanimity from 1948 to1958 from the perspective of 
the judges who were faced with ‘the greatest issue any of them had met or [were] likely 
ever to meet.” The story is not only one of the influence of personality on the decision-
making process, as is so often assumed, but of the dominance of ideas and doctrine as well. 
It is also the story of the balance sometimes struck by the members of the Supreme Court 
between the particular requirements of the cases with which they were presented and the 
capacity of the Court as an institution to address explosive social issues presented in those 
cases. Great cases strain not only the law but also the position and effectiveness of the 
Supreme Court.21 
Insofar as this is his purpose, Hutchinson succeeds. Indeed, the evidence he presents proves that 
unanimity was a conscious goal of both Warren and Frankfurter in the Brown decision-making 
                                                
19 Hutchinson (1980). 
20 313 U.S. 1 (1958). 
21 Hutchinson (1980, 3-4). Internal citations omitted. 
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process, that Warren used appeals to institutional unity to convince Justice Stanley Reed to join 
the other eight justices in overturning segregation, and, “[o]nce established in 1954, unanimity 
ceased to be merely a desirable value; it became a routine practice.”22 Moreover, Hutchinson re-
ports upon primary source evidence taken from the justices’ papers for Shelley v. Kraemer,23 Hen-
derson v. United States,24 and the aforementioned Sweatt and McLaurin, showing that the justices 
had long been exposed to and considering arguments–––including sociological and moral argu-
ments–––for ending not only segregation but all forms of racial discrimination.25  
 Hutchinson does not, however, adduce any proof that any of the justices had, at some point 
over the course of those cases, decided that segregation per se was unconstitutional. What we learn 
from Hutchinson’s review of those case materials is instead consistent with the model of judicial 
behavior I will postulate as largely controlling in Brown. With respect to such approaches, 
Hutchinson acknowledges that his purpose is not “to evaluate the evidence presented against mod-
els or theories of judicial decision-making. My limited concern is to help fill part of the evidentiary 
gap that has flawed attempts at theoretical models of adjudication.”26 My work, in turn, establishes 
that the evidence Hutchinson adduces both in and before Brown better fits a particular model of 
judicial decision-making and that that model explains Hutchinson’s evidence better than some of 
his theoretically agnostic analysis. 
                                                
22 Id., at 3. 
23 334 U.S. 1 (1948) [ruling that court enforcement of racially restrictive covenants was discriminatory state action 
and therefore unconstitutional]. 
24 339 U.S. 816 (1950) [construing the Interstate Commerce Act’s requirement that railway service providers not 
“subject any particular person . . . to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatso-
ever” to prohibit racial segregation in railway cars]. 
25 Hutchinson (1980, 4-30). 
26 Id., at 4, fn 12. 
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 For instance, Hutchinson interprets Frankfurter’s comments at the second Brown merits 
conference as “focus[ing] on the tone and manner with which” the Court should overturn segrega-
tion as a result of the justice’s realization “that a majority of the Court was prepared to hold seg-
regation unconstitutional.”27 My analysis will show that this presentation of Frankfurter’s confer-
ence comments is empirically mistaken and that Hutchinson’s interpretation of the justice’s com-
ments misunderstands Frankfurter’s position on Brown as of December 12, 1953. Relatedly, 
Hutchinson construes the justices’ failure to discuss the legislative history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment at the second Brown conference as a “victim, in large measure,” of Alexander Bickel’s 
memo on the legislative history of the Amendment. Hutchinson notes that Frankfurter had circu-
lated Bickel’s memo to the other justices with a cover memo contending that “the research was 
‘inconclusive in the sense that the Congress as an enacting body neither manifested that the amend-
ment outlawed segregation to that end, nor that it manifested the opposite,’”28 and suggests that 
the Bickel memo put to bed the justices’ qualms about the history. As my analysis will demon-
strate, not only did Bickel’s memo fail to assuage completely Frankfurter’s own concerns about 
the role that the history of the Amendment should play in any decision, but also at least two of the 
other justices (Jackson and Clark, with Douglas a possible third) did not agree with the proposition 
that the history was “inconclusive” as to segregation or racial discrimination. Finally, I offer a 
model of judicial behavior that can better unify and explain the historical evidence than does 
Hutchinson. 
 Bernard Schwartz, in his judicial biography of Chief Justice Earl Warren,29 provides a sum-
mary of additional primary source materials from the Brown decision-making process and incisive 
                                                
27 Id., at 39. 
28 Id., at 40. 
29 Schwartz (1983). 
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interpretative analysis that largely coheres with the model of judicial behavior by which I try to 
explain Brown. I incorporate selections of Schwartz’s analysis into appropriate places in my own. 
I make particularly extensive use of his interpretations of Warren’s comments at the 1953 confer-
ence and his reporting of Warren’s opinion-writing method and Warren’s overall persuasion strat-
egy throughout the Brown decision-making process. While most of Schwartz’s work pertains to 
the Court’s major post-Brown cases decided during Warren’s tenure, enough of the book is devoted 
to Brown primary source material and analysis to make the work a major contribution to under-
standing what transpired in the case, especially given Warren’s central role in fomenting unanimity 
among his colleagues and in writing the Brown opinion. 
 Mark Tushnet and Katya Lezin30 provide a summary and re-interpretation of the Brown 
primary source materials that make their work closer to my own than any other in the Brown liter-
ature. Tushnet and Lezin review the “standard narrative” of Brown and conclude that it does not 
adequately or accurately explain Frankfurter’s behavior. That narrative, presented most clearly in 
Kluger, holds that Frankfurter “saved” the Court from a self-inflicted wound of deciding on the 
merits in the October 1952 term, when the opinion would have come down with the justices closely 
divided. Frankfurter spared the Court this “catastrophic” outcome by convincing his colleagues to 
re-hear the cases in 1953. Frankfurter’s motive in requesting delay was to buy the justices time to 
coalesce around a common outcome. Vinson’s death and Warren’s serendipitous ascension to the 
Court in fall of 1953 afforded Frankfurter an unexpected new ally in fomenting unanimity, and 
after the Brown rehearings Warren and Frankfurter together succeeded in that goal. 
 Tushnet and Lezin argue that this tidy story masks Frankfurter’s own profound (and never 
judicially resolved) struggle over Brown, likely misstates his motivations, and was in fact his own 
                                                
30 Tushnet and Lezin (1991). 
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handiwork. Frankfurter, they claim, requested reargument on the history of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment because he could not persuade himself to vote to invalidate segregation in the state cases. He 
wanted to buy time primarily so that he could reconcile his judicial views to the outcome he fa-
vored morally, not so that the Brethren would have more time to coalesce around a common out-
come. After all, no one could have foreseen, before the next term, the passing of Vinson, who 
along with Reed had spoken out unequivocally in favor of sustaining segregation at the first Brown 
conference. Moreover, Tushnet and Lezin argue that Jackson’s comments at both Brown confer-
ences posed a serious problem for Frankfurter by highlighting the necessarily “political” nature of, 
and the lack of an appropriate “judicial” rationale for, any decision invalidating segregation. Frank-
furter apparently internalized this challenge but never failed to meet it adequately. In other words, 
Frankfurter failed in his attempt to reconcile his judicial to his moral views on segregation. Tushnet 
and Lezin suggest instead that Frankfurter shifted his focus to the remedy portion of the case, 
which provided him with technical legal material into which he could “sink his teeth” and thus feel 
as though he had reached an adequate “judicial” decision on the merits. The “story” about Frank-
furter seeking delay with the foresight that it would produce a unanimous court was peddled by 
Frankfurter to the other justices, his clerks, and friends like Judge Learned Hand, as a post hoc 
rationalization of what had simply been an effort to buy time in which to discover or develop an 
acceptable judicial rationale for a “congenial political conclusion,” to use Jackson’s expression. 
Tushnet and Lezin conclude, however, that Frankfurter never succeeded in doing so. 
 In my view, Tushnet and Lezin’s interpretation is an improvement on Kluger’s account of 
some of the central events of the Brown decision-making process. But, as my work will show, their 
account can be refined as well. For instance, while Tushnet and Levin are probably correct that 
Frankfurter sought time to work out his own views, it is also entirely possible that he wanted, as 
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he claimed, to buy time in the hopes of a less divided outcome the following term–––there is 
certainly no proof against this interpretation. My analysis will suggest, additionally, that Frankfur-
ter’s primary motivation in holding the cases over for reargument was to find, whether by the 
historical materials dredged up in reargument or by Bickel’s research project, a historical “smoking 
gun” that showed Plessy had been a mistaken interpretation of the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment the day it was decided. When that proof failed to materialize, and when 
indeed proof for precisely the opposite position emerged in the late summer and fall of 1953, the 
evidence suggests that Frankfurter neutralized the Amendment’s history by declaring it “inconclu-
sive.” He then proceeded to reconcile his judicial views (though he had to stretch them almost to 
the breaking point) to his moral ones on the merits before turning to the remedy portion of the 
litigation. 
 Michael Klarman’s book, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the 
Struggle for Racial Equality,31 is also a precursor to my work. By his own accounting, Klarman 
tries to answer three questions: “What factors explain the dramatic changes in racial attitudes and 
practices that occurred between 1900 and 1950? What factors explain judicial rulings such as 
Plessy and Brown? How much did such Court decisions influence the larger world of race rela-
tions?”32 While the first and third questions render Klarman’s work appreciably broader than my 
own, the second is one that my work attempts to answer as well. Like my approach to answering 
the second question, Klarman’s is multidisciplinary, drawing on history, law, and sociology. In 
short, Klarman concludes: 
                                                
31 Klarman (2004). 
32 Id., at 4. 
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judicial decision making involves a combination of legal and political factors. A legal axis, 
which consists of sources such as text, original understanding, and precedent, exists along 
a continuum that ranges from determinacy to indeterminacy. In other words, some legal 
questions have fairly clear answers, while others do not. A political axis, which consists of 
factors such as the personal values of judges, the broader social and political context of the 
times, and external political pressure, exists along a continuum that ranges from very strong 
preferences to relatively weak ones. . . . When the law is clear, judges will generally follow 
it, unless they have very strong personal preferences to the contrary. When the law is inde-
terminate, judges have little choice but to make decisions based on political factors.33 
Klarman argues that applied to the mid-twentieth century historical context of Brown, this frame-
work accounts for the Brown justices’ decision-making. The “political factors” to which he alludes 
manifest themselves as shifts in public opinion. Judges’ receptivity to those shifts, as refracted 
through the “elite subculture” that judges occupy, explain judges’ willingness to invalidate long-
standing precedent and to reinterpret the Constitution in accordance with public opinion-mediated 
elite consensus. “[B]ecause constitutional law is generally quite indeterminate,” Klarman claims, 
“constitutional interpretation almost inevitably reflects the broader social and political context of 
the times.”34 
 What most obviously distinguishes my answer to the second question from Klarman’s is 
that my work attempts to establish, at a deep causal level, how changed elite opinion migrated 
from the justices’ private consciences to the U.S. Reports. In other words, my research takes for 
granted that the moral views of most non-southern American elites, including the justices of the 
                                                
33 Id., at 5. 
34 Id., at 5. 
 
20 
Supreme Court, had evolved on segregation and racial discrimination generally. What interests me 
is how the justices, especially the more formalist ones like Frankfurter and Jackson, reconciled 
their judicial philosophies with the demands of private conscience, and how the decision-making 
of the associate justices influenced the reasoning and rhetorical strategies of the final opinion for 
the Court. I posit that a psychological model of moral decision-making, operationalized for the 
study of judicial process, unifies the available primary source evidence. The model additionally 
explains the manner in which the justices achieved unanimity in Brown, and the writing-process 
and holding of the final Brown opinion. 
 Jack Balkin’s work on Brown35 is also relevant to my inquiry. Balkin views the evolution 
of American constitutional law in terms of models of citizenship, and contends that Brown is an 
inflection point between the end of the “tripartite theory of citizenship” and the beginning of the 
modern “model of scrutiny rules.” The tripartite theory of citizenship, Balkin claims, began with 
the ratification of the Civil War Amendments, and reads the equal protection guarantee of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as its framers in the 39th Congress did: narrowly. The tripartite model 
distinguishes among civil, political, and social equality, and holds that the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment assured only the first of those. The Fifteenth Amendment, of course, 
guaranteed political rights, but none of the Amendments secured a guarantee of social equality 
between blacks and whites. The model of scrutiny rules, in contrast, has its roots not in an original-
ist interpretation of the Civil War Amendments but in judicial decisions that coincided with the 
end of the Court’s surveillance of social and economic legislation. The two most important of those 
decisions are United States v. Carolene Products36 and Korematsu v. United States,37 in which, 
                                                
35 Balkin (2011). 
36 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
37 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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respectively, the Court announced that it would begin (1) scrutinizing more closely laws that in-
fringed or curtailed the rights of “discrete and insular minorities”38 and (2) viewing legislative 
racial classifications as intrinsically “suspect.”39 This legal regime of scrutiny rules operates by 
recognizing and articulating “suspect classifications” and “fundamental rights” against which 
judges balance claims of legislative purpose or interest. In the decades following Brown, the model 
of scrutiny rules would supplant its predecessor’s constitutional agnosticism toward social equality 
with the requirement that state action not subject citizens to suspect classifications. Another way 
of saying this is that the scrutiny rules model would recognize “protected classes” of persons––––
racial and religious minorities, women, etc.–––and task judges with being especially vigilant of 
those groups’ rights and interests against legislative restriction. 
 Balkin argues that although Brown announced the end of the tripartite theory of citizenship 
and inaugurated the modern regime of equal protection, the decision did not itself develop the 
model of scrutiny rules that would replace the older regime. Brown “presages a new way of organ-
izing the idea of equal citizenship, one that will eventually employ concepts such as scrutiny rules, 
suspect classifications, and fundamental rights,” Balkin states. But “Brown does not tell us any-
thing about this theory, because it has not been developed yet. Instead, the very paucity of Brown’s 
arguments, and the massive resistance that followed Brown, spur lawyers, judges, and legal schol-
ars to come up with novel and sophisticated theories about why Brown was correct.”40 Balkin 
acknowledges, in other words, that Brown was not self-justifying. It did not develop a robust and 
generalizable theory of equal protection that could be applied to future cases in which state action 
                                                
38 Though Carolene Products was a federal commerce power case, Footnote 4’s internal references were all to state 
cases. The Court thereby signaled that it would apply its scrutiny to state legislation with special vigilance. 304 U.S. 
144 (1938), at 152-153. 
39 Balkin (2011, 154-157). 
40 Id., at 159. 
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was claimed to discriminate against some class of citizens. Hence the need for ascertaining 
Brown’s holding–––a central goal of my research. Balkin posits that there are three ways in which 
to interpret Brown. 
First, it might stand for a principle forbidding government to make classifications based on 
race. Second, it might stand for a principle forbidding government from subordinating one 
social group to another (or helping to maintain this subordination). Third, it might stand 
for a principle of fair distribution of the public goods and services that are necessary to 
equal citizenship in an increasingly complicated world. Call the first the anticlassification 
principle, the second the antisubordination principle, and the third the principle of fair dis-
tribution of citizenship goods.41 
My work will show that as a partial consequence of the way in which the justices arrived at their 
decisions, and of the concerns and considerations they entertained in the conference discussions 
and expressed in their intrachamber memoranda throughout the Brown decision-making process, 
Brown advances the consequentialist antisubordination principle, as opposed to the deontological 
anticlassification one. Though anticlassification may characterize the majority of the applications 
of the model of scrutiny rules since the 1980s, during which time a conservative Court has been 
ascendant, it does not describe the decisions of the Court during which the model of scrutiny rules 
was being elaborated and consolidated in the 60s and 70s. In its examination of the Brown primary 
source record, my dissertation will show that the more anticlassification interpretation of Brown 
comprises conservative retrenchment from the consequentialist reasoning and purpose of the de-
cision. 
                                                
41 Id., at 161. 
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 My research will also refer and respond to Jeffrey Hockett’s42 recent work on Brown. 
Hockett helpfully canvasses the history of the litigation, the arguments of the litigants, the timeline 
of the hearing and rehearing, the justices’ conferences, interactions, and interchamber memoranda, 
and the record of the justices’ private reflections. Thus, in terms of the scope of the material sur-
veyed, Hockett’s work is the best precedent for my own. I disagree, however, with the thrust of 
Hockett’s interpretative analysis. His primary claim is that three factors dominated the justices’ 
decision-making process: the justices’ sense of and adherence to the court’s institutional mission 
in vindicating the rights of minorities whom the democratic process has failed; their desire to im-
prove the international reputation of the United States in the global struggle against the Soviet 
Union; and their prediction that desegregation would favorably alter the domestic political calculus 
for liberalism, particularly in the South. In highlighting the role these factors played in the Brown 
decision-making process, Hockett downplays the influence of the justices’ ideological views and 
political attitudes. He contends that there is little correlation between measures of the justices’ 
political ideology and their votes in Brown, and claims that there are good reasons to believe that 
many of the justices harbored illiberal views on race even after joining the Court. In my view, 
Hockett’s deprecation of attitudinalism and elevation of the justices’ sense of the Court’s ostensi-
ble institutional mission, their opinion of the importance of foreign affairs, and concerns about the 
domestic political calculus are highly speculative and generally belied by the plain words and ac-
tions of the justices, which suggest their moral sentiments were strongly egalitarian. Consequently, 
I view Hockett’s work as useful more for its exposition of primary source materials than for his 
occasionally strained accounting of the roles played by factors that in my view, if they explain any 
of the justices’ behaviors, do so in a secondary and undocumented manner. 
                                                
42 Hockett (2013). 
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 Finally, I should broach the primary methodological work from which my own analysis 
will take its bearings, and to which it will partially respond. Segal and Spaeth’s43 pathfinding work 
in developing the attitudinal model of judicial behavior provides a template upon which my anal-
ysis improves. Segal and Spaeth’s attitudinal model posits that measures of judges’ ideological 
values (or attitudinal preferences) predict those judges’ voting behaviors. However, their model is 
agnostic as to the specific causality of how judges’ attitudes determine their voting behaviors. My 
work fills the causal gap in traditional judicial attitudinalism by positing a theory of deep causal 
attribution. The model of decision-making that I operationalize for this study identifies the specific 
psychological processes by which the justices reached their decisions, and explains how those 
processes are interrelated. By providing a theory of psychological decision-making, my model will 
explain, to an unprecedented degree in the study of judicial behavior, the causal chain in each 
justice’s decision-making in Brown. Using the model’s insights, I will also link and illuminate the 
reasoning employed in the final opinion for the Court to the character of those psychological pro-
cesses. Now, a major caveat is in order. I do not claim to and will not show that the particular 
species of attitudinalism I advance explains all of the justices’ behaviors as survive in the primary 
source record. I simply contend that the model accounts for most of those behaviors, and does so 
more plausibly than any other model or combination of models of judicial behavior. However, as 
the cases of Reed and Clark will show, there is considerable–––and dispositive in Reed’s case–––
evidence indicating that those justices did not have a moral preference for desegregation, a factor 
whose presence is central to my analysis of the other seven justices. The primary elements of 
Reed’s and Clark’s decision-making are nonetheless captured and explained by my model, albeit 
                                                
43 Segal and Spaeth (2002). 
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via different paths (linkages, the vocabulary of the model) than those by which the model illumi-
nates the other justices’ behaviors. 
FINDINGS 
 
 My fresh examination of the Brown primary source record demonstrates that the composi-
tion of the ultimate Brown opinion, and in particular its lack of a robust constitutional rationale, 
were functions of the justices’ individual decision-making. To elucidate the justices’ decision-
making in Brown, my work operationalizes and deploys for the study of judicial behavior the social 
intuitionist (SI) psychological model of moral decision-making, which was developed by social 
psychologist Jonathan Haidt in the early 2000s.44 The core prediction of the SI model is that in 
response to an eliciting stimulus S, emotion or intuition determines judgment, and judgment then 
motivates reasoning. That is to say, intuition or emotion, not reasoning, causes judgment (e.g., S 
is bad or immoral); language or reasoning then finds reasons R and evidence E to justify the con-
clusion (e.g., S is bad or immoral because R and E). This process usually occurs automatically and 
is largely opaque to the person experiencing it. Thus, people tend to misunderstand the nature of 
their own decision-making, thinking that the reasons and evidence that they marshalled to justify 
a judgment explain, preceded, and caused them to reach that judgment, when it was in fact intui-
tions or emotions that did so. 
 Two methodological virtues of the SI model are that it is falsifiable (as when, for example, 
there exists evidence that deductive reasoning from general principles occurred prior to the deter-
mination of judgment) and countenances exceptions. For instance, the model holds that reasons 
                                                
44 Haidt (2001). Greene et al. (2001), Greene et al. (2004), and Greene (2009) provide qualified support for Haidt’s 
model by showing that deontological moral judgments are driven by affective (emotional) responses. Those authors 
show that utilitarian judgments, in contrast, are driven by rational calculation. During the Brown decision-making 
process, deontological arguments predominated. 
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and evidence do sometimes form direct inputs to the moral decision-making process. More than 
being widely dispersed among the population, though, this “rationalist” mode of moral reasoning 
tends to be circumscribed to small classes of people, such as academic philosophers and logicians, 
who have received professional education and socialization that uniquely prepare and encourage 
them to follow a train of logic to its sometimes disturbing or morally unacceptable conclusions. 
The SI model holds that instead of comprising direct inputs to moral decision-making, reason and 
evidence more frequently form indirect inputs and affect judgment by eliciting countervailing 
emotions or intuitions that in turn operate upon judgment directly. Nevertheless, the model posits, 
all but a vanishingly small number of inputs to moral judgment are intuitions and emotions elicited 
in response to non-rational stimuli (i.e., to things other than reasoned arguments and evidence that 
contradict a person’s initial views of the matter). 
 As I mentioned a moment ago, in the conceptual universe of public law scholarship, the SI 
model is a species of attitudinalism. Whereas traditional public law attitudinalism observes a cor-
relation between judges’ voting behavior and measures of judges’ political ideology, most attitu-
dinalist models do not suggest a causal framework to explain the relationship. The SI model rem-
edies this shortcoming by positing a causal mechanism for judgments involving morally or politi-
cally salient questions. Furthermore, the SI model has telltale evidentiary “fingerprints” from 
which its applicability can be reliably inferred. Such fingerprints include the order in which judg-
ment and reasoning occur, but also extend to psychological correlates of intuition-mediated judg-
ment, such as motivated reasoning, confirmation bias, and attitude and group polarization. Lastly, 
the SI model, correctly understood, negates the hard attitudinalist claim that judges crassly and 
consciously–––in a word, “unjudicially”–––substitute their private, subjective moral judgments 
“for the law,” or for voids in the law, in hard cases. Instead, the model demonstrates that judges’ 
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moral intuitions appear to motivate, and are therefore inextricably bound up in, their views of the 
law, often in ways (owing to the nature of the moral decision-making process) that are hidden from 
judges themselves. None of this, though, impugns Brown’s moral and legal legitimacy, which is, 
in the apt words of Michael W. McConnell, “utterly secure.”45 Rather, the application of the model 
follows from the facts that most of the justices’ behaviors closely fit it and that the model can 
consequently elucidate the justices’ intentions and Brown’s legal holding. 
 This work will demonstrate that the Brown opinion lacked a robust and generalizable the-
ory of equal protection as a direct consequence of the fact that eight of the nine justices decided to 
invalidate segregation by means of intuition-driven or -mediated moral decision-making, as op-
posed to strictly a priori reasoning or logical deduction. The legalist model of judicial behavior is 
therefore inapposite to Brown. Moreover, no justice succeeded in developing a defensible original-
ist basis for invalidating segregation, though Justices Felix Frankfurter and Robert Jackson felt 
compelled to do so and failed in their attempts. Finally, during the Brown decision-making process, 
some of the justices contemplated and endorsed race-conscious integration as a remedy and treated 
segregation as a problem of national, not regional (i.e., exclusively Southern) scope. My research 
accordingly reaches two conclusions.  
 (1) The SI model explains the primary elements of the decision-making of every justice on 
the Court, albeit by different linkages. Nonetheless, other models, such as the legalist and strategic 
ones, explain subordinate aspects of the justices’ decision-making. Therefore, while the SI model 
does not exhaustively describe the justices’ decision-making, it succeeds in accounting for the 
major part of the Brown decision-making process. Not every justice demonstrated unequivocal 
evidence of having reached a judgment that was motivated by moral intuitions prior to contriving 
                                                
45 McConnell (1995, 955). 
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a judicial rationale for his outcome, but every justice exhibited evidence of either confirmation 
bias or motivated reasoning, both of which are SI model correlates. Reed, Frankfurter, Jackson, 
and Clark additionally exhibited evidence of attitude polarization and/or group polarization. 
 (2) Brown has an unequivocally consequentialist, not a deontological or colorblind, prov-
enance and purpose. In Balkin’s terms, the case enshrines the antisubordination principle. The 
decision’s consequentialist character is rooted in the justices’ intentions, concealed in both the 
Brown merits decision and putatively colorblind Brown II remedy order, but revealed in the pri-
mary source record, not to outlaw racial classifications per se, but to dismantle the institution of 
segregation–––to strike at and precipitate the abolition of an entire way of life, not merely enjoin 
its legal apparatus.  
 However, my research is not intended to demonstrate anything about judicial behavior gen-
erally. To otherwise would require the study of more cases than only Brown.  Neither does my 
inquiry purport to show that the judicial decision-making that took place in Brown is not repre-
sentative of judicial behavior generally. This work confines itself to the narrow claim that a psy-
chological model of moral decision-making can elucidate the causes of judicial decision-making 
in Brown, the most important Supreme Court decision of the twentieth century, and the decision’s 
holding as a matter of constitutional law. 
ORGANIZATION AND PRIMARY SOURCES 
 
 Chapter 2, an analysis of the final Brown opinion, elucidates the deficiencies of the deci-
sion, foreshadows relevant elements of the primary source record that connect to them, and prob-
lematizes the narrative Warren develops in the opinion, “short, readable by the lay public, non-
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rhetorical, unemotional and, above all, non-accusatory”46 though he intended it to be. Chapter 3 
provides a full account of the social intuitionist model and its operationalization for qualitative 
analysis. Chapters 4, 6, and 7 comprise the bulk of the analysis of the justices’ decision-making. 
Chapter 4 examines the decision-making processes of seven of the nine justices, both because the 
seven struggled far less with their decision-making than the two, and (as a partial consequence) 
because available materials on the seven can be comprehensively analyzed in far less space. Felix 
Frankfurter and Robert Jackson, whose decision-making comprises the subject matter, respec-
tively, of Chapters 6 and 7, struggled laboriously to reconcile their judicial philosophies to the 
outcome they would eventually join. Of the seven justices who unequivocally harbored private 
moral preferences for desegregation, Frankfurter and Jackson have the longest paper trails and 
took the judicial case for segregation the most seriously. They therefore exhibit behaviors that are, 
of all the justices’, the most interesting and illuminating for understanding and fully appreciating 
the political, moral, and judicial stakes present in Brown. 
 Chapter 5 is a re-analysis of the historical materials examined in Alexander Bickel’s “Leg-
islative History of the Fourteenth Amendment.” The chapter comes when it does–––after the ex-
amination of most of the justices but before the studies of Frankfurter and Jackson–––to afford the 
reader a sense of the historical evidence that the justices confronted in the form of Bickel’s memo, 
which Justice Frankfurter circulated among the Brethren in the fall of 1953. The objective of the 
chapter is to demonstrate that the Fourteenth Amendment’s history was not, as both Frankfurter 
and Bickel would have it, “inconclusive” as to whether the Amendment targeted segregation, either 
                                                
46 May 7, 1954 cover memo to Brown and Bolling draft memoranda. Tom C. Clark Papers, Box A27, Folder 4. 
Tarlton Law Library, The University of Texas at Austin. 
 
30 
at the time of adoption or in the future. The chapter will argue that the Amendment was not in-
tended by its framers–––as Chief Justice Warren and Justices Hugo Black, Sherman Minton, and 
Harold Burton seemed to opine at the Brown conferences–––to put blacks on an equal footing with 
whites in every respect. The chapter shows in fact that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
including the members of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction who drafted it, were on guard 
against possible future “latitudinarian” abuses of overly vague language, and on several occasions 
replaced wording that they feared too susceptible of overly expansive interpretation with language 
of more “determinate” reach. The chapter is necessary to establish the extent to which the justices 
engaged in motivated reasoning and confirmation bias when considering the history of the Amend-
ment and its possible constitutional significance for segregation. The chapter is not, however, in-
tended to impugn the Court’s conclusion that racial segregation in 1954 was unequal or a violation 
of equal protection. I only claim to show that none of the justices could (and only Justices Felix 
Frankfurter and Robert Jackson made efforts to) reconcile that determination with the clear histor-
ical fact that “the equal protection of the laws” was not intended or understood by the 39th Congress 
to command social equality. Many of the justices appeared not to look too closely at the history 
and seemed simply to rest satisfied with the conclusion that Bickel’s recounting of the history 
proved something (the history’s “indeterminacy” with respect to segregation) that the study in fact 
did not. 
 Chapter 8 is the work’s conclusion. It examines the factors that compelled Justice Reed to 
join his Brethren in voting to invalidate segregation, elucidates Warren’s opinion-writing process, 
articulates the significance of the change in the forms of reasoning employed by the justices over 
the course of the Brown decision-making process, and suggests that the justices in Brown em-
ployed a meta-consequentialist judicial approach whose outcome in the final Brown decision was 
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the employment of a primarily consequentialist rationale. The chapter concludes by showing that 
Brown embodies the antisubordination principle. 
 The primary source materials upon which this work bases its analysis are the justices’ con-
ference notes, their private memoranda, their letters to private citizens, and interviews with the 
justices and their law clerks by biographers and journalists. Of these, the materials that figure most 
prominently in this work are the justices’ conference notes. Four sets of notes on the Brown De-
cember merits conferences survive. They are Douglas’, Jackson’s (’52 only), Burton’s, and Clark’s 
(’52 only). I acquired Douglas’ and Jackson’s from the Library of Congress and Clark’s from the 
Tarlton Law Library at the University of Texas at Austin; I did not acquire a copy of Burton’s, but 
rely instead upon the extensive reporting of his observations in the research of Kluger, Schwartz, 
and Hockett. All of the works that have contributed to the scholarly literature on Brown–––includ-
ing those of Kluger, Hutchinson, Schwartz, Tushnet and Lezin, and Hockett–––have availed them-
selves of one or more sets of these notes. 
 The conference notes form the basis for most of the analysis of Chapter 4. While Chapters 
6 and 7, which examine the decision-making of Frankfurter and Jackson, analyze the notes to 
reconstruct those justices’ conference comments, the bulk of those chapters derives from memo-
randa documents located in the Felix Frankfurter Harvard Law School Papers and the Robert H. 
Jackson Papers at the Library of Congress. The Frankfurter memo on the Brown merits that com-
prises one of focal points of Chapter 6 is available in the Felix Frankfurter Harvard Law Papers, 
but was also quoted in its entirety by Kluger. The three drafts of Jackson’s Brown concurrence 
memorandum come from the Robert H. Jackson Papers. The fourth draft, which is not examined 
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in Chapter 6, is available in an abridged published form, in Whitman, Removing a Badge of Slav-
ery: The Record of Brown v. Board of Education.47 To improve the availability of the first three 
drafts of Jackson’s Brown memos for future research, they have been transcribed and reproduced 
in the appendix to this work. 
 Chapter 4 additionally references materials from the Felix Frankfurter Harvard Papers, in-
cluding a letter from Bickel to Frankfurter, as well as materials located in the Tom C. Clark papers, 
in particular Clark’s memo on Sweatt and McLaurin, Earl Warren’s May 7 cover memo to the 
Brown and Bolling opinions, Frankfurter’s cover letters to Bickel’s memo, and Bickel’s Prefatory 
Note to his research on the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chapter 5, on Alex-
ander Bickel’s treatment of legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, relies upon materials 
located in the Felix Frankfurter Harvard papers. Finally, Chapter 7 quotes at length from letters 
between Robert Jackson and Charles Fairman in the Charles Fairman Papers at the South Texas 
College of Law. 
 
  
                                                
47 Whitman (1993, 292-299). 
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Chapter 2. The Brown Opinion 
 
No person shall […] be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.] 
–––U.S. Constitution, Fifth Amendment 
§1. […] No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws. […] 
§5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of 
this article. 
–––U.S. Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment 
Chief Justice Earl Warren’s succinct, eleven-page opinion for a unanimous Court in Brown 
is probably the most famous of the 20th Century. It begins with a statement of the facts common 
to the five consolidated cases, and acknowledges that all of the federal district courts found for the 
respondents on the basis of the “separate but equal doctrine” of Plessy v. Ferguson. “Under that 
doctrine,” Warren declares, “equality of treatment is accorded when the races are provided sub-
stantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be separate.” Warren then states the petition-
ers’ claims: “The plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are not ‘equal’ and cannot be 
made ‘equal,’ and that hence they are deprived of the equal protection of the laws.” The decision 
next canvasses the history of the litigation before the Court, and remarks that the most recent hear-
ings (in 1953) had been held on reargument of questions about the history of the adoption and 
intended effect of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. The results of this historical inquiry, War-
ren declares, “convince us that, although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve 
 
34 
the problem with which we are faced.” Maintaining that the historical resources examined by the 
Court are “inconclusive,” Warren prosaically observes that the proponents of the Civil War 
Amendments “intended them to remove all legal distinctions among ‘all persons born or natural-
ized in the United States,’” while their opponents “were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit 
of the Amendments” and wished to circumscribe the Amendments’ effect. Warren concludes by 
stating, “[w]hat others in Congress and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be determined 
with any degree of certainty.”48 
 The apparent thrust of these opening paragraphs is that the historical record casts little light 
on the specific question before the Court in 1954: whether state laws requiring racial segregation 
in public education were intended to be targeted by or exempt from the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause. However, this claim is belied by the documentary record of the reactions 
of some of the justices to reargument on the Fourteenth Amendment and the justices’ experiences 
with the then-recent cases concerning segregation in graduate and professional school. As an il-
lustration of this point, Justice Tom Clark is recorded as remarking at the second Brown conference 
that he had always thought the purpose of the Civil War (Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth) 
Amendments was to make blacks and whites entirely equal before the law, implying that the argu-
ments and briefs presented throughout the latest hearings on Brown had convinced him other-
wise.49 Furthermore, at both Brown conferences, Reed50 and Jackson51 spoke in opposition to the 
assertion that the history of the Fourteenth Amendment was “inconclusive” with respect to segre-
gation. 
                                                
48 347 U.S. 483, at 487-489. 
49 See discussion at fn 221, infra. 
50 See discussion at fn 197, infra. 
51 See discussion at fn 341, infra. 
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 As if hedging his bet on the persuasiveness of this line of historical argumentation, in the 
subsequent paragraph Warren contends that public schools in 1868 lacked the compulsory charac-
ter and the binding social function of American public education of almost a century later. He 
observes that the South did not have “free common schools, supported by general taxation”; that 
“education of Negroes was almost nonexistent”; that “[e]ven in the North, the conditions of public 
education did not approximate those existing today” and “compulsory attendance [there] was vir-
tually unknown.” Accordingly, Warren surmises, “it is not surprising that there should be so little 
in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended effect on public education.” 
The implication, though, is not to be the one Warren evidently intends. Rather, the lesson seems 
to be that even if a contrary case to the one Warren presented in the preceding paragraph could be 
proved, one need not accept the argument as dispositive. If the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment can be dated to prior to the advent of modern, compulsory education, then the defensibility 
of an interpretive approach to that Amendment that takes its bearings from history is undermined, 
and the pregnant possibilities of the abstract language of the Amendment can supersede the narrow 
historical intentions of its framers. Without making explicit its implication, Warren cements this 
point in footnote four, appended to the opening sentence of the paragraph: “Compulsory school 
attendance laws were not generally adopted until after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and it was not until 1918 that such laws were in force in all the states.”52 
 Warren next proceeds into a discussion of the first major Equal Protection Clause contro-
versies before the Court, the Slaughterhouse Cases53 and Strauder v. West Virginia.54 These cases, 
he explains, were the first in which “this Court construed the Fourteenth Amendment,” and the 
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Court did so “as proscribing all state-imposed discriminations against the Negro race.” Warren 
immediately contrasts these decisions’ unequivocal holdings to the later one of Plessy v. Ferguson: 
“[t]he doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ did not make its appearance in this Court until 1896 in the 
case of Plessy v. Ferguson, involving not education but transportation.” Footnote 5, which, like 
footnote 4, accompanies the opening sentence of its paragraph, quotes Strauder at length. What is 
the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, the Strauder excerpt asks, “if not [] that the law in the 
States shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, 
shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose pro-
tection the amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made against them 
by law because of their color?” Warren’s purpose in comparing the elegant, perspicacious reason-
ing of Strauder with Plessy’s paradoxical catchphrase is clear: the contrast has the effect of sug-
gesting that Plessy is not the true constitutional authority for understanding the Equal Protection 
Clause, but a doctrinal aberration that improvidently revised earlier, truer constructions of the 
clause, and unfortunately forced the Court into a path-dependent interpretative approach that had, 
as of the mid-1950s, only recently begun to be corrected. Warren’s language following the first 
mention of Plessy in the main body of the decision buttresses this impression: “American Courts 
have since labored with the Plessy doctrine for over half a century.”55 
 The Chief Justice’s next move is to survey the cases in which the Court took Plessy as a 
compass for navigating the terrain of public education. The findings are not reassuring of Plessy’s 
authority or applicability. Cumming v. County Board of Education56 and Gong Lum v. Rice57 are 
quickly and succinctly distinguished from the segregation cases at bar because they did not directly 
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challenge Plessy’s authority as a constitutional precedent. Warren then closes in on the real prize 
in the trilogy of recent Court decisions that went against Plessy’s grain if not its letter: Sipuel v. 
Oklahoma,58 Sweatt v. Painter, and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents. These decisions inter-
preted the Equal Protection Clause to require states to provide graduate education to blacks sub-
stantively equal to that afforded whites in state universities. Warren observes that the Court did 
not explicitly impugn Plessy’s authority in those cases, and that in Sweatt the Court even “reserved 
decision on the question whether Plessy v. Ferguson should be held inapplicable to public educa-
tion.” He then notes that “in the instant cases,” the question the Court nimbly elided publicly (alt-
hough discussed at length privately) in Sweatt and McLaurin “is directly presented.” Warren 
stresses the findings of the lower federal trial and state courts out of which the Brown cases origi-
nated “that the Negro and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being equalized, 
with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other ‘tangible’ 
factors,” thereby highlighting the contrast between the graduate education cases and the cases at 
bar. Warren then deploys a pivotal rhetorical legerdemain: “Our decision, therefore, cannot turn 
on merely a comparison of these tangible factors” in black and white schools; “[w]e must look 
instead to the effect of segregation itself on public education.”59 
 Warren’s seamless transition from acknowledging the equalization of tangible factors in 
segregated school environments to announcing the imperative of examining the “effect of segre-
gation itself on education” reveals that the question whether Plessy is applicable to public educa-
tion has already been answered in the negative. Were the question still an open one, the inquiry 
would presumably shift from taking judicial notice of a prima facie trend of equalization to closer 
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scrutiny of the degree of that equalization in order to determine whether either the attained degree 
or the rate of change has defensibly approximated, or is in the process of approaching, the level of 
equality Plessy commands. The advantage of concealing the fact that the question has already been 
answered is that the basis on which it is resolved need not be candidly explained. To put the matter 
more plainly, the effect of this rhetorical move is to enable Warren to avoid explicitly acknowl-
edging that the Court has effectively already overruled Plessy. 
 Reading Brown from the point at which it mentions Plessy to the point at which Warren 
acknowledges the equalization of “‘tangible’ factors,” one comes away with the impression that 
the Court was moved by a hidden, inexorable force independent of and contrary to Plessy. That 
force, it turns out, was the aforementioned trilogy of graduate and professional education cases. 
The NAACP brief filed in the original Brown hearings under Chief Justice Vinson in 1952 pro-
claimed: “Plessy v. Ferguson is not applicable” to public education. “Whatever doubts may once 
have existed in this respect were removed by this Court in Sweatt v. Painter, supra, at 635, 636.”60 
Sweatt held that the creation of a separate law school for blacks in order to ensure education for 
whites only in the state’s flagship law school at the University of Texas at Austin denied blacks 
equal protection of the law. The portion of Sweatt cited (“at 635, 636”) in the NAACP’s 1952 
Brown brief commences with a dismissal by then-Chief Justice Vinson of Texas’ assertion that 
“excluding petitioner from that school is no different from excluding white students from the new 
law school.” This argument, Vinson contends, “overlooks realities.” Vinson states that no member 
of the white majority would judge “a [law] school with rich traditions and prestige which only a 
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history of consistently maintained excellence could command” equal to what Texas proposed for 
segregated education for blacks: a law school with substantially less. Then, quoting Shelley v. 
Kraemer,61 Vinson summarizes his train of thought in a statement whose logic would impel 
Plessy’s death knell in Brown: “Equal protection of the laws is not achieved through indiscriminate 
imposition of inequalities.”62 Two paragraphs hence, Vinson concludes that “petitioner may claim 
his full constitutional right: legal education equivalent to that offered by the State to students of 
other races. Such evidence is not available to him in a separate law school as offered by the State.” 
It is on this basis, finally, that the Court “hold[s] that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires that petitioner be admitted to the University of Texas Law School.”63 Point-
ing to this line of reasoning, the 1952 NAACP Brown brief declares: 
In the McLaurin and Sweatt cases, this Court measured the effect of racial restrictions upon 
the educational development of the individual affected, and took into account the commu-
nity’s actual evaluation of the schools involved. In the instant case [of Brown], the [federal 
district court] found as a fact that racial segregation in elementary education denoted the 
inferiority of Negro children and retarded their educational and mental development. Thus 
the same factors which led to the result reached in the McLaurin and Sweatt cases are 
present. Their underlying principles, based upon sound analyses, control the instant case.64 
This is the position that Chief Justice Warren appears to have adopted by the point in the Brown 
decision at which he proclaims the need to examine “the effect of segregation itself on public 
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education.” To eschew an analysis of the facts of Brown under Plessy is not merely to reject 
Plessy’s applicability to the arena of public education, but silently to assert its incompatibility with 
the Equal Protection Clause. At this stage of the decision, Warren has, to the careful reader, an-
nounced that Plessy is not merely inapplicable to public education, but is essentially at odds with 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 The ensuing paragraphs of the Brown decision emphasize the altered status of public edu-
cation in the United States since the adoption and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hav-
ing hinted at this point earlier, Warren now means to cement it: “we cannot turn the clock back to 
1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. 
We must consider public education in the light of its full development and present place in Amer-
ican life throughout the Nation.”65 In other words, though, for the sake of argument, Plessy might 
have been a defensible interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause in 1896, that defensibility 
does not incontrovertibly imply authoritativeness at a later time, when the status and import of the 
arena of public life that the courts scrutinize for consistency with constitutional commands has 
changed substantially. This observation reinforces and extends the decision’s earlier implication, 
discussed above, that the rudimentary character of American public education in the mid- to late 
19th century, and the fact it was not universal or compulsory, postdates modern public education 
with respect to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. The import of these facts is that the 
historical record of the Amendment’s adoption by Congress and ratification by the states need not 
be consulted with a specific view to the compatibility of state-mandated racial segregation in pub-
lic education, since public education as understood in mid-20th century America did not exist at 
the time. “Today,” Warren observes by contrast, 
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education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compul-
sory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our 
recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the 
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It 
is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening 
the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping 
him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may 
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. 
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be 
made available to all on equal terms.66 
While the Chief Justice’s words are eloquent, the connection between his articulation of the pur-
poses of public education and the imperative to provide it “to all on equal terms” is not self-evident. 
The intended upshot of these lines, however, is less ambiguous: American public education in 
1954 is different in kind, not degree, from that of 1868 or even 1896. It is by priming the reader 
with the salience of this distinction that Warren prepares him for the question to follow, and to 
hear its answer in the Court’s new-and-improved take on the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than 
the particular intentions of the Amendment’s framers. 
 “We come then to the question presented,” Warren declares. “Does segregation of children 
in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical faculties and other ‘tangible’ 
factors [] be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? 
We believe that it does.” This is the one instance in the decision in which the Court squarely states 
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the question it intends Brown to answer; the diction is accordingly of crucial importance. Four 
observations are in order. 
 First, though Warren uses the term “segregation”–––noun, not verb–––the attendant chain 
of prepositional phrases clarifies that this peculiar species of segregation must be by state action. 
“Segregation . . . solely on the basis” of some criterion necessarily implies a willful decision by a 
human agent to delineate conceptually according to the criterion and segregate practically along 
the line the criterion specifies. If there is any doubt as to this point, a literal explication of the terms 
“solely on the basis of race” removes it. In what sense could segregation could be described as 
both “solely” on some “basis” and not the product of a deliberate action by a human agent? For 
instance, would it make sense to use any of the phrases “solely on the basis of birth,” “solely on 
the basis of height,” “solely on the basis of blood type,” or “solely on the basis of test scores” 
outside of the context of deliberate action by a human agent? Whatever the criterion, its use in the 
formulation beginning “solely on the basis of” can only be understood to signify purposeful human 
action with a view to the criterion. Read in this light, Warren’s expression “[s]egregation . . . solely 
on the basis” can have no other plausible construction than state action to separate students of 
different races. This interpretation is confirmed by the NAACP’s social science brief, which in its 
second paragraph clarifies that the brief’s use of the term “segregation” signifies state action with 
the purpose to segregate school population according to one or more criteria. “For purposes of the 
present statement,” the brief reads, “segregation refers to that restriction of opportunities for dif-
ferent types of associations between the members of one racial, religious, national or geographic 
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origin, or linguistic group and those of other groups, which results from or is supported by the 
action of any official body or agency representing some branch of government.”67 
 Second, in the formulation of the dependent clause of the interrogatory, Warren describes 
educational conditions that meet Plessy’s command–––substantive equality, or equality of “tangi-
bles,” under conditions of separation. Though apparently taking care not to broach Plessy by name, 
Warren obviously has the offending precedent in his sights. The very formulation of the decision’s 
central question, whose answer will circumnavigate and supplant Plessy while not overruling it 
explicitly, suggests as much. Corroborating evidence of Warren’s wish to conceal the true extent 
of the Brown generally and the overruling of Plessy specifically comes from a memorandum writ-
ten to Justice Frankfurter by E. Barrett Prettyman, who had been Justice Jackson’s October 1953 
term clerk and had stayed on for the 1954 term until Jackson died of a second heart attack on 
October 9, 1954. Dated December 15, 1954, the memo recounts Warren’s May 10, 1954 visit, as 
the final Brown draft was taking shape, to a convalescing Jackson in Walter Reed Hospital after 
Jackson’s first heart attack in late March of 1954. 
While [Jackson] was still in the hospital, The Chief Justice personally delivered [the Brown 
draft majority opinion] to him. Justice Jackson and I talked about the opinion and agreed 
that it could use a little more law. The Justice asked me to type up a short paragraph, taken 
substantially from the memorandum I had already written him on his own opinion. He was 
going to suggest to the Chief (who was due to come back that afternoon) that the paragraph 
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be added to the Chief’s opinion. I typed up the attached paragraph and took it to the Justice. 
He deleted the clause following the Plessy citation because he did not want to pass judg-
ment in any way upon the wisdom or justification of the Plessy decision. He told me later 
that he did not show the attached sheet to the Chief but instead orally suggested its contents 
to him. The Chief, however, had a very good reason for not wanting this statement in the 
opinion as a legal justification: Everything in the Chief’s opinion was directed at segrega-
tion in public education; the Justice’s paragraph, on the other hand, could be applied to 
segregation in general. The Chief felt, and the Justice agreed, that the Court should not 
even intimate that segregation would fall in other fields.68 
While the precise contents of the paragraph Prettyman prepared for Justice Jackson are unknown, 
the wording of the last sentence in the above excerpt strongly indicates that both Warren and Jack-
son intended Brown to comprise the first blow in dismantling all forms of state-sponsored segre-
gation. The use of “would” in lieu of “could,” if chosen deliberately by Prettyman, points to this 
conclusion. The final sentence also suggests, but does not prove, that the two justices believed the 
Brown opinion should begin a line of constitutional reasoning that could be extended from public 
education to other spheres of state action, though (if Prettyman’s observation is accurate) both 
justices agreed that the implications of that line of reasoning should be left fastidiously unstated in 
Brown. The upshot is that both justices appeared to be extraordinarily circumspect about the deci-
sion’s treatment of Plessy. Warren apparently intended to overrule it in spirit and letter, but not in 
name. 
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 Third, Warren confines the inquiry to “children of the minority group.” This expression 
evinces the strongest indication yet that the focus of Warren’s subsequent analysis will be not 
deontological, but consequentialist. Confining the focus of the Court’s analysis to harm historically 
imputed to a specific class of persons without simultaneously accounting for the rights of persons 
outside of that class risks the danger of circumscribing any subsequent rule of action to the realm 
of consequentialism.69 That is to say, Warren is gearing up not to announce a robust and general-
izable theory of equal protection, but to address the application of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to a particular class of individuals who have experienced a peculiar 
historical deprivation, the character of which has yet to be precisely ascertained.  
 Fourth and finally, Warren identifies the right to which the plaintiffs are entitled, but de-
prived, as “equal educational opportunities.” To do so is to decide, effectively, that the equal pro-
tection of the laws requires that every class of individuals have access to educational opportunities 
commensurate with those available to other classes in state-supported schools–––a subtle though 
crucial equivalence upon which Warren elaborates in the following paragraph. Additionally, War-
ren’s use of the word “opportunities” focuses Brown’s inquiry on the inputs of the state-sponsored 
educational process. Finally, Warren does not define his choice of words. No standard is adduced 
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or referenced for gauging the degree or determining the kinds of equality of educational opportu-
nities. Whether or not this ambiguity is intentional, it has two effects: it affords the Court a plenary 
future discretion over the meaning of (and hence standards for effecting) “equal educational op-
portunities,” while being so vague as to deflect criticism from interests or individuals unsympa-
thetic to the Court’s holding who might more easily attack a more clearly articulated standard. 
 In the subsequent paragraph of the Brown opinion, Warren highlights the Court’s emphasis 
in the graduate and professional school education cases that separation in those contexts tends to 
undermine equality. First quoting Sweatt, Warren remarks that in that case “this Court relied in 
large part on ‘those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for 
greatness in a law school.” In its ruling in McLaurin, the Court similarly stressed “intangible con-
siderations: ‘ . . . [the student’s] ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with 
other students, and, in general, to learn his profession.’” So far, Warren is on strong footing. How-
ever, in proceeding to extend the Sweatt and McLaurin equal protection lines of reasoning to pri-
mary and secondary public school education, his next move is not so unassailable. “Such [intan-
gible] considerations apply with added force to children in grade and high schools,” Warren states. 
“To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race gen-
erates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and 
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”70 In order to determine the significance and defensi-
bility of Warren’s reliance on the Court’s graduate school cases as precedents for Brown, it is 
necessary to examine those cases at greater length.  
In Sweatt v. Painter an African American prospective law student, Herman Marion Sweatt, 
contended that the law school that the state of Texas had established for black students in order to 
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satisfy the first part of Plessy’s “separate but equal” command nonetheless ran afoul of the second. 
The Court agreed. But the Court’s own analysis in Sweatt clarifies that the denial of equal protec-
tion of the laws inhered in the denial to blacks of the opportunity to receive a professional educa-
tion substantially similar to the one made available by the state to whites. That denial of equal 
educational opportunity originated in the nature of law school education, wherein the perceived 
quality of the education (which is to say, the magnitude of its desirability to prospective students) 
is a function of institutional reputation-affecting “intangibles” such as the achievements of past 
graduates, the prestige of present faculty, the distribution of human capital in the student body, 
and networking opportunities, to name a few. The Court correctly observed that these characteris-
tics, like all the distinctive features of elite graduate and professional education, could not be rep-
licated or approximated with the founding of new schools, whether segregated or integrated, be-
cause such features take decades to develop under even the most serendipitous conditions. As the 
Court declared: 
Whether the University of Texas Law School is compared with the original or the new law 
school for Negroes, we cannot find substantial equality in the educational opportunities 
offered white and Negro law students by the State. In terms of number of the faculty, vari-
ety of courses and opportunity for specialization, size of the student body, scope of the 
library, availability of law review and similar activities, the University of Texas Law 
School is superior. What is more important, the University of Texas Law School possesses 
to a far greater degree those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but 
which make for greatness in a law school. Such qualities, to name but a few, include repu-
tation of the faculty, experience of the administration, position and influence of the alumni, 
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standing in the community, traditions and prestige. It is difficult to believe that one who 
had a free choice between these law schools would consider the question close.71 
In other words, the analysis of the Sweatt Court located the inequality of education in grad-
uate and professional schools created for the express purpose of segregating blacks not in the in-
stitutions’ segregation per se, but in their younger provenance: generally speaking, recently 
founded educational institutions simply lack the prestige, traditions, professoriate, financial and 
physical resources, and established alumni network of older schools. The inequality of “intangi-
bles” to which the Court referred in Sweatt, therefore, is rooted in the status- and prestige-related 
characteristics predominately peculiar to tertiary public and primary and secondary private edu-
cation that can develop only in the long term. Accordingly, the denial of educational equality orig-
inates in the non-fungibility of the underlying educational resource, which renders equal education 
under conditions of separation impossible, because that separation depends on the creation of new 
schools that cannot, in any short period of time, measure up to the reputations of older ones. The 
significance of the foregoing for Warren’s opinion in Brown is that the purported constitutional 
harms deriving from the two forms of compulsory separation are not the same harms, and do not 
derive from the same causes. In Brown, as we will see, the evident harm is the psychological 
burdening or stigmatizing of black students by the state’s message, conveyed symbolically in the 
act of separation, that blacks are unfit schoolmates for whites; in McLaurin, the harm is the refusal 
to afford a black plaintiff access to a higher quality legal education. The Brown harm is produced 
by the symbolism of state policy; the Sweatt harm by a denial of admission. Let us assume, for a 
moment, that the Brown harm is not caused by legal symbolism, as the Brown opinion seems to 
suggest, but by the state (not act) of separation, as the Brown opinion has been interpreted by some 
                                                
71 339 U.S. 629, at 633-634. 
 
49 
to mean. In that case, the provenance of the stigma imputed to segregation is still the symbolism 
and significance of the separation, according to Brown’s own analysis: nowhere does Brown claim 
that the education available to blacks segregated into blacks-only schools is inferior in any esteem-
independent context to white-only schools. Brown’s harm is that to esteem and status; Sweatt’s, 
that of an undeniably inferior educational opportunity. 
The logic of the constitutional analysis deployed in McLaurin, on the other hand, is argu-
ably more parallel to that in Brown. But the facts are somewhat more complex than those of Sweatt, 
so I will summarize them before addressing the Court’s analysis. The McLaurin litigation com-
menced with a challenge to the laws of the state of Oklahoma requiring segregation in higher 
education. After a trial, a statutory three-judge federal District Court found that the University of 
Oklahoma’s refusal to admit to its graduate school George McLaurin, a black prospective doctoral 
candidate in education, denied McLaurin the equal protection of the laws, and ordered him admit-
ted. In response, the Oklahoma legislature amended the relevant state laws to permit the admission 
of blacks to erstwhile “white” state universities. However, the legislature at the same time imposed 
a new requirement that where black students were admitted to formerly whites-only state colleges, 
instruction take place “upon a segregated basis.” To comply with this legislative command, the 
University of Oklahoma permitted McLaurin to matriculate but required him “to sit apart at a 
designated desk in an anteroom adjoining the classroom; to sit, at a designated desk on the mezza-
nine floor of the library, but not to use the desks in the regular reading room; and to sit at a desig-
nated table and to eat at a different time from the other students in the school cafeteria.”72 The 
statutory district court sustained these restrictions under Plessy, and the NAACP appealed directly 
to the Supreme Court.  
                                                
72 Id., at 640. 
 
50 
The Court held for McLaurin. In the dispositive passage of his unanimous opinion for the 
Court, Chief Justice Vinson concluded that for the State of Oklahoma to “set[] McLaurin apart 
from the other students” is to “handicap[]” McLaurin “in his pursuit of effective graduate instruc-
tion. Such restrictions impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange 
views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession. . . . Appellant, having been 
admitted to a state-supported graduate school, must receive the same treatment at the hands of the 
state as students of other races.”73 However, this logic is necessarily confined to a single educa-
tional institution. It is not clear how a constitutional violation would arise under this reasoning 
applied to separate educational institutions until Vinson elevates it to a higher level of abstraction. 
There is a vast difference–––a Constitutional difference–––between restrictions imposed 
by the state which prohibit the intellectual commingling of students, and the refusal of 
individuals to commingle where the state presents no such bar. The removal of the state 
restrictions will not necessarily abate individual and group predilections, prejudices and 
choices. But at the very least, the state will not be depriving appellant of the opportunity to 
secure acceptance by his fellow students on his own merits.74 
The last sentence evinces the Court’s apparent motive for finding unconstitutional Oklahoma’s 
command that education for blacks among whites take place “on a segregated basis.” Segregation 
is unconstitutional because it is state action that has both the intent and effect of precluding the 
possibility of social acceptance and of forestalling any organic movement toward social equality 
in the private sphere. Jack Balkin observes that the belief that the state had a duty to regulate the 
private sphere in order to “prevent the mixing of the races” was a central tenet of the Court’s 
                                                




tripartite theory of equal protection, which originated after the Civil War and was eventually dis-
mantled by Brown and its progeny.75 As early as 1950, however, the Court was prepared to hold 
that state action that perpetuated–––without necessarily causing–––the social inequality of the 
races was unconstitutional. 
There therefore appear to be two ways to read McLaurin. The first is that the state cannot 
deny equal educational opportunities on the basis of race. It is clear that separating students from 
their peers within the context of a single educational institution does precisely that for the reasons 
the Court articulated: at least some of the educational opportunities of a particular institution inhere 
in socialization with one’s fellow students. The second is that the state cannot perpetuate the social 
inequality of the races, removing a crucial component of the Balkinian tripartite model of equal 
protection. Certainly, to separate students by race within a given educational institution is to fore-
stall movement toward equality where social inequality of the races already exists. However, to 
presage later research on the effects of desegregation on academic performance and race relations 
in the 1970s, to integrate such students does not guarantee mutual understanding and respect, 
though it might offer a higher probability of such. In any case, from these considerations emerges 
the unstated assumption of the second McLaurin interpretation: state action to preserve–––without 
necessarily increasing–––the social inequality of the races is inconsistent with “the equal protec-
tion of the laws.” On this view, in other words, the Fourteenth Amendment proscribes state action 
that attempts to thwart the “providential fact”76 and seemingly inexorable march of equality. 
 But to serve as precedent for future controversies with very different trial records involv-
ing not simply differential treatment within one school, but differential treatment across multiple 
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schools, one (or both) of the interpretations of McLaurin must be concretely connected to the facts 
of the case at bar. Accordingly–––to frame the facts of the Brown cases in McLaurin’s terms–––
does the state’s command that black students and white students attend separate educational facil-
ities deny the former “equal educational opportunities”? Does it deny black students social equal-
ity? The answers to both questions would seem to turn on empirical facts, rather than on a priori 
or self-evident principles. 
Both questions are at bottom inquiries into causality, and to answer them is to make causal 
assertions. To contend that the compulsory segregation of the races denies blacks equal educational 
opportunities is to claim that but for such state action, blacks would have educational opportunities 
on par with, or less unequal to, those available to whites. To assert that compulsory segregation of 
the races denies blacks social equality with whites is to claim that but for such state action, blacks 
would have social equality with whites, or suffer from less social inequality. In fine, deploying 
either or both of McLaurin’s readings to decide future cases presupposes knowledge of, or as-
sumptions about, the underlying causal mechanisms that deny equal educational opportunity or 
prevent social equality. Of course, it is possible as an empirical matter that state action is merely 
one of a number of causes denying blacks equal educational opportunities and social equality with 
whites. But the framing of McLaurin does not countenance the judicial incorporation, considera-
tion, or weighing of other factors in the equal protection analysis. It instead focuses–––perhaps 
unwittingly–––that analysis entirely on the causal role of state action, while obfuscating the reality 
that knowledge of causality is central to the validity of its analysis and claims. 
It is worth pausing to emphasize this point, as virtually all of the Court’s major desegrega-
tion decisions from McLaurin to Keyes v. Denver School District No. 177 exhibit this paradox. That 
                                                
77 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
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puzzle is that the Court’s analysis of race-related equal protection violation (1) presupposes causal 
relations between the identified harms and state action, while simultaneously tending (2) to conceal 
that the Court is making empirical causal claims, and (3) declining to adduce persuasive empirical 
evidence in support of those claims. The obvious exception to the third prong, footnote 11 of 
Brown, was widely derided by contemporary observers,78 and the Court, stung by criticisms of the 
authoritativeness with which it adduced such social science support, was thereafter reluctant to re-
enter that realm.79 Nonetheless, the Court’s pronouncements on segregation and constitutional 
harm are necessarily casual and empirical. 
Now, in purporting to extend the Sweatt and McLaurin lines of reasoning to primary and 
secondary public school education, Warren fails to connect his discussion perspicaciously and 
concretely to Sweatt or McLaurin. Warren instead approvingly excerpts Finding of Fact No. 8 of 
the Kansas federal district court that tried the titular Brown case that segregation by law “denot[es] 
the inferiority of the negro group,” which in turn “affects the motivation of a child to learn. Seg-
regation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental 
development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in 
a racial[ly] integrated school system.”80 This finding is irrelevant to the non-fungibility issue that 
served as the basis for Sweatt. So too is it devoid of allusion to a defensible interpretation of 
McLaurin, although it might at first appear otherwise. While it is true that Warren frames Brown’s 
central question (discussed above) as, “Does segregation of children in public schools solely on 
the basis of race, even though the physical faculties and other ‘tangible’ factors [] be equal, deprive 
                                                
78 See, e.g., Cahn (1955), and generally Jackson (2004). 
79 Although it should be noted that in future landmark desegregation cases (e.g. Keyes v. School District No. 1, Den-
ver), the Court would, in putative support of its causal claims about segregation and educational opportunity, cite the 
findings of the US Commission on Civil Rights (USCCR). See, e.g., Keyes, 413 U.S. 189 at 197. 
80 347 U.S. 483, at 494. 
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the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities?”, Warren’s answer, appro-
priated from the record of the Kansas federal trial court, fails to demonstrate how educational op-
portunities are denied. His ensuing commentary provides little additional insight: “[w]hatever may 
have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, th[e] finding 
[that segregation harms blacks] is amply supported by modern authority.” Appended to this sen-
tence is the second most famous footnote in all of Supreme Court history, Brown v. Board, footnote 
11. Following his assurance in that footnote that “modern authority” has dispelled any supposition 
that segregation is benign with respect to blacks, Warren then dramatically concludes in the body 
of the decision: “Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected. We con-
clude that in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate 
educational facilities are inherently unequal.”81 
 Whether this reasoning is supported by the precedents that Warren has claimed produce it 
depends on the congruence of the harms Warren has identified with those of Sweatt and McLaurin. 
As we have already seen, there appears to be a perhaps insuperable discontinuity between the harm 
identified in Sweatt (denial of a concrete educational opportunity) and that in Brown (psychologi-
cal harm or increased anxiety as to social status in the community). However, there appears to be 
a tenable connection between one of the two harms proscribed in McLaurin and the psychological 
harm Warren imputes to segregation. The irony, of course, is that Warren does not make the rela-
tionship explicit, emphasizing instead the connection between the psychological harms in Brown 
and the “intangible factors” that had played such a decisive role in the Court’s analysis in Sweatt. 
Warren would have been on much stronger footing extricating clearly the harms of McLaurin and 
connecting them to Brown’s. 
                                                
81 Id., at 494-495. 
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 The psychological harm of stigma or inferior status articulated in Brown has clear prece-
dent in both interpretations of McLaurin. The first McLaurin reading, that the state cannot deny 
students equal educational opportunities on the basis of race, is implicit in the Brown harm to the 
extent the reader accepts, as Warren appears to believe the reader would, that educational practices 
that impose burdens on students do not provide educational opportunities equal to those available 
to individuals not so harmed. The second McLaurin reading, that the state cannot perpetuate social 
inequality, is implicit in the fact that the Brown harm is putatively produced by the denial of equal 
social status. Since McLaurin presented the far stronger support for Brown, why did Warren rely 
on a phrase originated in Sweatt to create the crucial precedential nexus on which Brown’s consti-
tutional argument would rely? 
 Perhaps the immediate answer lies in the strategic value of the phrase “intangible factors.” 
Shorn of its context in Sweatt (where the term clarified that the equal protection violation con-
demned was due to the non-fungibility of educational experiences in elite professional degree-
issuing institutions), the phrase “intangible factors” acquires a high degree of abstraction in Brown, 
as was almost certainly Warren’s intent in so appropriating the phrase. This high abstraction, in 
turn, is likely intended to preclude the need for a more-closely argued and cogent theory of equal 
protection, and, regardless of Warren’s intention in deploying it, certainly affords the judge a high 
degree of latitude in assessing whether a given policy abides equal protection of the laws. 
 While the strategic value of locating the precedential nexus for Brown in “intangible fac-
tors” is clear, doing so entails a cost. Put plainly, finding a justification for a pathbreaking and 
controversial theory of equal protection in the ambiguous dicta of a recent decision detracts from 
the phrase’s persuasiveness as a controlling authority for the constitutional questions raised in 
Brown. Certainly, deploying “intangible factors” is less persuasive and therefore less authoritative 
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(even if simpler) than extricating and applying one or both of the McLaurin readings. Moreover, 
the advantage to judicial discretion of the “intangible factors” standard is not clearly superior to 
the judicial latitude inherent in defining and assessing educational burdens under the first McLau-
rin reading, or social equality under the second. Accordingly, the higher cost, lower persuasive-
ness, and roughly equal strategic advantage of the Court’s reliance upon “intangible factors” in 
lieu of the pregnant resources in McLaurin raise the question of whether Warren was even aware 
of the McLaurin interpretative possibilities. The evidence from the Brown conference discussions, 
to be discussed more extensively below, suggests not. And the clear persuasive superiority of the 
McLaurin tact to the one the Court took in Brown strongly points to the same conclusion.  
 What inference can be drawn on the basis of the foregoing discussion? In isolation, perhaps 
nothing other than the fact that Warren was not, at least at this early stage in his tenure as Chief 
Justice, an expert judicial craftsman–––and that the associate justices were either lacking in fas-
tidiousness as to the decision’s constitutional reasoning, or prevented by some unknown cause 
from steering Warren’s opinion writing process in a different, more “judicial” (or at least persua-
sive) direction. However, in the context of my account and analysis of the record of the Brown 
opinion writing process to follow, Warren’s apparent ignorance of a superior constitutional alter-
native to the “intangible factors” route coheres with the available evidence suggesting that Brown’s 
outcome preceded the “discovery” or articulation of its constitutional rationale. In other words, 
Warren’s reliance on a weak constitutional rationale suggests that constitutional reasoning did not 
lead him to the conclusion proffered in Brown, but was grafted on after Warren and the other 
justices had agreed on the outcome. Indeed, such is precisely what the available evidence suggests–
––including Warren’s own reflections on the Brown decision-making process twenty years later.82 
                                                
82 See the discussion at fn 162, infra. 
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 The Court’s decision in Brown had to overcome what were, in the judicial context, usually 
fatal impediments to embracing a novel interpretation of the Constitution, especially when it dis-
placed one of an established pedigree. Stare decisis, the longevity of the Plessy (58 years in 1954), 
the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the evidence presented to the Court dur-
ing the 1953 rearguments focusing on the intentions of the Amendment’s framers seemed to pro-
vide little affirmative support for overturning Plessy in the context of public education. In fact, the 
traditional, Frankfurterian sources of judicial interpretation (especially the history of the Four-
teenth Amendment’s proposal in Congress and ratification by the state legislatures), provided sub-
stantial support for sustaining de jure racial segregation in the context of education. At the same 
time, there were very few concrete historical supports for the proposition that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was designed or intended to eradicate social and educational inequalities of the kind 
Brown presented. The question for the justices, then, was whether the impediments were so mas-
sive as to prevent the Court from arriving at the only outcome that seven of the nine justices who 
voted in 1954 could countenance. To answer that question in the negative, to overcome the tradi-
tional judicial modalities pointing toward an affirmance of Plessy, the Court needed a powerful 
countervailing force. For Warren–––as for the majority of the associate justices–––that force was 
not the strength or clarity of the constitutional arguments overturning segregation, but segrega-
tion’s self-evident injustice. Had it been the other way around, had the Court felt compelled to 
overturn segregation by a close reading and appropriation of the constitutional logic of the prior 
cases, Warren may have been able to produce a much stronger constitutional rationale. 
 The justices deciding Brown were deeply ambivalent about the precise constitutional logic 
and the nature and scope of the individual rights announced. This uncertainty about the constitu-
tional holding dovetailed with their ambivalence about how to effectuate the ruling, even after a 
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year and the rehearing on remedy in spring of 1955. The only question on which they all (minus 
Justice Reed) agreed over the course of the three terms in which they considered the cases was that 
state-imposed racial segregation in American public life was bad, that it should be eradicated, and 
that the public should be put on notice that the federal judiciary was setting out to do just that. As 
author of both Brown opinions, Warren was spokesman and counsel for the Court’s constitutional 
case for embarking on this ambitious and unprecedented endeavor. But in penning the first of the 




Chapter 3. The Social Intuitionist Model of Moral Decision-Making 
 
The Justices of the Warren Court [] ventured to identify a goal. It was necessarily a grand 
one–––if we had to give it a single name, that name … would be the Egalitarian Society. 
And the Justices steered by this goal, as Marshall did by his vision of a nation, in the belief 
that progress, called history, would validate their course, and that another generation, re-
membering its own future, would imagine them favorably. Such a faith need not conflict 
with, but [] overrides standards of analytical reason and scientific inquiry as warrantors of 




 Brown lacked what throughout this work I have called a “robust theory” of equal protec-
tion. As Jack Balkin puts it: “Brown was written the way it was because the details of the new 
theory of equality simply had not been worked out. That required the efforts of many lawyers, 
judges, politicians, legal scholars, and members of social movements in succeeding decades.”84 
Balkin’s remark highlights the distinctively political character–––political both in the essential 
sense of who rules whom, and in the derivative sense of moral discretion–––of, respectively, 
Brown’s import and its provenance. The Court’s decision was at that time in history the loudest 
shot across the bow of white America that it could not, and would not, rule black America differ-
ently than it ruled itself, or at least (as subsequently developments would soon evince) not to the 
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disadvantage of the latter. It was a declaration that while majorities ostensibly rule, their laws 
operate not on minorities as minorities but on all citizens as individuals–––such, I take it, is the 
significance of Warren’s soliloquy in Brown on the role of modern education in forging a common 
citizenship. And for all future cases containing a racial dimension and posing the primordial polit-
ical question, Who rules?, Brown effected and promulgated notice of a recasting of the Fourteenth 
Amendment into a license for answering that question with three words: the federal judiciary. 
 The political character of Brown’s meaning and effect is a function of the political cast of 
the Brown decision-making process. Brown was written absent a robust theory of equal protection 
because the decision to reach the outcome in Brown preceded the articulation of a constitutional 
case for that outcome and was primarily motivated by elements of moral psychology. The justices’ 
individual decision processes were moral because their concerns were expressed in the form of 
claims about justice or fairness, which imply a theory of normativity rather than legality or consti-
tutionality. Normativity and legality/constitutionality can be related, and the central purpose of 
many jurisprudential schools is to perform precisely that task. My analysis will nonetheless show 
that the normative concerns entertained by the justices deciding Brown generally preceded consti-
tutional and legal ones, and that the justices lacked coherent, generalizable, and articulable juris-
prudential philosophies (as opposed to ad hoc judicial approaches) that would allow the justices to 
incorporate their personal moral views as inputs to the judicial process. Moral judgment preceded, 
motivated, and caused constitutional and legal theorizing, not the other way around. Furthermore, 
the available evidence strongly suggests that the decisive considerations for each justice were of 
an affective or social nature. By affective I mean driven or powerfully mediated by emotion; by 
social, I mean driven or powerfully mediated by the interpersonal dynamics of group membership 
and considerations of institutional solidarity.  
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 The theory of moral psychology that best coheres with the available Brown primary source 
record is Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionist theory of moral cognition. Haidt’s account echoes an 
older but still-modern philosophic account of the soul developed by David Hume85 and, judiciously 
applied, helps capture and articulate what happened in the Brown merits decision-making process, 
from the time the cases were first argued in December, 1952 until the unanimous Brown decision 
came down on May 17, 1954. Haidt has argued that for most people most of the time, “moral 
judgment is caused by quick moral intuitions and is followed (when needed) by slow, ex post facto 
moral reasoning” or rationalization.86 In the words of Joshua Greene, a colleague and occasional 
collaborator of Haidt’s, “moral judgment is driven primarily by rapid, affectively based, intuitive 
responses, with deliberate moral reasoning engaged after the fact to provide rational justifications 
in response to social demands.”87 
 
Figure 1. The Social Intuitionist Model of Moral Judgment 
                                                
85 Hume ([1739], 1896, 413-418). 
86 Haidt (2001, 817). 
87 Greene et al. (2004, 397). 
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 “The number links, drawn for Person A only, are (1) the intuitive judgment link, (2) the post hoc 
reasoning link, (3) the reasoned persuasion link, and (4) the social persuasion link. Two addi-
tional links are hypothesized to occur less frequently: (5) the reason judgment link and (6) the 
private reflection link.”88 
 The “social intuitionist” model proposed by Haidt gives the following account of moral 
judgment. Moral judgment begins when a subject confronts an eliciting stimulus that induces an 
intuitive response (e.g., fear, anger, joy, disgust). The tenor of that reaction then determines the 
subject’s disposition toward the stimulus (e.g., good, bad, ambivalent), which is to say, the sub-
ject’s moral judgment (Link 1). The subject then engages the rational or linguistic faculty to de-
velop a cogent set of arguments that justifies the judgment to other people, especially when the 
subject is pressed to explain himself (Link 2). Haidt claims that this link correlates with intelli-
gence: as David Perkins and colleagues have found,89 people who have the most sophisticated and 
plausible arguments for their judgments tend to be those with an especially high IQ, independent 
of the content of their judgments. Haidt acknowledges that private contemplation sometimes alters 
moral judgments, but such reflection usually does so by eliciting new intuitions, which then change 
the judgment (Link 6). Rarest of all, however, is that form of cognition that rationalist philosophers 
long imputed to moral judgment, and from which they claimed to derive Reason’s autonomy: rea-
soned judgment (Link 5). Haidt suggests that reasoned judgment is possible in principle, but rare 
in practice.  
                                                
88 Haidt (2001, 815). Both figure and figure label are Haidt’s. 
89 Perkins et al. (1991). 
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The literature on everyday reasoning suggests that [reasoned judgment] may be common 
only among philosophers, who have been extensively trained and socialized to follow rea-
soning even to very disturbing conclusions (as in the case of Socrates or the more recent 
work of Peter Singer), but the fact that there are at least a few people among us who can 
reach such conclusions on their own and then argue for them eloquently (Link 3) means 
that pure moral reasoning can play a causal role in the moral life of a society.90 
In a word, emotion or intuition, not Reason, directly determines moral judgment; private, rational 
reflection can sometimes elicit new intuitions that may then alter judgment, but rarely operates 
directly upon judgment.  
 Finally, intuitive judgments tend to be of an automatic, rapid-fire, language-free nature. 
Haidt argues that people experience dozens of intuitive “flashes” daily, and that these form the 
seeds from which the majority of moral judgments grow. He calls this cognitive process the “see-
ing-that” faculty, analogizing these flashes to automatic cognitive processes such as visual percep-
tion.91 
The next time you read a newspaper or drive a car, notice the many tiny flashes of con-
demnation that flit through your consciousness. Is each such flash an emotion? Or ask 
yourself whether it is better to save the lives of five strangers than one (assuming all else 
is equal). Do you need an emotion to tell you to go for the five? Do you need reasoning? 
No, you just see, instantly, that five is better than one. Intuition is the best word to describe 
the dozens or hundreds of rapid, effortless moral judgments and decisions that we all make 
every day. Only a few of these intuitions come to us embedded in full-blown emotions.92 
                                                
90 Haidt (2001, 829). 
91 Haidt (2013, 48). 
92 Id., at 53. 
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Haidt argues that “almost everything we look at triggers a tiny flash of affect” and “affective reac-
tion are so tightly integrated with perception that we find ourselves liking or disliking something 
the instant we notice it, sometimes even before we know what it is.”93 As a consequence, most 
people are not conscious of the process by which they reach moral judgments because they are 
largely unconscious of automatic cognitive processes, and an automatic cognitive process produc-
ing barely discernible flits of intuition plants the seed out of which the majority of people’s moral 
judgments grows. Moreover, since the process of moral decision-making tends to be opaque to the 
person performing or (to state the matter perhaps more accurately) undergoing it, people tend to 
believe the reasons they found to rationalize a pre-existing judgment “are the reasons for”–––that 
is, preceded and caused–––that judgment, rather than post hoc defenses of the outcome of a non-
rational process. People want to and do believe that reasons are the causes and not the effects of 
their moral judgments. 
 Such is the “intuitionist” element of the social intuitionist model. The “social” component 
refers to the implications of the intuitive character of moral decision-making for interpersonal per-
suasion and communication. In a nutshell, the social component holds that because almost all 
moral decision-making turns on intuition, not rational calculation, people are generally unrespon-
sive to arguments or facts alone when considering an emotionally salient matter, that is, any subject 
on which they have any firm prior opinion (because to have formed an opinion in the first place, 
they had to have experienced an intuition that induced the formation of that opinion). The model 
predicts that the primary way in which countervailing claims and evidence alter an existing opinion 
is by eliciting new intuitions that then change the subject’s judgment. Nonetheless, absent a coun-
tervailing intuition, not only will the subject’s opinion remain unchanged, but also the subject’s 
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rational or linguistic faculty will seek novel supporting arguments and evidence to defend the ex-
isting opinion and dismiss the new, countervailing arguments or information to which the subject 
has been exposed.  
 This hypothesis is supported by recent experimental findings in psychology on group po-
larization, performance on the Wason selection task, average ability to assess emotionally-neutral 
logic puzzles (e.g., syllogisms), confirmation bias, motivated reasoning, the rationalization of im-
moral behavior, and the discontinuity between reasoned deliberation and optimal decision-making. 
“People who have an opinion to defend don’t really evaluate the arguments of their interlocutors 
in a search for genuine information but rather consider them from the start as counterarguments to 
be rebutted.”94 Reasoning, then, has a naturally argumentative cast, and, Haidt and others hypoth-
esize, evolved to help people “to put forward arguments to defend their decisions and actions,” 
and to help them “reason proactively to that end.” In the cases of motivated reasoning (as when a 
person discounts or exaggerates information to cohere with his preexisting desires or preferences), 
biased assimilation (as when, e.g., a subject selectively attacks the methodology of a study whose 
conclusions he disfavors, while raising no such qualms about the similar or identical methodology 
of a study whose conclusions he favors), group polarization (as when pre-existing ideological com-
mitments are rendered more extreme by discussion with like-minded individuals), and the ration-
alization or excusing of moral violations to preserve self-conception, “epistemic or moral goals 
are not well served by reasoning. By contrast, argumentative goals are: People are better able to 
support their positions or justify their moral judgments.”95 
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 To illustrate this mechanism in the context of interpersonal deliberation, Haidt offers the 
following analogy. A person’s intuition is to her reason (or, more accurately, the rationale-discov-
ering component), as a president is to his press secretary. The president is the undisputed boss and 
sets the agenda, almost always without any substantive input from his press secretary. The press 
secretary is the chief rationalizer and apologist par excellence for the president’s agenda. The sec-
retary has negligible agency in the policies and actions he defends and is singularly guided by the 
imperative to ferociously justify every action of the president, and aggressively cast every fact in 
the most helpful light to the president and his agenda. The president is intuition. The press secre-
tary, obviously, is language or reason. Haidt contends that rational calculation performs a hyper-
active, rationalizing and apologetic function in the service of intuition, and thereby tends to frus-
trate even good faith efforts to discover the truth. In short, the very way in which people acquire 
and process information that impinges upon a pre-existing opinion is almost always subject to the 
distorting influence of their intuitions, hopes, and expectations about those subjects, and reason is 
only too happy to render that information compatible with its boss’s sentiments. The stronger the 
intuition and the more incongruent the information is with it, the more extreme (or creative) the 
distortion tends to be.96 
 Haidt offers his social intuitionist model as an alternative to the rationalist model of moral 
judgment, which has its roots in Plato’s exoteric account of the soul and was refined over the 
course of 2,300 years of western intellectual development until crystallized as an operational psy-
chological account by mid-20th century psychologists Lawrence Kohlberg and Jean Piaget.97 
                                                
96 Haidt (2013, 91-92). 




Figure 2. The Rationalist Model of Moral Judgment 
“The rationalist model of moral judgment. Moral affects such as sympathy may sometimes be 
inputs to moral reasoning.”98 
The rationalist model holds that moral judgment is primarily the product of reasoning or calcula-
tion. “Moral emotions such as sympathy may sometimes be inputs to the reasoning process, but 
moral emotions are not the direct causes of moral judgments. In rationalist models, one briefly 
becomes a judge, weighing issues of harm, rights, justice, and fairness, before passing judgment 
[]. If no condemning evidence is found, no condemnation is issued.”99 As the legal cast of Haidt’s 
description appropriately suggests, the rationalist model of moral judgment is an analog for the 
legal model of judicial behavior. However, as Haidt’s cursory and vague analogy of the balancing 
process to judicial reasoning also implies, the calculations performed therein, and the rules they 
abide, are unspecified. Perhaps, therefore, even that truly rarest of phenomena–––genuine moral 
reasoning–––is not entirely free of non-rational elements, such as the hierarchy and relative 
weights of the issues that the “judge” must balance. 
 In the lexicon of political science, the social intuitionist model applied to judicial behavior 
falls under the aegis of the attitudinal model of judicial decision-making, but with a twist: the 
social intuitionist model predicts that judges are susceptible to judicial esprit de corps or what 
                                                
98 Haidt (2001, 815). Both figure and figure label are Haidt’s.  
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Haidt calls “groupishness,”100 and that their identity as judges and members of the judiciary, or as 
members of a particular subset of the judiciary (e.g., particular courts or factions within a court), 
strongly mediates their moral judgments. Likewise, the rationalist model falls under the umbrella 
of the legal model of judicial decision-making, and predicts that judges will arrive at outcomes by 
dispassionately weighing the elements of legal interpretation and constitutional construction to 
determine “what the law says.” 
 The social intuitionist model accounts for what is known about the justices’ decision-mak-
ing in Brown better than does the rational model, and, for that matter, any other model of judicial 
or moral decision-making. However, this is not to say that all of the justices’ behavior can be 
accounted for by social-intuitionism: owing to the unusual degree of secrecy in which the Brown 
deliberations were shrouded,101 much of the decision-making process is simply lost to history. I 
remain open to the possibility that the unrecorded portion of the justices’ conduct and considera-
tions that culminated in the Brown decision might be better accounted for by models other than 
the social intuitionist one.102 But the evidence that has survived for the examination of posterity, I 
contend, supports my thesis.  
 Now if the social intuitionist model can tell us something about the justices’ behavior in 
Brown, then it can also explain much, though not all, of the decision’s peculiar rhetoric and rea-
soning, and, to the extent it does that, even elucidate the Court’s holding. After all, if the legal 
holding of a court decision is at least a partial function of the meaning of the words of the majority 
opinion, and that meaning is a partial function of the intentions and understandings of those who 
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composed them, then it follows that the designs and understandings of the justices participating in 
Brown is partially constitutive of the decision’s meaning. The elusive meaning of Brown depends 
in part on the character of the moral reasoning in which the justices engaged. By this I do not mean 
that Brown’s holding turns on the specific forms of moral argument that the justices deployed in 
their conference discussions, or those that eventually appeared in Warren’s final written opinion 
for the Court. More important–––and authoritative for future judicial action–––than either of those 
factors was the decision-making process that Brown legitimated. It is for that reason that ascer-
taining the modes of the justices’ decision-making, not just their putative constitutional reasoning, 
is a central goal of this work. 
 I propose to make this case by performing the following tasks. First, I will survey the be-
havioral characteristics that Haidt imputes the cognitive dynamics described by his model. Second, 
I will evaluate the justices’ behavior in Brown against the behavioral characteristics identified by 
Haidt. Third, I will evaluate that behavior against the rationalist model of moral judgment, and, 
when such conduct appears to conflict with that account, offer assessments of how the justices’ 
behavior differs from the predictions that rationalist model makes of moral judgment. Over the 
course of steps two and three, I hope to establish to a high degree of probability that the justices’ 
behavior conforms substantially to behavior predicted by the social intuitionist model. Fourth and 
finally, I will expound upon the implications of the finding that the justices’ behavior conforms to 
the social intuitionist model for the constitutional holding in Brown and for certain lines of rea-
soning and rhetorical choices in the decision itself. The first three tasks are performed in Chapters 




BEHAVIORAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOCIAL INTUITIONIST MODEL 
 
 The behavioral characteristics that Haidt adduces for the social intuitionist model pertain 
to people’s ability to make and defend decisions, reason perspicaciously, adjust their opinions to 
evidence that contradicts them, cope with cognitive dissonance (mental discomfort caused by the 
simultaneous possession of contradictory beliefs), and demonstrate understanding of their own 
decision-making and reasons. Haidt argues that measured by these criteria, people’s performance 
is generally dismal: people tend to be much better at finding novel reasons to defend their prior 
beliefs (rationalization) than at seeking the truth or adjusting their beliefs to comport with new 
information. Haidt speculates that this is because reasoning and language–––whose unity was pres-
ciently detected and reflected, e.g., in the Ancient Greek word, logos–––evolved in relatively re-
cent human prehistory “to help us pursue socially strategic goals, such as guarding our reputations 
and convincing other people to support us, or our team, in disputes,”103 not to discover the truth or 
to reason accurately. At the risk of oversimplification, speech and reason developed initially be-
cause people who could communicate could better cooperate in groups to survive (in what Haidt 
suggests is “group selection”).104 Then, people who could speak better than others used language 
to accrue relative advantage–––both reproductive and otherwise–––with respect to their peers (“in-
dividual selection”).105 In other words, Haidt hypothesizes that as the human brain evolved the 
capacity for language, it simultaneously evolved a capacious architecture for using language for 
social ends; the mind’s development of a concomitant architecture for epistemological (truth-seek-
ing) ends was, in contrast, a fortuitous byproduct of that evolution. Speech used in the employ of 
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Science or Reason is relatively anomalous and of very recent provenance. Speech used as a tool 
for survival and status jockeying is much older and more ubiquitous. 
 Social scientific experiments provide evidence probative of Haidt’s assessment of human 
reasoning. For example, Jennifer Lerner and Phil Tetlock have shown that when subjects are tasked 
to solve problems or make decisions with prior knowledge that they will not be required to justify 
their actions, the quality of their decisions is poor, exhibiting “the usual catalogue of errors, lazi-
ness, and reliance on gut feelings that has been documented in so much decision-making research.” 
However, when subjects are informed prior to making a decision that they will have to defend their 
decisions to an audience, the quality of their decision-making and reasoning improves, and sub-
jects even show a willingness to revise their initial conclusions and assumptions. Tetlock observed 
that when all of three conditions apply, people tend to become disinterested and successful truth 
seekers: “(1) [when] decision makers learn before forming any opinion that they will be account-
able to an audience, (2) [when] the audience’s views are unknown, and (3) [when] they believe the 
audience is well informed and interested in accuracy.” Absent one or more of the three conditions, 
subjects tended to engage in “confirmatory thought,” or “a one-sided attempt to rationalize a par-
ticular point of view.”106 On the basis of these experimental results, Lerner and Tetlock drew the 
following conclusion. 
A central function of thought is making sure that one acts in ways that can be persuasively 
justified or excused to others. Indeed, the process of considering the justificability of one’s 
choices may be so prevalent that decision makers not only search for convincing reasons 
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to make a choice when they must explain that choice to others, they search for reasons to 
convince themselves that they have made the “right” choice.107 
The authors’ findings raise the question of self-deception. In making decisions and judgments, to 
what extent do people delude themselves in order to minimize cognitive dissonance? A host of 
studies on cheating and dishonesty speak to this question. When experimental subjects are tasked 
to play a game in which their performance can earn them a variable amount of money, those sub-
jects afforded plausible deniability and the opportunity to cheat do so at very high rates. In contrast, 
when subjects playing the same game are given precisely the same opportunity to cheat, but denied 
plausible deniability, those subjects cheat at much lower frequencies. Importantly, the subjects 
who do cheat in the first scenario do not try get away with the maximum possible level of fraud, 
but cheat “just a little bit.” Haidt construes this finding to suggest that when afforded the oppor-
tunity to cheat and effective indemnity from discovery, people “cheat[] only up to the point where 
they themselves could no longer find a justification that would preserve their belief in their own 
honesty.”108 By and large, people want to be moral, and will accordingly rationalize and excuse 
their own indiscretions to minimize cognitive dissonance. Therefore, to preserve the cogency of 
their worldview and self-conceptions, people unconsciously and automatically assimilate infor-
mation to their beliefs–––manipulating or discounting it when it conflicts with their beliefs, am-
plifying and extending it when it coheres–––rather than the other way around. When people as-
similate information about their own actions to their self-conceptions, they run the risk of self-
deception.  
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 A related psychological phenomenon is confirmation bias, or “the tendency to seek out and 
interpret new evidence in ways that confirm what [a person] already think[s].” Confirmation bias 
can operate in the absence of distorting moral beliefs and in the presence of an accuracy goal. The 
Wason selection task demonstrates the emotionally-neutral and truth-seeking contexts in which 
confirmation bias can operate. Wason “showed people a series of three numbers and told them that 
the triplet conforms to a rule. They had to guess the rule by generating other triplets and then 
asking the experimenter whether the new triplet conformed to the rule. When they were confident 
they had guessed the rule, they were supposed to tell their experimenter their guess.” People could 
quickly offer numbers that adhered to the underlying pattern, but usually did not think to offer 
numbers that might disconfirm any of their hypotheses about the rule. 
 Suppose a subject first sees 2-4-6. The subject then generates a triplet in response: 
“4-6-8?” 
 “Yes,” says the experimenter. 
 “How about 120-122-124?” 
 “Yes.” 
 It seemed obvious to most people that the rule was consecutive even numbers. But 
the experimenter told them this was wrong, so they tested out other rules: “3-5-7?” 
 “Yes.” […] 
 “OK, so the rule must be any series of numbers that rises by two?” 
 “No.” 
 People had little trouble generating new hypotheses about the rule, sometimes quite 
complex ones. But what they hardly ever did was to test their hypotheses by offering tri-
plets that did not conform to their hypothesis. For example, proposing 2-4-5 (yes) and 2-4-
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3 (no) would have helped people zero in on the actual rule: any series of ascending num-
bers.109 
Confirmation bias can therefore plague any truth-seeking endeavor in which the investigator pro-
ceeds without a clear, articulated prior hypothesis, and without making a conscious effort to iden-
tify the kind of data that would falsify that hypothesis, and test his hypothesis against such data. 
 A phenomenon related to confirmation bias is motivated reasoning. Social psychologist 
Tom Gilovich authored an operational description of motivated reasoning with the following 
thought experiment, as recounted by Haidt. 
[W]hen we want to believe something, we ask ourselves, “Can I believe it?” Then, we 
search for supporting evidence, and if we find even a single piece of pseudo-science, we 
can stop thinking. We now have permission to believe. We have a justification, in case 
anyone asks. In contrast, when we don’t want to believe something, we ask ourselves, 
“Must I believe it?” Then we search for contrary evidence, and if we find a single reason 
to doubt the claim, we can dismiss it. You only need one key to unlock the handcuffs of 
must.110 
Motivated reasoning, then, often transpires when a person’s attitude guides or distorts his reason-
ing, and can be said to occur when an individual encounters information about which that person 
has a pre-existing motivation (i.e., a desire, expectation, or wish). Motivated reasoning minimizes 
cognitive dissonance by discounting information that conflicts with the person’s prior beliefs (Pe-
ter Ditto and David Lopez call this particular form of motivated reasoning “motivated skepti-
cism,”111 but I will adhere to the more widely-used term throughout this work.) For example, 
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“[w]hen people read a (fictitious) scientific study that reports a link between caffeine consumption 
and breast cancer, women who are heavy coffee drinkers find more flaws in the study than do men 
and less caffeinated women.”112 Haidt remarks that the effects of motivated reasoning are so pow-
erful that they even affect visual perception, again suggesting a link between the “seeing-that” 
nature of intuition and lower-order cognitive processing involved in sense perception. Experi-
mental “[s]ubjects who thought that they’d get something good if a computer flashed up a letter 
rather than a number were more likely to see the ambiguous figure 13 as the letter B rather than the 
number 13. [] People can literally see what they want to see.”113 
 Similarly, merely thinking about an object has been observed to strengthen pre-existing 
attitudes toward it, in a phenomenon known to psychologists as attitude polarization. Experimental 
studies have found that both “the time spent thinking about an item” and “the motivation to think” 
about an item increase polarization.114 Studies that tasked participants with writing an essay about 
an opinion to which the participants already subscribed found not only that polarization occurred, 
but also that “it was correlated with the direction and number of the arguments put forward in the 
essay. These results demonstrate that reasoning contributes to attitude polarization and strongly 
suggest that [reasoning] may be [attitude polarization’s] main factor.”115 Further support for this 
contention comes from experiments that have found that subjects who commit publicly to an opin-
ion, or know that they will need to defend it to an audience, exhibit high degrees of subsequent 
attitude polarization, in an effect known as bolstering.116 In other words, the omnipresent desire to 
preserve or improve self-conception and reputation ossifies opinions that are connected to both. 
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Other studies have found that people are generally competent argument evaluators, especially 
when motivated, but very poor producers of arguments that conflict with their own opinions.117 
This would confirm Haidt’s hypothesis that reasoning is primarily confirmatory of intuition rather 
than truth-seeking: a capacious ability to defend one’s opinions combined with an inveterate fail-
ure to anticipate and address weaknesses in one’s own arguments suggests that reasoning’s primary 
function is to rationalize, rather than discover the truth, which would presumably benefit from, and 
might even be impossible to discover without, adjudicating conflicting ideas. 
 Despite Lerner and Tetlock’s findings that accountability can increase the epistemic quality 
of reasoning, the catalogue of errors and distortions in reasoning to which people are prone in 
private is actually exacerbated by some group and social settings. When a group is tasked with 
solving a “logical or, more generally, intellective” problem “for which there exists a demonstrably 
correct answer within a verbal or mathematical conceptual system” the usual outcome is that “truth 
wins, meaning that, as soon as one participant has understood the problem, she will be able to 
convince the whole group that her solution is correct.”118 However, when the task is performed by 
an ideologically, morally, culturally, or politically homogeneous group–––as sometimes happens 
in “multimember courts, juries, political parties and legislatures[,] not to mention ethnic groups, 
extremist organizations, terrorists, criminal conspiracies, student associations, faculties, institu-
tions engaged in feuds or ‘turf battles,’ workplaces, and families”–––an effect called group polar-
ization occurs. 
 Cass Sunstein describes group polarization as a phenomenon in which “members of a de-
liberating group predictably move toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the 
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member’s predeliberation tendencies.” The effect is more likely “[w]hen like-minded people are 
participating in ‘iterated polarization games,’ [that is,] when they meet regularly, without sustained 
exposure to competing views” and the effect is more pronounced “for groups with some kind of 
salient shared identity (like Republicans, Democrats, and lawyers, but unlike jurors and experi-
mental subjects.)”119 In a word, homogeneity within a group on any particular question tends to 
transform that group into an echo chamber with respect to the question, with negligible capacity 
for simulating the perspectives necessary to generate counterarguments to the prevailing view. 
Sunstein suggests two reasons for this effect. On the one hand, “people want to be perceived fa-
vorably by other group members, and also to perceive themselves favorably.” To achieve both 
goals, people “adjust their opinions in the direction of the dominant position” within the group. 
“[I]ndividuals move their judgments in order to preserve their image to others and their image to 
themselves.” On the other hand, “any individual’s position on an issue is partly a function of which 
arguments presented within the group seem convincing.” But since the pool of available arguments 
in the group is limited, and is moreover skewed toward an outcome that members of the group 
already prefer, the opinions of group members will tend to become more extreme.  
 Sunstein offers some “refinements” to this account. First, he acknowledges that group po-
larization is not inexorable but probabilistic–––certain conditions must obtain, such as the presence 
of persuasive primary interlocutors, and the effect can be curbed by the desire of some group 
members to maintain a moderate visage before their peers and forestalled entirely by things such 
as exogenous shocks to the group. Second, “affective factors, identity, and solidarity” will augment 
group polarization. When group members are “linked by affective ties, dissent is significantly less 
frequent” because such ties tend to preclude the development of countervailing arguments and 
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strengthen the effect of social dynamics on group deliberation and shifts in opinion. “[T]he likeli-
hood of a shift, and its likely size, are increased when people perceive fellow members as friendly, 
likeable, and similar to them. In the same vein … a sense of common fate and intragroup similarity 
tend to increase [polarization], as does the introduction of a rival ‘outgroup.’” Indeed, “when group 
members think of one another as similar along a salient dimension, or if some external factor (pol-
itics, geography, race, sex) unites them, group polarization will be heightened.”120 
 In sum, ideologically committed individuals are highly attuned to errors of an ideologically 
unfriendly provenance, while being appreciably handicapped with respect to detecting erroneous 
reasoning from a friendly source. Thus, truth-finding is unlikely to occur under conditions in which 
many people are working together, ideology is salient, the majority of those people share the same 
ideology, and one or more objects of the truth-seeking relate to any part of the shared ideology, 
since ideological co-partisans exercise very little scrutiny of information consistent with, and flaws 
in, their own views, while remaining highly attuned to and desirous of finding flaws in information 
that contradicts their views. The deleterious consequences for truth-finding are equally applicable 
when philosophy, religion, morality, or any other human value system substitutes for ideology. 
 The conclusion that Haidt draws from the literature on reasoning in group contexts is that 
human beings are profoundly group-oriented, and reasoning operates to shore up members’ indi-
vidual standings within the group, and especially to strengthen the group vis-à-vis other groups. 
Such reasoning is motivated by a desire for group solidarity and cohesion and therefore tends to 
distort the truth. Again, this is consistent with the social intuitionist model’s claim that emotions 
and intuition guide reasoning. When group membership and competition becomes salient, as in 
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politics, people’s concern for the groups to which they belong is heightened, sometimes dramati-
cally, and what economists have called “rational” (i.e. individual) self-interest fades into the back-
ground. Haidt observes: 
Many political scientists used to assume that people vote selfishly, choosing the candidates 
or policy that will benefit them the most. But decades of research on public opinion have 
led to the conclusion that self-interest is a weak predictor of policy preferences…. Rather, 
people care about their groups, whether those be racial, regional, religious, or political. The 
political scientist Don Kilmer summarizes the findings like this: “In matters of public opin-
ion, citizens seem to be asking themselves not ‘What’s in it for me?’ but rather ‘What’s in 
it for my group?’ Political opinions function as “badges of social membership.” They’re 
like the array of bumper stickers people put on their cars showing the political causes, 
universities, and sports teams they support. Our politics is groupish, not selfish.121 
In Haidt’s summation, “human beings are conditional hive creatures. We have the ability (under 
special conditions) to transcend self-interest and lose ourselves (temporarily and ecstatically) in 
something larger than ourselves.”122 
 From these studies, it is possible to derive a series of testable hypotheses that will enable 
us to evaluate whether and to what degree the justices who decided Brown exhibited behavior 
conforming to the social intuitionist model. 
 1 [Intuition as causative of reasoning.] The first and most important hypothesis is that, if 
indeed the social intuitionist model is applicable in Brown, the justices decided the merits of the 
case by intuition or emotion and afterward rationalized the outcome. To put this in more precise 
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terms, we might say that if the model controls, the evidence will show that the case’s outcome 
temporally preceded and guided the constitutional or legal reasoning deployed. Moreover, this 
would not just hold for Warren’s decision-writing process, but would also be evident in the jus-
tices’ conference discussions, interchamber memoranda, records of private conversations and re-
flections, and other primary source materials. 
 2 [Opacity of judgment.] The third hypothesis is that the justices will fail to understand 
their own decision-making. Such evidence would consist of a justice’s description of or reference 
to his own decision-making that contradicts the record of how the justice in question actually made 
the decision. I will examine the record with a special view to the order in which judgment and 
reason take place, and the justices’ own understandings of the relationship between the two. For 
example, if a justice claims to have been persuaded by argument X for his vote, but exhibited a 
propensity for the position that he ultimately endorsed without ever mentioning argument X, then 
it is at least possible argument X was a post hoc rationalization. The determination of whether any 
particular justice understood his own decision-making will necessarily depend on the available 
record, and in many cases, it may not be possible to make an assessment. 
 3 [Confirmation bias.] The fourth hypothesis is that the justices will focus excessively on 
supporting evidence for their position, while failing to lend much consideration to countervailing 
information. Evidence of reflection about or reasoned discussion of such information, even if such 
consideration leads ultimately to dismissal of that information, qualifies as disconfirmation of this 
hypothesis. 
 4 [Motivated reasoning.] The fifth hypothesis is that the justices will tend to discount in-
formation inconsistent with their preferences. This hypothesis differs from the previous one in that 
confirmation bias suggests that the justices will tend to see only information consistent with their 
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position, while motivated reasoning suggests that justices, when forced to confront information 
that contradicts their position, after cursory consideration, will find excuses to dismiss it. 
 5 [Attitude polarization.] The sixth hypothesis is that private, individual reflection by a 
justice on a question connected to the case, especially its outcome, will cause the justice’s initial 
position on the question over time to become more extreme. 
 In addition to the above SI model correlates, the following are psychological phenomena 
that are not unique to social intuitionism but that were nonetheless observed in the justices’ deci-
sion-making and help explain it. 
 6 [Group polarization.] The seventh hypothesis is that the average position of the justices 
on the matters addressed in Brown will become more pronounced in the direction in which that 
position pointed initially as a result of the justices’ ongoing consideration of the case. In the spe-
cific context of Brown, this is to say that the model predicts that the justices will become more 
favorable to desegregation over time, since the largest bloc of justices at the 1952 conference (a 4-
justice plurality) favored desegregation. 
 7 [Role of exacerbating factors in group polarization.] The eighth hypothesis is that affec-
tive factors (e.g., interpersonal relations among and between justices), identity, solidarity, and the 
existence (if any) of “recurrent polarization games” will render the Court’s position on desegrega-
tion more extreme over time. For instance, it is possible that the personal warmth and charisma of 
Chief Justice Warren affected the other justices’ views of desegregation and race-related questions. 
Additionally, it is almost certain that the conflict between the federal judiciary and the South (and 
especially the most salient apologists for its segregationist policies, e.g., Alabama Governor 
George Wallace, Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus, and Mississippi Governor Ross Barnet) made 
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the Court’s position more extreme in certain desegregation decisions. Cooper v. Aaron123 is the 
most famous example of a controversy in which the position the justices took initially was made 
more extreme by the perceived threat to the Court’s institutional legitimacy and power by the 
defiance of an outgroup.124 Finally, the Washington, D.C. elite social milieu to which all the jus-
tices were exposed during their service probably had the effect of an “iterative polarization game” 
on their views on a plethora of constitutional questions, not merely desegregation. 
 8 [Solidarity]. The ninth hypothesis is that when confronted with a threat from another 
group (e.g., the South’s noncompliance and attacks on the legitimacy of the federal courts’ deseg-
regation efforts), the federal judiciary will respond by becoming more insistent upon the course 
that had precipitated the threat (desegregation) and more extreme in the measures it authorizes and 
undertakes to produce it. 
 I contend that the social intuitionist model captures elements of each justice’s behavior in 
the Brown decision-making process. However, as Jeffrey Hockett has contended, the Brown deci-
sion-making process is also partially explicable via more traditional models of judicial behavior, 
especially rational choice. I join in Hockett’s assessment. I believe, though, that Hockett underes-
timates the role of attitudinal factors in the decision. He claims that because scholars lack inde-
pendent and direct means of measuring justices’ preferences, attitudinalists often fail to meet their 
burden of showing that the justices’ attitudes caused the outcome. Instead, “‘there is a kind of 
basic circularity’ in the attitudinal model since ‘consistency in voting behavior is used to infer the 
attitude, and then the attitude is used to explain the consistency.’”125 Accordingly, “marshaling 
evidence of the justices’ values regarding the matter of racial equality would seem to be of some 
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importance to an attitudinal account of Brown.”126 But this task is complicated, if not rendered 
impossible, by the justices’ having passed. “[U]nless social scientists develop an alternative 
method of attitude measurement that is not restricted to living persons,” Hockett concludes, “an 
attitudinal account of Brown will remain a matter of conjecture rather than empirical proof.”127 
 Hockett is correct in this narrow sense: an attitudinal account of Brown will never be totally 
incontrovertible, unless, as is extremely unlikely, there exists documentary or other corroboration 
that has not yet been made available to scholars. However, as with many important questions–––
indeed, as with perhaps the most important questions in life–––necessity forces us to rest satisfied 
with partially-illumined probabilistic calculations rather than the unadulterated sunlight of certain 
knowledge. And the social intuitionist model is an instrument that can raise the level of probability 
that certain elements contributed to, and accounted for more of, the Brown decision-making pro-
cess, than others. The model can do this in the same way that present-day physicians can establish 
or increase the likelihood that the deaths of historical personages were caused by certain factors 
rather than others: by studying the suite of symptoms quintessentially attributable to a particular 
malady, and reason inductively from the historical record of the symptoms to a conclusion that a 
particular malady was the likely cause of the observed historical outcome. I contend that applied 
to judicial behavior, the social intuitionist model will function in the same way. The model pro-
vides a suite of behavioral “symptoms” (as I have attempted to summarize in the above nine hy-
potheses) that are characteristically attributable to a particular and ubiquitous form of human moral 
decision-making and reasoning. If many of the behaviors are observed, it can be concluded that 
the probability is high that such behaviors are evidence of the causes observed to induce the same 
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conduct in present-day subjects to whose preferences and brain mechanics psychologists and neu-
roscientists have access thanks to experimental devices such as attitude surveys and fMRI scans.128 
As the science of human decision-making has improved over the last half century, it has made 
possible not simply speculative interpretations of past human decision-making, but probabilistic 
calculations about the causes of past behavior. 
 Applied to the Brown decision-making process, the social intuitionist model suggests that 
for many (and perhaps a majority) of the justices, the case’s outcome was first arrived at via moral 
considerations, and then post hoc rationalized in constitutional and legal terms. That is to say, the 
general template for the decision-making of those justices whose behavior the model encapsulates 
is as follows. First, the justice would decide that compulsory segregation and, especially, the way 
of life it stood for or symbolized–––white supremacy, the racial animus of local white majorities, 
the continued subjugation of a historically downtrodden, identifiable racial minority–––was mor-
ally reprehensible. Second, he would reflexively seek a constitutional argument that could be used 
to ban the practice. I believe that such is the inference we can draw from those justices who indi-
cated a concern about segregation’s injustice, immorality, or offensiveness when 1) there was a 
time lag between the justice’s announcement of his position and development or presentation or a 
supporting rationale, 2) the justice’s proffered rationale was unpersuasive, incoherent, or not ger-
mane to constitutional or legal factors, and/or 3) the justice exhibited indicators of confirmation 
bias or motivated reasoning. In the first instance, the lag would suggest (though, admittedly, not 
prove) that the justice did not possess a constitutional argument for his position prior to espousing 
it, indicating that his position on the case’s outcome temporally preceded his legal or constitutional 
                                                
128 On the role of certain portions of the brain in moral decision-making, especially those known to process emotion, 
see generally Greene et al. (2001), Greene et al. (2004), Kilts (2006), and Haidt (2013, 39-40). 
 
85 
reasoning, or at the very least preceded his complete formulation of a legal or constitutional case 
that he viewed as persuasive. In the second instance, if the justice was willing to espouse a position 
with a weak argument, the chances are high indeed that the proffered reasoning was not the cause 
of his judgment. It is far more likely that a weak argument was ex post rationalized to justify a pre-
existing intuition than it is that a weak or flawed argument genuinely persuaded a Supreme Court 
justice to adopt a position the argument was adduced to support. Finally, a justice’s refusal or 
failure to address and refute evidence contradicting his position suggests the justice sought to min-
imize cognitive dissonance by finding evidence necessary to affirm his commitment to a pre-ex-
isting viewpoint (confirmation bias, or answering in the affirmative Haidt’s low burden of proof 
question, “Can I believe it?”) and/or by discounting countervailing evidence (motivated reasoning, 
or answering in the negative Haidt’s high burden of proof question, “Must I believe it?”). 
 Now, in conference, some justices stated their position (e.g., “segregation is immoral and 
unconstitutional”) and then followed it with reasons for their conclusion. Such occurrences would 
not fall incontrovertibly under the aegis of the model, as it is possible that those justices’ conclu-
sions, though stated before the reasons, were compelled by the reasons each justice immediately 
provided thereafter–––just as it is possible that the causality was in fact reversed. Whatever the 
direction of causality, such cases lack the evidence necessary to conclude that the originating jus-
tice was employing ex post rationalizations, and so I will not suggest that that he did. Evidence of 
hypotheses 2 through 5 will be construed as supportive of the model because the model was pos-
tulated in response to observations of those deficiencies and tendencies in reasoning, and each 
hypothesis captures an independently articulable manifestation of the cognitive dynamics de-




 The suggestion that the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown was ex post rationalized is not 
novel. But it has been downplayed in scholarly efforts to understand the Brown decision-making 
process, possibly because of the political stakes that attended uncharitable interpretations of Brown 
at the time many of these assessments were composed. The political war over desegregation was 
a hot one for four decades after Brown was handed down, and responsible commentators appeared 
not to want to offer analysis tending to delegitimize a decision that most people of good faith 
agreed achieved, as Justice Frankfurter remarked of Brown after it was decided, “a great good for 
our nation,”129 even if it did so by imperfect means. An early and instructive lesson on this score 
arrived in 1958, when Judge Learned Hand, a close friend of Justice Frankfurter and a sympathetic 
ally in the fight for the civil rights of African Americans, criticized Brown’s reasoning in a lecture 
at Harvard Law School. Of Hand’s reproach that in Brown, the Court had substituted its values for 
those of 17 state legislatures, Gerald Gunther observed: “Southern editorial writers quickly jumped 
on the bandwagon, cheering . . . Hand’s criticism of Brown.”130 Judicial observers for the most 
part appeared subsequently to hedge any complaints about Brown’s constitutional rationale in or-
der to deny to southern intransigents support for their most strident complaint: that Brown repre-
sented judicial lawlessness and the illegitimate usurpation, by a coterie of unelected do-gooders in 
Washington, of six decades of constitutional precedent. 
 Perhaps because of this tacit agreement not to rehash unnecessarily Brown’s constitutional 
reasoning, that Brown “smacked of politics rather than law”131 has not, it seems to me, been em-
phasized in attempts to understand what Brown meant. Rather, as adherents of the social intuition-
ist model would be little surprised to discover, interpretations of Brown have tended to fall into 
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two camps, with liberals tending to proffer some form of anti-subordination reading (Brown bans 
the subjugation of minorities, and permits or requires race-conscious state action to remedy the 
violations Brown condemns) and conservatives tending to advance an anti-classification construc-
tion (Brown prohibits state action on the basis of race). The views expressed in the dueling opinions 
of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer in Parents Involved v. Seattle School District No. 1132 
comprise effusive illustrations of these two most common approaches. However, neither school of 
thought takes seriously the possibility that as a precedent, Brown means little to nothing at all.  
 I contend that Brown was solely intended and written to reach an outcome. And that out-
come was to the very narrow question, “Is compulsory racial segregation in public schools consti-
tutional?” The justices’ overarching objective in deciding the case was to achieve a unanimous 
front for the answer, “No.” Brown’s constitutional reasoning, such as it was, means little to nothing 
because the justices didn’t view the cogency or persuasiveness of the constitutional case as partic-
ularly important. Inducing acceptance of their “ipse dixit”133 was the order of the day. The justices 
cared about outcome, unanimity, tone, and constitutional rationale–––in that order. 
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Chapter 4. The Seven 
 The Court’s first Brown conference on the merits, in December 1952, had ended in indeci-
sion. On the advance recommendation of Justice Jackson, the conference suspended its usual prac-
tice of taking a formal vote at the end of discussion in order to determine which side had a majority 
and to assign the opinion for that majority to a particular member. Despite this agreement to hold 
off on a formal vote, the tenor of the conversation revealed that the justices fell into three groups. 
Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Reed clearly indicated that they believed the rulings of the federal 
district courts upholding compulsory segregation in public education were correct. Justices Black, 
Douglas, Burton, and Minton unequivocally stated they were prepared to vote that day to declare 
almost all forms of such segregation unconstitutional. Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Clark 
each expressed ambivalence about the correct resolution of the cases. Thus, at the end of the first 
Brown conference in December 1952, the Court appeared to be divided 4-3-2.134 It is impossible 
to know how Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Clark would have voted in Brown if required to in 
1953, but the Court’s resolution of a case touching upon related questions that spring suggests that 
if push came, Frankfurter and probably Jackson and Clark would have gone along with Black, 
Douglas, Burton, and Minton–––although without a single opinion for the Court. 
 That case was Terry v. Adams,135 colloquially known as the “Jaybird” primary case. The 
Jaybird Democratic Association held pre-primary elections for the Democratic Party in Fort Bend 
County, Texas, from which blacks were excluded from voting. Although the “Jaybirds” were tech-
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nically a private organization, in his opinion for the Court Justice Black concluded that the organ-
ization’s effective control over the Fort Bend County political process and its exclusion of blacks 
amounted to a circumvention of the Fifteenth Amendment. 
The only election that has counted in this Texas county for more than fifty years has been 
that held by the Jaybirds from which Negroes were excluded. The Democratic primary and 
the general election have become no more than the perfunctory ratifiers of the choice that 
has already been made in Jaybird elections from which Negroes have been excluded. It is 
immaterial that the state does not control that part of this elective process which it leaves 
for the Jaybirds to manage. The Jaybird primary has become an integral part, indeed the 
only effective part, of the elective process that determines who shall rule and govern in the 
county. The effect of the whole procedure, Jaybird primary plus Democratic primary plus 
general election, is to do precisely that which the Fifteenth Amendment forbids -- strip 
Negroes of every vestige of influence in selecting the officials who control the local county 
matters that intimately touch the daily lives of citizens.136 
 Terry v. Adams figures in the Brown story in part because it took up a disproportionate 
share of the justices’ time in spring 1953,137 preventing the justices from developing a consensus 
in Brown on the first hearing, and making a majority of the justices receptive to Frankfurter’s 
“filibustering” device of ordering rearguments on the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Terry also matters because the justices’ voting behavior in Terry presaged their voting be-
havior on the Brown merits after reargument. At the first Terry conference, five of the justices 
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voted to sustain the Jaybird primary. However, Frankfurter, who at the vote’s conclusion appar-
ently realized that his vote would be decisive in sustaining a practice that disenfranchised blacks, 
immediately switched his vote, making the tally 5-4 in favor of holding the Jaybird primary un-
constitutional. According to Klarman, 
Vinson, Reed, Minton, and Jackson planned to dissent, and Jackson drafted an opinion that 
criticized the majority for sacrificing ‘sound principle[s] of interpretation.’ Yet when Terry 
came down, only Minton dissented. Apparently the other three prospective dissenters, once 
deprived of control over the outcome, were unwilling to subordinate their political prefer-
ences to their legal principles. Similar considerations may explain the unanimity in 
Brown.138 
As we will see, the close division on the Brown merits that emerged among the justices at the 1952 
conference gave way to unanimity by the late spring of 1954. 
 On May 27, 1953, with just two “decision” Mondays139 left in the Court’s 1952 term, 
Frankfurter circulated to the justices a reargument order that he had drafted with the help of his 
law clerk, Alexander Bickel. The order posed five questions to the parties on the legislative history 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the powers of Congress and the Court to interpret it.140 After 
several minor changes in the order’s wording, five of the justices–––Black, Frankfurter, Jackson, 
Minton, and Burton–––voted to put Brown down for reargument.141 The revised order was issued 
on June 8, the last decision Monday of the 1952 term. 
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 Chief Justice Fred Vinson, one of the probable votes to sustain segregation, passed away 
unexpectedly on September 8, 1953. By recess appointment, President Eisenhower named then-
California Governor Earl Warren to head the Court on October 1, in time for Warren to participate 
in the entirety of the Court’s 1953 term. The significance of this shift in personnel was not lost on 
the justices, and its import was acutely apparent from the very beginning of the second Brown 
conference on December 12, 1953. Proceeding by justice, not year or conference, what follows is 
an attempted reconstruction and detailed analysis, on the basis of the justices’ conference notes 
that have survived to the present day, of the Brown conference discussions in both 1952 and 
1953.142 Two of the nine justices who joined the Court’s unanimous decision on May 17, 1954 
spoke at only one conference–––Warren in 1953, after his appointment to replace the late Vinson, 
and Black in 1952, since he was away to attend to an illness in his family the year after. 
WARREN 
 Speaking first at the second Brown conference in 1953, Warren began by repeating Justice 
Jackson’s suggestion from the conference the year prior that no formal vote on the merits be taken, 
but that the justices’ views on the merits “be discussed informally in view of their importance.”143 
“Realizing that when a person once announces he has reached a conclusion it is more difficult for 
him to change his thinking,”144 Warren later elaborated, “we decided not to make up our minds on 
that first conference day, but to talk it over, from week to week, dealing with different aspects of 
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it–––in groups,  over lunches, in conference. It was too important to hurry it.”145 Warren then 
commented upon the matter before the Court as follows: “separate but equal doctrine rests on basic 
premise that the Negro race is inferior -- that is the only way to sustain Plessy.”146 In other words, 
Plessy can be affirmed and segregation can be sustained only if the Court is willing to affirm white 
supremacy. “If we are to sustain seg[regation] we must do it on that basis.”147 Justice William O. 
Douglas records Warren as remarking that the “argument of the negro counsel proves that they are 
not inferior.” For constitutional support, Warren claimed that “the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments 
were intended to make equal those who were once slaves -- that view causes trouble perhaps -- but 
CJ does not see how segregation can be justified in this day and age -- he recognizes that time 
element is important in the deep south -- we must act but we should do it in a tolerant way.”148 
Schwartz contributes the following refinement of Warren’s closing remark: “the Chief concluded 
his presentation, ‘my instincts and feelings lead me to say that, in these cases, we should abolish 
the practice of segregation in the public schools - but in a tolerant way.’”149 To summarize, the 
substance of Warren’s statements is as follows. 
1. Plessy is based on white supremacy, and defensible only on the basis of white suprem-
acy. 
2. The example of the black counsel who argued the Brown cases for the NAACP proves 
that white supremacy is false. 
3. The framers of the Civil War Amendments intended those Amendments to secure 
equality for blacks. 
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4. Accordingly, segregation should be overturned. 
 This framing, though not singling out any particular persons from among the justices who 
might disagree with Warren, telegraphed a boldness belying its superficially modest and matter-
of-fact tone. First, the unequivocal and impersonal manner in which Warren conveyed his views 
might have caused–––and been intended to produce–––a chilling effect on the expression of con-
trary opinions. The justices’ conference notes do not record Warren qualifying these statements as 
his opinions (“it appears to me”, “I think”) or softening them with clauses suggesting probability 
(“it might be”, “it is probable”); all available sources record him presenting his views as firm facts. 
It is a cast of speech that while not quite quelling dissenting views, tends not to invite any. 
 Second, in tying Plessy to white supremacy, Warren placed on any justice who wished to 
speak favorably of Plessy a burden to defend white supremacy, or, at a minimum, to prove the two 
were severable. As Schwartz observed of Warren’s Brown conference delivery, “[b]y stating the 
matter in terms of the moral issue of racial inferiority, he placed those who might still lean toward 
Plessy on the defensive. Then he reached out to them by his stress on the need to proceed ‘in a 
tolerant way.’”150 While Warren’s final comment may have been intended as an olive branch to 
dissenting justices, it did not ameliorate the boldness or certainty of Warren’s contention that white 
supremacy and segregation were inextricably joined. 
 Third, in referencing the black NAACP counsel, Warren not only put a face on the victims 
of racial discrimination, but also suggested that these attorneys should be held in mind when pon-
dering any argument advanced in support of Plessy. The probable intention and foreseeable effect 
of personifying the targets of racial discrimination was to induce sympathy for blacks as a class. 
Moreover, summoning the recent memory of the passionate and adept black attorneys who humbly 
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requested a fair shake for themselves and their fellow African Americans at the bar of the Supreme 
Court was no doubt a persuasive evocation. Justices who might be inclined to speak in favor of 
Plessy were therefore put on notice by Warren’s opening remarks that any argument advanced in 
favor of Plessy would likely come across, to the Chief Justice at least, as an implicit denigration 
of the capable black attorneys who argued Brown before the Court.  
 Fourth, Warren’s casual and unequivocal claim that the Civil War Amendments were in-
tended to “make equal those who were once slaves” evinces a failure to grapple deeply with the 
considerable evidence presented by Virginia, South Carolina, and Alexander Bickel’s report on 
the history of the Fourteenth Amendment that cast doubt upon the proposition that the Amend-
ments’ “intention” to achieve equality “across the board” could be established to a high (or even 
middling) degree of probability. Rather, it seems Warren had almost categorically accepted the 
claims of the 1953 NAACP brief, which stated in part: 
… [T]he very purpose of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments was to 
effectuate a complete break with governmental action based on the established uses, cus-
toms and traditions of the slave era, to revolutionize the legal relationship between Negroes 
and whites, to destroy the inferior status of the Negro and to place him upon a plane of 
complete equality with the white man….151 
However, as the Virginia and South Carolina briefs effusively demonstrated, whether the “pur-
pose” referred to in the NAACP brief was that of the framers of those amendments or the legisla-
tors composing the ratifying state legislatures, virtually no evidence existed suggesting that any of 
those individuals desired or understood the Amendments to place blacks on a footing of “complete 
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equality” with whites.152 The point here is not to suggest Warren should have arbitrarily taken a 
different side in a debate between adversaries before the Court. Nor is it to say Warren would not 
have been justified in adopting several other of the persuasive historical and interpretative ration-
ales advanced by the NAACP. The point is instead that even under the best circumstances for the 
NAACP, the true historical “score,” as a majority of the justices153 would go on at the conference 
to acknowledge explicitly, was almost even, rather than an unequivocal win for the NAACP, as 
Warren’s view of the historical debate implied. Indeed, as will become clear in Chapter 7, in Jack-
son’s judgment–––which, given Jackson’s evident lack of emotional investment in segregation, 
there is good reason to trust on the matter of truth-seeking on this question–––the “score” actually 
favored the eventual losers in Brown. 
 As Kluger recounts, the NAACP strategy for the Brown rearguments had been to neutralize 
any historical theories that suggested the Fourteenth Amendment could not conceivably be read as 
a mandate of general equality in all facets of government action. The theory undergirding this 
strategy was that a finding of historical indeterminacy would liberate the justices to follow their 
sense of fairness. As Thurgood Marshall memorably–––and accurately–––predicted of the Brown 
battle of historical briefs: “A nothin’-to-nothin’ score means we win the ball game.”154 That War-
ren was convinced by (or, more likely, adopted as a historical rationale for pursuing his underlying 
egalitarian commitments) the NAACP’s weak historical argument regarding the Civil War 
Amendments, while remaining totally unreceptive to a mountain of contrary evidence, suggests 
confirmation bias (affirming only such evidence as is amenable to his preferred outcome) and 
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motivated reasoning (discounting, and failing to address in any respect, all countervailing evi-
dence) on Warren’s part. This surmise is strongly reinforced by a comparison of Jackson’s ac-
counting and reception of the historical evidence to Warren’s.155 
 Fifth, Warren’s emphatic embrace of the NAACP’s position instantly telegraphed to the 
justices that, provided the recent rehearings had not changed the minds of Black, Douglas, Burton, 
and Minton, there were now five votes–––a majority of the Court–––to hold segregation unconsti-
tutional. This likely altered the dynamic of the resulting discussions considerably. The three fence-
sitters from the 1952 arguments (Frankfurter, Jackson, and Clark) were now apprised of the over-
whelming likelihood that, if they continued to hew to the scruples they had aired a year earlier 
about the judicial basis for overturning segregation, they would end up doing so in dissent. These 
justices would, in other words, be omitted from the Court majority’s decision-making process in 
what every justice viewed as the most momentous case of the 1953 term, and what most justices 
suspected even at the time would turn out to be one of the most important set of cases to come 
before the Court during their tenures. Accordingly, or perhaps simply coincidentally, when it came 
time to speak, though the erstwhile fence-sitters all rehashed their concerns about the judicial case 
for ending segregation, each signaled far more jurisprudential flexibility than he had the year be-
fore. 
 Sixth, the behavior Warren displayed at the Brown conference and other justices’ later 
descriptions of Warren’s typical conference conduct and constitutional decision-making indicate 
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that the Chief Justice was frequently motivated by moral intuitions, rather than legal considera-
tions. As we saw above,156 Warren referred explicitly to his “instincts and feelings” in announc-
ing his position on the merits in Brown. If his statement is literal, it suggests that the social intui-
tionist model captures Warren’s decision-making on the Brown merits. Moreover, Justice Byron 
White, who joined the Court in 1962, would later describe Warren’s conference practices thus: 
“he would state his position and he usually had his mind made up. He usually had a pretty firm 
view of the case.”157 This observation implies that such reasons and evidence as the other justices 
presented in the conferences had little to no effect on Warren, indicating that he had “made up 
his mind” by means other than rational deduction or legal reasoning. White’s evocative descrip-
tion of Warren’s decision-making process is also consistent with this interpretation. Warren “was 
quite willing to listen to people at length,” White related, “but, when he made up his mind, it was 
like the sun went down, and he was very firm, very firm about it.”158 Additionally, Justice Abe 
Fortas, appointed in 1965, would remark of the Chief Justice’s conference leadership: “it was 
Warren’s great gift that, in presenting the case and discussing the case, he proceeded immedi-
ately and very calmly and graciously, to the ultimate values involved–––the ultimate constitu-
tional values, the ultimate human values.”159 Schwartz observes that Warren’s Brown conference 
presentation was an illustration of his characteristic pursuit of “ultimate human values” in decid-
ing constitutional questions. Warren 
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clearly stated the question before the Court in terms of the moral issue of racial inferior-
ity. Segregation, he told the Brethren, could be justified only by belief in the inherent in-
feriority of blacks and, if we follow Plessy, we have to do it upon that basis. Warren’s 
words went straight to the ultimate human values involved. In the face of such an ap-
proach, traditional legal arguments seemed inappropriate, almost pettifoggery.160 
To borrow Fortas’ words once more, “opposition based on the hemstitching and embroidery of the 
law appeared petty in terms of Warren's basic values approach.”161 Pedantic, legalist “hemstitching 
and embroidery” are certainly not the tools upon which intuitive decision-makers rely.  
 Knowledge of Warren’s “human values” approach increases the probability that Warren’s 
determination that the Civil War Amendments were intended to make blacks and whites perfectly 
equal was a consequence of motivated reasoning; in other words, Warren’s esteem for the “human 
value” of equality may have mediated his interpretation of the Amendments’ legislative history. 
The “human values” approach also indicates that the truly dispositive consideration for Warren in 
determining segregation’s constitutionality was his disgust with or indignation at assertions of 
black inferiority, and converse claims of “white supremacy,” as the bases for segregation. But 
perhaps the greatest proof of the applicability of the SI model to Warren’s behavior comes from 
comments Warren made to Kluger two decades after Brown. Warren conceded that desegregation 
had been, in his view, a foregone conclusion. “I don’t remember having any great doubts about 
which way [the decision in Brown] should go,” Warren remarked, pointing to the Court’s erosion 
of Plessy as an authoritative interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause in the 15 years prior to 
Brown. “On the merits, the natural, the logical, and practically the only way the case could be 





decided was clear. The question was how the decision was to be reached.”162 For Warren, as for 
many of the other justices, the salutary moral decision to end segregation preceded how that out-
come would be justified in constitutional terms to the public and the American bar. 
BLACK 
 At the 1952 conference, Black had been the first justice to speak in clear opposition to 
segregation. His remarks, as recorded by Justice Clark, appeared to be stream of conscience. He 
first distinguished the state cases from the federal one: “Not sure Congress is barred by same lim-
itations as states.” This remark suggests that Black thought that racial segregation violated equal 
protection and not necessarily due process, for the only formal restriction regarding individual 
rights that the federal Constitution imposes on the states and not on the national government is the 
equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. If Congress is not “barred by [the] same 
limitations as the states,” the difference in restriction would necessarily arise from the unequally 
distributed equal protection burden of the Fourteenth Amendment. Black then wondered aloud 
whether “segregation [is] per se [a] violation?” A violation of which specific clause, Clark’s notes 
do not specify; however, as noted above, we have good reason to believe Black was thinking of 
the equal protection. Black is recorded as then remarking, “to so hold would bring drastic things. 
S.C. [presumably, South Carolina] etc.” This comment, of course, reflected Black’s concern with 
probable southern noncompliance and perhaps even outright resistance to a desegregation ruling. 
The remark also foreshadowed Warren’s peculiar choice of constitutional rationale in the eventual 
Brown opinion, which refrained from declaring segregation “per se” (intrinsically) unconstitu-
tional. Continuing, Black stated that he “do[es]n’t believe in injunctions,” presumably indicating 
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that he was opposed to the judiciary becoming involved in the tedium of enforcement-by-decree. 
His next comment, however, is crucial: “at first blush I would have said it was up to Congress. But 
if we can declare confiscation or other laws unconstitutional than we can segregation.” This remark 
is worth elaborating upon at some length. 
 “Confiscation” refers to the congressional policy, during and following the Civil War, of 
“sweeping confiscation programs designed to seize the private property of enemy citizens on a 
massive scale.” This regime commenced with the passage of the Second Confiscation Act in July 
1862 and “permitted the Union government to seize all the real and personal property of anyone 
taking up arms against the government, anyone aiding the rebellion directly, or anyone offering 
aid or comfort to the rebellion.”163 Though it would be another seven years before the federal 
judiciary began to apply the law, a year later, the Kentucky Court of Appeals ruled in Norris v. 
Doniphan that the statute effected an unconstitutional “derogation of the personal rights and rights 
of property.” In so holding, the court observed that “[c]onfiscation had not been recognized by the 
law of nations since the eighteenth century, and since then ‘nearly a century’s advance of com-
merce, civilization, and Christianity’ had rendered ‘the barbarous rules of the past intolerable.’”164  
 The federal judiciary agreed. Beginning in the late 1860s, in a series of complex cases 
touching upon the property rights of former rebels whose estates had been subject to confiscation, 
the Court circumscribed the Act’s constitutional basis and deliberately eroded the law’s efficacy. 
Bigelow v. Forrest,165 decided in 1869, announced the beginning of the end for confiscation. There, 
the Court incorporated into its construction of the Second Confiscation Act an “explanatory reso-
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lution” that President Lincoln, under threat of vetoing the entire bill, had managed to force Con-
gress to adopt at the time of the bill’s passage. Lincoln had been concerned that confiscation ran 
afoul of the constitutional prohibition that “no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of 
Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted,”166 by denying to a rebel’s 
posterity the right to inherit his estate. Lincoln’s “explanatory resolution” touted “temporary con-
fiscation”167: the confiscation of the life estate of the rebel, with the fee remaining in the rebel’s 
heirs. Though lower federal courts populated by Radical judges attempted to undo Lincoln’s evis-
ceration of the Act, in 1870 the Court converted Lincoln’s limitation into constitutional law.  
 Thus, in Bigelow, the Court ruled that “the U.S. could seize property only for the ‘life of 
the person for whose act it had been seized’”: all sales of confiscated properties were only of “a 
life interest” in the confiscated estates that expired with the life of the rebel. “After Bigelow,” 
Daniel Hamilton remarks, “permanent, uncompensated property confiscation for disloyalty was 
practically impossible and conceptually illegitimate.”168 However, controversies stemming from 
the market uncertainty created by Bigelow continued to percolate up to the Court through the turn 
of the century. The Court was under periodic pressure to clarify the contours and permissible lo-
gistics of temporary confiscation. Though Bigelow had introduced a rule intended to achieve jus-
tice and ensure conformity to the Constitution, it had also opened a Pandora’s box of property 
litigation. The next term, in Miller v. United States,169 the Court palliated some of those uncertain-
ties and further eroded confiscation by pinning it squarely on Congress’ Article I war power. Con-
fiscation “was not upheld by the [Court] so much as subsumed within existing rights recognized 
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by the laws of war. . . . The Court treated intensely controversial legislation as settled law, stripping 
away any larger implications for ideas of property.” Miller circumscribed Confiscation to time of 
war, and established a constitutional foothold for restoring to erstwhile rebels some of their re-
voked property rights in time of peace. 
 Black’s seemingly offhand remark about “confiscation” at the first Brown conference takes 
on new meaning when bathed in the light of the country’s–––and especially the Court’s–––expe-
rience with confiscation, which stretches back to the polity’s founding. Bigelow was to Confisca-
tion as Brown was to segregation. Like segregation, confiscation was underpinned by precedent–
––legislative tradition–––and moral (or at least ideological) appeals. The first great American ex-
periment with confiscation occurred during the Revolutionary War, when Loyalist “property had 
been permanently seized, as part of a republican vision of the overriding importance of allegiance 
to the polity.”170 “A great deal of Loyalist property was seized forever, without compensation or 
recourse to the courts.”171 In the eighteenth century, confiscation was therefore a legal tool used to 
punish disloyal members of the community for failing to support the nascent liberal republicanism 
of the victorious American rebels, whose military victory consecrated rebellion as Revolution and, 
a few years hence, Founding. Four generations later, confiscation was resurrected to punish rebels 
whose defeat condemned their appeal to Heaven as illegal rebellion. By this later date, the legal 
circumstances had changed: the Constitution, written and ratified after the first bout of confisca-
tion, condemned its injustice. So as in Brown with segregation, in Bigelow the Court announced 
the end of confiscation, but would take close to three decades to sort out what that end would look 
like concretely. 
                                                
170 Ibid. 
171 Id., at 254. 
 
103 
 Thus, in surveying the landscape of judicial opportunity at the 1952 Brown conference, 
Justice Black was probably thinking of the Court’s first real experience with superintending, over 
a period of decades, constitutional rights to overcome a specific legislative injustice. Black ap-
peared confident that the parallels between confiscation and segregation boded well for the Court’s 
likelihood of success if it intervened in the latter. Indeed, the Court would probably be on stronger 
footing in trying to end segregation, given that its primary target would be state legislation, a less 
formidable adversary than a national policy supported by an active congressional majority. Black’s 
remark further hinted at the possibility that he was contemplating that a judicial ruling to end 
segregation would foment a long stream of litigation to adjudicate the logistics of enforcement, 
just as Bigelow did for ending Confiscation. Indeed, immediately prior to Black’s reference to 
Confiscation, Clark records him as saying: “one of worse features is courts are put on battle front–
––don’t believe in injunctions–––”, lending credence to the notion that Black’s thinking about 
Confiscation included a weighing of the problems of enforcement. Whatever the drawbacks of 
enforcement, however, Black appeared satisfied that the Constitution compelled desegregation. “I 
am compelled for myself to believe the idea of segregation is because negro is inferior. Nor can I 
escape that Amendments had as their basic purpose the abolition of such castes. That is what is 
behind opposition now.”172 
 Clark records Black rephrasing the previous thought and adding an important qualification. 
“If I have to meet it, the purpose of the law is to discriminate on account of color–––that the 
Amendments were designed to stop it–––unless the long line of decisions banned this course–––I 
don’t think Congress went as far as they thought Amendments went–––”. To begin at the end, 
                                                




Black’s comment about Congress is ambiguous, but the most plausible interpretation is that he 
believed Congress’ statutory actions, e.g., in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and segregating 
the D.C. public schools, were not exhaustive of Congress’ understanding of the reach and effect 
of the Civil War Amendments, nor dispositive for determining the same over eighty years later. In 
other words, Black might say, the Fourteenth Amendment is not coextensive with the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866, though the former was adopted and ratified to remove any doubt about the constitu-
tionality of the latter. Furthermore, that the same Congress that adopted the Fourteenth Amend-
ment decided to segregate the D.C. schools does not prove that segregation is constitutional: 
though Congress meant to abolish castes, perhaps it did not understand that segregation in educa-
tion was precisely the kind of legislation it wished ultimately to proscribe. 
 Whatever Black’s meaning in pronouncing on Congress and the Amendments, in the words 
that Clark underlined, Black seemed to be grappling with stare decisis. After expressing his pre-
ferred outcome unequivocally and even repetitiously, he appeared to articulate the possibility that 
the weight of precedent might tip the balance of judicial factors toward affirming Plessy, though 
either his comment to that effect or Clark’s recording of it is cryptic. That the words were under-
lined, however, suggests Black delivered them with emphasis, and emphasis implies they formed 
part of a coherent thought, pointing to the likelihood that Clark’s diligence in recording comments 
slipped at this point in the conference. So the remarks leave the impression that Black was saying 
that segregation is unconstitutional, and that he would so vote unless he could be persuaded that 
the weight of precedent was so overwhelming as to make it imprudent to do so. Black concludes: 
“I have to vote that way–––”.173 
 Justice Black’s train of thought can be summarized as follows. 




1. In permitting or enforcing segregation, Congress might be subject to a less exacting 
constitutional hurdle than the states because Congress is not formally subject to the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
2. Therefore, equal protection is the likely ground for overturning segregation. 
3. Does the Constitution outlaw segregation per se? To so hold would rouse resistance 
from certain states. 
4. Congress’ inaction invites the Court’s intervention. 
5. The Court’s nineteenth century experience with confiscation is a precedent for inter-
vening today to secure a constitutional right in a politically fraught area of law backed 
by the weight of history and tradition. 
6. Segregation owes its existence to the belief that blacks are inferior. Segregation creates 
castes, and the purpose of the Civil War Amendments was to abolish such castes. 
7. If, however, overturning segregation is “banned” by “a long line of decisions,” Black 
might acquiesce in sustaining the practice. 
8. The 39th Congress’ statutory actions are not exhaustive of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
meaning. 
9. The cumulative effect of the foregoing considerations makes Black feel compelled to 
vote to overturn segregation. 
The movement of Black’s comments begins with constitutional reasoning: what does the Consti-
tution say, and to whom does it apply? In his musings about Congress, Black seemed to conclude 
that segregation runs more afoul of equal protection than due process. Without betraying evidence 
that he had yet decided on the merits, he next reflected on a rationale: does segregation itself violate 
 
106 
some part of the Constitution, presumably (given his emphasis on the difference between the con-
stitutional restrictions on the state and federal governments) equal protection? Black immediately 
recognized that “to so hold would bring drastic things,” such as the Deep South, e.g. “S.C.”, South 
Carolina. He then delivered the first hint that he had already made up his mind on the merits by 
saying that because Congress had not acted, the Court should. None of steps 1-3 compel this con-
clusion, and Black did not divulge its putative basis until step 6. The justice next countenanced the 
challenge of enforcement: in pursuing a program of desegregation, the federal judiciary could 
count only on its own powers. This realization raised the specter of judicial incapacity and failure. 
Black quickly overcame this unattractive prospect, however, by recalling the Court’s experience 
with confiscation. “[I]f we can declare confiscation or other laws unconstitutional than we can 
segregation.” Then, as if this sudden conviction that the judiciary is capable of achieving the result 
he desired to reach liberated him to announce the outcome he favored, he did so. Next, he articu-
lated a caveat: the Court should dismantle segregation unless the force of precedent was too strong. 
Finally, in reaching his proffered outcome, he reiterated the sense of compulsion to which he al-
luded earlier in his remarks: “I have to vote that way.” 
 Much of Black’s train of thought, in particular, steps 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8, exhibit evidence of 
straightforward reasoning, unmediated by intuition. In these instances, Black appears to be reflect-
ing dispassionately and with calculative effort on constitutional principles or probable conse-
quences of possible courses of action. However, steps 4, 5, and 7 appear to be better captured by 
the social intuitionist model.174 After the cursory legalistic considerations expressed in steps 1 and 
                                                
174 The psychology by which the mind can process any normative premise, even if that premise is ensconced in non-
moral conceptions, such as an institution’s mission or role in the political system, can fall under the social intuition-
ist model, since the process by which the normative commitment exercises influence over reasoning is the same as 
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2, steps 3, 4 and 5 comprise a brainstorm on the possible impediments to desegregation. In steps 1 
and 2, Black identified a prospective constitutional authority for deciding Brown without articu-
lating a constitutional rationale under that authority. In step 3, the justice mixed his musing on the 
basis for a constitutional holding (does segregation inherently violate some clause of the Consti-
tution?) with strategic calculations about enforcement: “to so hold would bring drastic things.” 
Step 3, therefore, operated as a segue from reasoning about a constitutional basis for overturning 
segregation to countenancing strategic concerns about enforcement, which continued with step 4 
(whether Congress should or will act instead) and 5 (judicial precedent for taking such action).  
 The implications of these first five steps are as follows. First, Black had already made up 
his mind prior to steps 1 and 2 that segregation was unconstitutional, for the questions he implicitly 
posed presuppose the normative premise that segregation should be overruled. To ask, “how can 
the Court rid D.C. of segregation when Congress is not subject formally to the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?” and, “should the Court say segregation is inherently un-
constitutional and directly overrule Plessy’s rule of ‘separate but equal’?” is to have already an-
swered in the affirmative the more primordial inquiry of whether segregation should go: these are 
questions about means, not ends. Second, the palpable uncertainty that Black telegraphed about a 
constitutional rationale for stamping out Congress’ policy of segregation in D.C. suggests that it 
was not a constitutional argument that ultimately convinced him that segregation in D.C. was un-
constitutional. Rather, Black’s uncertainty at the 1952 conference indicates that he harbored a mo-
tivation to develop a rationale that would support his conclusion, but had not yet succeeded in 
doing so. The internal struggle signaled by the justice’s uncertainty probably arose from a clash 
                                                
that by which an explicitly moral principle or consideration does: as an explanation for (and perhaps as ex ante evi-
dence for the existence of) an underlying sentiment cascading to a particular judgment. Reasons are then sought and 
usually discovered to rationalize this outcome (e.g., our institutional mission compels it). 
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between Black’s desire to achieve uniform outcomes on the state and federal segregation questions 
and the obstacles imposed by his judicial philosophy. 
 With respect to using the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as a basis for over-
turning segregation sanctioned by Congress, Black’s hands were probably tied by his famous an-
tipathy toward substantive due process. Hutchinson speculates, for example, that Black’s well-
known distaste for the fundamental liberty doctrine and for the “due process philosophy” of such 
cases as Meyer v. Nebraska,175 Bartels v. Iowa,176 Pierce v. Society of Sisters,177 and Farrington v. 
Tokushige178 may have had a decisive impact on Warren’s writing of the Bolling opinion for the 
Court. Warren produced two drafts of the Bolling opinion, relying in the first upon a “fundamental 
liberty” rationale that cited those cases as precedent, though in the second omitting supplanting 
the liberty account with the now-famous “reverse incorporation” theory.179 Though the evidence 
is circumstantial, Hutchinson conjectures that either Frankfurter or Black convinced Warren to 
take a different approach. Douglas, for what his assessment is worth, believed Black was probably 
responsible.180 In any case, sixteen months before Warren would commence the opinion-writing 
process in Brown, Black was already expressing ambivalence about the rationale for demolishing 
segregation commanded by the federal government. Over a decade hence, while dissenting in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut,181 Black would distinguish what he defended as the valid due process theory 
                                                
175 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (overturning on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds a state law proscribing Ger-
man language instruction in public and private schools). 
176 262 U.S. 404 (1923) (effectively a companion case to Meyer, decided the same term and “upon authority of 
Meyer”). 
177 268 U.S. 512 (1925) (invalidating on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds a state law prohibiting pri-
mary and secondary school aged students from attending private in lieu of public schools). 
178 273 U.S. 284 (1927) (invalidating on Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds a statute of the then-
Territory of Hawaii requiring a permit to teach foreign language instruction in public schools). 
179 Hutchinson (1980, 45-48). 
180 Id., at 48. 
181 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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upon which Bolling relied from that the Griswold majority advanced: “Bolling v. Sharpe merely 
recognized what had been the understanding from the beginning of the country, an understanding 
shared by many of the draftsmen of the Fourteenth Amendment, that the whole Bill of Rights, 
including the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, was a guarantee that all persons would 
receive equal treatment under the law.”182 But Black had available neither this rationalization, nor 
Bolling’s eventual “it would be unthinkable”183 theory of reverse incorporation, when he spoke at 
the December 1952 Brown conference. 
 There are good reasons, moreover, to believe that Black was foregoing his normal consti-
tutional approach, and was therefore not engaged in constitutional reasoning, but instrumental cal-
culations with a pre-determined outcome in mind, in delivering his comments about the Constitu-
tion’s limits on the power of Congress to impose caste legislation. Black’s literal or absolutist 
approach to reading the Constitution posited that legislative judgments can and should be voided 
only when the plain or literal text of the Constitution clearly condemned them, and when there was 
no text to the contrary, legislative judgments should be tolerated, even when they were unwise. 
Black’s dissent in Griswold, in which he argued that the Fourteenth Amendment protected from 
state encroachment only those rights explicitly ennumerated in the Bill of Rights (necessarily ex-
cluding, of course, those of the Ninth Amendment), is a representative illustration of Black’s tex-
tualism. There, Black stated: 
I do not believe that we are granted power by the Due Process Clause or any other consti-
tutional provision or provisions to measure constitutionality by our belief that legislation 
                                                
182 Id., at 487, fn 1. 
183 347 U.S. 497, at 500. 
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is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or accomplishes no justifiable purpose, or is offen-
sive to our own notions of “civilized standards of conduct.” Such an appraisal of the wis-
dom of legislation is an attribute of the power to make laws, not of the power to interpret 
them. The use by federal courts of such a formula or doctrine or whatnot to veto federal or 
state laws simply takes away from Congress and States the power to make laws based on 
their own judgment of fairness and wisdom and transfers that power to this Court for ulti-
mate determination–––a power which was specifically denied to federal courts by the con-
vention that framed the Constitution.184 
The appropriate method for altering the Constitution “to keep [it] in tune with the times,” Black 
later declares, is not judicial review but the Article V Amendment process. “That method of change 
was good for our Fathers, and being somewhat old-fashioned I must add it is good enough for 
me.”185 
 These dicta illuminate Black’s remarks at the December 1952 Brown conference. The last 
of these pronouncements explains Black’s emphatic position that the Fourteenth Amendment out-
lawed segregation: he not only had textual evidence in the Amendment to invalidate segregation, 
but also believed the intent of the Amendment’s framers was to abolish caste legislation, whether 
or not they understood that segregation in particular belonged to that category of laws. The framers 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, in other words, had changed the Constitution to keep it in tune with 
the Union’s victory in the Civil War–––and to make constitutionally explicit a certain commitment 
that had long been foundational in the American regime, but had not been constitutionally opera-
                                                
184 381 U.S. 479, at 513. 
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tionalized: legal equality. That, for Black, was dispositive for the unconstitutionality of state seg-
regation laws. The former dictum, meanwhile, helps to account for Black’s anxiety about the Con-
stitution’s limits on Congress: his comments suggest he felt to some degree genuinely restrained 
by the lack of a clear textual warrant or evidence of historical purpose in the constitutional re-
strictions on the federal government, all of which predate the Civil War. But, as Chief Justice 
Warren went on to note in Bolling, perhaps at Black’s behest, and perhaps precisely because of the 
associate justice’s disquiet in the face of this constitutional conundrum that his usual interpretative 
approach could not resolve, “it would be unthinkable,” absurd, and, most importantly, bad judicial 
politics to eliminate segregation in a region of the country where resistance would be maximal, 
and not to do so where it would be minimal. 
 Whatever Black’s motive, his remarks prior to step 6 indicate that he lacked a constitutional 
rationale for overturning segregation in D.C., and that he possessed a motivation or desire to do 
so. The closest he came to providing a constitutional case for invalidating segregation imposed by 
Congress is by pointing to the precedent of confiscation, which, it turns out, is a revealing selec-
tion: though Black phrased the point as one of capacity (“if we can declare confiscation or other 
laws unconstitutional, then we can segregation”), the thought itself seemed to assuage his qualms 
about the lack of a constitutional theory to buttress invalidating segregation. Black’s next move 
coheres with this interpretation, for immediately after referencing confiscation, Black proceeded 
seamlessly to step 6, his constitutional argument for overturning segregation imposed by the state 
governments. It was as though Black felt the question of the constitutionality of congressionally-
sanctioned segregation had been disposed of by his discussion of confiscation. This behavior is 
consistent with Haidt’s layman conceptualization of motivated reasoning, discussed above: if the 
motivated reasoner wants to believe something, he asks himself, “Can I believe it?” If he doesn’t 
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want to believe something, he asks, “Must I believe it?”186 Apparently prevented by his judicial 
philosophy from answering in the affirmative to the first form of the “Can I?” question (i.e., “Can 
I believe the Constitution imposes restrictions on Congress that would allow us to overturn segre-
gation?”), Black appeared unconsciously to reformulate the question to a lower threshold of diffi-
culty: “Can we convincingly hold that the Constitution imposes the same restrictions on Congress 
as it does on the States?” Consistent with Haidt’s predictions, Black seemed to locate one piece of 
evidence (confiscation) that allowed him to reach the answer he sought, an answer that released 
him from the cognitive dissonance of being stuck with an undesirable conclusion. As Haidt says, 
“you only need one key to unlock the handcuffs of must.”187 
 An obvious objection to this interpretation of Black’s conference remarks is that the deci-
sion-making Black evinced was not moral or psychological in nature but simply doctrinal: he 
sought unity and coherence for the constitutional standards controlling all levels of government. I 
do not dispute that Black’s comments about the applicability of the Civil War Amendments to 
segregation legislation (in particular steps 6 through 9) are consistent with a legal model of judicial 
decision-making, which corresponds to the rationalist model of moral decision-making. In these 
later considerations, Black appeared to be operating almost entirely deductively and dispassion-
ately. Indeed, he even countenanced sustaining segregation if the precedential weight behind it is 
too great to be overturned (step 7). But, Black’s conclusion about the consequences of the Four-
teenth Amendment for state-sponsored segregation, and his apparent overriding commitment to 
constitutional coherence, induced a motivation that permitted him to bypass, perhaps unwittingly, 
                                                




his usual interpretative approach. In this limited but, I believe, important respect, the record of 
Black’s decision-making at the first Brown conference adheres to the social intuitionist model. 
 Hockett discounts attitudinal accounts of Black’s vote on the basis of Black’s “racist back-
ground” and membership in the Ku Klux Klan. He instead argues that Black’s behavior can be 
better accounted for by the “constitutive model” of judicial decision-making.188 A “constitutive 
understanding of institutions” holds, against crassly attitudinal models of judicial behavior, that 
judges “‘associate certain actions with certain situations by rules of appropriateness. What is ap-
propriate for a particular person in a particular situation is defined by the political and social system 
and transmitted through socialization.’ While ‘self-interest undoubtedly permeates politics, action 
is often based more on discovering the normatively appropriate behavior’” than on other processes, 
e.g., balancing likely risk and reward, or consulting the judge’s personal policy preferences or 
moral values. “‘As a result, political behavior … can be described in terms of duties, obligations, 
roles, and rules.’” The judiciary’s role in the broader American regime might be articulated as 
“mission” or “an identifiable purpose or shared normative goal that, at a particular historical mo-
ment in a particular context, becomes routinized within an identifiable corporate form as a result 
of the efforts of certain groups of people.” Justices “discover that normatively appropriate behavior 
requires that decisions regarding constitutional rights . . . be informed by polity principles, that is, 
a developed theory of democratic governance, which implies a particular ‘attitude–––critical or 
trusting–––toward legislative and interest group politics.’”189 In other words, Hockett distinguishes 
constitutive concerns from attitudinal motives, and argues that much of the observed behavior that 
                                                
188 Hockett (2013, 115-121). 
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I contend is subsumed under the social intuitionist model is in fact a manifestation of the influence 
of constitutive concerns. 
 Hockett’s elaboration of the “constitutive model” and its applicability to Black prefaces 
Hockett’s contention that in Brown, the NAACP succeeded in persuading the justices that “segre-
gation laws were an integral part of a long-standing effort in the South to subjugate African Amer-
icans,” thereby “invit[ing] the justices to regard American racial politics as hierarchical, albeit, 
amenable to–––and in need of–––judicial redress.”190 But Black’s December 1952 conference re-
marks–––indeed, the only ones he made at either of the Brown conferences, since he missed the 
1953 conference due to an illness in his family–––offer scant evidence for Hockett’s claim. The 
evidence much more strongly supports the proposition that Black’s particular judicial philosophy 
compelled him to accept the NAACP’s gloss on the purpose of the Civil War Amendments. While 
Black stated his belief that segregation was predicated upon the idea of “negro [] inferior[ity],” he 
did not speak of any special judicial mission or duty to correct this fallacious notion, or legislation 
based on it. In keeping with his judicial temperament and philosophy, Black instead addressed 
himself to the purpose and text of the Civil War Amendments. His obviously motivated thoughts 
on Congress were, of course, the exception here. But the latter stages of his remarks suggest that, 
at the very minimum, Black adhered to his famous interpretative approach, and that, more likely 
than not, his judicial philosophy was cause of rather than cover for the outcome he espoused. 
 While I disagree with Hockett that attitudinalism cannot account for much, if not most, of 
the justices’ behavior in Brown, I agree with him that it is likely that some of the justices’ attitudes 
derive from “constitutive understanding of institutions” that Hockett raises. Indeed, a process of 
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socialization with and among the other justices (not to mention the justices’ elite D.C. social mi-
lieu) invariably conditioned them to be more responsive to certain legal, constitutional, and moral 
appeals, and less responsive to others. The NAACP’s convincing presentation of historical data 
linking laws requiring segregation to Southern whites’ efforts to preserve social inequality between 
the races and soaring pronouncements on blacks’ aspirations to “join” fully the mainstream and 
middle classes of American society no doubt elicited a number of powerful intuitions in the jus-
tices’ minds that segregation was offensive, unjust, and wrongheaded. But my argument is that for 
many of the justices, these epiphanies came first, and the inference (or rationalization) that the 
injustice or moral offensiveness of segregation means government was without legislative author-
ity to impose it, came second. There is no evidence from the 1952 Brown conference that this was 
the case for Black on segregation’s constitutional merits, but there is plenty of evidence the many 
of the justices experienced that process at the conferences. 
 Finally, an advantage of the social intuitionist model is that it can provide a theory of cau-
sality by which the constitutive commitments Hockett attributes to a sense of mission or duty affect 
a judge’s decision-making. As Joshua Greene and colleagues have shown,191 deontological moral 
decision-making is driven primarily by emotional responses; therefore, deontological “reasoning” 
is subsumed by the social intuitionist model. Hockett’s constitutive and institutional principles 
tend to be deontological, though they can be given utilitarian justifications. To the extent such 
principles rely upon deontological argumentation, however, they conform to the social intuitionist 
model. If a judge accepts constitutive or institutional principle X as controlling under certain con-
ditions, unless he has done so unwillingly or begrudgingly (as sometimes inferior court judges 
must and do), it is likely that he has invested himself emotionally in securing that principle–––
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even if only to a very small degree. Thus, the inculcation of institutional norms, even utilitarian 
ones, possesses an affective component. As an example, if principle X is–––a la John Hart Ely192 
or, for that matter, Earl Warren–––a judicial responsibility to lubricate the machinery of democ-
racy, and keep clear access to its electoral channels, when the judge acts to secure that principle, 
the cause of his doing so is the sentiment or intuition of the justice and appropriateness of the 
principle to a particular application. No aspect of rational deduction permits the judge to pick that 
principle among competing alternatives. Rational deduction might help the judge determine when 
and how to apply the principle, but not to choose the principle. Socialization, legal education, life 
and career experiences, or membership within a political or ideological faction are the sources of 
such commitments. But at bottom, even self-contained, coherent systems of judicial ideology, e.g., 
Black’s “textualist” interpretative approach, are systems of rules reversed engineered based on 
their capacity to produce outcomes, from the perspective of the user, that on average achieve a 
higher degree of satisfaction than do those of any other available “philosophy.” 
REED 
 At the 1952 conference, Justice Reed had spoken third after Chief Justice Vinson and Jus-
tice Black. Following such an emphatic statement of anti-segregationist views, Reed, who believed 
segregation to be constitutional, was put immediately on the defensive. Clark records the first 
words out of Reed’s mouth as, “I approach from a different view.”193 The thrust of the remarks 
that follow is that state-mandated segregation meets rational basis scrutiny. “Negroes have not 
been assimilated. There has been some amalgamation of the races as shown by the counsel who 
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appeared here. There is a reasonable body of opinion that segregation is beneficial to both.” Clark 
then records Reed as saying that there had been improvement for blacks in recent years: “Think of 
advancement: – transportation, voting – FEPC [Fair Employment Practice Committee]194 etc.” 
Reed appeared to suggest both that preserving racial distinctiveness is a legitimate government 
purpose, and that, against the preceding suggestion of Justice Black, segregation was not rooted in 
some kind of white supremacist ideology: after all, Reed implied, segregation was coeval with 
recent “advancement[s]” that had benefited blacks. Presumably, Reed argued, a government policy 
promoting racial “integrity” through separation could coexist benignly with government policies 
improving the lot of blacks. That this is the implication of Reed’s opening remarks is reinforced 
by the focus of his subsequent comments on whether Plessy’s command of separate but equal had 
been fulfilled in practice. 
 “We don’t have same problems as South (in Ky.) Facilities not equal in Ky but better than 
they are in South,” Reed stated. Reed’s next remark, while more ambiguous, nonetheless appears 
to evince a preference for deferring to the legislative powers on the question of what for Reed 
seemed to be an area of social policy: “If legislature is to pass on questions then that is place for it 
to be done.” Turning to the constitutional rationale for sustaining or upending segregation, Reed 
contended, “Constitution not fixed.” The implication, then, is that Reed was purporting to eschew 
arguments rooted in history or precedent for sustaining segregation: he believed that Plessy was 
good law, not simply an unfortunate precedent that, for prudential reasons, must nonetheless be 
endured. Reed next applied Plessy to the facts of Brown and other state cases. The Court “[s]hould 
                                                
194 Created by President Roosevelt in 1941 to enforce Executive Order 8802, which banned racial discrimination in 
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allow time for equalizing the opportunity, the facilities – may be take 10 years to accomplish in 
Va,” he states. “I would uphold separate & equal.”195  
 Reed’s train of thought, slightly elaborated, is as follows. 
1. Although some racial amalgamation has taken place, blacks and whites have not mixed 
extensively.  
2. That they have not done so suggests perhaps it is better that they not. 
3. That at least some “reasonable people” of good will approve of segregation suggests that 
it is benign and legitimate. 
4. Segregation’s benign character is demonstrated by the fact that it has endured at the same 
time as efforts have been made to help blacks. 
5. There is regional variation in the extent to which Plessy’s command of separate but equal 
has been fulfilled in practice. In the border states (e.g., Reed’s home state of Kentucky), 
the facilities to which blacks have access under segregation are superior to their equivalents 
in the Deep South. 
6. If the legislatures (presumably, both state and federal) wish to increase the degree of facility 
equalization, or to create a more egalitarian rule than Plessy’s to superintend or even elim-
inate segregation, they may do so, but the Court should not require them to. 
7. Both the existence and degree of segregation are properly objects of legislative discretion. 
8. The practical requirements of the Constitution indeed change over time. But they have not 
changed so far as to obliterate Plessy’s basic correctness. 
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9. The Court should affirm Plessy and require greater compliance with the “equal” half of its 
command, although afford the states time for the equalization to occur–––up to a decade 
or more in some parts of the South. 
An unstated presumption underlies Reed’s remarks: forced separation of the races is compatible 
with equal treatment for both. Reed seemed to reach this conclusion due to intuitions induced by 
observations such as those presented in steps 1, 3, and 4, which suggest that Reed did not detect 
animus, or the imputation of the inferiority of blacks, in segregation. Step 1 indicates that Reed 
viewed widespread integration as difficult or impossible, if not dangerous. So, the justice seemed 
to be saying, regardless of normative considerations, the “natural” or inevitable tendency for 
whites, at least, was to wish to live separately from blacks. Steps 3 and 4 appear to be Reed’s way 
of claiming that segregation was not motivated by racial malice, as the NAACP had argued during 
the hearings: how could racial animus have undergirded segregation when the latter coexisted with 
efforts to help blacks? The justice therefore seemed to conclude that segregation was a legitimate 
democratic manifestation of a racial majority’s desire to live separately from a racial minority, and 
perhaps even of the majority’s desire to maintain its racial distinctiveness or “purity.” Reed ap-
peared to feel that it was “beneficial to both” races that such distinctiveness remain, though he 
attributed this view to an impersonal “reasonable body of opinion” and declined or failed to pro-
duce any supporting argument. Instead, the only evidence he presented for this view came in step 
1, which highlighted the difficulties of “assimilation.” 
 Reed’s comments at the 1952 hearings are remarkable for the degree of the virtually un-
mediated intuitive decision-making they telegraph. Speaking after Black, Reed was immediately 
on the defensive, and his comments appear directed toward rebutting Black’s claim of personal 
knowledge that segregation was predicated on the inferiority of blacks. For this reason, it seems, 
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Reed argued that separation is an accommodation of difference, not an imputation of inferiority to 
one race by another, and adduced evidence for that proposition first by way of a naked appeal to 
ethos, to the authority of a “body of reasonable opinion,” and second by pointing to contemporary 
developments that he interpreted as proving segregation and helping blacks are not mutually ex-
clusive. Reed, in other words, seemed to harbor only benign or neutral feelings toward segregation, 
and bristled at the implication that those, who, like him, saw it as basically beneficial and reason-
able, might be motivated by racial hatred.  
 Reed then spoke to his own personal experience as a citizen of a border state, perhaps to 
offer a counterweight to and partial refutation of the authoritativeness of the revelations of Justice 
Black, one of the Court’s three (including Reed) members from a border or southern state. By 
highlighting Kentucky’s more egalitarian segregation regime, Reed implied that Plessy can be just, 
if implemented correctly: that is, with a bona fide intent to provide equal facilities. Finally, Reed’s 
pronouncement about allowing states many more years to comply with Plessy reinforce this con-
struction of his preceding remarks. In sum, Reed’s comments possess a distinctively apologetic, 
rationalizing cast: he sought to defend a practice that apparently never inconvenienced him or 
offended his sensibilities and in which he detected from personal experience not racial animus but 
a pragmatic accommodation of the reality of racial differences and, as he implied, the apparently 
“natural” and healthy desire of members of both races to preserve that distinctiveness. Because of 
Reed’s evidently positive history with segregation, it seems that he remained thoroughly impervi-
ous to the NAACP’s argument that the practice had originated in racist southern whites’ desire to 
confine blacks to second class citizenship. An experientially-mediated emotional profile suscepti-
ble of producing the kind of intuitions that could have induced Reed to reach contrary conclusions, 
it would appear, was simply lacking in the justice’s mind. 
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 Reed’s comments can therefore be characterized by hypothesis 1, intuition as causative of 
reasoning. The examples Reed picked to defend segregation imply that Reed saw himself as a 
reasonable person of good faith, and moreover had interpreted the NAACP’s arguments and some 
of Black’s remarks as imputing the opposite qualities to individuals who took a different view of 
the constitutionality, justice, or wisdom of segregation. It is impossible from the conference notes 
to know what, if any, emotions Reed experienced as he delivered his remarks, but it would be very 
difficult to square such remarks with a totally dispassionate, calm delivery. The justice’s state-
ments suggest that some indignation and spiritedness were likely. Reed’s comments also indicate 
that he had engaged in some degree of confirmation bias as he processed the claims of the litigants. 
Perhaps in part because Justice Black had failed to advance any impersonal evidence for his alle-
gation, based on personal familiarity with the South and its practices, that segregation was rooted 
in white supremacy,196 Reed declined or failed entirely in his remarks to engage with that claim at 
any higher level than that of subjective experience or authority. In other words, it seems as though 
Reed felt a sufficient rebuttal to Black’s soliloquy about Black’s personal experience with segre-
gation was a series of countervailing remarks of the same subjective nature and, therefore, persua-
siveness and authority. Nonetheless, at no point did Reed broach and attempt to dismantle any of 
the NAACP’s theories or evidence, if only to increase the chance that the other justices would join 
his views, suggesting that he never fully engaged with the NAACP’s arguments. 
 At the 1953 conference, Reed spoke second, not third, due to Justice Black’s absence. Still, 
as in the conference the year before, Reed had to follow the powerful expression of anti-segrega-
tion views by another justice (in this instance, Warren). This time around, Reed presented his views 
                                                




somewhat more forcefully and clearly than in ’52. The justice first stated that he had been per-
suaded on reargument that the history of the Civil War Amendments showed that “it was valid to 
have separate school leg[islation].”197 Though this fact was not alone dispositive of the outcome 
of the cases, Reed conceded, it certainly undermined the position of those on the Court who cited 
the Amendments as unequivocal authority for overturning Plessy. Then, Reed resurrected his ef-
forts from a year earlier to defend segregation’s moral basis by restating his conviction that segre-
gation was rational and not necessarily motivated by racial animus: “segregation is not done on 
[the basis of a belief in racial] inferiority but on [the basis of] racial differences.” The justice then 
rebutted explicitly what in ’52 he appeared, in Clark’s notes, to address only implicitly: the insin-
uation that segregation is rooted in white supremacy. “There is no ‘inferior race,’” Reed pro-
claimed. But segregation “protects people against mixing of the races.” Segregation is not only 
supported by the weight of history and precedent; it is supported by justice. Accordingly, Reed 
remarked, were he “writing on a clean slate [he] probably would say should have seg[regation].”198 
DOUGLAS 
 Douglas spoke after Frankfurter at both the 1952 and 1953 Brown conferences.  Consistent 
with the reputation of his judicial opinions, his remarks at both conferences were succinct and 
unequivocal. “Cases very simple for me,” Douglas began at the 1952 conference. “I can’t avoid 
conclusion Hugo has reached in states cases – same in D.C.” Kluger reports that Burton’s notes 
record Douglas as remarking, “State can’t classify by color for education,”199 although Clark’s 
notes do not record any rationale. In response to Frankfurter’s exhortation at the 1952 conference 
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that the Court reschedule the cases for another round of arguments in the October 1953 term, 
Douglas stated that he “would not mind setting down DC cases – but not others.” To what this 
insistence on deciding the state cases quickly can be attributed is impossible to know. Perhaps 
Douglas shared Black’s ambivalence about an adequate justification for invalidating an act of Con-
gress on equal protection grounds, and would have liked to plumb the NAACP for more convinc-
ing rationales to enable the Court to do so. Or perhaps Douglas felt the rationale in the D.C. case 
was relatively unimportant, but was willing to acquiesce to the delay in the federal case as the price 
of securing a quick reversal of the state cases. On this latter view, Douglas might have felt that 
from the standpoint of judicial policy, the state cases were more important than the DC case. What-
ever his motive, Douglas exhibited in the first Brown conference his characteristic approach to 
judicial decision-making, which privileged result over rationale. 
 Douglas’s remarks at the 1953 conference were almost identical. He began by conveying 
to the conference the vote of the absent Justice Black, whose position had not wavered from the 
previous year. Then, speaking for himself, Douglas conceded that the rearguments had demon-
strated that the “history” of the Fourteenth Amendment had “mixed light in it.” This did not change 
the fact, however, that for him the constitutionality of segregation remained “a simple problem.” 
Repeating his rationale from the year before, Douglas declared: “Race and color cannot be a con-
stitutional standard for segregating the schools.” Thus, Douglas announced, he “would join War-
ren’s [position] and reasons.”200 
 Perhaps the most telling characteristic of Douglas’ remarks at the Brown conferences is his 
decision in both soliloquys to indicate agreement with another justice (1) on the constitutional 
outcome and (2) for the reasons the other justice gave. These declarations, in my view, constitute 
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the only effort he made to justify his preferred outcome to the other justices, for he did not build 
any arguments of his own. The closest he came to doing so were the two occasions on which he 
presented a deontological anti-classification claim: in 1952, “State can’t classify by color for edu-
cation,” and in 1953, “Race and color cannot be a constitutional standard for segregating the 
schools.” Nevertheless, in syllogistic terms, these statements are conclusions; the major and minor 
premises that would compel them are missing. Thus, Douglas’ claim that racial classification is 
unconstitutional went totally unsupported by any justifications other than those he adduced explic-
itly: Black’s “reasons” in the ’52 conference and Warren’s in the ’53 conference. Now, Black’s 
and Warren’s accounts are basically compatible: both Black and Warren respectively contended 
that the cause of segregation, or its only basis, was a belief in black inferiority. And both justices 
agreed that the purpose of the Civil War Amendments was to outlaw caste legislation. But there is 
a basic incongruity between these rationales and the deontological conclusion Douglas proffered 
at the Brown conferences. 
 The notion that government should not classify on the basis of color usually proceeds as a 
consequence from premises about the relationship of race to legitimate government purposes or 
objectives. The classical anti-classification argument proceeds along the following lines: 
P1. Justice requires treating each person according to his merit. 
P2. A person’s character and actions determine his merit. 
P3. A person’s character and actions are unrelated to or independent of race or color. 
C1. To treat people differently on the basis of race is to treat people independently of their 
merit. 
C2. But to treat individuals independently of their merit is unjust. 
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P4. The reason for which legislatures classify by race is to treat people differently on the 
basis of race. 
C3. To classify on the basis of race is unjust. 
Other versions of the syllogism might substitute “fairness” for “justice,” or impute an intrinsic 
harm (e.g., stigma) to racial classifications or to their use, rather than alleging that such classifica-
tions are inherently unjust or unfair. But, the above syllogism is representative of the form anti-
classification reasoning takes. 
 Now, of the premises, the third is the one on which segregationists and integrationists most 
disagreed: indeed, negation of premise 3 is the necessary but perhaps not sufficient condition of 
asserting “white supremacy.” And it is precisely as an attack on the denial of this premise that 
Warren’s comments about the NAACP counsel seem to be intended. But in conference, neither 
Warren, Black, nor Douglas clearly stated this crucial premise or presented the argument of which 
it is the central element in anything close to the argument’s entirety. Warren unflinchingly en-
dorsed the third premise by adducing evidence for it in the example of the NAACP’s black counsel, 
and by highlighting the offensiveness of the alternative conclusion (in effect, that a denial of the 
third premise requires an endorsement of white supremacy) to which he contended probity requires 
assent if premise 3 is negated. But he failed or declined to articulate the premise or couch it in the 
broader argument that racial classifications are invidious. Instead, the Chief Justice emphasized 
that segregation was unjust because it was unfair to blacks and, for good measure, added that it 
was unconstitutional because banned by the Civil War Amendments. Black, in turn, hewed fairly 
closely to his usual interpretative approach, at least with regard to the states, and did not address 
himself at all to the above syllogism, thereby bracketing the question of segregation’s morality, at 
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least ostensibly. Douglas, finally, presented only conclusion 3, although he cast it in at least super-
ficially constitutional (“State can’t”), not moral (“it is unjust,” “it is intolerable,” “it is wrong”), 
terms. However, in the ’52 conference, Douglas seemed totally untroubled by Black’s qualm that 
the Constitution may not exert any equal protection constraints on Congress. That Douglas was 
willing to gloss over that important constitutional detail (“I can’t avoid conclusion Hugo has 
reached in state cases – same in D.C.”)  without providing any distinguishing rationale for his 
conclusion–––if only to resolve and assuage Black’s conundrum–––implies that Douglas was more 
concerned that the cases be decided in a particular direction than that that outcome be reasoned 
perspicaciously. So too does Douglas’ treatment of Black’s argument concerning state segregation 
as basically dispositive of both kinds of legislative action, when, of course, Black himself was still 
suffering grievous doubts about the constitutional basis for overturning segregation in D.C. 
 Reaching the outcome Douglas supported in conference through reasoning alone would 
have required much more detailed analysis, such as that demonstrated in the anti-classification 
syllogism, than the kind Douglas evidenced in his conference remarks, or Black and Warren ex-
hibited in theirs. Now, it is certainly possible that Douglas had privately reasoned his way to the 
outcome he unhesitatingly announced in conference, or that he had been, for example, completely 
persuaded by the NAACP briefs, the 1952 iterations of which strongly emphasized anti-classifica-
tion claims. However, whether or not reasoning or reasoned persuasion conduced Douglas to the 
outcome he defended to his colleagues, there are two reasons to conclude that the social intuitionist 
model captures elements of his conference remarks, if not his conclusion as to the cases’ result. 
First is the fact that his anti-classification conclusion is not compelled by the reasoning presented 
in conference: neither Black’s, Warren’s, nor Douglas’ remarks provide an adequate basis for 
reaching conclusion 3. Second is Douglas’ concession at the ’53 conference that the Fourteenth 
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Amendment has “mixed light in it.” This comprises an acknowledgment that the “purpose” of the 
Amendment or the “intent” of its framers was not incontrovertibly to outlaw segregation. Probity, 
it would seem, induced Douglas to go at least this far. However, what followed this concession 
was not an adjustment, but a forceful reiteration, of the justice’s original position. This reaffirma-
tion exhibits the markings of motivated reasoning: when confronted with information that is not 
easily reconciled with their preferences, people tend to discount that information, sometimes even 
reacting defensively to the resulting cognitive dissonance by “doubling down” on their initial opin-
ions. At the very least, had Douglas reasoned his way to the conclusion that the newly-discovered 
“mixed light” did not require him to alter his position, we would expect him to give some indica-
tion of why not, but the justice evidently felt no compulsion to justify his steadfastness. While 
there is no dispositive proof one way or the other, these considerations are consistent with the 
proposition that Douglas adopted a deontological, anti-classification constitutional rationale (quite 
possibly cribbed directly from the 1952 NAACP briefs) after he had already reached a decision on 
the outcome (to end segregation), and then, convinced of the justice of that outcome, effortlessly 
overcame constitutional qualms such as Black’s concern that equal protection might not constrain 
the federal government, and the contention of the state governments at the 1953 rearguments that 
the Civil War Amendments may not have had the purpose or intent ascribed to them by the 
NAACP. 
 This interpretation, furthermore, coheres with what is known about Douglas’ personality, 
temperament, and judicial approach, such as it was. Assessing the first decade of Douglas’ tenure 
on the Court, the justice’s biographer Bruce Allen Murphy remarked,  
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In anticipation of the day when he would leave the Court, Douglas showed little interest in 
learning the craft of a career jurist. He had no interest in developing a long-term jurispru-
dential philosophy. Instead, he behaved in each case just like he had as a commissioner on 
the SEC: determining which issues were in his own best interests, battling with his enemies, 
and taking positions with an eye to his political future.201  
Moreover, Douglas developed a reputation, especially later in his career, for writing hurried and 
underdeveloped judicial opinions that were heavy on philosophy but light on the traditional trap-
pings of constitutional reasoning. After his close miss with the vice-presidency and then presi-
dency in 1944 and 1945, Douglas was worse for the wear. The justice’s longtime personal attorney 
and close friend, Clark Clifford, later recounted of Douglas’ frustrated presidential hopes, “It cer-
tainly would take a lot of luster out of your life, I would think …. When a man knows that–––that 
he was that close to the top–––well, it sort of takes some of the shine, I think, off the rest of your 
life.” The justice, according to Murphy, “never got over this defeat.”202 Finally, from late summer 
of 1951 to December of 1954, Douglas was, to put it bluntly, consumed by ridding himself of his 
first wife, Mildred, and acquiring the freedom to pursue his nascent romance with his second (of 
an eventual four), Mercedes.203 In short, the available evidence from Douglas’ biography strongly 
suggests that he had little time and inclination for approaching Brown with anything but his char-
acteristic judicial approach, and is consistent with the possibility that Douglas relied upon non-
rational factors, such as gut intuition, in first arriving at, and later, in the face of countervailing 
evidence, adhering, to his views. 
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 At the 1952 conference, Clark’s comments showed that his concerns about the enforcea-
bility of a desegregation order superseded his preference for any particular outcome on the consti-
tutional merits. Jackson records Clark as beginning his remarks by stating that, along with Frank-
furter, Clark would like to set Bolling down for reagrument: “Favors reargument D.C.” 204Douglas, 
in contrast, records Clark as beginning his remarks with the admonition that the “result must be 
the same in all the cases”205–––that is, in both the states and D.C. This comment likely reflects 
Clark’s sensibilities as one of the Court’s few Southerners, or, as Klarman says, “probably 
evince[s] the typical sensitivity of southern whites to perceived antisouthern prejudice.”206 Draw-
ing on his background, Clark then explained that the racial landscape in Texas was complicated 
by the “Mexico problem--Mexican boy of 15 is in a class with a negro girl of 12. Some negro girls 
get in trouble.”207 Jackson recorded that Clark also remarked, “Mexican problem more serious for 
more retarded.”208 Next, without having spoken explicitly to the question of whether segregation 
violates the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses, Clark disposed of the questions of constitu-
tionality and enforceability in one fell swoop: “if we can delay action it will help--opinion should 
give lower courts the right to withhold relief in light of troubles--he would go along with that--
otherwise he would say we had led the states on to think segreggation is OK and we should let 
them work it out.”209 
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 Clark’s pronouncements at the 1953 conference mirrored his of a year before, with one big 
difference: Clark clarified that he now supported desegregation. Apparently recognizing that after 
Warren’s comments, desegregation was effectively a foregone conclusion, Clark began by high-
lighting the likely backlash. “Violence will follow in the south--very serious problem--if it is to be 
abolished it may be handled very carefully.”210 Then, Clark turned his attention to challenges that 
the diversity of local conditions would pose to enforcement. “[H]e thinks colored students in Texas 
get as good an education as the whites--various conditions will require different handling--the 
opinion must indicate that clearly.” Next, Clark for the first time in the Brown conferences ad-
dressed himself to the underlying constitutionality of segregation. “[O]n merits, [Clark] always 
thought that the 14th Amend covered the matter and outlawed segregation--but the history shows 
different.” Clark subsequently circled back around to enforcement and the insights of his personal 
experience in Texas. “[P]eople couldn’t vote to integrate here and return home to the south,” Clark 
said, evidently anticipating the number of Turncoat Texan contests he would win back home after 
voting with the burgeoning desegregationist majority on the Court. Douglas described Clark as 
concluding his second Brown conference soliloquy with a reference “to problem between [M]ex-
icans and whites--they are now segregated along the border--does not like the system of segrega-
tion and will vote to abolish it but the remedy should be carefully worked out[.]”211 
 Of all the justices’, Clark’s conformity to the social intuitionist model based on conference 
remarks alone is the hardest to determine: his comments do not suggest a clear or stable jurispru-
dential theory or private moral preference regarding segregation, despite his claim in ’53 that he 
“does not like the system of segregation”–––a statement that arrived only after desegregation was 





a foregone conclusion. It will thus be helpful to review the content of an April 7, 1950 memoran-
dum Clark circulated to the Brethren three days after oral arguments in Sweatt and McLaurin. The 
four-page memo is structured according to four numbered points. 
1. The “horribles” following reversal of the cases pictured by the States, excepting Okla-
homa, are highly exaggerated. […] 
2. The issue of Plessy v. Ferguson’s application to these cases must be met. […] 
3. I think Sweatt should be reversed. [i.e., segregation as practiced by the University of 
Texas Law School invalidated] […] 
4. McLaurin can, I think, be handled rather summarily. [i.e., disposed of by recourse to 
the same reasoning as deployed in Sweatt].212 
Clark elaborates on the first point by noting that “Oklahoma was frank enough to admit” that 
“[t]here would be no ‘incidents’ … if the cases are limited to their facts, i.e., graduate schools.” 
The real trouble, Clark observed, would come from invalidating segregation in public primary and 
secondary education: Oklahoma’s “concern was the extension of the doctrine [of overruling seg-
regation] to the elementary and secondary schools.” Clark acknowledged that he would “be op-
posed to such extension at this time and would vote against taking a case involving same. Perhaps 
at a later date our judicial discretion will lead us to hear such a case.” 
 Clark did not elaborate appreciably on point 2. The third point, in contrast, forms the meat 
of Clark’s analysis. “There are two courses,” he announced at the outset. 
(a) Overrule Plessy v. Ferguson, which would carry with it subsequent cases based on 
that doctrine. I am opposed to this course. 
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(b) Hold Plessy not applicable because it does not involve education; and state that the 
cases cited therein are not apposite to the Sweatt case. Distinguish Gaines213 as holding the 
State cannot avoid its obligation by furnishing funds for its Negro citizens to attend out-of-
state institutions. Gong Lum involved elementary schools, and merely held the State was 
not obliged to furnish separate facilities for each race. Fisher214 and its companion Sipuel 
are not controlling for the question of “separate but equal” was excerpted in the Fisher 
opinion. 
This part of the memo evinces clearly that Clark was engaging in motivated reasoning, for from 
the beginning he proceeded instrumentally with a view to outcome (“There are two courses:”), not 
deductively from a view of legalist premises to a conclusion. Therefore, his attempt to distinguish 
Gaines, Gong Lum, and Fisher (all of which accepted the validity of, without directly examining, 
Plessy’s “separate but equal” standard) as precedents for Sweatt and McLaurin was clearly moti-
vated by a desire or purpose. That purpose, in turn, may be inferred both from Clark’s concerns 
about the reactions of southern states to the implications of the Sweatt and McLaurin decisions for 
the constitutionality of segregation in public primary and secondary education and from the 
memo’s concluding lines. As Clark would go on to announce at the end of the memo, “I join with 
those who would reverse these cases upon the ground that segregated graduate education denies 
equal protection of the laws. . . . If some say this undermines Plessy then let it fall, as have many 
Nineteenth Century oracles.” Consequently, the instrumental objective with which Clark was writ-
ing most likely was to erode Plessy without overruling it explicitly.  
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 This goal also seemed to motivate Clark’s misleading claim that Plessy “does not involve 
education.” While it is true that the facts of the immediate case in Plessy did not involve segrega-
tion in public schools, the Court in its reasoning upheld segregation in railway cars in part by 
highlighting the constitutionality of segregated education. “Laws permitting, and even requiring, 
the[] separation [of the races] in places where they are liable to be brought into contact do not 
necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have been generally, if not univer-
sally, recognized as within the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their police 
power,” Plessy reads. “The most common instance of this is connected with the establishment of 
separate schools for white and colored children, which has been held to be a valid exercise of the 
legislative power even by courts of States where the political rights of the colored race have been 
longest and most earnestly enforced.”215 Additionally, the Court in Plessy in 1896 construed Con-
gress’ and the states’ recent provision for segregated schools as a warrant for the constitutionality 
of enforced segregation per se. 
So far, then, as a conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, the case reduces 
itself to the question whether the statute of Louisiana [requiring segregation in railway 
cars] is a reasonable regulation, and, with respect to this, there must necessarily be a large 
discretion on the part of the legislature. In determining the question of reasonableness, it is 
at liberty to act with reference to the established usages, customs, and traditions of the 
people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort and the preservation of the public 
peace and good order. Gauged by this standard, we cannot say that a law which authorizes 
or even requires the separation of the two races in public conveyances is unreasonable, or 
more obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment than the acts of Congress requiring separate 
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schools for colored children in the District of Columbia, the constitutionality of which does 
not seem to have been questioned, or the corresponding acts of state legislatures.216 
So, even if the compatibility of Clark’s behavior with the SI model in deciding Brown cannot be 
immediately established, it can be inferred that Clark had previously employed motivated reason-
ing when considering the constitutionality of segregation in education. In my view, this finding 
increases the probability that Clark’s subsequent ruminations on segregation in education were 
similarly mediated. 
 Now, though he employed motivated reasoning (and, in ignoring Plessy’s analysis of seg-
regation in public schools, possibly confirmation bias) in discussing the legal rationales available 
to the Court for eroding Plessy’s authority, Clark might well have determined that segregation in 
graduate education amounted to a violation of equal protection by means of the SI model. “There 
are good reasons for us not to extend the Plessy doctrine to graduate schools,” Clark continued 
under the third point of his Sweatt and McLaurin memo. Unlike “segregated grammar schools,” in 
which “Negroes [might yet] receive skills in [] elementary subjects equivalent to those of segre-
gated white students, assuming equality in the texts, teachers and facilities,” segregated graduate 
schools cannot but deny equal educational opportunities to black students. 
There are many reasons: (1) white schools have higher standing in the community as well 
as nationally, which means much to the graduate professional man; (2) the older and larger 
college has more alumni, which gives the graduate more professional opportunities; (3) the 
larger and older school attracts better professors; (4) competition among schools is much 
keener in the older and more established school, thus affording a wider professional com-
petition; (5) the larger and older institution attracts a cross section of the entire State in its 
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student body–––affords a wider exchange of ideas–––and, in the combat of ideas, furnishes 
a greater variety of minds, backgrounds, and opinions which is most important in the pro-
fessions; (6) it takes years and years to establish a professional school of top rank, affording 
law reviews, competitions, medals, societies, etc., which a Negro school would never at-
tain; (7) acquaintance is important in the professions and segregation prevents it, thus de-
priving the Negro of many state-wide opportunities. These and other reasons are those 
which I am sure have led all but nine of the States to abandon the “separate but equal” 
doctrine at the graduate level. 
Some of these reasons might be post hoc justifications, but most of them seem to be the kinds of 
considerations that would arise in someone with Clark’s extensive personal experience of the sub-
ject in question. It was, after all, Clark’s own legal alma mater, the University of Texas Law 
School, whose whites-only admissions rule was being challenged in the Sweatt litigation. Presum-
ably, then, Clark was able to draw on a wealth of firsthand knowledge and personal experience, 
even if only anecdotal, to evaluate Sweatt’s claim that the state’s segregated “black” law school 
was not comparable to the public flagship Clark had attended. Thus, even though such “reasons” 
as Clark adduced might not be “moral” in nature, they likely arose in Clark in the same manner as 
moral intuitions: in the form of flashes of intuition or as epiphanies, accompanied by affective 
reactions. Such would explain Clark’s rather confident assessment, based in his own experience 
with one of the two, that a segregated “black” law school could in no way be comparable to the 
long established “white” one in Austin, and that this denial of equal educational opportunity 
amounted to a violation of equal protection. 
 The foregoing evidence suggests that Clark’s behavior in Brown, although harder to clearly 
subsume under the SI model, nonetheless can be partially explained by SI model correlates. The 
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evidence also indicates that Clark’s strategic concerns about enforcement trumped his moral ones 
about segregation’s injustice, which in turn superseded, or at least preceded, his constitutional 
conclusions. As we have seen, at the 1952 conference Clark indicated that he thought segregation 
was constitutional: unless the Court was willing to tolerate delayed or no enforcement in a deseg-
regation decree, the Court “had led the states on to think segregation is OK and we should let them 
work it out.” As a consequence, Frankfurter counted Clark in the “affirm” column in the 1952 
term.217  A year later, though, Clark was willing to state forthrightly that “he doesn’t like the system 
of segregation and will vote to abolish it.” Clark nonetheless continued to exhibit a high degree of 
solicitousness toward the sensibilities of Southerners: “the remedy should be carefully worked 
out,” “various conditions will require different handling,” and desegregation must “be handled 
very carefully.” Three mutually compatible explanations might explain Clark’s apparent change 
in heart. 
 The first is that Vinson’s death and absence precipitated Clark’s shift. Vinson’s and Clark’s 
relationship antedated their appointments to the Court, as both had been colleagues and cabinet 
members in the Truman administration–––Vinson, Treasury Secretary; Clark, Attorney General. 
Vinson had been Clark’s closest friend among the other justices, and the two men had voted to-
gether in 90 percent of cases in the three full terms Clark had served on the Court prior to October, 
1952.218 Because Vinson did not ultimately vote in Brown, this study does not analyze his com-
ments at the first  Brown conference, but in the interest of understanding Clark’s change of heart, 
it should be noted that Vinson’s remarks on that occasion indicated he believed that segregation 
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was constitutional and that desegregation would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to en-
force in the deep South. For instance, Clark records Vinson as remarking, “[h]ard to get away from 
continued interpretation of Congress ever since the Amendments – and at that time.” In other 
words, it was hard to ignore Congress’ tolerance of racial segregation in the states and the implicit 
sanction it gave to segregated education in the nation’s capital by appropriating money for the 
District’s school system. The rest of Vinson’s comments reveal Chief Justice’s disquiet about the 
magnitude and likely impossibility of inducing compliance with a desegregation order: “[i]n Sipuel 
& McLaurin we said right was personal – more serious when you have large numbers…. It is said 
we should not consider this but I can’t throw it all off. When you force the complete abolition of 
public schools in some areas then it is most serious.”219 The concerns that Clark expressed at both 
conferences regarding compliance with a desegregation decree, then, closely echoed Vinson’s in 
the first Brown conference. With Vinson’s passing, however, Clark might have felt more liberated 
to follow his instincts as to segregation’s basic injustice–––which, as we saw in his 1950 Sweatt 
and McLaurin memo, when practiced in the context of graduate and professional education, Clark 
did not hesitate to condemn in unequivocal terms. 
 The second explanation for Clark’s shift between the Brown merit conferences is that the 
passage of time and the continued exposure to arguments against segregation in primary and sec-
ondary public education finally broke the dam of reticence that had been built up by concerns, 
implicit in the 1950 Sweatt and McLaurin memo and explicit in the justice’s comments at both 
Brown conferences, about the South’s probable reaction to the desegregation of public schools. In 
the 1950 memo, Clark had said he favored overruling Plessy but “would be opposed to” declaring 
it inapplicable to “elementary and secondary schools . . . and would vote against taking a case 
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involving” public primary and secondary education. In other words, in 1950 Clark had said Plessy 
should go but implied that he was reluctant it to get rid of it because of the South’s likely response. 
By 1953 what seems to have changed for Clark is the balance of his desire to overturn Plessy 
relative to his preference for forestalling confrontation with the South. Thus the shift in the relative 
magnitudes of Clark’s preferences might be attributable to attitude polarization: exposure to argu-
ments from counsel and conversations among the justices that reinforced his dislike of segregation 
and Plessy, over the course the year between the two Brown conferences, might have simply tipped 
the balance of decision inputs for Clark in favor of voting to invalidate segregation. 
 The third explanation for Clark’s shift is that it was induced by knowledge of Warren’s 
vote, which guaranteed a Court majority for desegregation. Two decades later, commenting to 
Kluger about the position he took at the 1952 conference, Clark would say, “[y]ou may be ready 
in your own mind to decide on a case, but think it wiser to hold off – until the circumstances are 
different.”220 With Warren’s replacement of Vinson, and with it, five votes to reverse the lower 
courts that had sustained segregation under Plessy, the circumstances had changed radically by 
1953, indeed. 
 From 1950 until at least the winter of 1952-1953, Clark evidently felt constrained by his 
(prescient, as it would turn out) foresight of the South’s reaction to invalidating segregation in 
primary and secondary public schools. He succeeded in overcoming that constraint, as I have sug-
gested, for one or several of three reasons. Only the second of these possibilities directly invokes 
the SI model. Regardless of Clark’s motives in ultimately voting with the others to overturn seg-
regation, the evidence shows that the SI model explains at least one crucial aspect of Clark’s vote. 
At the 1953 conference, “on merits [Clark] always thought that the 14th Amend covered the matter 
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and outlawed segregation – but the history shows different.”221 Thus, while having been convinced 
by the reargument on the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment–––Bickel’s interpreta-
tive gloss on the history,222 and that of the NAACP counsel, notwithstanding–––that the Amend-
ment did not “outlaw” segregation, and, presumably, was not intended by its framers to do so, 
Clark nonetheless voted to read the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate segregation. That Clark 
never went on the record with a judicial rationale during the Brown decision-making process for 
his vote suggests his attitude toward it may not have been too far from Jackson’s: Clark might 
have seen his vote as one for a “congenial political conclusion,” without, however, feeling the 
attendant need to “make a judicial basis” for it. Clark’s conscious willingness to ignore the history 
of the Amendment, combined with his buffet-style approach to possible rationales for overturning 
Plessy in his 1950 memo, suggests that as regards segregation, for Clark, “judicial” factors were 
subordinated to moral or political ones. 
BURTON AND MINTON 
 Justices Harold Burton and Sherman Minton are relatively minor personages in the drama 
of Brown. The evidence indicates that the men, both Truman appointees, held relatively consistent 
views over the two terms and exhibited in their behavior evidence of the psychological dynamics 
captured by the social intuitionist model. Substantively, both men emphasized the role of precedent 
and legislative history: on the one hand, the Court’s recent graduate school decisions had eroded 
Plessy’s applicability to education, and hence the tenability of affirming the constitutionality of 
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segregation in public primary and secondary education, and on the other, the Equal Protection 
Clause outlawed segregation as practiced in the states. 
 At the 1952 conference, Burton boldly declared that “states do not have choice” because 
“segregation violates equal protection,” and “5th Amendment bars segregation.” However, no jus-
tice recorded Burton explaining if or how he solved the conundrum that had confounded Black: 
how due process could suddenly be used to condemn segregation when it had existed peacefully 
alongside slavery for 72 years, and alongside segregation for another 87. Burton then argued that 
segregation in education has been eroded by the recent graduate segregation cases: “Sipuel and 
Sweatt control.” “Education is more than buildings and faculties,” he continued, “it’s a habit of 
mind.” Finally, Burton’s particular conception of American life appeared to exert a decisive effect 
on his opinion of segregation’s constitutionality. “Separate education,” he claimed, “is not suffi-
cient for today[’]s problems . . . not reasonable to educate separately for a joint life.”223 Burton 
then concluded by “refer[ring] to his policies as Mayor of Cleveland in putting colored nurses, etc. 
in white hospitals,” which produced interracial “respect” and understanding. 
 Kluger reports that in a letter to Justice Frankfurter a few months prior to the December 
1952 conference, Burton had expounded upon his view that blacks and whites did and should share 
a “joint life”. In that missive, Burton stated:  
I have been increasingly impressed with the idea that under conditions of 50 or more years 
ago it probably could be said that a state’s treatment of negroes, within its borders, on the 
basis of “separate but equal” facilities might come within the constitutional guaranty of an 
“equal” protection of the laws, because the lives of negroes and whites were then and there 
in fact separately cast and lived. Today, however, I doubt that it can be said in any state 
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(and certainly not generally) that compulsory “separation” of the races, even with equal 
facilities, can amount to an “equal” protection of the laws in a society that is lived and 
shared so “jointly” by all races as ours is now.224 
Thus, for Burton, perhaps the decisive factor that rendered segregation unconstitutional was the 
recent change in how the races comingled and lived: if in fact members of both races lived and 
worked side-by-side, it appeared ludicrous to Burton that they should be isolated artificially, not 
to mention futilely, by the state. 
 These remarks provide direct evidence that the dynamics described by the social intuition-
ist model exerted some effect on Burton as he “came to his senses” with respect to segregation. 
Burton’s comments regarding racial comingling in both his letter to Frankfurter and at the 1952 
conference are structured as an argument, but his statements lack the cogency that would indicate 
that the justice reached his conclusion via reasoning. Instead, Burton’s pronouncements suggest 
that he found something about forced separation offensive, when Americans of different races 
sharing a “joint life” seemed to him innocuous and inevitable. His observation was that Americans 
of different races in fact comingle. His conclusion was that the state should not impede them from 
doing so. But the conclusion does not ineluctably follow from the premise: that X occurs does not 
imply that government must permit X. Other premises (such as, e.g., no harms arise from such 
comingling, or that such comingling is desirable) are necessary to reach the deduction Burton ad-
vances, but the remainder of his comments are wholly devoid of the necessary additional reason-
ing. Perhaps Burton’s mention of his positive personal experience with and observation of inte-
gration is intended to supply the missing premise. If so, however, it is a tenuous premise: a personal 
experience does not suffice for a generalizable principle. In other words, it is not true to conclude 
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that because one’s particular experience with X is Y, that all X are likely to (or do) produce Y. 
However, precisely these personal observations of questionable representativeness clearly com-
prised some part of the information universes of most of the justices. Warren, Black, Reed, Clark, 
and (as we will see) Frankfurter, Minton, and Jackson–––six of the nine justices–––used such in-
formation to supply premises of controvertible accuracy that helped shore up arguments for con-
clusions they proffered. Regardless of the empirical validity of those insights, they are evidence of 
intuitive decision-making. The justices’ intuitions and emotions primed them to lean in the direc-
tion of a certain disposition, and “reason” supplied the remainder of the appropriate argument. 
 Again, none of this is to denigrate any of the justices’ decision-making. It is only to give 
the most likely account of at least some of the primary causes of their behavior. If the evidence 
suggests erroneous reasoning, allusions to personal experiences, confirmation bias, and the like, 
then it is exceedingly unlikely that reasoning caused the judgment or outcome advanced by the 
justice, and likely instead that intuition played a causal function, though the level at and extent to 
which intuition operated is open to question. Finally, the causal role of intuition helps explain 
individual justices’ lack of a coherent, reasoned position steeped in the traditional sources of con-
stitutional interpretation. 
 Another respect in which the social intuitionist model captures Burton’s decision-making 
pertains to the justice’s record of the performance of the NAACP counsel in his diary. As Kluger 
recounts, “[b]eside the name of each NAACP lawyer in Brown, all of whom he rated from ‘good’ 
to ‘excellent,’ he also wrote: ‘(colored).’”225 I think the most plausible interpretation of this infor-
mation is that the black counsel made a similar impression on Burton as on Warren: the example 
they provided eliminated the plausibility of the strongest form of the white supremacy claim, that 
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is, that blacks are categorically inferior to whites. If true, this insight would likely have worked its 
way into Burton’s view that “the life of today” countenanced and even required racial integration 
by reinforcing his unstated premise that such integration entails only benefits for members of both 
races, and that members of each race is equipped to contribute equally to that shared life. 
 At the 1953 conference, Burton hewed substantially to the position he expressed a year 
prior. He reiterated his position that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibited segregation, once more without at-
tempting to resolve Black’s concern about the inadequacy of a due process argument to constrain 
Congress in the matter. Again highlighting his belief that Sweatt, Painter, and Sipuel had eroded 
Plessy, and his view that public primary and secondary education were not distinguishable from 
higher education, Burton contended that the Court “can’t draw a line between types of schools”; 
the “principle applicable to graduate schools is applicable to primary school.” Modifying the crux 
of his ’52 position ever so slightly, the justice said that “At time of the 14th Amendment life was 
separate.” But by the 1950s segregated education afforded only “inadequate preparation for the 
life [of] today.”226 
 The reason for Burton’s shift in this line of argument from his claim that segregation might 
have been rational “50 or more years ago” to the contention that segregation might have been so 
at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was almost certainly due to the historical 
information acquired during the ‘53 rehearings. While Burton’s argument remained effectively the 
same as the year before, he evidently felt no compulsion to engage with any of the evidence pre-
sented on reargument that suggested that the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
did not intend their handiwork to command social equality between the races. Foreshadowing 
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Warren’s treatment of the Amendment’s history in the eventual Brown opinion, Burton’s neglect 
of that history in ’53 implied that he viewed it as either inconclusive or unimportant. The justice’s 
apparent certainty and paucity of buttressing specificity–––his refusal or failure to confront the 
historical evidence favoring the legal position of the states–––suggest that he was somewhat un-
justifiably discounting countervailing evidence, and therefore engaged in motivated reasoning. As 
I have said before, the point is not to say the justice should have had a different view of the evi-
dence, only that a decision compelled by reasoning would have been much more likely to engage 
with, and provide justifications for disregarding, the historical materials unfavorable to his posi-
tion. Only two justices, Frankfurter and Jackson, ended up doing so appreciably. 
 Justice Minton’s position tracked Burton’s but was framed more forcefully. At the ’52 
conference, Minton observed that Plessy “has been whittled away” by the graduate education 
cases. Then, like Douglas, he assumed an anti-classification position. “Classification on the basis 
of race is invidious and can’t be maintained.”227 Clark records him as saying, “can’t classify as to 
race bad – invidious – This is a race that grew up in trouble.” Evidently to quell enduring fears that 
the Fifth Amendment might not impose upon the federal government the same constraints as the 
Fourteenth applied to the states, Minton rather matter-of-factly declared, “It’s not legal,” the “it” 
being segregation. “Segregation is per se unconstitutional.”228 
 Like Douglas’ remarks, Minton’s are noticeably devoid of the additional reasoning neces-
sary to compel the anti-classification conclusion that forms the affirmative basis (that is, independ-
ent of his opinion of Plessy’s viability) for invalidating segregation. Perhaps both Minton and 
Douglas felt that the other members of the Court would be sufficiently acquainted with the chain 
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of premises involved in the argument to bother expounding them. But then, perhaps, neither had 
developed the argument to a sufficient level of detail to present it to his colleagues convincingly. 
In either case, both men’s pronouncements carry the distinctive smack of rationales found after the 
outcome has been decided upon. The moderately adversarial environment presented by the jus-
tices’ conference would also seem to provide additional impetus to flesh out such an argument. 
Why, for example, is segregation invidious, when at least one of the Court’s members (Reed) and 
a host of states claim it is a rational response to “respectable” concerns about racial harmony and 
integrity? Again, the point is not to suggest that Minton should have concluded other than he did. 
It is only to observe that his reasoning was less than adequately developed, suggesting that it was 
a post hoc veneer for a decision reached via other, and likely intuitive or emotive, avenues. 
 A year later, at the 1953 conference, Minton reaffirmed his ’52 position but buttressed it 
with novel theories, “courtesy,” as Hockett dryly observes, “of the LDF” [NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund]. Minton first repeated his contention from the previous year that the graduate education 
decisions, especially McLaurin, “greatly weakened” Plessy’s claim to control in public primary 
and secondary education. There is no “valid distinction in color.” Now echoing Warren, Minton 
then proclaimed that “the only basis left” for sustaining segregation is a belief in the “inferiority 
of blacks.” Next, he endorsed the LDF’s argument that the objective of the Civil War Amendments 
“was to wipe out the badge of slavery,” presumably, by eradicating state legislation perpetuating 
all kinds of inequalities, not just civil and political ones. The Fourteenth Amendment, Minton 
stated, “says ‘equal’ rights not separate but equal;” Plessy’s dictum “is a lawyer’s addition to the 
language.” Then, endorsing the NAACP’s interpretation of the first equal protection cases to come 
before the Court, the justice argued that “the Slaughter and Strauder cases,” whose spirit is con-
trary to that of Plessy, embodied the Amendment’s true intent. Finally, Minton clarified that in 
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addition to offending equal protection, segregation constitutes “a denial of due process,” and is 
therefore proscribed by the Fifth Amendment as well.229 
 What distinguishes Justice Minton’s comments at the second Brown conference is the de-
gree to which he appropriated new rhetorical and persuasive resources, “courtesy of the LDF,” to 
reinforce a position for which he had expressed a strong preference the year prior. Minton made 
no attempt to address the states’ different reading of the historical evidence, and borrowed from 
the historical record only insofar as it supported his preference regarding the cases’ outcome. 
Therefore, the justice’s success in finding new reasons for his pre-existing position by borrowing 
from one half of the historical information presented at the ’53 rehearings is consistent with con-
firmation bias (fixating upon and construing as dispositive materials and theories amenable to his 
position), motivated reasoning (failing even to address, much less refute, any countervailing evi-
dence) and, of course, intuition as causative of reasoning (if indeed the justice “reasoned” his way 
through the historical materials, we would expect to see some commentary from Minton as to why 
the materials upon which he relied were superior to or more appropriate as a basis for judicial 
decision-making than the historical evidence advanced by the states). 
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Chapter 5. Alexander Bickel and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth 
Amendment 
 Felix Frankfurter requested reargument at the first Brown conference both to “buy time” 
so that the justices, who appeared divided 5-4 or 6-3 on the merits in 1952, could coalesce around 
a shared outcome and constitutional rationale,230 and, as Chapter 6 will show, to dredge up evi-
dence that would allow him to overcome his own judicial impasse. To the latter of these ends, 
Frankfurter tasked his 1952 term clerk and future academic epigone Alexander Bickel with a term-
long research project: to read the Congressional Globe’s record of the debates surrounding the 39th 
Congress’ adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and to report what he believed the framers’ 
views of their handiwork was. As Frankfurter wrote to the Brethren the first time he first dissemi-
nated the Bickel memo, 
Having become convinced of the unreliability of the most quoted account of the history of 
the Fourteenth Amendment,231 I had one of the most dependable of the law clerks I have 
had, Alexander Bickel, devote many weeks at the last Term to the reading of every word 
in the Congressional Globe relating to the history of what ultimately became the Fourteenth 
Amendment, including theretofore also the history of related measures.232 
Bickel completed the memo by late August of 1953, and Frankfurter corrected it in his own hand, 
had it reproduced on the Court printer, and distributed copies to the justices on two occasions 
during the 1953 term–––on December 3, a few days prior to the Brown rehearings, and on May 
18, the day after Brown came down.233 
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THE HISTORY OF THE AMENDMENT 
 
 There are two versions of Bickel’s memo. The first is the one to which the justices had 
access: the copy Frankfurter twice distributed to the conference. The second is a revised and ex-
panded form of the memo that Bickel published in the Harvard Law Review in 1955. Although 
the expanded version of the memo was published after Brown and therefore did not directly influ-
ence the justices’ decision-making, the second memo is instructive insofar as it illuminates 
Bickel’s method of historical inquiry, the purposes that inquiry was evidently made to fulfill, and, 
possibly, some of theories that he and Frankfurter had been batting around privately. 
 At first glance, the findings of Bickel’s historical inquiry appeared not just unhelpful, but 
counterproductive to his boss’s desire, so evident in the questions that he and Bickel wrote and in 
response to which the rehearings were ordered, to locate historical evidence that the Fourteenth 
Amendment had been misunderstood and misapplied since conception. Bickel noted that Section 
1 of the Amendment, which contains the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses that the Court 
sought to use as the bases for invalidating segregation, was intimately linked to the passage of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866. The relevant language of the Civil Rights Act reads as follows. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America 
in Congress assembled, That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any 
foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United 
States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition 
of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party 
shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in 
the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to 
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and 
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equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is 
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and 
to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwith-
standing.234 
That Act, in turn, had undergone several revisions to eliminate language that might be susceptible 
of “latitudinarian” future interpretations. In particular, the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 
which drafted both the Civil Rights Act and Fourteenth Amendment, chose to delete language 
from the first draft of the bill which declared: “That there shall be no discrimination in civil rights 
or immunities among the inhabitants of any State or Territory of the United States on account of 
race, color, or previous condition of slavery.”235 This language originally appeared after the semi-
colon in the block quote above. It was ultimately removed by the intervention of Ohio Congress-
man John Bingham, who would go on to author Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
 In debate over the bill on the floor of the House, Bingham foreshadowed President John-
son’s criticism of the bill by declaring that Congress lacked the constitutional power to prohibit 
“discrimination in civil rights” by and throughout the states. For Congress to proscribe such dis-
crimination, Bingham proclaimed, would upset the country’s federal structure: “‘centralized gov-
ernment, decentralized administration.’ That, sir, coupled with your declared purpose of equal jus-
tice, is the secret of your strength and power.” Moreover, the language would force state judges to 
choose between upholding the constitutions and laws of their states and their oaths to abide the 
national Constitution. “You propose to make it a penal offense for the judges of the States to obey 
the constitution and laws of their States,” Bingham stated. “I deny your power to do this. You 
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cannot make an official act, done under color of law . . . and from a sense of public duty, a 
crime.”236 Finally, the Bill’s original formulation providing for “no discrimination in civil rights” 
was susceptible of being interpreted to cover political rights. “[T]he term civil rights includes every 
right that pertains to the citizen under the Constitution, laws, and Government of this country,” 
Bingham declared. “[A]re not political rights all embraced in the term ‘civil rights,’ and must it 
not of necessity be so interpreted?”237 In 1866, the insinuation that a proposed statutory or consti-
tutional clause might include political rights comprised a death knell for the relevant wording. 
Bingham did, however, clarify that he personally favored what he understood to be the aims of the 
original “civil rights” formulation. 
Now what does this bill propose? To reform the whole civil and criminal code of every 
State government by declaring that there shall be no discrimination between citizens on 
account of race or color in civil rights or in the penalties prescribed by their laws. I humbly 
bow before the majesty of justice, as I bow before the majesty of that God whose attribute 
it is, and therefore declare there should be no such inequality or discrimination even in the 
penalties for crime[.]238 
It should be noted, however, that “no discrimination between citizens on account of race or color 
in civil rights or in penalties prescribed” by law, and Bingham’s description of its policy implica-
tions, is less expansive than the interpretation incorporating social and political rights that the 
Court sought in Brown to impute to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Of course, Bingham’s pronouncement on the Civil Rights Act did not necessarily express his view 
of the meaning of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but because Section 1 was, as we will 
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see, written deliberately to be narrower than the Civil Rights Act, Bingham’s remarks on the scope 
of the Act circumscribes the meaning he could have imputed to Section 1 of the Amendment. One 
of two relationships therefore exists between the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment. 
One possibility is that the Fourteenth Amendment “constitutionalized” the Civil Rights Act by 
providing indisputable constitutional authority for the Act in Section 1, and by granting Congress 
power to enforce that language in Section 5. On this view, the restrictions Section 1 authorizes are 
those specific rights enumerated in the final language of the Civil Rights Act. Another possibility 
is that Section 1 has a broader scope than the Civil Rights Act, but that scope is coextensive with 
the policy preferences of Section 1’s author. Bingham expressed that preference when communi-
cating his policy agreement with the original “civil rights” formulation of the Act: “there shall be 
no discrimination between citizens on account of race or color in civil rights or in penalties pre-
scribed by [state] laws.” As we will see below, because Bingham appeared to believe that the civil 
rights formulation he attacked here as unconstitutional, when he presented in the context of a con-
stitutional amendment, was not redundant with the eventual “equal protection of the laws” wording 
of the final proposed Amendment, it is overwhelmingly likely that Bingham believed the “equal 
protection” phraseology set an even lower latitudinarian limit on the meaning of Section 1 than 
did his apparent personal preference that there “be no such [racial] inequality or discrimination 
even in the penalties for crime.” 
 After his speech, Bingham moved to delete the civil rights formulation from the bill. Bickel 
interpreted Bingham’s speech and proposal to strike to signify not merely that Bingham had doubts 
about the bill’s constitutionality, but that the term “civil rights” was too susceptible of unintended, 
latitudinarian constructions: “Unless one concludes that Bingham entertained apprehensions about 
the breadth of the term ‘civil rights’ and was unwilling at this stage, as a matter of policy, not 
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constitutional law, to extend a federal guaranty covering all that might be included in that term, 
there is no rational explanation for his motion to strike it.”239 Illinois Congressman James Wilson, 
the bill’s floor manager in the House, responded to Bingham by claiming that the bill’s civil rights 
formulation protected only federal civil rights. 
My friend [Bingham] .... knows, as every man knows, that this bill refers to those rights 
which belong to men as citizens of the United States and none other; and when he talks of 
setting aside the school laws and jury laws and franchise laws of the States by the bill ... he 
steps beyond what he must know to be the rule of construction which must apply here, and 
as a result of which this bill can only relate to matters within the control of Congress. 
Bickel notes that Wilson’s description of Bingham’s position is a misinterpretation, but, though 
true, that observation is inapposite to the import of Wilson’s remarks for the Civil Rights Bill: that 
the legislation was intended and understood by the House leadership only to prohibit states from 
violating civil rights that were traditionally understood to apply against the national government. 
However, what precisely those were under the civil rights formulation was not stated. 
 The House voted overwhelmingly against Bingham’s motion to recommit with instructions 
to delete the civil rights formulation. However, it then voted by a much closer margin (82-70) to 
recommit the bill without instructions, i.e., to direct the Joint Committee to revise the bill gener-
ally. The Joint Committee ended up removing the civil rights formulation anyway and Wilson 
resubmitted the bill to debate four days later after. At that time, he said: “Mr. Speaker, the amend-
ment which has just been read proposes to strike out the general terms relating to civil rights. I do 
not think it materially changes the bill; but some gentlemen were apprehensive that the words we 
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propose to strike out might give warrant for a latitudinarian construction not intended.”240 After 
some more procedural wrangling, the House adopted the Bill by a “large” majority, according to 
Bickel, although Bingham himself voted nay, perhaps because Wilson demanded an immediate 
vote and would not allow the revised bill to be printed and distributed to members for more exten-
sive consideration. 
 The first iteration of the Civil Rights Act was vetoed on March 27, 1866, by President 
Johnson, who articulated two constitutional objections. First, Congress could not constitutionally 
abrogate to itself the power to determine state citizenship, for “the power to confer the right of 
State citizenship is just as exclusively with the several States as the power to confer the right of 
Federal citizenship is with Congress.” Second, “[h]itherto every subject embraced in the enumer-
ation of rights contained in this bill has been considered as exclusively belonging to the States.” 
The Act attempts to establish “a perfect equality of the white and colored races [] by Federal law 
in every State of the Union over the vast field of State jurisdiction covered by these enumerated 
rights.” But Congress lacks the constitutional power “to make rules and regulations” for the States 
that it possesses, by the terms of Article IV, Section 3, over the territories.241 
 Though Congress quickly re-enacted the law with the two-thirds majority in both chambers 
required to override President Johnson’s veto (after deleting from the bill language that might have 
been construed to extend suffrage to blacks), concerns among members of Congress that the na-
tional government lacked constitutional authority to define state citizenship and legislate on civil 
rights predated Johnson’s veto (as we have already seen from Bingham’s motion to recommit with 
instructions). The constitutional authority for the Civil Rights Bill was supposed by many members 
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of Congress to be Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, which others (including Bingham) 
found woefully unsatisfactory, since Section 1 dealt with emancipation, and emancipation had 
been achieved by the military defeat and occupation of the South. Accordingly, the Joint Commit-
tee on Reconstruction–––formed by Thaddeus Stevens and intended to serve as an institution by 
which Congress could commandeer reconstruction of the South from what Radicals and many 
Moderates perceived as a reticent, obstructionist president–––had since January of 1866 been mull-
ing two proposals that would have provided a more unequivocal constitutional authority for con-
gressional reconstruction than the Thirteenth Amendment.  
 The first was submitted by Bingham and read in its entirety: “The Congress shall have 
power to make all laws necessary and proper to secure to all persons in every state within this 
Union equal protection in their rights of life, liberty and property.” The second, authored by Ste-
vens, stated in similarly succinct fashion: “All laws, state and national, shall operate impartially 
and equally on all persons without regard to race or color.”242 The Joint Committee also considered 
three proposals submitted by the Chairman, Maine Senator William Fessenden, which made pro-
visions of various strength and immediacy for black suffrage. The first, Article A, provided in part 
that “all provisions in the Constitution or laws of any State, whereby any distinction is made in 
political or civil rights or privileges, on account of race, creed or color, shall be inoperative and 
void.” The second, Article B, formed the basis for what would become Section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, reducing states’ representation in Congress if they denied blacks the right to vote. 
The third, Article B, read in its entirety: “Congress shall have power to make all laws necessary 
and proper to secure to all citizens of the United States, in every State, the same political rights 
and privileges; and to all persons in every State equal protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty 
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and property.” The Joint Committee quickly decided not to try to push for suffrage for blacks, and 
so abandoned Article A and reported Article B to Congress for consideration as its own Amend-
ment (it would go down to defeat due to the opposition of Radical Republicans, who at the time 
insisted on immediate suffrage.) Article C was referred to a subcommittee composed of Bingham 
and two other members, who reported the Article back to the Joint Committee a few days later 
with the following wording: “Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary 
and proper to secure all persons in every state full protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty and 
property; and to all citizens of the United States in any State the same immunities and also equal 
political rights and privileges.”243 
 “The same political rights and privileges” of Article C had become “the same immunities 
and also equal political rights and privileges,” while “equal protection” had become “full protec-
tion,” and the order in which the clauses appeared was reversed. Thaddeus Stevens exhorted the 
Joint Committee to report the revised Article C out to Congress for consideration as an independent 
constitutional Amendment, but lost the vote: “[f]our Republicans were absent and three voted 
nay.”244 Bingham flew the rescue with a compromise substitution for Article C: “The Congress 
shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of 
each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States (Art. 4, Sec. 2); and to all 
persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty and property (5th Amend-
ment).”245 The Joint Committee voted this version out to Congress for consideration. The proposed 
text became known as the “Bingham Amendment,” and was the first iteration of Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment that the House debated. 
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 In his survey of the record of congressional debate on this language, Bickel noted that 
“[a]side from [Pennsylvania Congressman William Kelley] … and from Bingham, later, when he 
was responding to attacks, the supporters of the amendment had little if anything specific to say 
about the kind of state action to which [the Bingham Amendment] was directed. This contrasts 
with the speeches made in behalf of the Civil Rights Bill.”246 It is for this reason that Bingham’s 
remarks about the scope and meaning of the Civil Rights Bill are relevant to, which is not to say 
dispositive of, an understanding of those of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nonetheless, 
the exchanges between proponents and critics of the Bingham Amendment illustrate how members 
of the House understood language very similar to that which would appear in the final form of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
 The first enlightening exchange occurred on the very first day of debate over the Bingham 
Amendment, on February 26, between Robert Hale of New York, Bingham, and Thaddeus Ste-
vens. Hale precipitated the exchange by claiming that the language of the proposed Amendment, 
far from being “a subject of the most trivial consequence,” as its proponents had represented it, 
was “in effect a provision under which all State legislation, in its codes of civil and criminal juris-
prudence and procedure, affecting the individual citizen, may be overridden . . . and the law of 
Congress established instead.” He went on to claim, in Bickel’s summation, that “all states distin-
guished between the property rights of married women on the one hand, and of ‘femmes sole’ and 
men on the other” but that “such distinctions would be outlawed” by the proposed Amendment. 
Stevens answered Hale’s peroration by denying that the language banned class legislation, adopt-
ing, as Bickel notes, a proto-rational basis scrutiny argument: “[w]hen a distinction is made be-
tween two married people or two femmes sole, then it is unequal legislation; but where all of the 
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same class are dealt with in the same way then there is no pretense of inequality.” Hale continued 
to press his point, however, insisting that the language of the Amendment “gives to all persons 
equal protection,” and Stevens failed or declined to muster a rejoinder.247 The upshot of this ex-
change is that Hale, who opposed the language, thought that the proposed Amendment might be 
abused to undermine reasonable legislative classifications. Stevens, in contrast, appeared not to 
believe that the Amendment extended to sex classifications. In any case, the beginning of the ex-
change provides evidence that neither Stevens nor Hale believed that it was wise to require the 
elimination of all class legislation, even if the latter believed the proposed Amendment could be 
so construed, and the former could not muster a convincing riposte to the latter’s concerns. 
 Next, Bingham responded to Hale by pointing out, in a clear allusion to the Black Codes, 
that (once again in Bickel’s words) “property rights and procedural rights in courts of law had been 
denied by some states…. Was not some protection needed?” Hale proposed that affected individ-
uals could flee such states and migrate, for example, to his own home state of New York, where 
their rights would be protected. Bingham replied: “I do not cast any imputation upon the State of 
New York. The gentleman knows full well, from conversations I have had with him, that so far as 
I understand this power, under no possible interpretation can it ever be made to operate in the State 
of New York while she occupies her present proud position.”248 Bingham went on: “It is to apply 
to other States [than those which seceded] . . . that have in their constitutions and laws to-day 
provisions in direct violation of every principle of our Constitution.” Finally, in response to a 
question by a member asking if Bingham’s remarks applied to Indiana, Bingham replied: “I do not 
know; it may be so. It applies unquestionably to the State of Oregon.” 
                                                




 Bickel pointed out that at that time (and until 1900), New York law reflected the Plessy 
dispensation, permitting “separate but equal schools for colored children in the discretion of local 
districts.”249 It is impossible to know whether Bingham was aware that New York law permitted 
segregation in schools. But what his remark about New York’s “present proud position” does sug-
gest is that Bingham’s understanding of the reach of the proposed Amendment was at least con-
sistent with legislative classifications employed by those states not recently in rebellion against 
the Union, and not egregiously discriminating against blacks in the right of movement or in basic 
legal protections for person and private property. It is for this reason that Bingham apparently 
singled out Oregon as an exemplar of a loyal state whose practices would run afoul of the Amend-
ment’s thrust. Bickel remarked: “[t]he Oregon constitution at this time … forbade free Negroes or 
mulattoes not residing in the state at the time of its adoption to come into the state, reside there, 
hold real estate, contract, or sue. This sort of thing Bingham wanted to strike down.”250 Piecing 
together Bingham’s comments on New York and Oregon indicates that Bingham intended the 
Amendment to outlaw gross violations of common law protections for person, property, and move-
ment, but not to outlaw legislative race classifications regulating social policy, such as marriage 
and education. Whether or not Bingham was aware of the precise laws on the books in Northern 
states requiring segregated education or banning interracial marriage, these matters did not rise to 
a level of salience that attracted his attention and ire, as did, for instance, Oregon’s practices. 
Therefore, as far as Bingham’s personal “intention” and “purpose” in authoring the Fourteenth 
Amendment are concerned, the foregoing strongly suggests that they extended to eliminating the 
                                                




very worst contemporaneous abuses of blacks throughout the country. These abuses were undoubt-
edly more prevalent and egregious in the South, where they took the form of Black Codes, and 
they also occurred sporadically throughout the North (as in Oregon), but in no instance would the 
social policies of these states be identified by Bingham as appropriate objects of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s proscriptions. 
 One final speech from the House’s initial consideration of the language that was to become 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is worth examining. New York Congressman Giles 
Hotchkiss, a Radical Republican, believed the Amendment did not go far enough. “As I understand 
it … [Bingham's] object in offering this resolution … is to provide that no State shall discriminate 
between its citizens and give one class of citizens greater rights than it confers upon another. If 
this amendment secured that, I should vote very cheerfully for it to-day; but … I do not regard it 
as permanently securing those rights….” Hotchkiss also objected to the extent of the power the 
Amendment contemplated granting Congress. “It is not indulging in imagination to any great 
stretch,” he said, “to suppose that we may have a Congress here who would establish such rules in 
my State as I should be unwilling to be governed by.”251 Finally, Hotchkiss said he felt Bingham’s 
views “upon this matter” were not “sufficiently radical” and that Hotchkiss would prefer the 
Amendment “go to the root of this matter.” What he thought might do so was a blanket prohibition 
on class legislation. “Why not provide by an amendment to the Constitution,” he asked, “that no 
State shall discriminate against any class of its citizens; and let that amendment stand as part of 
the organic law of the land, subject only to be defeated by another[?]” 
 Apparently, most of the Radicals (including Stevens) and the Moderates thought that the 
Amendment did not ban class legislation, while the Democrats and Conservatives thought it might 
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one day be twisted by an overly ambitious Congress to do so. Despite Stevens’ and Bingham’s 
attempts from February 26 to 28 to assuage fears over Hale’s concern that the language of the 
proposed Amendment was overly latitudinarian, “Hale’s argument,” Bickel tells us, “had sunk in 
and was going to prevail.”252 Two motions were consequently proposed: one to delay consideration 
of the Bingham Amendment indefinitely, the other to delay consideration until the second Tuesday 
of April. The first failed; the second, supported by the Republican leadership and Bingham himself, 
carried. However, the Amendment in this form was never heard from again: “The second Tuesday 
in April came and went with no further mention of the Bingham amendment.”253 Evidently Hale’s 
suggestion that the Bingham Amendment might be interpreted to ban all class legislation–––i.e., 
precisely what the Court in Brown sought to construe the Fourteenth Amendment to read–––had 
alarmed enough members to kill the amendment. None of the justices who decided Brown left any 
evidence in the primary source record that they confronted or overcame this or any other challenge 
arising from the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment to interpreting the Equal Protec-
tion Clause to announce precisely the rule that the 39th Congress took pains to avoid enshrining in 
the Constitution, as evidenced by the House’s de facto rejection of the Bingham Amendment. 
 The failed Bingham Amendment was superseded by a proposal drafted by Robert Dale 
Owen and introduced by Stevens in the Joint Committee on April 21. That newly suggested 
Amendment provided (again, in Bickel’s recapitulation): 
Section 1. No discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by the United States, as to 
civil rights of persons because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 
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Sec. 2. From and after the fourth day of July, in the year one thousand eight hundred and 
seventy-six, no discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by the United States, 
as to the enjoyment … of the right of suffrage…. 
Sec. 3. [Excluded all persons who were denied suffrage from the basis of representation, 
till 1876.] 
Sec. 4. [Confederate debt and compensation for slaves.] 
Sec. 5. Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation, the provisions of 
this article.  
And be it further resolved, [former Confederate states which ratified this amendment and 
enacted legislation in compliance with it, to be readmitted to the Union, when rati-
fication of the amendment was complete.] 
Provided, [that certain "rebels" be excluded from office till 1876.]254 
 Though the Bingham Amendment was dead, its author had not given up on the limited 
form of the principle he (not Hotchkiss) understood and intended it to embody, and now maneu-
vered to insinuate that principle into the new proposal. Bickel remarked that Bingham first pro-
posed adding to Section 1 the following wording: “nor shall any state deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, nor take private property for public use without 
just compensation.” This suggestion was defeated by a vote of 7 to 5. The Committee then voted 
10 to 2 to accept Section 1 as it appeared, with Bingham, his motion defeated, this time agreeing 
to Section 1’s wording. When the Committee took up consideration of Section 5, Bingham sug-
gested substituting the existing text with what would become the final wording of most of Section 
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment: “Sec. 5. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
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abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive 
any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” This time, the Committee agreed to adopt Bing-
ham’s suggestion by a vote of 10 to 2, with the same division among participants as had occurred 
on the vote over the final wording of Section 1. 
 The Committee met once more on April 23, but failed to make any changes affecting the 
Bingham language. When the Committee reconvened on April 25, however, Oregon Senator 
George Williams moved to delete the Bingham-reworded Section 5. This vote carried 7 to 5. After 
the Committee then voted to report out the whole package, Bingham, demonstrating impressive 
persistence, moved to propose his deleted Section 5 as an independent constitutional Amendment 
from the one emerging from the Owen draft. He lost this vote 8 to 4. Shortly thereafter another 
Committee member proposed rescinding the Committee’s prior vote to report out the package to 
Congress, and the Committee agreed, reversing its earlier decision 10 to 2 before adjourning. On 
April 28, the Committee met again. Bingham moved to substitute his deleted Section 5 wording 
for Section 1. This motion finally carried 10 to 3, the Democrats joining Bingham, Stevens, and 
others. Two of the three opposition votes were Radical Republicans; the third, a Moderate Repub-
lican. The Committee voted out its final handiwork 12-3, with all three Democrats in opposition. 
 Several observations regarding the significance of these legislative machinations are in or-
der. Bingham’s April 21 proposal would have recast Section 1 to read as follows: “No discrimina-
tion shall be made by any state, nor by the United States, as to civil rights of persons because of 
race, color, or previous condition of servitude, nor shall any state deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, nor take private property for public use without just 
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compensation.”255 Unless Bingham was blithely indifferent to redundancy, his proposal demon-
strates that he understood “no discrimination … as to civil rights of persons” and “equal protection 
of the laws” to mean distinct things. Whether in a world solely of his own making Bingham would 
have included both is doubtful due to the concerns he expressed during debate over the Civil Rights 
Bill about the undesirable “latitudinarian” applications to which the phrase “No discrimination … 
as to civil rights” was susceptible. As we have already seen, although Bingham claimed during the 
Civil Rights Bill debate personally to prefer that states abide the “no discrimination” principle as 
a matter of discretion, not only did he never speak in favor of rendering it constitutionally com-
pulsory, but he went on the record to oppose making it statutorily compulsory, apparently, as 
Bickel pointed out, due to substantive considerations of justice or policy in addition to merely legal 
reasons (i.e., lack of existing constitutional power to do so).  
 What is clear is that Bingham repeatedly sought to incorporate the principle embodied in 
the failed proposed Amendment bearing his name. His April 21 proposal is strong evidence indeed 
that he believed that that principle and the “no discrimination” civil rights formulation meant dif-
ferent things. Moreover, Bingham’s evident lack of interest in advancing a civil rights formulation, 
when contrasted with his unrelenting push for the Committee to incorporate his stricken Section 1 
wording in any possible position in the Amendment (or, even independently of the Owens draft, 
as a proposed Amendment of its own), strongly indicates Bingham did not seek to constitutionalize 
a command that there shall be “no discrimination … as to civil rights,” despite the preference he 
expressed during the Civil Rights Bill debate two months before that all state laws abide that prin-
ciple. Finally and most importantly, because Bingham evidently viewed the civil rights formula-
tion and his own equal protection language as signifying different things, and was interested solely 
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in “constitutionalizing” the latter, “No state shall … deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws” must mean something different, at least as far as Bingham was con-
cerned, than “No discrimination shall be made … as to civil rights of persons because of race, 
color, or previous condition of servitude.” 
 The probability that a man of Bickel’s accomplishments and intelligence did not detect the 
implications of Bingham’s April 21 proposal in the Joint Committee is vanishingly small. But 
Bickel did not express those implications in either version of his memo. Bickel instead emphasized 
the change in phrasing from the Bingham Amendment to Section 5 (later Section 1) of the Owens 
draft that would become the Fourteenth Amendment: “As regards negro rights, there is no internal 
indication whether the ‘equal protection of the laws’ formula (nota bene – ‘of the laws,’ not ‘in 
the rights of life, liberty and property,’ as in the earlier Bingham amendment) was thought by the 
Committee to imply greater or lesser coverage than the term ‘civil rights.’” Moreover, in the “Sum-
mary and Conclusions” section of his Harvard Law Review article (which did not appear in the 
memo that Frankfurter twice distributed to the conference during the 1953 term), Bickel argued 
that this change in phrasing rendered the language more capacious or indeterminate than protection 
“in the rights of life, liberty and property.” 
One would have to assume a lack of familiarity with the English language to conclude that 
a further difference between the Bingham amendment and the new proposal was not also 
perceived, namely, the difference between equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and 
property, a phrase which so aptly evoked the evils uppermost in men’s minds at the time, 
and equal protection of the laws, a clause which is plainly capable of being applied to all 
subjects of state legislation. Could the comparison have failed to leave the implication that 
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the new phrase, while it did not necessarily, and certainly not expressly, carry greater cov-
erage than the old, was nevertheless roomier, more receptive to “latitudinarian” construc-
tion? No one made the point with regard to this particular clause. But in opening debate in 
the Senate, Jacob Howard was frank to say that only the future could tell just what appli-
cation the privileges and immunities provision might have. And before the vote in the Sen-
ate, Reverdy Johnson, a Democrat, to be sure, but a respected constitutional lawyer and no 
rabid partisan, confessed his puzzlement about the same clause. Finally, it is noteworthy 
that the shorthand argument characterizing the fourteenth amendment as the constitutional 
embodiment of the Civil Rights Act was often accompanied on the Republican side by 
generalities about the selfevident demands of justice and the natural rights of man. This 
was true both in Congress and in the course of the election which followed. To all this 
should be added the fact that while the Joint Committee's rejection of the civil rights for-
mula is quite manifest, there is implicit also in its choice of language a rejection–––pre-
sumably as inappropriate in a constitutional provision–––of such a specific and exclusive 
enumeration of rights as appeared in section 1 of the Civil Rights Act.256 
 Bickel’s reading of the evidence is somewhat forced. As we have already seen, the House 
first failed to approve, and then let die, the Bingham Amendment, not only due to fears about the 
“necessary and proper” power it would have afforded Congress over legislating with regard to civil 
rights, but also because of the broadly shared view that the “no discrimination … as to civil rights” 
formulation was too “latitudinarian.” The House was, in other words, on guard against language 
that was susceptible of runaway constructions by future Congresses. It is unlikely, therefore, that 
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many members viewed the familiar “due process” and novel “equal protection of the laws” word-
ings as more susceptible of future latitudinarian distortion than the “equal protection in the rights 
of life, liberty and property” formulation of the Bingham Amendment. As Democratic New Jersey 
Congressman Andrew Jackson Rogers said during the debate over the latter, “I defy any man upon 
the other side of the House to name to me any right of the citizen which is not included in the 
words ‘life, liberty, property, privileges, and immunities,’ unless it should be the right of suf-
frage.”257 “Equal protection of the laws,” on the other hand, seems to strike at precisely the kind 
of ills Bingham complained of while defending his eponymous Amendment to a skeptical Con-
gress, without guaranteeing to blacks, as Rogers claimed the Amendment’s language would, “the 
right to marry white women”258 or, more generally, invalidate legislative racial classifications reg-
ulating social and political rights. Consequently, “equal protection of the laws” seemed, in Bing-
ham’s opinion, and the House’s understanding, to provide a minimum level of protection for blacks 
against legislative attacks on the legal rights surrounding person, property, and movement. At the 
very least, the evidence suggests that had the House believed the “equal protection of the laws” 
formulation promised more, any constitutional provision sporting it would have followed the Bing-
ham Amendment to oblivion or defeat. 
 The remarks Bingham delivered during the debate over his eponymous constitutional pro-
posal are also instructive. The species of caste law Bingham evidently wished his Amendment to 
reach were those, like the Black Codes and the then-constitution of Oregon, that egregiously dis-
criminated against blacks by denying them basic legal protections for person and property, and 
refusing them the ability to travel and settle freely. These rights and liberties were in Bingham’s 
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view evidently so elementary that to negate them for any person, not to mention entire classes of 
people, was grossly unjust. This interpretation of Bingham’s intentions coheres completely with 
his later attempts in the Joint Committee to add “due process” and “equal protection” formulations, 
and his apparent indifference as to whether the “no discrimination … as to civil rights” language 
survived the Committee’s proceedings on the Owens draft. It also gels with Bingham’s dictum, 
delivered during the debate over his proposed Amendment, concerning the “present proud posi-
tion” of school-segregating New York: his pronouncement indicated that he did not have run-of-
the-mill social caste laws in his constitutional crosshairs.  
 Finally, the change in phrasing from “equal protection in the rights of life, liberty and prop-
erty” to “equal protection of the laws” suggests two mutually compatible possibilities. The first is 
that the change arose from Bingham’s desire to moderate the language in order to make it more 
palatable to the Joint Committee and Congress, since the original phrasing had been successfully 
attacked in the House debate and, independently of its merits, could have been viewed by members 
of the Committee and Congress as toxic because of its association with a measure that had been 
tabled and forgotten. That Bingham encountered persistent resistance and setbacks from the Com-
mittee in securing this language a permanent place in the Owens draft also suggests that Joint 
Committee members were reluctant to enshrine language so similar to, and of the same provenance 
as, the formulation that appeared in the Bingham Amendment. Therefore, one possibility is that 
Bingham believed the two equal protection formulations were at least roughly synonymous, and 
rephrased the first primarily to quell fears about its susceptibility to future latitudinarian abuses. 
 Another possibility is that the “equal protection of the laws” formulation more accurately 
captured the thrust of the constitutional attack Bingham intended to levy. As we have seen, Bing-
ham probably sought not to eliminate all caste laws, but to secure to blacks certain rights–––of 
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person, property, and movement–––that were in Bingham’s opinion so fundamental that anyone 
deprived of them could reasonably described as “exposed,” because denied by the state, and con-
sequently without, the “protection of the laws.” The Oregon’s constitution and laws and the Black 
Codes of Southern states so abused blacks that blacks could be said to lack the protection of the 
legal system. Hence, it is possible that the change in phrasing from “equal protection in the rights 
of life, liberty, and property” to “equal protection of the laws” both afforded, by eliminating the 
emphasis on rights, less substantive grounds for later Congresses to unduly interfere in state leg-
islation, and articulated a clearer authority for eliminating the most egregious of abuses.  
 Recall, moreover, the various proposals that the Joint Committee on Reconstruction had 
considered prior to the adoption of the Bingham Amendment. Article C had been reported for 
rephrasing to a subcommittee on which Bingham served, and the resulting change in wording was 
from “[t]he same political rights and privileges” to “the same immunities and also equal political 
rights and privileges,” and from “equal protection” to “full protection.” Provided the clauses were 
not understood to be redundant, the inclusion of a clause commanding “the same immunities and 
also equal political rights and privileges” and of a clause specifying “full protection” indicates that 
the subcommittee intended the “protection” language to target something other than political 
rights, on the one hand, and substantive civil or social rights that might have been subsumed under 
immunities, on the other. That the language cycled back and forth between “equal protection” and 
“full protection” also suggests that Bingham, the primary responsible party for the fluctuations, 
did not intend the final formulation of “equal protection of the laws” in the Fourteenth Amendment 
to be a constitutional authorization to abrogate all manner of political and social class legislation. 
Instead, the alternating language, and the synonymy of “full” and “equal” that the language im-
plies, points to the idea that Bingham and the subcommittee sought to require states to extend basic 
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protections for the civil rights of person, property, and movement to all citizens, regardless of 
class. In the House debate over the Fourteenth Amendment, Bingham would go on to defend Sec-
tion 1, his handiwork, as follows: 
The necessity for the first section … is one of the lessons that have been taught … by the 
history of the past four years.... There … remains a want now, in the Constitution … which 
the proposed amendment will supply…. It is the power in the people … to protect by na-
tional law the privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic and the inborn 
rights of every person within its jurisdiction whenever the same shall be abridged or denied 
by the unconstitutional acts of any State…. [T]his amendment takes from no State any right 
that ever pertained to it. No State ever had the right … to deny to any freeman the equal 
protection of the laws or to abridge the privileges and immunities of any citizen of the 
Republic, although many of them have assumed and exercised the power, and that without 
remedy…. [M]any instances of State injustice and oppression have already occurred in the 
State legislation of this Union, of flagrant violations of the guarantied privileges of citizens 
of the United States, for which the national Government furnished and could furnish by 
law no remedy whatever. Contrary to the express letter of your Constitution, “cruel and 
unusual punishments” have been inflicted under State laws … not only for crimes commit-
ted, but for sacred duty done. That great want of the citizen and stranger, protection by 
national law from unconstitutional State enactments, is supplied by the first section of this 
amendment. That is the extent that it hath, no more; and let gentlemen answer to God and 
their country who oppose its incorporation into the organic law of the land.259 
                                                
259 Id., at 49-50 [emphasis added]. 
 
170 
 This extensive soliloquy on the scope and purposes of Section 1 is entirely consistent with 
the theory that Bingham’s understood “equal protection of the laws” to command substantive legal 
protections for fundamental rights–––not those that might in future be added to the list, but those 
that were deeply embedded in the country’s legal tradition, and identified concretely in the Civil 
Rights Bill, though they had always been violated wherever slavery existed, and were being vio-
lated still by state laws like the Black Codes. The whole thrust of Bingham’s peroration quoted 
above is that the part of the phrase “equal protection of the laws” that performs the most work, in 
Bingham’s view, is “protection.” Bingham apparently intended “equal,” like the “full” version 
with which it alternated in the drafts of what became his eponymous Amendment, to signify com-
prehensiveness by identifying the respect in which the law’s coverage was most often circum-
scribed: on the basis of class or group identity.  
 No part of Bingham’s remarks on the Section 1 lends credence to Bickel’s theory, ex-
pressed to Justice Frankfurter in his farewell letter of August 22, 1953 (discussed at greater length 
below) that “the Congress was on notice that it was enacting vague language of indeterminate 
reach.” To the contrary, Bingham seemed to believe that his equal protection language had a con-
crete purpose and scope. And that Bingham both spearheaded the attack on the open-ended civil 
rights phraseology of the Civil Rights Act that culminated in the language’s deletion and consist-
ently favored the word “protection” in his Section 1 formulations in lieu of diction that would 
unequivocally ensure substantive equality of social and political rights most strongly suggests that 
Bingham’s aim in Section 1 was to “constitutionalize” the Civil Rights Act. That “constitutional-
ization,” finally, occurred at two levels: by creating a constitutional authorization for the Civil 
Rights Act, and by elevating the protections for the rights of person, property, and movement to 
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constitutional restrictions on the states, while evading the latitudinarian dangers that had been 
struck from the Civil Rights Act and had sunk the Bingham Amendment. 
 Thaddeus Stevens also appeared to believe that the language of Section 1 had a concrete 
purpose and scope, ones that, in Stevens’ view, were lamentably inadequate. Recall the proposals 
Bingham and Stevens had independently submitted to the Joint Committee on Reconstruction prior 
to the formulation of the Bingham Amendment. Bingham’s initial proposal read: “The Congress 
shall have power to make all laws necessary and proper to secure to all persons in every state 
within this Union equal protection in their rights of life, liberty and property.” Stevens’ proposal, 
in contrast, commanded: “All laws, state and national, shall operate impartially and equally on all 
persons without regard to race or color.” Bingham’s language, in other words, was of “equal pro-
tection in rights”, while Stevens’ commanded the “impartial[] and equal[]” “operation” of state 
and national laws “on all persons without regard to race or color.” Thus, at the very least, Stevens 
probably did not view Bingham’s phrasing (“equal protection in [] rights of life, liberty and prop-
erty”) to guarantee that state and national laws “operate impartially and equally on all persons 
without regard to race or color.” Confirmation of this interpretation comes from Stevens’ subse-
quent expression of bitter disappointment with the final text of the Fourteenth Amendment during 
the House debate. 
In my youth, in my manhood, in my old age, I had fondly dreamed that when any fortunate 
chance should have broken up for awhile the foundation of our institutions, and released 
us from obligations the most tyrannical that ever man imposed in the name of freedom, that 
the intelligent, pure and just men of this Republic, true to their professions and their con-
sciences, would have so remodeled all our institutions as to have freed them from every 
vestige of human oppression, of inequality of rights, of the recognized degradation of the 
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poor, and the superior caste of the rich. In short, that no distinction would be tolerated in 
this purified Republic but what arose from merit and conduct. This bright dream has van-
ished “like the baseless fabric of a vision.” I find that we shall be obliged to be content with 
patching up the worst portions of the ancient edifice, and leaving it, in many of its parts, to 
be swept through by the tempests, the frosts, and the storms of despotism. Do you inquire 
why, holding these views and possessing some will of my own, I accept so imperfect a 
proposition? I answer, because I live among men and not among angels….260 
Stevens’ hopes for the liberation of American society from the “vestige of human oppression” and 
“inequality of rights” were apparently frustrated by the Fourteenth Amendment, but he accepted 
it, warts and all, evidently because he understood politics was the art of the possible. Stevens’ 
disappointment with the Fourteenth Amendment and his preferred wording for the Bingham 
Amendment suggest that Stevens believed that Section 1, including the phrase “equal protection 
of the laws,” did not incontrovertibly command or secure the impartial and equal “operat[ion]” of 
state and national laws “on all persons without regard to race or color.” 
 Now, perhaps an argument will be made that Stevens felt that the language of Section 1 
was necessary but not sufficient to achieve the kind of equality he favored, or that he felt that the 
Amendment’s language was not sufficiently unambiguous in commanding the aims he favored, 
but believed that in the hands of a likeminded judiciary and Congress, the language could be con-
strued to achieve precisely those goals. That may well be, but there is no evidence for it. Stevens’ 
remarks indicate that he believed only the minimum level of equality commanded by the language 
would be achieved, although he did expressly pin his hopes for greater equality on “future enabling 
acts or other provisions.” As he declared before moving for the House to vote on the proposal that 
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would become the Fourteenth Amendment: “[t]he danger [now] is that before any constitutional 
guards shall have been adopted Congress will be flooded by rebels and rebel sympathizers. Hence, 
I say, let us no longer delay; take what we can get now, and hope for better things in further legis-
lation; in enabling acts or other provisions.”261 
BICKEL’S INTERPRETIVE GLOSS 
 
 The interpretative gloss Bickel overlaid on this legislative history in both the memo that 
Frankfurter distributed to the other justices and the published 1955 Harvard Law Review article is 
worth examining in some detail. For while it is unlikely that many of the justices carefully studied 
the 58 pages of legislative history in Bickel’s memo, it is very likely that all of the justices read 
Bickel’s executive summary of that history in the six-page “Prefatory Note” prefixed to every 
copy. The Prefatory Note begins by attempting to situate the Fourteenth Amendment within the 
electoral context of 1866, though this context was scarcely mentioned in the memo that followed, 
or in the expanded version that Bickel published in 1955. “It is central to an understanding of the 
legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment,” Bickel wrote, “that the First session of the 39th 
Congress met in an election year, that it soon became engaged in a struggle with the President 
unique in our history, whereby it sought to make a record on which to go to the country against 
the President.”262 The implication at which Bickel was grasping is clear: there may not be evidence 
to construe the Fourteenth Amendment the way we know is salutary and just, but that is because 
its authors were subject to political pressures in the absence of which they might (or would) have 
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used language more amenable to our purposes.  “The[] aims [that] defined the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,” Bickel continued, “were suffrage or restricted representation for former Confederate States, 
amnesty or political disabilities for large numbers of Southerners, and the Confederate debt.” Other 
questions were considered, but 
were subsidiary, and there is a striking paucity of allusion to them in the rather hurried 
debate on the Fourteenth Amendment itself. It is not insignificant that Charles Sumner [the 
leading Senate Radical] did not once in the First Session of the 39th Congress speak either 
to Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment or to the Civil Rights Act, which were generally 
deemed similar in purpose.263 
Bickel noted that Bingham, Senate Radical John Howard of Michigan, and Andrew Jackson Rog-
ers all spoke to the meaning of Section 1, the former two in “glowing” terms, the latter only by 
“attributing some importance to it.” “Almost without exception, however,” Bickel observed, “the 
other speakers ignored Section 1, passed it off by remarking on its self-evident justice and on the 
fact that Congress had previously expressed itself in favor of its purpose by passing the Civil Rights 
Act, or condemned it on the summary ground that it embodied the Act.” 
 Bickel then pointed out that the Civil Rights Act “secured a series of enumerated rights, 
not including, in the view of its sponsors and clearly not of the representative body of congressional 
opinion, so-called political or social rights, or, specifically, the right to sit on juries.” Bickel’s 
allusion to the “representative body of congressional opinion” evidently refers to the belief of the 
Democrats and some conservative Republicans who had aligned themselves with the President 
that the Act would procure social and political rights for blacks. Why Bickel would include that 
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reference when those who voted for the Civil Rights Act were on the congressional record over-
whelmingly rejecting that view of the law264 will probably become clearer as Bickel’s gloss be-
comes more explicit. However, in the next few lines of the memo, Bickel acknowledged some 
unhelpful facts for construing the Fourteenth Amendment to mean what his own boss obviously 
wanted it to: “It is impossible, on the basis of the debates, to conclude that the 39th Congress 
intended that segregation be abolished. The specific fear that segregation in schools would be 
abolished was voiced at some length by three leading figures who opposed the Radical leadership 
and all its works.” Still, in light of the fact that two of the vociferous opponents were Democrats 
of “extreme unreconstructed views” and the third was a Conservative Republican who had “sided 
with the President” against the Radical Congressional leadership, “[i]t is inescapable that warnings 
coming from these men were somewhat discounted by their colleagues.” Detracting from the au-
thoritativeness of the alarms sounded by these men, whom their colleagues evidently viewed as 
untrustworthy on the question of the Amendment’s meaning, was the fact that “these three almost 
invariably coupled their warnings concerning school segregation with forebodings in regard to 
miscegenation and the extension of suffrage to Negroes.” 
 But, Bickel proclaimed, “if anything is clear,” it is that the Fourteenth Amendment ex-
cluded suffrage for blacks–––there was unequivocal legislative history on that question. “As for 
miscegenation, with all the political pressures and the post-war fervor of the times, it is inconceiv-
able that a two-thirds majority of the 39th Congress would have voted for any measure which it 
believed would strike down antimiscegenation statutes.” This is perhaps the most important con-
cession Bickel made in his writings on the history of the Fourteenth Amendment. For if the 39th 
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Congress would not have “voted for any measure which it believed would strike down antimisce-
genation statutes,” then that same body did not understand or intend the Fourteenth Amendment 
to strike down antimiscegenation statutes now, or at any time in the future. But if that is true, then 
the 39th Congress did not understand or intend the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down any 
legislation regulating social equality or inequality. Nor did it, by the incontrovertible record of its 
proceedings, vote in the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down any classifications pertaining to 
political rights. Hence, what the 39th Congress did and did alone in proposing the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the states was to constitutionalize the protections Bingham explicitly identified––
–those of rights pertaining to person, property, and movement–––and those specified in the Civil 
Rights Bill. That is, such is what Section 1 of Fourteenth Amendment means if its meaning is 
determined or exhausted by the legislative history.  
 However, Bickel refrained from extending the implications of his observation about the 
attitude of the 39th Congress toward miscegenation laws. Instead, he continued on to report that 
the most ardent abolitionists and Radicals, including Thaddeus Stevens, were disappointed in the 
limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Consequently, “[t]he majority of the 39th Congress 
knew that the fullness of the abolitionist program was unfulfilled and the direst of the opposition’s 
fears unfounded.” Of course, if it did not, it would not–––could not, per Bickel’s own analysis of 
the congressional record–––have adopted the Amendment. Bickel also recounted that Bingham 
was the author of Section 1 and of the successful attack on overly latitudinarian language in the 
Civil Rights Act, for both substantive (policy) and constitutional (legal) reasons. Furthermore, 
Bickel highlighted that Bingham had “thought the civil rights to be safeguarded must be specified” 
when constitutional language protecting civil rights generally had been proposed in the Joint Com-
mittee on Reconstruction and that Bingham’s “persistent effort in the Committee was to avoid the 
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use of a general ‘civil rights’ provision, at least one standing alone.” Finally, Bickel summarized 
the evidence he had surveyed in his letter up to this point. 
It is thus reasonably clear what the majority in the 39th Congress did not have specifically 
in mind. It is also clear that there were a number of existing practices in the South (and in 
some Northern States as well) which it was generally thought the Civil Rights Act, and 
hence the Fourteenth Amendment, would strike down. Among them were restriction on 
movement, on ownership of property and on professional activities, and deprivation of 
procedural rights in court. Such practices were generally codified in Southern Black Codes. 
Though Bickel stated that “it is thus reasonably clear what the majority in the 39th Congress did 
not have specifically in mind,” he refrained from attempting to explain the implications of those 
deliberate omissions for the likelihood that the 39th Congress might have targeted in the Fourteenth 
Amendment subjects not at all or only infrequently contemplated, such as school segregation. 
Bickel’s observations in other areas (especially his comment regarding the 39th Congress’ attitudes 
toward miscegenation, discussed above) tend strongly to minimize this likelihood, a fact which 
suggests his reason for not examining it. Moreover, the ills Bickel did identify as falling squarely 
within the scope of the legislative action that Congress sought to proscribe in Section 1 are those 
Bingham repeatedly emphasized as the targets of the Civil Rights Act and his own eponymous 
Amendment. Why Bickel did not proceed candidly if unenthusiastically to the terminus of his train 
of reasoning–––i.e., to the conclusion that Bingham’s intentions for and understanding of Section 
1 were dispositive of its meaning–––is demonstrated by the thought Bickel expressed in the Pref-
atory Note’s conclusion, discussed below. 
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 Next, in weakly trying to adduce support for the proposition that his inquiry into the pro-
ceedings of the 39th Congress might provide grounds for overriding Plessy, Bickel inadvertently 
highlighted Plessy’s sound historical footing. 
It may also be suggested, on the basis of a few remarks–––one by a moderate Re-
publican in the House, another by a Radical in the Senate … –––that there was some 
opinion holding that if Negroes were taxed toward school funds, some sort of ade-
quate, though segregated, school system would have to be provided for them from 
those funds. Finally, it was fairly common ground in Congress, and very likely 
throughout the North, that the mass of people whom the Thirteenth Amendment 
had freed would have somehow to be educated, “elevated,” if any sort of viable 
society were to be erected with them in its midst…. It may well have been thought 
that the Fourteenth Amendment might impose some obligation in this respect, at 
least on States which provided educational facilities for white children. But this is 
little more than conjecture. 
With respect to the framers’ only direct consideration of segregated education during the congres-
sional debates over the Fourteenth Amendment, the most Bickel could say is that some members 
of the 39th Congress expressed views of the Amendment’s purpose entirely consonant with 
Plessy’s rule of “separate but equal.” 
 Bickel then proceeded to deliver the final, parting thought of his Prefatory Note. It is here 
that he dispensed with any vestigial pretense of scholarly disinterestedness and stated what he 
evidently wished the justices to take away from his historical inquiry: whatever unhelpful facts the 
history of the Fourteenth Amendment contains, that history “invites” the Court to proceed down 
whatever path it concludes is just.  
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To arrive at the only two relative certainties thus disclosed–––once concerning the 
matters which, in the 39th Congress, were generally thought to be without, the other 
concerning those which were thought to be within, the scope of the Fourteenth 
Amendment–––is not to have concluded the necessary inquiry into the legislative 
history of the Amendment. For it gives that history a much more conclusive ap-
pearance than its comprehensiveness warrants. The 39th Congress was on notice 
that it was enacting vague language of essentially indeterminate reach. No one–––
least of all Mr. Bingham–––knew precisely what Section 1 meant…. [I]n the rush 
and under the political pressures of the final days, the 39th Congress, believing it 
was meeting some immediate needs now and others not yet or not at all, acted as 
other Congresses acted before and since; it left for the future the solution of a num-
ber of painful problems. It cannot be said that it knew what role the language it was 
enacting should or would play in that solution. 
Here Bickel implied that being on notice of X is equivalent to having a conscious purpose to allow 
or pursue X. With this rationalization Bickel apparently sought to relieve himself of the normal 
burden of historical proof in judicial inquiry, which would be to establish that a provision’s archi-
tects had adhered to a particular point of view or plan of action that the judiciary shares. Bickel 
instead attempted to shift the burden of proof to those who believed that the Amendment’s legis-
lative history provided no affirmative warrant for construing the Amendment to outlaw segregation 
to show that that lack of evidence was an insurmountable obstacle to interpreting the Amendment 
to ban precisely what was never explicitly targeted. More generally, Bickel charged those who 
construe the Amendment’s legislative history to be amenable to segregation with the responsibility 
of proving that the framers did not expressly disavow future latitudinarian constructions of their 
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handiwork. Thus, despite the fact that Bickel’s own research showed conclusively that Section 1 
of the Fourteenth Amendment–––“like section I of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, carried out the 
relatively narrow objectives of the Moderates, and hence, as originally understood, was meant to 
apply neither to jury service, nor suffrage, nor antimiscegenation statutes, nor segregation,”265 i.e., 
social and political rights–––Bickel argued that the Supreme Court could interpret the Amendment 
not just more liberally than its framers intended, but also to include precisely those things its fram-
ers explicitly disclaimed. The Court could do so, he reasoned, because the Amendment’s framers 
did not explicitly say that they did not think that the Court in the future should not be able to 
interpret the Amendment to target precisely what they did not want it to target, in a way entirely 
at odds with their understanding of the purpose and reach of their own handiwork.  
 In this way, Bickel discounted completely the results of his own historical inquiry, while 
purporting to claim that they–––in the guise of the burden-shifting interpretative narrative he had 
helpfully weaved–––were still of some use to the justices. Bickel’s is an egregious case of trans-
parently motivated historical interpretation. Not only does “A being on notice of X” emphatically 
not prove that A desired and intended that X should issue from its efforts, but also, as Bickel 
himself noted and was no doubt keenly aware, Congress chose the Amendment’s equal protection 
wording in part because it wished to avoid language with a “latitudinarian” bent.266 Moreover, 
against Bickel’s claim that “least of all Mr. Bingham … knew precisely what Section 1 meant,” 
Bingham’s remarks throughout the debates of the 39th Congress and the record of his votes on the 
Joint Committee indicated that he had a reasonably concrete idea of what Section 1 meant. As we 
have seen, Bingham, like most of the other members of the 39th Congress, was mindful of language 
                                                




that might lend itself to future distortions and sought to avoid it. Finally, Bickel’s argument that 
Congress did not know what role the Fourteenth Amendment would play in the solution of future 
problems is true, just as it is true that one does now know precisely what will happen next year or 
even tomorrow, but that fact does not compel the conclusion Bickel imputed to it: that the 39th 
Congress acquiesced to or intended for the Amendment to be interpreted in the future in a way that 
that that Congress specifically and explicitly disclaimed, to solve problems that were themselves 
alive and well in 1866. 
 Bickel evidently attempted to palliate this shortcoming of his Prefatory Note’s interpreta-
tive gloss by introducing in his Harvard Law Review article the following contention. Whether or 
not Congress anticipated that its constitutional provision might be used in a way it would not have 
itself approved, it should have known better. The 39th Congress, Bickel argues, “cannot be said [to 
have known] what role the language it was enacting should or would play in future endeavors,” 
and since “[t]he tradition of a broadly worded organic law not frequently or lightly amended was 
well-established by 1866 … it cannot be assumed that [the 39th Congress] or anyone else expected 
or wished the future role of the Constitution in the scheme of American government to differ from 
the past.”267 The biggest problem with this suggestion is that it implies that “the future role of the 
Constitution in the scheme of American government” was the same in 1866 as it would become in 
the Twentieth Century, during the first half of which the Supreme Court acquired a far more central 
role in American politics and political culture than it had possessed in the first 112 years of the 
polity’s history. Indeed, as late as 1920 it was an extremely controversial proposition in American 
political culture that major expansions or reconceptions of constitutional rights could legitimately 
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transpire by means of judicial decision alone: the pervasiveness of that orientation toward revolu-
tionary judicial action explains, for example, the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment in lieu of 
a judicial decree extending suffrage to women, and the widespread contempt in which Lochner-
era jurisprudence was held. There is, furthermore, every reason to think that the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment either distrusted or ignored judicial power: the Court’s recent and most 
significant political intervention (as of 1866) in American political life, Dredd Scott v. Sandford,268 
destabilized the country and precipitated civil war.269 Perhaps this distrust or disregard of the ju-
diciary was most evident in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which afforded Congress 
alone explicit enforcement power. Therefore, to ascribe to the 39th Congress the purpose of adopt-
ing language that could be liberally reinterpreted by future generations (including future judicial 
generations) to solve future problems, by asserting that “Congress was on notice” that the language 
it chose was “indeterminate,” simply belies every indication in the historical record. 
 Bickel had still more rationalizations to present. In light of his uncorroborated conclusion 
that the 39th Congress would not have “wished the future role of the Constitution in the scheme of 
American government to differ from the past,” Bickel asked: “Should not the search for congres-
sional purpose, therefore, properly be twofold? One inquiry should be directed at the congressional 
understanding of the immediate effect of the enactment on conditions then present. Another should 
aim to discover what if any thought was given to the long-range effect, under future circumstances, 
of provisions necessarily intended for permanence.”270 Evidently finding the legislative history of 
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269 In fairness to Bickel, he acknowledged the likelihood that the 39th Congress was wary of an interventionist Court 
at the end of the Harvard Law Review version of his memo, although he presented this point as tangential and de-
clined to draw any inferences from it for understanding the 39th Congress’ attitude toward the 14th Amendment. Id., 
at 64. 
270 Id., at 59. 
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the Fourteenth Amendment depressingly unhelpful, Bickel thus tried to limit the implications of 
the history’s concrete facts for the judicial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment some 87 
years after its adoption. After all, little had been discovered in the inquiry to support the claim, 
central to a “judicial” case for overturning Plessy in 1954, that the Amendment had been under-
stood by its framers to invalidate social caste legislation. Therefore, the further removed the level 
of judicial analysis could be rendered from the history’s unhelpful facts, the more persuasive would 
be the inevitable determination that the “long-run” effect of the Amendment was salutary after all. 
Bickel attempted to discern that long-term effect by circumscribing the intentions of the 39th Con-
gress, which were entirely consistent with tolerating or permitting racial discrimination in social 
and political rights, to the “short term.” 
 Bickel was correct to say, as he did in the Harvard Law Review version of his memo,271 
that uncertainty over the meaning of constitutional provisions tends to invite future generations to 
apply their own interpretive gloss, as he had done himself. But the reality of the invitation and the 
legitimacy of the gloss are logically unconnected. To be legitimate, the gloss must issue from an 
invitation that is deliberately and explicitly extended. My leaving open the door of my house may 
very well invite passersby to enter and abscond with my possessions, but it does not thereby legit-
imate the taking. Similarly, the uncertainty of some members of the 39th Congress concerning the 
precise meaning or reach of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment might well 
invite, but does not thereby legitimate, that species of future interpretation that the majority ex-
plicitly anticipated and attempted to forestall by eliminating language that they concluded might 
be susceptible to “latitudinarian” distortions. That the vast majority of the 39th Congress failed to 
conclude that Bingham’s Section 1 “equal protection of the laws” formulation would in future be 
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susceptible of precisely those kinds of unintended constructions was probably due to the fact that 
Section 1 was widely represented and understood–––by opponents and proponents of the Amend-
ment alike272–––as “constitutionalizing” the Civil Rights Act in the two ways previously dis-
cussed.273 This would account, as Bickel acknowledged repeatedly, for the relative neglect Section 
1 experienced, and for the overwhelming focus on Section 3, in congressional debate on the 
Amendment.274 However, Bickel’s claim–––amounting to an argument from silence–––that the 
members of the 39th Congress never manifested any desire that future generations not substitute 
their superior moral opinions for Congress’ handiwork of 1866 (in the words of Raoul Berger) 
“assumes what needs to be proved”275: that the Amendment’s framers deliberately exercised (now 
in Bickel’s words) “a choice of language capable of growth.”276 The reading of the evidence 
Bickel’s own memo presents contradicts that conclusion. 
 Bickel expressed himself on this point in a slightly different way to Justice Frankfurter in 
an August 22, 1953 missive that served as both farewell letter to the justice and executive summary 
of his memo on the history of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
But all this [synopsis of the Amendment’s legislative history] only means that the legisla-
tive history is inconclusive. For the Congress was on notice that it was enacting vague 
language of indeterminate reach. I think, though it is hard to quote chapter and verse on 
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273 Or, in Raoul Berger’s more elegant summation: “the Amendment was designed to ‘constitutionalize’ the [Civil 
Rights] Act, that is, to ‘embody’ it in the Constitution so as to remove doubt as to its constitutionality and to place it 
beyond the power of a later Congress to repeal” (Berger [1976] 1997, 32-33). 
274 See Bickel (1955) at 48 (“But the bulk of the debate turned on other sections, principally section 3. A number of 
the Republicans who spoke failed even to mention section 1.”), at 50 (recounting the separate speeches of Bingham 
and Stevens in the House, which devoted considerable time to Section 3), and at 58 (“For the rest, however, section i 
was not really debated. Rogers, whose remarks are always subject to heavy discount, considering his shaky position 
in the affections of his own party colleagues, raised ‘latitudinarian’ alarms. One or two other Democrats in the 
House did so also. But more and more, debate turned on section 3 and not much else.”) 
275 Id., at 124. 
276 Bickel (1955, 63). 
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this, that many, very many men in that Congress, not least of all Thaddeus Stevens, thought 
that the amendment would operate principally through implementation legislation by Con-
gress. Hopes both for a broad and a narrow application of the general language being voted 
were met by this impression. Otherwise the 39th Congress saw the issues of its day, among 
which one [eliminating the Southern Black Codes] overshadowed the rest, and trusted to 
the future to solve future problems. It pointed, I think, in Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the general manner in which problems similar to those with which it was 
dealing should in future be solved. This I believe is the most that can be said, and it is 
supported it seems to me by the authority of this Court which has extended the solution of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to problems -- notably jury service277 -- which were as little in 
focus in 1866 as segregation, and concerning which an even better case can be made out to 
show that the 39th Congress affirmatively indicated that they were without the scope of the 
Amendment it was promising. I think the legislative history leaves this Court free to re-
member that it is a Constitution it is construing. I think also that a charitable view of the 
sloppy draftsmen of the Fourteenth Amendment would ascribe to them the knowledge that 
it was a Constitution they were writing.278 
Far from the elegant and soaring pronouncements on constitutionalism that Bickel obviously in-
tended these last sentences to comprise, they provide more corroboration that Bickel was moti-
vated by a desire to reach the “moral” or “just” conclusion that his research assignment into the 
                                                
277 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). Whether Bickel’s comment in the letter to Frankfurter had any 
ultimate influence on Warren’s use of Strauder in Brown is unknown, but it is more likely that Warren, who admit-
ted at the 1953 conference to having “studied” the litigants’ briefs, simply lifted the precedent, and the NAACP’s 
theory of what it signified for interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, from the 1952 NAACP brief (Brief for Ap-
pellants) in Brown. In any case, Strauder was certainly the strongest judicial precedent for Brown prior to Sweatt 
and McLaurin. 
278 Felix Frankfurter Harvard Law School Papers (emphasis added). 
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Amendment’s history had rather conspicuously failed to supply. Twenty-five years after Brown, 
Philip Kurland, Bickel’s predecessor in Frankfurter’s chambers, remarked rather caustically that 
Marshall’s dictum in McCulloch that 
“[W]e must never forget. . . it is a constitution we are expounding” [] transmuted the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause of Article I into a Hamiltonian grant of unlimited authority to the 
national government. Felix Frankfurter, near the end of his judicial career, asserted that 
this statement by Marshall was “the single most important utterance in the literature of 
constitutional law - most important because most comprehensive and most comprehend-
ing.” I suppose that my apprenticeship to Justice Frankfurter was a failure. For these words, 
“we must never forget it is a constitution we are expounding,” are as empty of meaning for 
me as they were full of significance for Mr. Justice Frankfurter, unless these words mean 
what Charles Evans Hughes meant when he said: “The Constitution is what the Justices 
say it is.”279 
Such, certainly, was the effect, if not the intent, of the interpretive gloss Bickel applied to the 
Amendment’s legislative history in his farewell letter to Justice Frankfurter. 
 In his account of the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, Bickel employs a 
modus operandi of (1) acknowledging facts unhelpful to the prospect of overturning segregation, 
(2) studiously refraining from identifying and expounding upon those facts’ rather obvious impli-
cations for the judicial concerns that animated his research assignment, and (3) drawing implica-
tions from silence or a lack of facts. Bickel apparently initially sought historical facts that would 
free his boss, Justice Frankfurter, from the handcuffs of the justice’s own jurisprudential approach, 
but when those facts failed to materialize in the inquiry, Bickel settled for an interpretive gloss that 
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he evidently hoped would permit his boss to reach the conclusion both Frankfurter and Bickel 
favored, jurisprudential shackles notwithstanding. Accordingly, Bickel’s argument was strongest 
when he moved farthest away from the historical facts, confirming the impression that his inter-
pretive gloss, and not the historical evidence it putatively synthesized and embodied, was doing 
the heavy lifting of convincing the reader that “the record of history, properly understood, left the 
way open to, in fact invited, a decision based on the moral and material state of the nation in 1954, 
not 1866.”280  
 Rather than illustrating any unhelpful implications of the uncertainty around the Amend-
ment’s precise meaning–––e.g., that though it was unclear precisely what the Amendment re-
quired, those members of the 39th Congress who supported it would have almost certainly all voted 
it down if they thought it could have been interpreted to require, e.g., desegregation–––Bickel 
repeatedly suggested in both unpublished and published versions of his memo that that uncertainty 
manifested a legislative intent that future generations construe the language however they prefer. 
As we have seen, however, Bickel failed to provide any evidence that any member of the 39th 
Congress believed or said that, or anything close to it. Presumably, members of the 39th Congress 
like Bingham would have thought it a manifest violation of the Amendment for future generations 
to interpret laws depriving people of the right to travel freely to be compatible with the imperative 
that “No state shall … deny to any person … the equal protection of the laws.” (Though we cannot 
ask Bickel for a response, it seems unlikely that he would have denied this.) So too, then, might 
most of the members of the 39th Congress have felt that future generations’ interpreting the equal 
protection clause to invalidate state anti-miscegenation laws would manifestly contradict the 
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Amendment’s meaning. “Did no one bother to read the legislative history?” they might ask. Bickel 
did, and reached the conclusion he set out to in the first place. 
 Thus, baked into Bickel’s analysis is an unstated premise concerning constitutional inter-
pretation itself. That premise is simply an analog of Tocqueville’s observation that “Equality is a 
providential fact.”281 In the form Bickel deployed it, the premise is that the interpretations of future 
generations are bound in one direction only. The intentions and understandings of the framers of 
a constitutional provision are relevant only insofar as they establish a floor; the ceiling, however, 
is at the discretion of future generations. This premise was not in any way expressed or legitimated 
during the 39th Congress: it is Bickel’s own import, if not his own manufacture. If the legislative 
history of a constitutional provision is to be consulted it all, it must be to establish, as far as possi-
ble, the precise intentions of its framers. If those intentions are disregarded, then all that is left to 
take its place and assume the mantle and authority of History are the motives and desires of the 
consultant, whose views are only too easy to project into the void. That, I believe, is what happened 
in Bickel’s no doubt well-intended account of the genesis of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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Chapter 6. Felix Frankfurter 
 Of the nine justices who eventually voted in Brown, Frankfurter exhibited by far the strong-
est evidence of intuitive decision-making, struggling palpably over the course of more than two 
years to reach a constitutional outcome in the segregation cases that his conscience could abide. 
Frankfurter harbored a powerful personal preference for ending segregation, but also subscribed 
to a particular judicial approach that, given only the evidence presented at the Brown hearings, 
precluded ending segregation on a basis that would, in the justice’s view, qualify as adequately 
“judicial.” Frankfurter only overcame his long impasse by finally convincing himself, in the month 
between the second Brown conference on December 12, 1953, and January 15, 1954, that “[t]he 
effect of changes in men’s feelings for what is right and just” is dispositive (though here he had 
used the words “equally relevant”) “in determining whether a discrimination denies the equal pro-
tection of the laws.”  
 At the first Brown conference, on December 13, 1952, Frankfurter began by addressing the 
D.C. case. Following on Reed’s concluding remark that the senior justice would vote to “uphold 
separate & equal”, Frankfurter contended that “D.C. case raises different questions” than the state 
cases. The justice declared: “I am prepared today to vote that segregation in D.C. does violate Due 
Process.”282 Autobiographically, Frankfurter commented that he “has never had close living rela-
tions to Negroes but much to do with the problem–was asst counsel to NAACP also belong to the 
Jewish minority.” Whatever the relevance of these details to his constitutional analysis, Frankfurter 
then proclaimed that it was “Intolerable that Gov. should permit seg. in DC life but deprecates 
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needless force in changing this.” Next, he exhorted the Court to “hold [over] all cases” for reargu-
ments. In these rehearings, Frankfurter suggested, the justices could “[a]sk counsel to demonstrate 
what it is that justifies saying it [segregation] is wrong.”283 Then, perceiving the possibility of 
cooperation from the executive branch, Frankfurter remarked that “The social gains of having them 
accomplished with executive sanction would be enormous.” “As to states,” the justice continued, 
“can’t take questions as sociological. How do we know what the framers of the Amendment 
meant? You can’t fairly say, ‘yes, these fellars meant to abolish segregation’ or vice versa.” Frank-
furter then neatly expressed what for him turned out to be the central obstacle in deciding Brown 
in accordance with his conscience: “What justifies us in saying that what was equal in 1868 is not 
equal now?” Apparently as a result of his inability to satisfactorily answer these questions, Frank-
furter reiterated that it was “highly desirable to set down cases for reargument, say 1st March.”284 
 Douglas records Frankfurter’s statements at the first Brown conference slightly differently. 
Douglas noted that Frankfurter’s comments with respect to the state cases led off with a request 
that the Court “ask counsel on reargument to address themselves to problems of enforcement” in 
both cases.” Then, Frankfurter apparently took a swipe at Black’s certainty (detailed in Chapter 4, 
above) about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment: “how does Black know the purpose of 
the 14th Amendment?” Frankfurter declared that “he has read all of [the Amendment’s] history and 
he can’t say it meant to abolish segregation.” Douglas also records Frankfurter’s willingness, as of 
that date, to “reverse” the Kansas District Court, which had heard the titular Brown case, “on the 
finding of the trial court – equal protection does not mean what was equal but what is equal.” 
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Finally, Douglas’ record of Frankfurter’s concluding comments evinces Frankfurter’s deep am-
bivalence at that time about the constitutional questions at stake in Brown. Frankfurter, Douglas 
noted, “wants to know why what has gone before is wrong–––he can’t say it’s unconstitutional to 
treat a negro differently than a white–––but he would put all the cases down for reargument.”285 
 Douglas also captured several helpful details concerning Frankfurter’s comments on the 
federal segregation case, Bolling. Douglas wrote that Frankfurter “does not agree with Black that 
states are more limited – he thinks segregation in the nation’s capital violates the due process 
clause.” Frankfurter adduced evidence for this position by “refer[ring] to the experience of colored 
people here [in D.C.] especially Coleman, one of his old law clerks.” William T. Coleman, the 
first black Supreme Court law clerk, had worked for Frankfurter during the Court’s 1948 October 
term. During his time as a Frankfurter clerk, Coleman regularly struggled to “find a restaurant in 
the capital that would allow him and his fellow clerks, all white — including Elliot Richardson, a 
future United States attorney general — to have lunch together.”286 As immersed as he was in the 
lives of his clerks, Frankfurter was no doubt well aware of the routine humiliations Coleman must 
have experienced under segregation. Finally, Frankfurter contended that reargument was desirable 
in order to acquire a sense of the incoming Eisenhower administration’s position on and level of 
commitment to desegregation. “[I]t is a gain in law administration,” Douglas records Frankfurter 
as saying, if the Supreme Court’s command to desegregate “comes not as a pronouncement of 
coercive law but with the help of the new administration that has promised to change the law here 
in the District.” 
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 Though in the summer of 1953 Frankfurter had succeeded in his singlehanded campaign 
to persuade the Court to order reargument in Brown, on December 12, 1953, the date of the second 
Brown conference, the justice had still not resolved his internal tension over segregation in the 
state cases. He opened at that conference by reiterating his view that neither the text nor the legis-
lative history of the Fourteenth Amendment provided a compelling basis for invalidating segrega-
tion on equal protection grounds. Douglas records Frankfurter as remarking that “due process and 
equal protection in 14th amendment certainly did not abolish segregation when it was adopted.” 
Furthermore, Frankfurter stated, the “most the history shows [is] that the matter was unconclusive 
[sic].” Finally, “history in Congress and in this court indicates that Plessy is right.”287 What both-
ered Frankfurter in particular was the behavior of the 39th Congress, which adopted both the 
Amendment and “a host of legislation . . . presuppos[ing] that segregation is still valid.” Then there 
was the obstacle of precedent, or the “history … in this [C]ourt [which] indicated that Plessy is 
right.”288 So even after the rearguments that Frankfurter had fought so hard to achieve, apparently 
as a means to resolving his own judicial impasse, the justice was back where he had started: stuck 
between the rock of unhelpful legislative history and the hard place of unfavorable precedent. 
 The first puzzle that emerges from Frankfurter’s remarks is the contradiction posed by the 
justice’s apparent certainty that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits Con-
gress from requiring segregation, and his ambivalence that the Fourteenth Amendment requires 
the same of the states. In the 1952 conference, Frankfurter unequivocally declared that segregation 
violates due process and is therefore proscribed by the Fifth Amendment. Yet, when it came time 
for him to pronounce on the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, which like the Fifth contains 
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a Due Process Clause, Frankfurter could not bring himself to say the former proscribed segrega-
tion. He was in the same position, a year later, at the second Brown conference, when he empha-
sized that history and discernible legislative intent were the sole justifications for judicial action. 
But if segregation violates due process, then both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments would 
presumably proscribe it. Why then, for Frankfurter, does the Due Process Clause of the Fifth self-
evidently ban segregation while the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth require recourse to his-
tory and legislative intent? This logical puzzle can be satisfactorily reconciled, I believe, by the 
following observations. 
 Frankfurter’s diction and reasoning about the constitutional warrants for his conclusion 
imply that the justice did not reason his way from the text of the Fifth Amendment and an analysis 
of segregation to the conclusion that the latter offended due process. The justice employed openly 
instrumental language in announcing his position on Congressionally-authorized segregation: it is 
“Intolerable that Gov. should permit seg. in DC life.” The unqualified use of the word “intolerable” 
suggests the statement describes Frankfurter’s personal sentiments. Moreover, it appears in the 
context of his remarks as a reason–––indeed, the only reason he explicitly adduces—–for his con-
clusion that segregation runs afoul of due process.289 Additionally, Frankfurter’s use of the English 
subjunctive (“would permit” in Clark’s notes; “should permit” in Burton’s) lends additional weight 
to the surmise that the justice’s position was determined by a profound personal reaction to an 
eliciting stimulus: the subjunctive affords him some distance on actions he obviously considers 
morally reprehensible. Thus, the federal government’s endorsement and perpetuation of an im-
moral and backwards policy was profoundly offensive to Frankfurter and most likely elicited a 
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powerful reaction, which Frankfurter attempted to articulate to his brethren in judicial terms (“seg-
regation does violate due process”) while belying his constitutional “conclusion” in pointing to an 
essentially personal reason for having reached it.  
 The force of this reaction was sufficient to overcome Frankfurter’s usual judicial approach 
to hard questions, that is, examining an enactment’s history and the intent of its framers. In light 
of Frankfurter’s apparent view that the history of the Fourteenth Amendment was essential to (if 
not dispositive of) the Amendment’s meaning with respect to segregation, that the justice es-
chewed any analogous inquiries into the history of the Fifth Amendment demonstrates that he did 
not subscribe unqualifiedly to his claim that segregation violates due process: if segregation vio-
lates due process, then both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments proscribe it by the plain letter 
of their Due Process Clauses. Thus, Frankfurter’s use of openly instrumental language combined 
with the logical inconsistency of his treatment of the two Amendments containing due process 
guarantees strongly suggests that the justice was so offended by the prospect of the national gov-
ernment enforcing segregation, that his decision in the DC case was “short-circuited” in favor of 
his personal policy preference. 
 The likely source of that powerful personal reaction, Douglas’ notes suggest, was Frank-
furter’s personal investment in a victim of D.C.’s segregationist policies: his law clerk William 
Coleman. Frankfurter apparently thought highly of and cared deeply about Coleman. Of their re-
lationship, Kluger reports, “[w]hen Coleman left Frankfurter’s service, the Justice wrote him, 
‘What I can say of you with great confidence is what was Justice Holmes’s ultimate praise of a 
man: “I bet on him.” I bet on you, whatever choice you may make and whatever the Fates may 
have in store for you.’”290 When Coleman worked for him in 1948 and 1949, Frankfurter witnessed 
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the routine humiliations to which segregation subjected blacks. In 2005, Coleman would recount 
one such instance to an interviewer. 
I remember there was one day when we were working and the Court was not open but the 
justices were working. It was one of those semi-holidays... And I was working on an anti-
trust case with Justice Frankfurter and Elliot [Richardson, Frankfurter’s other clerk] stuck 
his head in the door and said, “The law clerks have decided to go down to the Mayflower 
[Hotel] for lunch,” and I said, “Well, give me ten minutes and I will join you.” So, when I 
came out 10 minutes later, Elliot said, “Oh gee, it’s kind of late, let’s go down to the Union 
Station.” And I went [to Union Station] just thinking, that you know, we were late. I then 
got back to the office and I noticed that the justice had tears in his eyes. Why? Because 
Elliot had told him the story that he had called the Mayflower and the Mayflower had said, 
“Well, we can't take a black,” and so Frankfurter certainly felt very offended.291 
If this anecdote is representative, then it is very likely Justice Frankfurter was embarrassed and 
wounded by the gratuitous humiliations that segregation inflicted upon Coleman. In psychological 
terms, Frankfurter likely experienced intuitions of shame and indignation when contemplating the 
injustice of his clerk’s treatment in D.C. The justice’s visceral negative reaction to Coleman’s 
mistreatment was so powerful, it would seem, that that reaction impelled him to conclude that 
segregation was unconstitutional without recurring to any species of conscious deduction. In other 
words, the sufficient condition of Frankfurter’s determination that segregation in D.C. violated due 
process was the magnitude or acuteness of the indignation it induced in him, and his judgment of 
unconstitutionality required no inputs from formal judicial reasoning. Thus, Frankfurter’s visceral 
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intuitive reaction to the injustice of segregation in D.C., a reaction that occurred only because he 
had a personal stake in one of its victims, precluded him from even beginning to judicially analyze 
that species of segregation and formed the necessary and sufficient condition of his confident de-
termination that it violated due process. 
 At the same time, the justice apparently lacked an analogous personal investment in any 
victim of segregation practiced by the states. Recall Frankfurter’s acknowledgment at the 1952 
conference, as recorded by Justice Burton and reported by Kluger, that the justice “has never had 
close living relations to Negroes but much to do with the problem–was asst counsel to NAACP 
also belong to the Jewish minority.” Thus, with respect to state segregation, Frankfurter was prob-
ably bereft of the intuitions that compelled him to conclude that segregation in D.C. was unjust. 
So even though the two forms of segregation entailed precisely the same social and legal conse-
quences for blacks, what accounted for Frankfurter’s straightforward and analysis-free determina-
tions that segregation in D.C. “violates due process” but that segregation in the states needed to be 
further examined were the different intuitions Frankfurter experienced: the first a function of his 
personal experience of the injustice to which his clerk was subjected in D.C. and the second a 
function of the absence of personal exposure to the injustice of state segregation. The upshot is 
that Frankfurter’s lack of intuitions of indignation and shame regarding segregation in the states 
allowed him to subject that species of segregation to judicial scrutiny instead of declaring it ille-
gitimate from the beginning. 
 Now, it should be acknowledged that the above account is speculative, and that there is no 
direct evidence for its claims about Frankfurter’s intuitions. But the interpretation reconciles and 
synthesizes the available evidence more credibly than could, for example, the rationalist model of 
moral decision-making. The rational model predicts that once Frankfurter had determined that 
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segregation in D.C. violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, he would apply pre-
cisely the same logical rule to segregation in the states and conclude that state segregation violated 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since, as we have just seen, Frankfurter did 
not in fact do this, it would then behoove the rationalist to posit the presence of a distinguishing 
principle to account for the justice’s position on the differential constitutionality of the two species 
of segregation. But none is available: certainly, originalism and textualism could not supply the 
necessary distinction between the two Amendments. So this speculative account is nonetheless 
highly credible because it accounts for all of the available evidence and coheres with contemporary 
observations of how people actually engage in moral decision-making, that is, by relying on intu-
itions elicited by the phenomenon that forms the object of judgment. 
 Though Frankfurter was almost certainly deeply offended by the treatment to which D.C. 
segregation subjected William Coleman, the justice possessed a strong, prior personal preference 
for desegregation. Most of the existing Brown scholarship agrees on this. For example, Hockett, 
who tends to discount attitudinalism in the behavior of Warren, Black, Clark, Burton, and Minton, 
concedes Michael Klarman’s contention that Frankfurter’s background strongly suggests that the 
justice held strongly egalitarian racial views. For example, not only had Frankfurter hired the 
Court’s first clerk, but prior to his appointment to the Court, the justice had been a member of the 
NAACP’s National Legal Committee.292 Kluger also acknowledges Frankfurter’s egalitarian cre-
dentials. Philip Elman, an Assistant Solicitor General, former Frankfurter clerk, and decades-long 
Frankfurter friend and confidant, recounted to Kluger that Frankfurter “used to talk to me about 
the segregation question a good deal. He personally was deeply against it, but his first concern was 
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the Court, and he had a fear the whole thing was moving along too fast.”293 Coleman, interviewed 
by Kluger, similarly commented: “From the day these [Segregation] cases were taken, it was clear 
how [Frankfurter] was going to vote. Now it may be true that he felt if there had been any honorable 
way of delaying it now, then maybe the Court should do that. But I know for a fact–––well, let’s 
not say ‘fact’–––that he was for ending segregation from the start.”294 
 Thus, in part due to his strongly egalitarian personal proclivities, in part to his personal 
relationship with Coleman (and perhaps other similarly situated blacks), and in part due to his 
recognition that the Court’s confrontation with segregation exposed it to profound institutional 
risks, Frankfurter was to an unusual degree emotionally bound up in the disposition of the Segre-
gation Cases. Upon the death of Chief Justice Vinson in September 1954, for instance, the justice 
famously quipped to Elman that “this is the first indication I have ever had that there is a God.”295 
Frankfurter certainly wished to have the Segregation Cases decided unanimously–––an outcome 
that Vinson’s listless and inept leadership of the Court threatened–––and in a manner that mini-
mized damage to the Court’s reputation and power. But this comment, I believe, also evinces the 
magnitude of the moral question Frankfurter believed was at stake. In a letter that he composed to 
Justice Reed three days after Brown I was handed down, Frankfurter thanked his colleague for 
ultimately changing his position on the constitutionality of segregation in order to join the other 
eight justices and make a unanimous Court. “I am not unaware of the hard struggle this involved 
in the conscience of your mind,” Frankfurter wrote. “I am not unaware because all I have to do is 
look within. As a citizen of the Republic, even more than as a colleague, I feel deep gratitude for 
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your share in what I believe to be a great good for our nation.”296 It is possible, but exceedingly 
unlikely, that Frankfurter would have expressed gratitude to a colleague for joining the Court 
against his “first choice” constitutional position, to describe the Brown outcome as “a great good 
for our nation,” and to see, for the first time in his life, the benign hand of providence in securing 
that unanimous resolution, if Frankfurter did not believe that segregation was profoundly unjust, 
independent of the judicial basis for invalidating it. 
 While Frankfurter summarily dispatched the federal segregation case by an instantaneous, 
intuition-laden recourse to due process, his subsequent ambivalence about the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and its consequences for the state cases can, I believe, be understood as 
the result of felt constraints imposed by the justice’s intellectual temperament and judicial philos-
ophy. Frankfurter was a judge’s judge. His identity, first as a professor of law, and later as a jurist, 
comprised the core of his self-conception. In both of his careers, he felt consciously duty-bound to 
engage in judicial, as opposed to personal or moral, inquiry and reasoning, to a degree perhaps 
matched only by his predecessors, judicial archetypes, and mentors Oliver Wendell Holmes and 
Louis Brandeis. As Frankfurter once wrote to Justice Black, “I ‘have a romantic belief in Reason.’” 
Or, as he commented to Justice Jackson: “You see, my dear Bob, one drawback of a professor is 
that he does believe in reason and profoundly believes that the mode by which results are reached 
are important–––maybe more important–––in the evolution of society as the result itself. . . . But 
no sooner have I said that than I am wondering whether I do not claim too much for professors!”297 
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Be that as it may, Frankfurter did not claim too much for himself. As Justice Reed once compli-
mented him, “One thing you always do, better than most of us, [is] vote your view of the law, 
without direction from your own wishes.”298 
 Once Frankfurter cleared the indignation hurdle to which he had succumbed in the case of 
D.C. segregation and went into “judicial mode” on the question of state segregation, there were 
quite a few judicial obstacles in the way of his personal wishes. One of those obstacles was made 
palpably evident on the very first day of the 1952 Brown oral arguments, when NAACP counsel 
for appellants in the titular Brown case Robert Carter broached the precedent of Lum v. Rice,299 
commonly referred to as Gong Lum. In Gong Lum, the Court had, a mere quarter-century before 
the first Brown hearings, unanimously blessed the segregation statutes of the state of Mississippi. 
What appeared in Gong Lum to be such a formidable obstacle for Frankfurter was not merely its 
status as a judicial precedent, but also the fact that two of the justices whom Frankfurter held in 
the highest regard, Holmes and Brandeis, had considered the question and reached the conclusion 
that segregation was constitutional. During oral argument, Carter claimed that Gong Lum should 
not control segregation in public schools since petitioner Lum had accepted the validity of Plessy 
and “not at all contest[ed] the state’s power to enforce a racial classification.”300 Carter contended 
that Gong Lum “cannot be conceded as such a precedent until this Court, when the issue is squarely 
presented to it, on the question of the power of the state, examines the question and makes a de-
termination in the state’s favor; and only in that instance do we feel that Gong Lum can be any 
authority on this question.” At this point, Frankfurter intervened to say: 
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Mr. Carter, while what you say may be so, nevertheless in its [Gong Lum] opinion, the 
Court … did rest on the fact that this issue had been settled by a large body of adjudications 
going back to what was or might fairly have been called an abolitionist state, the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts. Going back to the Roberts case,301 I want to ask you–––and, 
may I say, particularly in a case of this sort, a question does not imply an answer; a question 
merely implies an eager desire for information–––I want to ask you whether in the light of 
the fact, this was a unanimous opinion of the Court which, at the time, had on its member-
ship Justice Holmes, Justice Brandeis, Justice Stone–––and I am picking those out not in-
vidiously, but as judges who gave great evidence of being very sensitive and alert to ques-
tions of so-called civil liberties–––and I should like to ask you whether you think that de-
cision rested on the concession by the petitioner in that case [Gong Lum], and the problem 
of segregation was not involved and, in fact, that underlay the whole decision, the whole 
adjudication–––whether you think a man like Justice Brandeis would have been foreclosed 
by the concession of the parties?302 
Carter replied that he considered Frankfurter’s suggestion that the Gong Lum Court must have 
examined the constitutionality of segregation to be only “partially true,” but Carter’s response is 
not important for our purposes. What is important to note here is that Frankfurter was wrestling 
with the fact that Brandeis and Holmes had sustained segregation. This point must have weighed 
heavily on Frankfurter, especially since Carter did not provide, and the justice himself could not 
muster, a rationale that would have allowed Frankfurter to compartmentalize or dismiss the fact 
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that his mentors–––whom he viewed as paragons of judicial reasoning and wisdom–––had sus-
tained a practice that he now sought a judicial basis for invalidating. 
 If judicial temperament and the example of two justices whom he greatly admired predis-
posed Frankfurter, against the cries of his conscience, toward the factors on the side of segregation 
in the judicial calculus, so too did his jurisprudential approach. Frankfurter’s judicial philosophy 
is encapsulated in the jurisprudence of Harvard Law Professor James Bradley Thayer, whom 
Frankfurter termed “the great master of constitutional law.” As Frankfurter remarked in anticipa-
tion of his judicial duties during a talk at Harvard: “One brought up in the traditions of James 
Bradley Thayer, echoes of whom were still resounding in this very building in my student days, is 
committed to Thayer’s statesmanlike conception of the limits within which the Supreme Court 
should move, and I shall try to be loyal to his admonition.”303 That Thayer’s doctrine held sway 
over Frankfurter throughout his tenure on the Court is further suggested by a statement the justice, 
late in his judicial career (and after the Court had decided Brown), made when asked to name an 
authoritative text on constitutional jurisprudence: 
I am of the view that if I were to name one piece of writing on American Constitutional 
law . . . I would pick an essay by James Bradley Thayer in the Harvard Law Review, . . . 
published in October, 1893, called “The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law.” . . . . [F]rom my point of view [the essay is] the great guide for judges 
and therefore, the great guide for understanding by non-judges of what the place of the 
judiciary is in relation to constitutional questions.304 
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 Thayer’s essay develops a doctrine of what today might be described as extreme judicial 
deference to legislation. Thayer held that in determining the constitutionality of a statute, judges 
must afford legislatures an “allowance . . . for the vast and not definable range of legislative power 
and choice, for that wide margin of considerations which address themselves only to the practical 
judgment of a legislative body.” A strong presumption of the constitutionality of legislative action, 
Thayer claimed, is necessary to respect the Constitution’s republican character and the legislative 
supremacy republicanism commands. Thayer approvingly quoted the dicta of one Chancellor 
Waites, who in an 1812 South Carolina Case distinguished the discretionary spheres of the judicial 
and legislative realms: 
… [H]igh deference [is] due to legislative authority. It is supreme in all cases where it is 
not restrained by the constitution; and as it is the duty of legislators as well as judges to 
consult this and conform their acts to it, so it should be presumed that all their acts do 
conform to it unless the contrary is manifest. This confidence is necessary to insure due 
obedience to its authority. If this be frequently questioned, it must tend to diminish the 
reverence for the laws which is essential to the public safety and happiness. I am not, there-
fore, disposed to examine with scrupulous exactness the validity of a law. It would be un-
wise on another account. The interference of the judiciary with legislative Acts, if frequent 
or on dubious grounds, might occasion so great a jealousy of this power and so general a 
prejudice against it as to lead to measures ending in the total overthrow of the independence 
of the judges, and so of the best preservative of the constitution. The validity of the law 
ought not then to be questioned unless it is so obviously repugnant to the constitution that 
when pointed out by the judges, all men of sense and reflection in the community may 
perceive the repugnancy. By such a cautious exercise of this judicial check, no jealousy of 
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it will be excited, the public confidence in it will be promoted, and its salutary effects be 
justly and fully appreciated.305 
The Thayer/Frankfurter standard for judicial invalidation of legislative acts on constitutional 
grounds, then, is a near-universal agreement of unconstitutionality proceeding from manifest or 
obvious legislative error. The judiciary, Thayer elaborates, “can only disregard” acts of the legis-
lature “when those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have 
made a very clear one,–––so clear that it is not open to rational question.”306 The threshold for a 
judicial declaration than a statute is unconstitutional is much higher than, because different in kind 
from, that for a legislator’s determination that a proposed bill would be unconstitutional as law. 
This rule recognizes that … much which will seem unconstitutional to one man, or body 
of men, may reasonably not seem so to another; that the constitution often admits of dif-
ferent interpretations; that there is often a range of choice and judgment; that in such cases 
the constitution does not impose upon the legislature any one specific opinion, but leaves 
open this range of choice; and that whatever choice is rational is constitutional. This is the 
principle which the rule that I have been illustrating affirms and supports. The meaning 
and effect of it are shortly and very strikingly intimated by a remark of Judge Cooley, to 
the effect that one who is a member of a legislature may vote against a measure as being, 
in his judgment, unconstitutional; and, being subsequently placed on the bench, when this 
measure, having been passed by the legislature in spite of his opposition, comes before him 
judicially, may there find it his duty, although he has in no degree changed his opinion, to 
declare it constitutional.307 
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 Finally, as a matter of practice, in deciding whether a law is constitutional, courts should 
also consider the likely reaction of the affected branches. Judges must not only decide whether a 
law is so obviously unconstitutional that no one can rationally deny that it is, but also adopt only 
“what judgment is permissible to another department which the constitution has charged with the 
duty of making it.” The courts are therefore not only constrained by an exceptionally high thresh-
old of judicial intervention, but by strategic calculations of what other actors–––the other branches 
of the federal government, the states, and the public, depending on who is affected by a particular 
ruling–––will accept. 
 Frankfurter’s jurisprudential philosophy likely exacerbated the conundrum posed by the 
state cases by creating a massive obstacle between the justice and (to borrow Kluger’s evocative 
expression) “the humanitarian goal his deepest conception of justice cried out for him to reach.”308 
Another way of saying this is that even though Frankfurter possessed a powerful moral motivation 
to overturn segregation in toto, when considering only the factors that Frankfurter’s philosophy 
recognized as legitimate inputs to the judicial process, there was not a good case for invalidating 
segregation in the states. As Frankfurter remarked at the 1953 conference, (1) as a matter of pure 
history, the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment did not abolish segregation in 1868, (2) the 
history of the Amendment was “[i]nconclusive” as to whether segregation could be targeted, even 
at a future date, under the proposers’ or ratifiers’ understanding of due process and equal protec-
tion, (3) legislation adopted by the 39th and subsequent Congresses “presuppose[d] that segregation 
is valid, and (4) “history in Congress and in this [C]ourt indicates that Plessy is right.” Douglas’ 
notes, from which these statements are drawn, did not record whether Frankfurter said how he 
would vote. Presumably, he had not so indicated. 
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 For Frankfurter, declaring segregation unconstitutional would be to override more than a 
half century of precedent stretching back to Plessy. It would be to invalidate a form of judicial 
“promise” the Supreme Court had made to the states309 in 1896, and periodically reaffirmed in the 
intervening years, that state caste laws were valid under the Fourteenth Amendment. In the terms 
of Frankfurter’s judicial philosophy, the decades during which the Court had acquiesced in and 
periodically reaffirmed Plessy had created an expectation in the minds of reasonable people in the 
states that segregation statutes were constitutional: such laws, as Reed’s conference comments 
evinced, were not obviously irrational to many Americans at the time. Moreover, Frankfurter prob-
ably lacked personal acquaintance with a victim of state-level segregation, knowledge of whose 
experiences might have delivered Frankfurter from these tedious judicial considerations by “short-
circuiting” a determination in the justice’s mind that state segregation was profoundly, incorrigibly 
unfair. Of course, Frankfurter knew and even felt segregation as practiced by the states was im-
moral, but it failed to elicit for him the powerful intuitions that allowed him to so quickly deter-
mine, without judicial reasoning or analysis, that D.C. segregation was unconstitutional because, 
in short, unjust. Consequently, Frankfurter was stuck: trapped between, on the one hand, his moral 
and personal desire to correct what he viewed as a profound and, on any non-judicial basis, inde-
fensible wrong, on the other, an equally powerful desire to hew to a code of judicial conduct rooted 
in the Thayerian jurisprudence that comprised the core of his identity as a scholar and jurist. 
 Despite the pivotal role intuitions almost certainly played in Frankfurter’s different atti-
tudes toward D.C. and state segregation, there were also a doctrinal (i.e., judicial) reasons, if he 
decided to search for them, by which Frankfurter could more comfortably declare D.C. segregation 
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unconstitutional. First, the Court had never sustained federal caste laws. A decade before, in Hir-
abayashi v. United States310 and Korematsu v. United States,311 the Court had approved, on the 
basis of alleged military necessity, executive wartime measures that discriminated on the basis of 
race, but the justices had never created the impression that federal law that did the same in peace-
time would be sustained under the Fifth Amendment. Thus, for Frankfurter, finding that congres-
sionally-sanctioned segregation was a violation of Due Process was more compatible with his ju-
dicial philosophy than finding the same of state-imposed segregation. However, for the reasons 
discussed above, this fact was not likely causative of Frankfurter’s quick and emotive determina-
tion that segregation in D.C. was “intolerable.”  
 Second, on the score of Thayerian strategic considerations, Frankfurter would have also 
been justified in assuming that overturning segregation in Congress would invite less resistance 
and controversy than doing so in the states. Though segregated education was the fruit of postbel-
lum liberalism, having been implemented by the same Congress that framed and proposed the 
Fourteenth Amendment, by 1950 that postbellum racial egalitarianism was strikingly insufficient, 
even regressive, by the standards of liberal sentiment in mid-20th Century America. In the liberal-
izing racial atmosphere of the 1950s, if desegregation-acquiescent or -favoring Congressmen did 
not form an outright majority in Congress, and if those members were denied access to legislative 
veto points afforded by the congressional committee seniority system, such members still certainly 
formed a rapidly-growing plurality. So long as legislative initiatives could be stymied by the 
Southern committee chairmen who predominated in Congress, federal legislative relief would not 
be forthcoming, but Frankfurter could count, and (given his extensive connections in Washington) 
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probably knew he could count, on many members of Congress enthusiastically greeting a decision 
by the Court invalidating segregation in D.C.  
 Ironically, because Frankfurter had likely concluded that segregation in D.C. violated due 
process without recourse to formal judicial reasoning, he never, so far as the record shows, devel-
oped or employed any of the above considerations. Even had he done so, these ruminations would 
probably have proven unhelpful for solving his real conundrum: developing a judicial rationale for 
invalidating segregation in the states. Frankfurter instead tried to break that impasse by assigning 
his 1952 term clerk, Alexander Bickel, the task of writing a research report on the legislative his-
tory of the Fourteenth Amendment. As we saw in Chapter 4, though, Bickel’s research failed to 
uncover a smoking gun in the legislative history that would have enabled Frankfurter to conclude 
that Plessy and its progeny were predicated on a gross misinterpretation of the Amendment’s pur-
poses. The interpretative gloss Bickel consequently developed and presented to his boss in both 
his Prefatory Note and his farewell missive was therefore essential to rescuing a judicial case for 
invalidating segregation from the depressing results of the Amendment’s legislative history. As 
we have already seen, Bickel declared in the cover letter appended to the draft of the memorandum 
that he prepared for and left with Frankfurter: “I think the legislative history leave this Court free 
to remember that it is a Constitution it is construing. I think also that a charitable view of the sloppy 
draftsmen of the Fourteenth Amendment would ascribed to them the knowledge that it was a Con-
stitution they were writing.”312 
 Viewed from the context of Frankfurter’s purpose in assigning that project, Bickel’s claim 
is more motivated rationalization than dispassionate and sincere interpretation of the historical 
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evidence he compiled. Bickel’s interpretative gloss seems to be designed to elide the uncomforta-
ble fact that, as we saw in Chapter 4, Bickel’s research did not turn up an affirmative historical 
warrant to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment to require protection for the social and political 
rights of blacks. While it would take a few months for Bickel’s memo to work the full measure of 
its magic on Frankfurter’s stance toward the constitutional merits of the NAACP’s position in 
Brown, the memo’s influence was already evident in the cover letter Frankfurter attached to copies 
of Bickel the memo that he disseminated to the Conference at the beginning of the October 1953 
term. “The [Bickel] memorandum indicates that the legislative history of the Amendment is,” 
Frankfurter stated, “in a word, inconclusive, in the sense that the 39th Congress as an enacting 
body neither manifested that the Amendment outlawed segregation in the public schools or au-
thorized legislation to that end, nor that it manifested the opposite.” This formulation might be 
strictly true because of the qualification “as an enacting body,” but, as Chapter 4 demonstrates, it 
is misleading.  
 Presumably, if the Amendment did not outlaw segregation or authorize Congress to do so, 
then the Frankfurterian judicial case for invalidating state-required segregation is thin indeed. But 
that is not the conclusion Frankfurter advanced, or the hard reality he faced up to, either in his 
cover letter to the Bickel memorandum, or the 1953 Brown conference, where, despite conceding 
that “the history in Congress and this [C]ourt indicates that Plessy is right,” the justice nonetheless 
refused to concede defeat with respect to his goal of invalidating segregation. At the 1953 confer-
ence, Frankfurter instead repeated Bickel’s contention that the Amendment’s legislative history is 
indeterminate. Doing so enabled him to keep alive the possibility of joining his conscience and the 
emerging desegregationist majority. 
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 In 1979, with a quarter century of hindsight on Brown, the aforementioned Philip Kurland 
would note that judicial examination of the legislative history of constitutional provisions to de-
termine their meaning was, prior to Brown, customary. To illustrate his point, Kurland quoted 
Jacobus Ten Broek, “the prime explicator of the ‘old equal protection,’” who fifteen years before 
Brown declared: “[w]henever the United States Supreme Court has felt itself called upon to an-
nounce a theory for its conduct in the matter of constitutional interpretation, it has insisted, with 
almost uninterrupted regularity, that the end and object of constitutional construction is the dis-
covery of the intention of those persons who formulated the instrument or of the people who 
adopted it.”313 Turning his attention to Brown, Kurland then observed: 
 
It must be conceded that this resort to history was that of advocates for a position. As such 
landmark cases as Dred Scott v. Sandford, Myers v. United States, Pollock v. Farmers' 
Loan & Trust Co., and Plessy v. Ferguson quickly reveal, the Justices readily found in the 
framing of the constitutional provisions at issue whatever intent they wished to find. A 
reader of the Court's opinion in Brown might be excused his cynicism which suggests that 
a finding of neutrality in the constitutional history means that there was no support to be 
found for the position that the Court was prepared to take.314 
Frankfurter appeared to have effectively deluded himself about the implications of the legislative 
history of the Amendment for the outcome in Brown that his conscience sought. Had Frankfurter 
been less emotionally involved in Brown, it is conceivable that he would have ultimately abided, 
however reluctantly, the limits that a lack of amenable legislative history imposed on the Frank-
furterian universe of judicial possibility. But the record suggests his deeply-felt commitment to 
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achieving “a great good for our nation” was too strong. Sometime between December 12, 1953 
(the date of the second Brown conference), and January 15, 1954, Frankfurter the moral thinker 
overcame the self-imposed constraints of Frankfurter the jurist. 
 We know this because on January 15, Frankfurter disseminated a memo to the conference 
announcing that he was shifting his focus to the remedy phase. This shift implied that he had 
decided to join the five-justice majority that had emerged at the December 12, 1953 Brown con-
ference, at which early date, as we have seen, Frankfurter was not yet prepared definitively to cast 
aside the judicial qualms staying his hand on the merits. In the cover letter to his January 15 memo, 
Frankfurter wrote: “As is doubtless true of the rest of you, all sorts of considerations have arisen 
within me in regard to the fashioning of a decree. In order to judge the worth of these worries more 
clearly, I subjected them, sometime ago, to the test of paper.” The brainstorm encapsulated in the 
memo, Frankfurter stated, was intended to provide “clarification of [his] own mind.” He decided 
to circulate it to the conference in the hopes that it “may stimulate good thoughts in others.”315 The 
five-page memo will be analyzed in detail in chapter 7, but for present purposes, provides a book-
end for Frankfurter’s transition from conflicted jurist to enthusiastic partisan of judicial desegre-
gation. 
 More revealing of Frankfurter’s torn mindset toward Brown is a two-page memo the justice 
composed, in similar fashion and with an analogous purpose to his January, 1954 memo on decree, 
of his brainstorm on the case’s merits. Unlike the document detailing his thoughts on the decree, 
this memo was neither dated nor distributed to the Brethren. However, Kluger speculates that the 
memo was composed “more than likely in the weeks just after the reargument of Brown,” i.e., the 
last half of December, 1953. In it, Frankfurter begins by declaring that the Segregation Cases 
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present a legal issue inextricably bound up with deep feeling on sharply conflicting social 
and political issues. The legal issue derives from the established practice of exercising ju-
dicial authority when appeal is made to vague provisions in the Civil War Amendments. 
While it has now been settled beyond question that some of the guaranties of the Constitu-
tion are not judicially enforceable, e.g., the guarantee of a republican form of government, 
amendments to the Constitution introduced in the reconstruction period, no less vague and 
no more appropriate for judicial judgment, serve as the basis for adjudication.316 
In other words, Frankfurter confirms what his conference comments implied: that he was still 
struggling with the fact that he lacked a clear, affirmative judicial justification for invalidating 
segregation. (There was certainly enough historical material, presented by both the litigants and 
Bickel, to sustain the practice if the justice wished to.) However, the memo quickly evinces beyond 
a doubt that Frankfurter was cognizant of his own internal struggle and, to a surprising degree, of 
the nature of the moral psychological forces by which he was being buffeted.  
 In the memo, Frankfurter’s framing of the conundrum in which he found himself is 
strangely impersonal: he consistently used either the first person plural or the third person voice to 
articulate the unique challenge facing him, even though (as he must have known from the confer-
ence discussions) of all the justices, it faced him and him alone. The peculiar framing suggests a 
desire on Frankfurter’s part to distance himself from the challenge he was describing, as if that 
conundrum had entrapped others, but not him, a man who, according to his own self-conception, 
was uniquely suited for judicial office by temperament, background, and jurisprudential philoso-
phy. The belief that such a man could extract himself from the storm of the passions and see the 
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forest through the trees is precisely the kind that would induce the impersonal framing of Frank-
furter’s memo. Finally, subjecting the thoughts and sentiments floating around in his head to “the 
test of paper,” to use the justice’s expression, was probably the last, desperate effort the justice 
made to reconcile the disconnect between his conscience and the dictates of his judicial philosophy 
on the Brown merits. After all, as Frankfurter remarked in January 15, 1954 remedy memo cover 
letter, he sometimes put “worries” to “the test of paper” “to judge [their] worth [] more clearly.” 
He was probably doing the same here. 
 The memo continues: “The inevitable result is that issues are cast in legal form for dispo-
sition by this Court that are embroiled in explosive psychological and political attitudes.” This 
appears to be an acknowledgment, oblique due to its impersonal framing, that Frankfurter himself 
found it difficult to quarantine his private conscience, harboring “psychological and political atti-
tudes,” from his role as a judge, as his customary judicial practice required. He underscores the 
force of that judicial commitment in the succeeding lines: 
However, it is not our duty to express our personal attitudes toward these issues however 
deep our individual convictions may be. The opposite is true. It is our duty not to express 
our merely personal views. However passionately any of us may hold egalitarian views, 
however fiercely any of us may believe that such a policy of segregation undoubtedly ex-
presses the tenacious conviction of Southern States [is] both unjust and short-sighted, he 
travels outside his judicial authority if for this private reason alone he declares unconstitu-
tional the policy of segregation. 
With this last remark, consciously or not, Frankfurter built himself an escape hatch, if only he 
could find a way to fit himself through it. Private egalitarian sentiment, like the kind Frankfurter 
harbored, is not “alone” sufficient to invalidate segregation, but neither does its presence in the 
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conscience of judges invalidate any judicial conclusions commensurate with that private commit-
ment. Those judges, however, badly need a convincing constitutional rationale independent of 
their private moral opinions.  
 Reacting to the deeply repugnant prospect of affirming segregation, Frankfurter next de-
clared, “Equally so he [the judge] cannot write into our Constitution a belief in the Negro’s natural 
inferiority or his personal belief in the desirability of segregating white and colored children during 
their most formative years.” That this comment is motivated by an emotional reaction is suggested 
by the fact that (as Frankfurter must have known in his calmer moments) sustaining the constitu-
tionality of segregation would in no way chisel such views into the hallowed marble of the Con-
stitution. What the Constitution permits, it does not thereby endorse or require. Presumably, for 
example, the Constitution allows states to repeal their laws against interpersonal violence, even 
homicide. It does not, however, by allowing states such legislative leeway, sanctify or celebrate 
the uses of that discretion. Certainly, there would have been no question in Frankfurter’s time (or 
mind, on any analogous issue) that the Constitution could be read otherwise.317 Moreover, in his 
concurrence in Korematsu, Frankfurter explicitly recognized this principle, when, after sustaining 
the racially discriminatory military orders under attack, he contended that the orders’ constitution-
ality neither depends upon nor implies their morality. “To find that the Constitution does not forbid 
the military measures now complained of,” Frankfurter wrote, “does not carry with it approval of 
that which Congress and the Executive did. That is their business, not ours.”318 
 Returning to the Brown memo, Frankfurter continued: 
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To attribute such a view [that blacks are “naturally inferior”] to science, as is sometimes 
done, is to reject the very basis of science, namely, the process of reaching verifiable con-
clusions. The abstract and absolutist claims both for and against segregation have been 
falsified by experience, especially the great changes in the relations between white and 
colored people since the first World War. 
 
This last statement appears to reflect Frankfurter’s conceit of remaining studiously evenhanded, 
even as he was grappling desperately with discovering a judicial path to overturn segregation. 
Precisely which of “the abstract and absolutist claims … against segregation” Frankfurter would 
have viewed as falsified is unclear, but his next lines suggest that such claims might have been 
claims about the burdening and retarding effects of segregation on black pupils. “The inequities 
and hardships of a policy of segregation have in the short period of thirty odd years undergone 
great amelioration,” the justice remarked. “The promising results of this tendency afford no ground 
for complacency. But it is fair to say that the pace of progress has surprised even those most eager 
in its promotion.”319 Nonetheless, the justice’s own admission that blacks have progressed more 
rapidly than anticipated by even their most ardent allies despite being subject to segregation does 
not afford him any occasion to consider, if only for the sake of argument, whether this empirical 
progress belies the contention that segregation denies blacks the equal protection of the laws. In-
stead, Frankfurter segues seamlessly to floating considerations more amenable to his acknowl-
edged egalitarian commitments: 
The outcome of the Civil War, as reflected in the Civil War Amendments, is that there is a 
single American society. Our colored citizens, like the other components which make up 
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the American nation, are not to be denied the right to enjoy the distinctive qualities of their 
cultural past. But neither are they to be denied the right to grow up with other Americans 
as part of our national life. And experience happily shows that contacts tend to mitigate 
antagonisms and engender mutual respect.320 
This is the most sympathetic face for the integrationist cause that could be put on the Civil War 
and the ensuing Amendments. It is the portrait of American society that the NAACP labored for 
two years to paint for the Court. But it is more reflective of racial egalitarians’ aspirations for 
American society in the middle of the twentieth century than the historical empirics of the preced-
ing hundred years, as a perusal of Rogers Smith’s Civic Ideals321 will attest.  
 In the decade from 1866 to 1876, in what Smith terms America’s “radical hour,” racial 
egalitarianism in American society reached a local maximum with the adoption of the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments. The latter, however, was far from a radical measure, as “it did not 
confer any right to vote per se” and “left the states power to enact many other restrictions, including 
property qualifications and exclusions from office holding, that could negate the formal political 
rights of blacks and many other citizens as well.”322 Following the Fifteenth Amendment’s pas-
sage, Reconstruction was brought to an end by a reinvigorated racism that had been “for a time 
submerged by the egalitarian religious and moral principles that came to define the war’s mission 
for many Northerners.” After 1870,  
new theories of racial evolution also began elevating the intellectual credibility of scientific 
racism to new heights…. This racism, old and new, mass and elite, proved most crucial to 
Reconstruction’s demise, and it was his unwillingness to break from his class and region’s 
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especially potent heritage of prejudice that most accounted for Andrew Johnson’s fateful 
obstructionism.323 
Though the Democratic Party’s postwar electoral fortunes were ruined for two generations by its 
defense of the “discredited causes of slavery and secession,” “their enduring tenets of white male 
supremacy, states’ rights, and no special privileges for any groups all retained great popular appeal 
even at their lowest ebb, in the mid-1860s.”324 Most Republicans, in turn, “were former Whigs 
who usually favored only the first–––white supremacy–––and they were joined uneasily by egali-
tarian white radicals and new black voters, who challenged all three.” Reconstruction resulted in 
the creation of “the great new legal systems of racial equality” for which it is remembered, “but 
soon, many white Americans felt threatened by the radical changes those laws entailed.” Accord-
ingly, “[f]rom the early 1870s on, prominent Republicans began turning away from the now-
scorned cause of genuine racial justice. By the mid-1890s, the legal pillars of equality the had 
erected with so much hope and pain became imposing but empty monuments to an abandoned 
dream.”325 
 This historical account of the prevalence of racism after the Fifteenth Amendment-writing 
process (and even during it) is hard to square with Frankfurter’s assertion that “the outcome of the 
Civil War, as reflected in the Civil War Amendments, is that there is a single American society.” 
That single American society had somehow managed to segregate itself for ninety years despite 
Frankfurter’s declaration of its unity. Now, it might be objected that Frankfurter intended his re-
mark about the “outcome of the Civil War” in a normative, not a declarative, sense. And that may 
well be. But in this memo, Frankfurter appeared still to be grappling with the lack of a clear, 
                                                
323 Id., at 288. 
324 Id., at 288-289. 
325 Id., at 289. 
 
218 
affirmative, historical warrant that was compatible with his judicial philosophy and would enable 
him to reach the conclusion he sought. He was clearly putting “to the test of paper” whatever 
thoughts he could muster to produce a theory that would get him across the judicial finish line in 
Brown. And, I believe, it is against that framework that his recorded thoughts must be construed. 
 On reargument in 1953, the defendant states (all, with the exception of Delaware, respond-
ents in the Brown litigation before the Court) had demonstrated in their briefs if not the precise 
history that Smith would later canvas, then legislative history that tends strongly to belie Frank-
furter’s reading of the Civil War Amendments. According to the Kansas brief, in 1868, 24 of 37 
of the states that then comprised the Union “maintained legal segregation at the time of adopt[ing]” 
the Fourteenth Amendment “or subsequent thereto.” Moreover, legislatures in 10 of those 24 states 
had during the same legislative term ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and “provid[ed] for seg-
regated schools.”326 Finally, and perhaps most fatal to Frankfurter’s reading, the 39th Congress, 
which authored the Fourteenth Amendment, “enacted laws to implement and expedite the admin-
istration of the segregated system of public schools” in the District of Columbia.327 Whether Frank-
furter intended his remark that “the outcome of the Civil War, as reflected in the Civil War Amend-
ments, is that there is a single American society” descriptively or aspirationally, it is hard to square 
either reading satisfactorily with Smith’s history of the period or the facts of which Frankfurter 
was no doubt aware from the briefs of Kansas, South Carolina, and others. The justice’s “reason-
ing” in this specific respect was more likely than not motivated by a desire to reach an outcome 
his conscience favored. 
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 Frankfurter continued: 
The legal problem confronting this Court is the extent to which this desirable and even 
necessary process of welding a nation out of such diverse elements can now be imposed as 
a matter of law upon the States in disregard of the deeply rooted feeling, tradition and local 
laws, based upon local situations to the contrary. The basis of such legal compulsion, if the 
Constitution requires it, is a provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, whereby a State is 
forbidden to “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”328 
 
Here, Frankfurter appeared to be recurring to the majority-friendly assimilationist mythos, today 
firmly discarded, of America as “melting pot.” Himself an immigrant from what at the time of his 
migration was the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the justice evidenced the melting pot’s personal al-
lure in terming it “desirable and even necessary.”  He countenanced the possibility that the Con-
stitution may even require it. Finally, he acknowledged in passing that there exist “local situations 
to the contrary,” supporting the proposition that his earlier comment about the “outcome of the 
Civil War” was more aspirational than empirical. 
But the equality of laws enshrined in a constitution which was “made for an undefined and 
expanding future, and for a people gathered and to be gathered from many nations and of 
many tongues,” Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530, 531, is not a fixed formula de-
fined with finality at a particular time. It does not reflect, as a congealed summary, the 
social arrangements and beliefs of a particular epoch. It is addressed to the changes wrought 
by time and not merely the changes that are the consequences of physical development. 
Law must respond to transformation of views as well as to that of outward circumstances. 
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The effect of changes in men’s feelings for what is right and just is equally relevant in 
determining whether a discrimination denies the equal protection of the laws.329 
 Frankfurter finally appeared to reach the judicial conclusion that his private conscience so 
ardently sought. He was able to do so by supplanting an unattractive interpretation of the Four-
teenth Amendment suggested by its unhelpful historical circumstances with a melting pot model 
and prescription of national life that at the time resonated deeply with almost all Americans and 
the justice himself. However, Frankfurter’s choice of corroborating dictum from Hurtado v. Cali-
fornia,330 of all cases, reveals the motivated character of his reasoning. In Hurtado, the Court held 
8-1 that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause did not “require an indictment by a 
grand jury in a prosecution by a State for murder.”331 It did so against claims by the petitioner, 
Joseph Hurtado, who had been found guilty of murder without the indictment of a grand jury, that 
a grand jury indictment prior to prosecution for a capital crime was an inherent component of “due 
process of law.” That is, the Court in Hurtado was unprepared to incorporate through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment the protections enumerated in the Bill of Rights 
(including a specific clause in the Fifth Amendment requiring the indictment of a grand jury for a 
“person [to be] held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime”) against the states. The 
clearest lesson Hurtado presents for judicial decision-making in Brown is diametrically opposed 
to Frankfurter’s desire to construe another clause of the same Amendment in the latitudinarian 
fashion that the Hurtado Court emphatically rejected.  
 Frankfurter deployed the Hurtado dictum to reinforce his argument that a kind of melting 
pot of peoples and cultures was an integral design feature of the American polity, and implied that 
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the Court’s purposes include both facilitating the “welding” of disparate peoples into a common 
American mould and superintending the evolution of the country’s institutions and political prin-
ciples. However, the dictum appears in the context of the Hurtado Court’s preemptive rebuttal of 
Justice Harlan’s argument in dissent that to determine whether a law violates due process, one 
need only examine “those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and 
statute law of England before the emigration of our ancestors.”332 In full, the Hurtado majority 
declared: 
The Constitution of the United States was ordained, it is true, by descendants of English-
men, who inherited the traditions of English law and history; but it was made for an unde-
fined and expanding future, and for a people gathered and to be gathered from many nations 
and of many tongues. And while we take just pride in the principles and institutions of the 
common law, we are not to forget that in lands where other systems of jurisprudence pre-
vail, the ideas and processes of civil justice are also not unknown. Due process of law, in 
spite of the absolutism of continental governments, is not alien to that code which survived 
the Roman Empire as the foundation of modern civilization in Europe, and which has given 
us that fundamental maxim of distributive justice––suum cuique tribuere. There is nothing 
in Magna Charta, rightly construed as a broad charter of public right and law, which ought 
to exclude the best ideas of all systems and of every age; and as it was the characteristic 
principle of the common law to draw its inspiration from every fountain of justice, we are 
not to assume that the sources of its supply have been exhausted. On the contrary, we 
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should expect that the new and various experiences of our own situation and system will 
mould and shape it into new and not less useful forms.333 
The Hurtado Court dictum about an “undefined and expanding future” upon which Frankfurter 
apparently relied to conclude that “[l]aw must respond to transformation of views as well as to that 
of outward circumstances,” was deployed to somewhat different effect by the Hurtado Court: to 
emphasize the versatility of the common law, not the constitutional law that it expounds, to deny 
that Due Process can come to encapsulate what a plain reading of the Fifth Amendment suggests 
it does not. Frankfurter’s approach to the Fourteenth Amendment in his disquisition on Brown 
reflects the “characteristic” flexibility of the common law, which “draw[s] its inspiration from 
every fountain of justice,” more than it tracks the judicially deferential posture of the Hurtado 
Court majority, which claimed to abjure expounding the Constitution with the same liberal discre-
tion as it might the common law. Frankfurter’s declaration that the Constitution “does not reflect, 
as a congealed summary, the social arrangements and beliefs of a particular epoch” but “is ad-
dressed to the changes wrought by time,” including the “transformation of views,” elides consid-
eration of the means by which those changes might be constitutionally incorporated. Frankfurter 
the jurist might have acknowledged his own philosophy’s limitations on judicial discretion in favor 
of the Article V Amendment processes. But that would not have sufficed to resolve the pressing 
necessity the justice felt in being forced to take a position in a case in which he was profoundly 
emotionally invested. Frankfurter had to instead bridge the personal with the judicial. He therefore 
weakly concluded: “The effect of changes in men’s feelings for what is right and just is equally 
relevant in determining whether a discrimination denies the equal protection of the laws.”  
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 By elevating the “changes in men’s feelings for what is right and just” to the category of 
factors, such as the “transformation … of outward circumstances,” of which the judiciary may 
legitimately take notice in expounding the Constitution, Frankfurter finds a way to circumvent the 
prohibition imposed by his judicial philosophy on basing constitutional interpretations on “private 
reason[s] alone.” The phrasing of the concluding sentence in Frankfurter’s last known memo on 
the Brown merits is also revealing. First, he said “men’s feelings,” i.e., sentiments or emotions, 
“for what is right and just,” i.e., moral. This coheres perfectly with the social intuitionist model’s 
prediction that intuitions and emotions precede and cause moral judgment. It also evinces the con-
nection and parallel that I have alleged exists between judicial decision-making in hard cases and 
moral decision-making. The same modules of the mind seem to be in play: judicial decision-mak-
ing in hard cases is essentially moral. Judges invariably ask themselves, at varying levels of con-
scious articulation, What outcome accords with principles of justice? Which outcome is satisfying? 
Answering these questions requires the use of the judge’s personal intuitions and sentiments, in-
cluding deep-seated and often poorly understood ones. Indeed, as the foregoing analysis of Frank-
furter’s memo amply demonstrates, the boundary between judicial reasoning on the basis of neutral 
principles and moral reasoning to justify outcomes favored by moral intuitions becomes extremely 
fuzzy. Second, Frankfurter used weasel phraseology to obscure the fact, possibly to himself, that 
he lacked a defensible theory of how such changes might be legitimately constitutionally incorpo-
rated by the judiciary (again, under the terms of his own judicial philosophy). Changes in men’s 
opinions are “relevant in determining whether a discrimination denies the equal protection of the 
laws.” How relevant, and a method for calculating the relevance, were left unstated. So too was 
whether the character of the determination is judicial, legislative, personal, some mix of the three, 
or something else entirely. 
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 Of the last lines of Frankfurter’s memo, Kluger remarks the following. “[Frankfurter] was 
ready to say, if he chose to mobilize the thoughts in the memo, that the Court was free to reinterpret 
the Constitution on the strength of ‘changes in men’s feelings for what is right and just’––which 
was really the only justifiable ground for its intrusion into the deeply held convictions of the white 
people in command of the segregating states.” In acknowledging forthrightly that the moral views 
of the members of the Supreme Court were “the only justifiable ground” for the Court’s “intrusion” 
into the social practices of the South, Kluger evinces a probity that Frankfurter did not muster with 
respect to his own behavior on the merits of Brown. From the vantage point of his own judicial 
philosophy, the conclusion in Frankfurter’s memo represents a strained and circuitous rationaliza-
tion, closer to willful self-deception than disinterested judicial reasoning. 
 Mark Tushnet advances a theory of Frankfurter’s behavior in Brown basically consonant 
with, although emphasizing different factors than, my own. Canvassing the justices’ conference 
notes, Tushnet concludes that throughout the terms the Court was considering Brown, Frankfurter 
viewed himself as a central player in the Court’s affairs, but struggled to reconcile that self-con-
ception in Brown with the objective fact that he was precluded by his tumultuous internal struggle 
from joining the other justices on the merits until relatively late in the game. Accordingly, Tushnet 
suggests that during the 1953 term the justice “developed a story about Brown in which he played 
a central and positive role in delaying decision by writing the questions to be asked in the order 
for reargument, thereby allowing the Court to come to a more mature and considered decision.”334 
This story, disseminated to Frankfurter’s law clerks and others, holds that without the Frankfurter’s 
ingenuity in securing five votes to delay decision and put the cases down for reargument, Brown 
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would have been decided under Chief Justice Vinson, whose inability to effectively lead the jus-
tices would have produced a deeply divided outcome on the merits. As Frankfurter remarked in a 
letter to Justice Reed after Brown I: “I have no doubt that if the Segregation cases had reached 
decision last Term there would have been four dissenters––Vinson, Reed, Jackson and Clark–––
and certainly several opinions for the majority view. That would have been catastrophic.”335  
 In addition to the tale that Frankfurter wisely and auspiciously intervened to spare the Court 
an ignominious self-defeat, Tushnet contends that the justice “developed a similar story about the 
gradualism of the remedy that the Court ultimately ordered.”336 As we have seen, because Frank-
furter’s “resources as a lawyer were exhausted without turning up a legal justification for what he 
agreed was a ‘congenial’ political solution,” he was “essentially paralyzed.”337 He overcame this 
paralysis, according to Tushnet, ultimately by turning his attention to the remedy phase of the 
Brown case, which for Frankfurter was far more susceptible than the outcome on the merits of a 
technical, legal (and therefore, in Frankfurter’s eyes, judicially legitimate) resolution. However, 
an open question in Tushnet’s account is how Frankfurter was able to reach a decision on the 
merits: certainly something must have induced the move from paralysis to energetic contemplation 
of a remedy. Tushnet implies that the trigger was Frankfurter’s realization that it was futile to 
continue attempting to justify overturning segregation judicially, but that the best thing to do, the 
just thing to do, would be to forge ahead anyway. Both to “hide” this fact from himself (and per-
haps to forget it) and to “atone” for the lack of a judicial resolution on the merits, Frankfurter then 
employed a far more legalistically intensive approach to the remedy phase.338 As we have seen, 
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though, the moment at which the justice decided likely came when or shortly after he composed 
the undated memo we recently visited. Moreover, the memo strongly indicates that Frankfurter 
never acquiesced to the idea that invalidating segregation was hopelessly irreconcilable with his 
own judicial philosophy. Rather, he struggled mightily to render the judicial resources at his dis-
posal into a “congenial,” if obviously stressed, shape. Once the justice finally succeeded in doing 
so, he was able to go “all in” on desegregation. Articulating the final sentences recorded in his 
memo on the Brown merits bridged the personal and the judicial for Frankfurter, and the single 
piece of evidence he required to answer “Can I believe it?” in the affirmative was finally at hand. 
 That this is so is additionally suggested by the opening sentence of Frankfurter’s aforemen-
tioned January 15, 1954 memo on remedy: “As is doubtless true of the rest of you, all sorts of 
considerations have arisen within me in regard to the fashioning of a decree.” Once the handcuffs 
preventing him from reaching the conclusion his conscience sought came off thanks to the key that 
the rationalizations in his earlier memo provided, Frankfurter sought to restore himself as quickly 
as possible to a pivotal position in the Court’s business on the most important case before it that 
term, a desire that the extensive considerations presented in the memo on remedy demonstrated. 
 Over the course of a year, from the first arguments on Brown in December 1952, until 
sometime between December 12, 1953, and January 15, 1954, Frankfurter underwent an intense 
internal struggle to convince himself that a judicial basis existed for doing what he believed to be 
“right and just” on the Brown merits. In so doing, he exhibited perhaps the highest degree of con-
firmation bias, motivated reasoning, and intuition-led moral decision-making of any of the justices 
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who ultimately voted in Brown I. None of my analysis, however, supports impugning Justice 
Frankfurter. Frankfurter was a first-rate legal mind who took his role as a jurist more seriously 
than perhaps any other justice who served with him. The tremendous personal struggle of which 
he left written record to history should, in my view, be construed as an illustration of his fierce 
devotion to his vocation, and the particular conception of the role and limits of the federal judiciary 
that he brought to it. In the end, Frankfurter was, like every other person who has graced the na-
tion’s highest Court, all too human. He could not resist his conscience for the sake of adhering to 
his philosophy when the result his conscience sought was inevitable anyway. Both the country and 
the Court, Frankfurter appeared to conclude, were better served by justice and judicial unanimity 
in the achievement of it than they were by a completely rigorous adherence to the judicial philos-
ophy that Frankfurter spent the overwhelming remainder of his professional life abiding, expound-




Chapter 7. Robert Jackson 
 Like Frankfurter, Jackson was one of the three justices whose votes were uncertain after 
the 1952 conference. The evolution of Jackson’s views over the course of the Brown hearing and 
rehearing would parallel that of Frankfurter’s, although Jackson’s would cause him appreciably 
less personal turmoil. Jackson’s problem from day one of the Brown deliberations was that he felt 
that the history of the Fourteenth Amendment, with which he was familiar from as far back as the 
McLaurin and Sweatt litigation in the spring of 1950, did not support a judicial case for invalidating 
segregation. Jackson never doubted that Congress had the power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to terminate local segregation–––the Amendment’s history notwithstanding–––but 
his sense of probity and view of the judicial process led him to conclude that the history of the 
Amendment did not provide the judicial authority for interpreting the Equal Protection Clause to 
proscribe segregation. It was for this reason that Jackson on more than one occasion remarked to 
the other justices that he would be willing to “go along” with desegregation, but that the Court 
should acknowledge that its decision could be justified only on the basis of political, not judicial, 
reasons. 
 Jackson’s comments at the 1952 conference were pithy. He began by suggesting that the 
justices not take a vote on the case, although the reason for which he made his suggestion was not 
recorded by any of the other justices.339 Then, Jackson made a comment that distinguishes the 
framing of his remarks from that of the other justices’: “start as a lawyer.”340 Presumably, this 
comment was Clark’s shorthand for Jackson’s announcement that Jackson sought to approach the 
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cases as a lawyer–––not as a sociologist, a private citizen, a man pursuing justice, or a judge de-
sirous of making history. The importance of Jackson’s unique framing in announcing that he was 
approaching the case “as a lawyer” might be overstated, but I think it illustrates that of all the 
justices, Jackson appeared to have the most emotional distance on the moral questions presented 
in Brown. The examination to follow of Jackson’s letters to a close friend and his Brown memo 
brainstorms will confirm this impression.  
 Jackson next delved into his analysis. “Nothing in text that tells me this is unconstitutional. 
(Marshall’s brief starts and ends with sociology) and nothing in legislative acts.”341 Douglas rec-
orded him as saying, “nothing in the text” of the Constitution, “nothing in the opinions of the 
courts,” and “nothing in the history of the 14th Amendment” suggested that segregation is uncon-
stitutional.342 Jackson remarked that he was “not conscious of the problem until I came here – we 
had segregation in Jamestown, [NY]” (Jackson’s hometown). The last pronouncement Clark rec-
orded is rather cryptic. “If can work it out so we can say segregation ‘bad’ – under approval of 
Court & support of Congress – and must be done in certain period.”343 Douglas and Burton, re-
spectively, note that Jackson added, “it will be bad for the negroes to be put into white schools,” 
and “I don’t know what the effect of segregation or reason for it but can’t cure this situation by 
putting children together.”344  
 A year later, after the rehearing of the cases on the legislative history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Jackson began his peroration at the second Brown merits conference by rather bluntly 
asserting that “education at time of the 14th amendment was not an issue.” That is, if education 
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was not foreseen by the Amendment’s framers as an area of social life to which the guarantees of 
the Amendment might someday apply, then there was no judicial basis eighty-five years later for 
declaring that the Amendment now so extended.345 Indeed, Jackson continued, the legislative his-
tory would need to provide some affirmative warrant for reinterpreting the Amendment as urged 
by the NAACP, since a straightforward application of “precedents and custom” would otherwise 
sustain Plessy. But the legislative history, Jackson emphasized, does not say what the five votes 
for reversal claim and want it to. The problem, therefore, is the same the Court faced the first term 
it heard Brown: “to make a judicial basis for a congenial political conclusion.” After all this time, 
he simply did not “know how to justify the abolition of segregation as a judicial act.” Jackson 
finally stated that he would be willing to join the majority if it acknowledged (as his 1953 term 
law clerk E. Barrett Prettyman would later describe Jackson’s view of it) that the Court was “writ-
ing new law for a new day”346: Jackson “personally [did] not [have] a problem with desegregation” 
and “[a]s a political decision, c[ould] go along with it.”347 
 Between the two Brown merit conferences, Jackson’s view that there was not an adequate 
judicial basis for overturning segregation seems to have ossified. Nonetheless, perhaps sensing 
that a majority had emerged to invalidate segregation at the 1953 conference, Jackson demon-
strated his lack of emotional investment in one outcome or the other by signaling that he could 
join the desegregationist majority despite his judicial qualms. This flexibility reflects Jackson’s 
character, in the retroactive assessment of Prettyman, as a “very, very, very practical person.”348 
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Though by late 1953 Jackson was prepared to “go along” with desegregation, he had not arrived 
at that position by the same path as most of his colleagues: Jackson exhibited an emotional profile 
that was far less responsive to accusations that segregation was unjust and invidious. Furthermore, 
Jackson’s commitment to the judicial process as he understood it had made him wary of constitu-
tional claims that appeared to be motivated by moral zealotry, as were, in his view, the debates 
surrounding segregation dating back to the mid-1940s. Evidence for this proposition comes from 
a letter Jackson wrote to his friend, Stanford Law Professor Charles Fairman, three weeks prior to 
the oral arguments of Sweatt and McLaurin. The letter, dated March 13, 1950, is worth examining 
closely. 
 Jackson began the letter remarking that he was grateful for the opportunity to avail himself 
of his friend’s “researched and informed judgment as to the constitutional questions involved in 
racial segregation in education.”  The very next sentence reads: “I am almost embarrassed to be in 
doubts about a matter on which nearly everyone here seems, one way or the other, to be fully 
convinced.” As the letter will make clear, that shared consensus appears to be the moral offensive-
ness and unconstitutionality of racial segregation. Jackson explained that he responded differently 
to racial appeals than the other justices, “perhaps [because of his] background.” 
I was brought up in a community where no serious racial problems or tensions existed, 
attended public school along with a few Negro pupils and never gave it a thought; I cannot 
remember that it was ever even discussed. I first encountered real racial consciousness and 
antagonism in Washington, D.C. I am amazed and disappointed at the depth and bitterness 
of the feeling among the Negroes. The stupidity and recklessness of extremists on both 
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sides is such that they seem ready to precipitate any kind of conflict. So I find a good deal 
of demagoguery and hypocrisy on both sides of this issue.349 
These are not the words one might expect a typical mid-20th Century liberal on the question of race 
to employ. There is not even a whiff of shame or disgust about whites’ historical treatment of 
blacks, nor are there any pronouncements to the effect that prevailing attitudes among blacks or 
blacks’ peculiar position in American life is at all attributable to white mistreatment. Jackson there-
fore did not appear to view segregation or whites’ treatment of blacks in the North as necessarily 
immoral or unjust. If he had, we would expect to see him express some level of sympathy with, 
rather than “amaze[ment]” and “disappoint[ment] at,” “the depth and bitterness of the feeling 
among Negroes.” Additionally, Jackson insinuated by juxtaposition that the “real racial conscious-
ness and antagonism” he had observed was mostly, if not exclusively, on the part of blacks. Per-
haps most strikingly, he suggested a moral equivalency between segregationists and civil rights 
activists by declining to temper his accusations of “recklessness,” “stupidity,” “demagoguery,” 
and “hypocrisy” against one group of “extremists” or the other: Jackson saw both sides as out for 
blood, seemingly “ready to precipitate any kind of conflict.” It may be inferred, therefore, that in 
the moral passions surrounding the mid-century battle over civil rights that he was called upon to 
adjudicate, Jackson saw a pervasive and unchecked fanaticism. 
 Now, Jackson would go on to make a remark that might indicate disapproval of segregation 
as such, so it should be examined in conjunction with this introductory portion of the letter. Refer-
ring to his and Fairman’s roles prosecuting the Nazis at Nuremberg, Jackson says: “[y]ou and I 
have seen the terrible consequences of racial hatred in Germany. We can have no sympathy with 
                                                
349 March 13, 1950 letter from Robert H. Jackson to Charles Fairman. Charles Fairman Papers, South Texas College 




racial conceits which underlie segregation policies. Neither can we overlook that widely held be-
liefs and attitudes, even if mistaken, are real factors in law and statecraft and a state of mind may 
be as real a hazard as a mountain range or a river boundary.”350 It is unlikely that Jackson used 
“racial hatred” and the “racial conceits which underlie segregation policies” synonymously. After 
all, if Jackson believed racial hatred undergirded segregation, he could be expected to have ex-
pressed himself differently than divulging “amaze[ment]” at the “bitterness of the feeling among 
Negroes.” If Jackson believed that the cause or “undergird[ing]” of segregation is racial hatred, 
and that racial hatred can produce “terrible consequences,” it would presumably be more natural 
for him to harbor and express “sympathy” for, as opposed to “amaze[ment]” and “disappoint[ment] 
… at the feeling among,” the victims. It is more likely that Jackson viewed the popular attitudes 
that precipitated and perpetuated segregation of blacks in the United States and the racial hatred 
directed toward Jews in Nazi Germany as falling in different places along a continuum of more or 
less odious “racial conceits.” But his strikingly unsympathetic attitude toward American blacks 
strongly suggests that he did not view the pervasive segregation of blacks in America as on par 
with the systemic persecution and murder of Jews in Europe during the recently concluded war. 
 Jackson nonetheless recognized the moral energy that the question of race presented by the 
McLaurin and Sweatt cases aroused in the other justices. Referring to his fellow Brethren, Jackson 
proclaimed, “[s]ome have records to live up to, some have records to live down. Some want to see 
the Administration’s hand strengthened politically. In short, nearly everyone seems under con-
scious or unconscious emotional commitments of one sort or another.” Jackson, in contrast, 
stressed his remove from this storm of “conscious or unconscious emotional commitments”: “[m]y 
real concern,” he claimed, “insofar as I can read my own feelings, is to see this thing decided 
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wisely rather than to see either side win.” For Jackson, moderation appeared to be a prerequisite 
of wisdom, but the heightened passions of the segregationists and civil rights proponents alike, 
and to some degree of Jackson’s own colleagues on the Court, meant that if the justices were to 
make a wise decision, “the wisdom [was] likely to be a by-product.”351 
 Ameliorating the implicit admonition of his judicial colleagues, and highlighting his own 
struggle to develop a satisfying judicial view of the cases, Jackson continued: 
Perhaps the cause of so much irrationality is the scarcity of satisfactory materials for a 
rational attitude. The cryptic words of the Fourteenth Amendment solve nothing; three-
fourths of a century of judicial interpretation is called in question. Congress itself created 
a segregated school system in Washington, and the Administration, which denounces seg-
regation, maintains it in the armed forces, Federal Housing, and other agencies.352 
By asserting that there existed a dearth “of satisfactory materials for a rational attitude,” before 
enumerating the available resources that he might use to come to a decision, all of which point 
toward affirming Plessy and sustaining segregation, Jackson betrayed that as early as March, 1950 
he had already begun to put the cart before the horse. Consciously or not, he was by that point 
viewing race cases before the Court not only in terms of the traditional elements of judicial inter-
pretation, but also through the instrumental lens of whether he could find reasons to “go along” 
(Jackson’s catchphrase throughout the Brown decision-making process) with the outcome favored 
by his fellow brethren, most of whose judgments he evidently saw as being distorted by moral 
passions. Unless by “rational attitude” Jackson meant one that condemns segregation, there seems 
to be little reason to conclude that the particular factors Jackson would go on to discuss in his letter 





were insufficient to reach a conclusion on the question of whether segregation was constitutional. 
The problem apparently was that the outcome to which they pointed was unpalatable. In view of 
Jackson’s claim that his “real concern … is to see this thing decided wisely” and that he did not 
construe the available materials to reach the outcome toward which they appeared to point indi-
cates that he was at least strongly leaning toward the proposition that to affirm Plessy was unwise, 
whether or not Jackson was conscious of his own attitude. 
 As we have seen from this same letter, Jackson did not exhibit the responses to racial claims 
that one would expect from a mid-20th Century liberal on the issue of race, so the cause of his 
evident reticence to affirm Plessy was almost certainly not Jackson’s personal view of the justice 
or morality of segregation. The likelier cause was Jackson’s position as an outlier among his fellow 
Brethren, who were apparently of one mind on the matter–––at least as the question manifested 
itself in the context of graduate education. As already discussed, Jackson admitted to being “almost 
embarrassed to be in doubts” about the constitutionality of segregation in higher education when 
“nearly everyone here seems, one way or the other, to be fully convinced.” Furthermore, over half 
of the three-page March 13 letter to Fairman is comprised of questions that appear to have been 
formulated to seek a rationale that would allow Jackson to join his Court colleagues. In framing 
those questions, he expressed concern that the outcome favored by his colleagues could not be 
reached constitutionally, and if it could, that the Court should not be the institution to make the 
decision. Finally, there appears to be no other explanation for Jackson’s resistance to going where 
the judicial evidence pointed than a desire to maintain unanimity with the other justices, and not 
to be locked out in the cold. If true, this would suggest that the social intuitionist model operated 
on Jackson by means of group polarization–––by a desire to be persuaded, on a judicial basis, to 
go along with the conclusion on which his fellows “seem[ed] … fully convinced.” In this narrow 
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respect–––that his reasoning was motivated by a personal desire severable from his usual judicial 
approach–––Jackson’s behavior parallels Frankfurter’s, although the “non-judicial” personal de-
sires mediating each justice’s decision-making were different. Frankfurter’s desire was to reach a 
moral result; Jackson’s was to “go along” with his judicial peers, to be seen by his colleagues and 
friends (including Fairman) as behaving respectably. Both men sought to reconcile their respective 
motivations with the parallel, but slightly weaker, motivation to preserve a clean judicial con-
science. 
 That the evidence available to Jackson indeed pointed toward affirming Plessy, and that 
Jackson apparently thought so, is confirmed in follow-up letter Jackson composed to Fairman on 
April 5. There, Jackson asked his friend: 
Have you read the [Sweatt v. Painter] Texas brief? It makes the most complete review of 
historical materials, including a good many citations to your own work.353 I have not yet 
read it with care, but, so far as it could be developed in the argument, they seem to have 
established pretty clearly, first, that there was no intention on the part of most of the pro-
ponents of the Fourteenth Amendment to interfere with the state school systems on the 
question of segregation; secondly, that even those who wanted to see that accomplished 
acknowledged that it was not accomplished by the Amendment or the civil rights legisla-
tion. So our question becomes a little more than whether we will fill gaps or construe the 
Amendment to include matters which were unconsidered. It really becomes whether we 
                                                
353 Fairman was an influential scholar, among other things, of the Fourteenth Amendment and its history, and his 
work on the Amendment was later cited extensively by Justice Frankfurter in the incorporation debate with Justice 
Black in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959), and by Justice Harlan in another chapter of that debate with Justice 
Black in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
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will construe it to include what was deliberately and intentionally excluded. This is assum-
ing that my superficial impressions of the legislative history are correct.354 
The last three sentences are especially revealing of Jackson’s state of mind on the constitutionality 
of segregation in 1950. He first stated that the question before the Court is “whether we will fill 
gaps or construe the Amendment to include matters which were unconsidered.” This framing is of 
course unhospitable to the NAACP’s case: “fill[ing] the gaps” corresponds to sustaining segrega-
tion, “constru[ing] the Amendment to include matters which were unconsidered” to invalidating 
it. Rethinking this formulation and further extending it in the direction in which it first pointed, 
Jackson then declared that the question “really becomes whether we will construe [the Amend-
ment] to include what was deliberately and intentionally excluded.” This phrasing reflects an ex-
tremely unsympathetic judicial attitude toward the NAACP’s constitutional arguments in the uni-
versity segregation cases, whatever Jackson’s moral stance toward segregation might have been. 
Moreover, the comments indicate that by April of 1950 Jackson had accepted, albeit somewhat 
tentatively, that the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment could not provide a judicial 
basis for invalidating segregation. Finally, that Jackson’s “superficial impressions of the legislative 
history” in the spring of 1950 were indeed borne out by subsequent investigation is confirmed by 
his pronouncement at the 1952 Brown conference that “nothing in the text” of the Constitution, 
“nothing in the opinions of the courts,” and “nothing in the history of the 14th Amendment” per-
suaded him that segregation was unconstitutional. 
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 Of course, the NAACP (with a substantial assist from Alexander Bickel) succeeded in neu-
tralizing the Amendment’s unsupportive history during the Brown reargument in 1953 by convinc-
ing those justices who were already temperamentally predisposed to lend a helping judicial hand 
to an oppressed and unfairly maligned minority that the history either unequivocally supported 
invalidating segregation (as Warren, Black, Burton, and Minton were convinced) or, in the final 
analysis, failed to present an insurmountable obstacle to reaching a desirable moral conclusion (as 
Frankfurter and Clark came to believe). Persuading the Court of the latter proposition, in particular, 
was Thurgood Marshall’s stated goal. During the “six-month summer”355 of 1953, when the 
NAACP legal research team was feverishly composing the organization’s reargument briefs, Mar-
shall would frequently remind his staff that its objective was to create the appearance of a historical 
stalemate in the justices’ minds. “A nothin’-to-nothin’ score means we win the ball game,” Mar-
shall said.356 The history, in other words, could only hurt the NAACP; but if it could be somehow 
be neutralized, Marshall anticipated that a majority of the nine “white bosses,” who, he would 
jokingly tell his legal team, could “do anything [they] want, ‘cause [they] got de power!”357 would 
do precisely what they wanted to in their heart of hearts: the right thing. Lead historian Alfred 
Kelly, who in the home stretch of November, 1953, returned to the organization’s Manhattan office 
from Detroit to superintend the recrafting of the NAACP brief on the Amendment’s history, later 
recounted to Kluger: 
I am very much afraid that … [during those sessions] I ceased to function as a historian 
and instead took up the practice of law without a license. The problem we faced was not 
the historian’s discovery of the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; the problem 
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instead was the formulation of an adequate gloss on the fateful historical events of 1866 
sufficient to convince the Court that we had something of an historical case…. It is not that 
we were engaged in formulating lies; there was nothing as crude and naïve as that. But we 
were using facts, emphasizing facts, bearing down on facts, sliding off facts in a way to do 
what Marshall said we had to–––“get by those boys down there.” 
To this Kluger adds, “[a]nd yet Kelly would become increasingly convinced with the passing years 
that the last-minute interpretation he came up with on the two sorest points in the historical evi-
dence was essentially the correct one.” But John Kelly the historian, not the partisan, was appar-
ently not so persuaded when the moral and constitutional positions in the service of which his 
historical theory was advanced had not yet gained the overwhelming and near-universal ac-
ceptance they would in Brown’s wake. Nothing succeeds like success. 
 Jackson appeared to detect the motivated nature of historical theories presented in adver-
sarial contexts, especially those of extraordinary political salience, and approached such claims 
skeptically. After reading a draft version of what would eventually become Fairman’s influential 
Stanford Law Review article, “Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? 
The Original Understanding,”358 on October 18, 1949, Jackson wrote his friend: 
I think you have done a great service to the legal profession, not only in bringing to light 
the real facts about the Fourteenth Amendment but in demonstrating the danger of going 
into history to reconstruct past attitudes as a basis for changing the constitutional doctrine. 
I am one who believes that we have gone too far in going into legislative history to clear 
up ambiguities which we sometime go to legislative history to create. It is even more 
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treacherous ground in constitutional matters, as you have so well demonstrated. While I 
would not want to say that we should never take into account legislative history or the 
history of the time, it is certainly a path to tread with care.359 
Jackson stressed that the Court should examine with special wariness litigants’ use not of legisla-
tive history per se, but of legislative history wielded to serve “as a basis for changing the constitu-
tional doctrine.” The reasons for this, though unstated by the justice, would appear to be relatively 
straightforward: legislative history that tends to confirm an existing constitutional understanding 
need not be scrutinized to the same degree as legislative history dug up and brandished by parties 
seeking to overturn that consensus because 1) it is unlikely that previous courts grievously erred 
in interpreting the history of a legislative act to which they were closer in time, and 2) implement-
ing constitutional change tends to be politically costly for the Court and legally expensive for 
everyone else, while sustaining precedent is expected, uncontroversial, and inexpensive. Perhaps 
more important for Jackson, though, is the point that legislative history appears to be the refuge of 
the desperate. Jackson’s curious locution that the Court has gone “into legislative history to clear 
up ambiguities which we sometime go to legislative history to create” suggests the justice believed 
that such excursions are often recursive and instrumental. The fruit of motivated inquiries into 
history will be as trustworthy as they are neutral. 
 Jackson discounted much of the Sweatt and McLaurin litigants’ arguments due to their 
putatively non-judicial nature. Returning to the aforementioned letter to Charles Fairman of April 
5, 1950, Jackson remarked of the McLaurin and Sweatt oral arguments: 
We have survived two days of argument on the segregation issue in which all parties 
seemed to vie with each other in enlisting pressure groups and giving the whole thing a 




general atmosphere of politics, which was especially emphasized by the appearance of the 
Attorney General, who added nothing except to get into a position to capitalized any ad-
vantages for the administration. The argument has not been very enlightening on the points 
that trouble me. 
Those points were enumerated in the second half of his March 13, 1950 letter to Fairman, the first 
half of which has already been canvassed. In the letter’s latter two-thirds, Jackson described the 
NAACP’s litigation strategy, evidently based solely on its briefs, as “advanc[ing] arguments as to 
the general philosophy of the Amendment, the inherent offensiveness of compulsory segregation 
and the general duty of the Court to outlaw evil and advance democracy and equality.” Jackson 
followed this rather blunt summary with a list of eight questions, which he described as ones “on 
which I am both perplexed and as yet open-minded and, incidentally, on which I don’t expect very 
substantial help from either side in the argument nor from the score of amici who are volunteering 
advice.” That he described the NAACP’s efforts in this way, and sought his friend’s input in an-
swering his own questions, indicates that the latitudinarian reading of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and appeals to conscience and judicial duty in the NAACP’s Sweatt and McLaurin briefs failed, 
in Jackson’s view, to amount to a genuine judicial case for overturning segregation in higher edu-
cation. Thus, Jackson not only was unreceptive to the NAACP’s interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment but was also apparently unmoved by the moral appeals the NAACP made, even when 
such were couched in the language of judicial duty. 
 Nevertheless, something over the course of the Sweatt and McLaurin arguments must have 
changed Jackson’s mind. Clark’s notes reveal that at the customary Saturday judicial conference 
after the cases were argued, Jackson expressed a desire to reverse the lower Courts that had applied 
Plessy but also asserted that the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment could not be 
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invoked in the appellants’ cause. Speaking after Douglas, who had announced his support for hold-
ing Plessy inapplicable to higher education, Jackson stated, “14th Amendment history leaves you 
without support” (by “you” he seemed to be referring to all those who had by that point spoken in 
favor of overturning segregation at the public university level.) “Congress has not touched it. In 
effect we are amending the Constitution.” Then, after predicting some of the likely public reaction 
in the Deep South, he rather paradoxically proclaimed, “Desirable to do it (reverse)[.] My views 
are fluid enough to join any theory.”360 
 Given Jackson’s imperviousness to the NAACP’s briefs and oral arguments in the univer-
sity segregation cases, and his recurring insistence on discovering a “judicial basis” for any deci-
sion in the cases, what could have convinced Jackson that it was “[d]esirable” for the Court to 
“amend[] the Constitution”? It is impossible to say with absolute certainty, but Fairman’s March 
30 reply to Jackson’s letter of March 13, in which Jackson had asked for Fairman’s thoughts on 
eight questions concerning the cases, suggests an answer. In the letter Fairman began by pronounc-
ing on the “conditioning factor” that one’s “personal background” plays in approaching a consti-
tutional question. After giving a synopsis of his own limited personal history with blacks and seg-
regation, he declared: “I respect Charles Sumner, but admire far more Abraham Lincoln. That is, 
I seem to want to line up with the men who, while identifying the distant goal, work in their own 
time to achieve the substantial advances that are presently obtainable. So much for disclosure of 
personal point of view.”361 To answer Jackson’s questions in the March 13 letter, Fairman next 
delved into the history of the Fourteenth Amendment. He said he had “never scanned the history 
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of the Fourteenth Amendment or of congressional action during Reconstruction with an eye spe-
cifically directed at the matter of segregation,” but “[m]y impression is that in 1866-1868 ‘Equal-
ity’ did not have an accepted meaning that excluded segregation.” 
When the Negroes in the South had so little, so nearly nothing, when it would have been a 
notable achievement to ensure them the enjoyment of even the most elementary rights, the 
issues now before the Court may well have remained unanswered if indeed they were con-
sidered. It seems to me that the men who carried the Amendment evidently regarded it as 
applying its leverage almost wholly upon the South. If the Northerners felt that thenceforth 
they too must search their souls and mend their ways, that thought has eluded me. 
If true, this would belie the periodic references, throughout the Brown decision-making process, 
to racial segregation as a national problem, albeit one whose peculiar rootedness in the South 
would likely precipitate the fiercest resistance from that quarter. Fairman then highlighted what he 
evidently viewed as a contradiction at the heart of Plessy. Rationalizing racial segregation, Plessy’s 
author, Justice Henry Brown, wrote that “distinctions based upon color were ‘in the nature of 
things.’” But “[p]ut beside this,” Fairman implored, “his remarks in Holden v. Hardy362 in 1898: 
‘the law is, to a certain extent, a progressive science ...;’ methods once ‘deemed essential’ may be 
‘found to be no longer necessary,’” and “‘while the cardinal principles of justice are immutable, 
the methods by which justice is administered are subject to constant fluctuations.” Surveying this 
contrast, Fairman wrote, “I believe that the issue of segregation should be worked out, not as a 
problem in the history of 1866-1868, but as one more instance of the progressive search for more 
equal justice.” 
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 Fairman then addressed himself directly to Jackson’s concern, expressed in question one 
of the March 13 letter, that the Court’s role should be circumscribed with respect to social legisla-
tion regarding race, just as it eventually became regarding social legislation touching upon national 
economic stewardship. In that letter, the first and most extensively annotated question Jackson 
submitted to Fairman reads as follows: 
 
1. What is the function of the Court in this matter? I am clear that I would support the 
constitutionality of almost any Congressional Act that prohibited segregation in education. 
The only place Congress has acted, i.e., the District of Columbia, it has gone the other 
way.) But I really did, and still do believe the doctrine on which the Roosevelt fight against 
the old Court was based – in part, that it had expanded the Fourteenth Amendment to take 
an unjustified judicial control over social and economic affairs. We insisted that a majority 
out of nine appointed life-tenure men should not settle such issues…. I find a good many 
who were associated in that fight now abandon that position but think the Court should 
decide such questions, provided it will decide their way. The problem in my mind is not 
merely should we nine decide this case, but should such an institution decide such questions 
for the Nation. 
Fairman, in his reply letter of March 30, responded: 
It seems to me that the question of unequal treatment of members of a racial minor-
ity is not to be bracketed with the matters of economic and social policy on which 
the old [pre-West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish363] Court made unwarranted and un-
wise pronouncements in the years prior to 1937. Whether bakers were limited to 60 
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hours per week, whether Tysons were limited to a write-up of 50 cents, etc. – these 
were questions on which the justices never had any business to pronounce. . . . 
Unequal treatment of a racial minority in a matter of public right seems to me a 
very different thing. Unlike questions of collectivism vs. laissez faire, there seems 
to me to be a right and a wrong side in the Sweatt and Henderson cases.364 
Fairman then pointed out that the plight of racial minorities seeking fair treatment from the major-
ity is not analogous to that of a litigant attempting to “arouse the public on a matter of common 
interest,” where the abuse would stand a good chance of being corrected. Abstaining from further 
elaboration upon this line of thought, Fairman nonetheless continued: “Woodrow Wilson had a 
phrase, ‘I’m not arguing with you, I’m telling you.’ The Negro, it seems to me, may take the same 
position in claiming truly equal treatment. He should not be remitted to persuasion and to the slow 
process of evolution of Southern sentiment for a recognition of his claim to equal right.” Fairman, 
evincing evidence of intuitive moral judgment of his own, then explained how he reached this 
conclusion: 
The Negro hopes to establish the proposition that no segregated treatment can be fully 
“equal”. In thinking about these current cases I have come to believe that this proposition 
will sooner or later become the law of the Constitution, because I believe it is true and will 
become recognized as true. I am a good deal impressed by what I read on this point in the 
briefs – Brief for the United States in Henderson case, 35 ff; Brief for petitioner in Sweatt 
case, 26ff; Brief for appellant in McLaurin case, 24 ff – not for any “authority” there found 
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but because as I read it, I think, This must be true. (My general reading is pretty limited, so 
I have never looked at Myrdal and the rest.) 
 The gist of the brief selections to which Fairman alluded is that segregation is inherently 
unequal. For instance, the brief for the United States in Henderson states in part: “When colored 
passengers are furnished dining car service only at a table partially screened off as a symbol and 
token of their separate and inferior status, the segregation is open, explicit, and humiliating.”365 
Perhaps more “impress[ive]” to Fairman, the brief reasons as follows: 
[T]he present case comes within an exception to the “separate but equal” doctrine 
stated or plainly indicated in the Plessy opinion. The Court there said (pg. 544) that 
laws requiring the separation of the white and colored races “do not necessarily 
imply the inferiority of either race to the other” (italics supplied). In other words, if 
the separation required did imply the inferiority of one race, the accommodations 
would be “separate” but they would not be “equal.” While the Plessy case held that 
enforced separation is not in and of itself inequality, it did not hold that as a matter 
of law, similar but separate physical accommodations are always equal. And if the 
question is one of fact, the facts of the present case establish beyond all doubt that 
the segregation which is enforced here is the antithesis of equality (supra, pp. 28-
34).366 
This is the best conceivable reconciliation of Plessy with a judicial finding that segregation violates 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Had it been appropriated by the Court in Brown, it would have 
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achieved Warren’s aim of not acknowledging that the effective or functional way in which Plessy 
was understood–––as categorically blessing segregation–––was being overthrown while preserv-
ing a much closer and therefore more defensible continuity with precedent than the Court ulti-
mately did. In other words, relative to the reasoning employed in the ultimate Brown decision, this 
rationale would have stated the Court’s case–––that segregation in fact almost always symbolizes 
and perpetuates inequality–––more directly, perspicaciously, and convincingly, while shielding 
the Court from criticism that it was behaving lawlessly by overturning 58 years of precedent. That 
none of the justices apparently recalled this element of the government’s brief in Henderson when 
Warren asked for their feedback on his Brown drafts likely detracted from the decision’s overall 
effectiveness. 
 Page 26 of the petitioners’ brief in Sweatt opens with the heading, “4. State ordained seg-
regation is a particularly invidious policy which needlessly penalizes Negroes, demoralizes whites 
and tends to disrupt our democratic institutions.” The first sentence of the section reads: “If the 
racial factor has no scientific basis, then the ills suffered as a result of racial segregation are par-
ticularly invidious.”367 This opening line depends upon and must be understood in the context of 
section 3. Commencing just two pages prior to Fairman’s citation, section 3 reported the social 
scientific consensus of 1950 that “differences in intellectual capacity or in ability to learn have not 
been shown to exist as between Negroes and whites, and … the results make it very probable that 
if such differences are later shown to exist, they will not prove to be significant for any educational 
policy or practice.” On the basis of this consensus, the NAACP’s lawyers in section 3 wrote that 
“[t]he racist premise [that there are inherent differences between the races] is completely invalid, 
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and no act of segregation based upon it can be upheld as reasonable.”368 Accordingly, although 
Fairman did not in his March 30 letter reference the social scientific evidence of section 3 indicat-
ing that there are no appreciable differences between races, what particularly “impress[ed]” Fair-
man was highly contingent upon that finding. 
 Section 4 proffers more empirical claims: “no child at birth possesses either an instinct or 
even a propensity toward feelings of prejudice or superiority,” and such “prejudices, when and if 
they do appear, are but reflections of the attitudes and institutional ideas evidenced by the adults 
about him.” Imputing the cause of the prejudices to segregation itself, the brief then asserts that 
“the very act of segregation tends to crystallize and perpetuate group isolation, and serves, there-
fore, as a breeding ground for unhealthy attitudes.”369 The atmosphere created by segregation, in 
turn, “accentuate[s] imagined differences between Negroes and whites,” affording such differ-
ences “an appearance of reality.” Next, the brief repeats the tact adopted in Henderson: “Qualified 
educators, social scientists, and other experts have expressed their realization of the fact that ‘sep-
arate’ is irreconcilable with ‘equality.’ There can be no equality since the very fact of segregation 
establishes a feeling of humiliation and deprivation to the group considered inferior.”370 Finally, 
section 4 alleges that segregation actually harms whites. Quoting Gunnar Myrdal’s American Di-
lemma,371 mid-century American liberalism’s social scientific Bible on race, the brief proclaims: 
“the low economic, political, legal, and moral standards of Southern whites” are “kept low because 
of discrimination against Negroes and because of obsession with the Negro problem. Even the 
ambition of Southern whites is stifled partly because, without rising far, it is so easy to remain 
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‘superior’ to the held-down Negroes.”372 The appellant’s brief in McLaurin is substantially similar 
to section 4 of the petitioner’s brief in Sweatt, just examined. The organization and content are 
virtually identical.373 
 Now it is unclear whether the briefs to which Fairman called Jackson’s attention exerted 
the same impression on Jackson as they did on Fairman, or even whether Jackson ever read (or re-
read) them at Fairman’s prompting. But it is safe to say that Fairman appeared to be powerfully 
convinced by the NAACP briefs’ claims that segregation was unjust and immoral, for blacks and 
whites alike, and that he hoped Jackson might be similarly swayed. Jackson’s acceptance, at Fair-
man’s exhortation, of the validity of the social science findings presented in the briefs, and of the 
intended moral implications of those findings, would certainly explain his clear-eyed acknowledg-
ment at the Sweatt and McLaurin conference that the Court would be “amending the Constitution” 
in overturning segregation in higher education, but that it was nevertheless “desirable” for them to 
do so. But it would not explain the much greater difficulty Jackson encountered in disposing of 
Brown, though he readily conceded at the Brown conferences that he was perfectly willing to write 
“new law for a new day.” The factors that distinguish Brown from Sweatt, McLaurin, and Hender-
son are the sheer magnitude of the judicial undertaking, the attendant problems of enforcement, 
and the impossibility of plausibly contending that in striking down segregation at the public-school 
level, the Court was not indeed overruling Plessy in toto. Some of these factors would logically 
have to account for the starkly different attitude Jackson exhibited toward the judicial questions 
with which he grappled in attempting to craft a concurrence in Brown. 
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ROBERT JACKSON’S BROWN MEMOS 
 
 The best insights we can glean into Jackson’s views on the questions posed in Brown come 
from three drafts of a memo he developed during January, February, and March of 1954.374 Titled 
and structured as memoranda to the conference (that is, for the justices’ eyes and internal use only), 
the documents evince Jackson’s judicial instincts, personal attitudes toward race and desegrega-
tion, and the clearly motivated nature and evolution of his case for declaring segregation uncon-
stitutional. These documents are by far the most revealing and extensive evidence of these factors 
for any of the justices, with the exception of perhaps only Frankfurter. They are accordingly worth 
examining in some detail. For intelligibility and ease of digestion, I will examine these documents 
in side-by-side fashion, focusing on parallel sections from each, summarizing their contents in 
discrete chunks, and noting changes in wording or meaning over the course of the three drafts on 
any given section or idea. The three memoranda are dated January 6 (hereafter “Draft 1”), February 
15 (“Draft 2”), and March 1 (“Draft 3”), 1954.375 They are 14, 15, and 23 pages in length, respec-
tively. For future scholarly examination and research, verbatim transcriptions of the three drafts 
are reproduced in the Appendix to this work.376 
 “Since the close of the Civil War the United States has been ‘hesitating between two worlds 
– one dead – the other powerless to be born’.” So begins each version of the Jackson Brown 
memos. This epigraph evocatively captures the dual struggles that transpired in its author and the 
country of which he wrote: in Jackson, of attempting to reconcile legalism with an instrumental 
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approach to judicial outcome, and in the United States, of “conform[ing] its racial practices to its 
professions.” 
 Echoing his March 13, 1950 letter to Fairman concerning the Sweatt and McLaurin cases, 
Jackson framed the first and third Brown drafts by forthrightly acknowledging his personal back-
ground and how it mediated his instincts in the matters of race and enforced segregation. “I must 
admit to little personal experience or firsthand knowledge by which to test many of the arguments 
advanced in these cases,” Jackson conceded in the first draft. “One reared in the North and attend-
ing public schools where not even a thought was given to segregating the very few negro pupils, 
finds it difficult to understand the emotional and traditional background of the present problem.” 
The analogous portion of the second draft, though transplanted to the second page of the memo 
from the first in the first and third drafts, is substantially similar.  
 However, in the third draft, Jackson embellished his personal framing of the memo with a 
comment that appears later in the two earlier drafts, on page 3 of each. This comment, and its 
elevation to the introductory framing of the entire opinion, lift the veil on both Jackson’s personal 
opinion and judicial technique, albeit the latter inadvertently.  
As one whose formative years were spent in the public schools in a part of the North where 
Negro pupils were very few and not even a thought was given to segregating them, I sup-
pose I am predisposed to the conclusion that Negro segregation in the schools in most parts 
of the country at least has outlived whatever justification it may have had. Economic, social 
and political considerations, which prevented it from gaining a foothold in some parts of 
the North, seem to mark it for certain and early extinction elsewhere. That within a gener-
ation it will also be outlawed by Constitutional interpretation, whatever we may say today, 
also appears certain. As the forces of mortality and replacement operate on this bench, it 
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seems certain that the political forces represented by the Executive branch rather than the 
inertia represented by the Congressional branch of the government will eventually make 
itself felt in law.377 
The revision of the sentence attributing its author’s ignorance to his limited personal experience 
with race and segregation to a statement pronouncing his conclusion that enforced racial segrega-
tion is no longer justified suggests that Jackson performed at least some of his revisions with an 
eye to strengthening the case for invalidating racial segregation. 
 In the earlier drafts, Jackson included prefatory language that he omitted in the third. In 
draft one, the first sentence is, “The conclusion that negro segregation in schools has outlived 
whatever justification it ever had and is incompatible with our current conception of equality be-
fore the law, is congenial to my own background and views of fair and wise public policy.” The 
second draft likewise reads, “That Negro segregation in the schools has outlived whatever original 
justification it may have had and is no longer wise or fair public policy is a conclusion congenial 
to my background and social and political views.” Jackson revised these sentences in the third 
draft, evidently to mute his prior admission that ending segregation was consonant with his per-
sonal “social and political views,” and to highlight instead the evolving American social and moral 
landscape. In fairness, this revision is likely a truer description of the forces impelling Jackson’s 
decision-making: from Jackson’s vantage point, it is not so much that segregation’s injustice made 
it unconstitutional, but that the abhorrence with which segregation was viewed by elites and in-
creasing proportions of the public made a finding of segregation’s unconstitutionality all but inex-
orable. Fairman, after all, had given him fair notice. 
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 So here, in the second paragraph of the third draft, is immediate evidence of the most no-
ticeable pattern weaving its way through the Jackson Brown memo drafts: all revisions serve to 
strengthen the case Jackson sought to make for invalidating racial segregation and tasking Con-
gress with enforcement legislation. By relocating these later comments in the first and second 
drafts to the crucial opening framing of the third, Jackson emphasized the centrality of the futility 
of resisting segregation’s abolition to his “judicial” case for invalidating the practice. In a way, 
Jackson appeared to signal that his hand had been forced. He indicated he was convinced not by a 
constitutional theory, but by the facts (1) that segregation was imploding, and would soon be 
widely recognized as immoral and unjust, even absent action by the country’s courts or legislatures 
to hasten the system’s demise; (2) that this secular evolution in views would induce the Supreme 
Court eventually to overturn segregation, regardless of whether it could muster what Jackson re-
garded as a strictly judicial basis for doing so; and (3) that national legislation would at some point 
address segregation and attendant social problems. Though the predictions were, as far as predic-
tions go, extremely accurate–––(1) and (3) came true, and (2), though in hindsight a historical 
counterfactual, would have almost certainly come true had the Court gone the other way than it 
actually did in 1954–––they were not, strictly speaking, germane to the development of Jackson’s 
judicial case for the “congenial political conclusion” toward which he was groping. Rather, from 
the perspective of Jackson’s usual judicial approach, the predictions are distractors, apparently 
intended not to persuade an eventual audience but to ease the justice’s conscience by demoting the 
salience of the underlying task–––reaching the outcome by means of defensible judicial reasoning. 
With these “elevated” lines in his third draft, Jackson was not so much resolving his interpretive 
conundrum as convincing himself that the outcome was a foregone conclusion, regardless of what 
he decided or said. In light of what we have already seen about Jackson’s judicial views toward 
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overturning segregation, these lines from Jackson’s memos seem to implore, Why stand athwart 
history when one can join in shaping it? 
 Shaping it, indeed, were the evolving forces of moral opinion–––and these apparently op-
erated just as much on the author of these drafts as on the broader society whose views Jackson 
felt such pressure to vindicate in his judicial role. After his first page framing in Draft 3, on page 
2 Jackson inserted a new sentence to provide a segue to his subsequent ruminations, appearing in 
all three drafts, on the ubiquity of “separatism” in human groups. That sentence reads: “These 
would be simple cases if they could be decided by a mere expression of our personal opinion that 
school segregation is morally, economically intellectually or even legally indefensible.” But, Jack-
son argued implicitly, that is not what comprised the basis of his own decision that segregation is 
unconstitutional. As we will see, the basis for that conclusion was a “change in the Negro popula-
tion” itself, which rendered segregation “morally, economically intellectually or even legally in-
defensible.” For now, however, Jackson continued in a parallel vein in all three drafts by contend-
ing that the impetus for racial segregation was an “instinct” most human groups experience and 
institutionalize through some form of imposed separation: 
It seems instinctive with every race, faith, state or culture to resort to some isolating device 
to protect and perpetuate those qualities, real or fancied, which it particularly values in 
itself. Separatism, either by voluntary withdrawal or by imposed segregation, has been 
practiced in some degree by many religions, nationalities, and races and by many – one 
almost can say all – governments to alleviate tensions, prevent subversions, and to quell or 
forestall violence. 
Jackson’s unapologetic expression of this sentiment corroborates the impression, suggested above, 
that Jackson was not a liberal on the question of race. He apparently was not abreast of, and had 
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not imbibed, theoretical and empirical developments emanating from academia (e.g., most fa-
mously, Myrdal’s An American Dilemma378) ; he was skeptical both of the relevance to the judicial 
process and accuracy of the sociological data proffered by the NAACP; he did not view American 
race relations through the Manichean prism born of that very period in the middle of the last cen-
tury that located the misfortunes of African Americans squarely in white racism and mistreatment; 
he believed there were “extremists on both sides”; and, abjuring the unequivocal civil rights moral 
righteousness he construed to be zealotry, Jackson preferred to chart a course of compromise, to 
see cases touching upon race “decided wisely rather than [] see either side win.” The opinion, 
expressed in all three drafts of his Brown memos, that racial segregation was a manifestation of a 
normal or at least ubiquitous human political instinct does not prove that Jackson harbored any 
“sympathy with racial conceits which underlie segregation policies” (a proposition he expressly 
disclaimed in his March 13, 1950 letter to Fairman), but it does suggest he did not view that instinct 
as simply evil or malicious. On the contrary, Jackson claimed to believe that separatism is moti-
vated by a positive or affirmative human instinct to “protect and perpetuate,” over and against the 
diluting or deleterious influences of other groups, “those qualities, real or fancied, which it partic-
ularly values in itself.” 
 Though he does not say so explicitly in his Brown memos, it is probable that Jackson 
thought that instinctual tendency to “protect and perpetuate” a people’s identity through separation 
is not necessarily malicious but that its actualization in practices such as racial discrimination 
might be. This proposition would square Jackson’s vote in Korematsu and his later allusion to that 
case in the third draft of his Brown memo (stating that the Court had failed to do “simple justice 
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to the [Japanese American victims]” of wartime internment) with his repeated statements that ra-
cial discrimination was offensive and his own practices of not moralizing his view of that discrim-
ination and thereby managing to retain some emotional distance on it. This attitude of emotional 
distance or dispassion, and the view that segregation, though baneful, might be motivated by a 
human instinct if not honorable then at least respectable distinguish him from those justices–––
Warren, Black, Douglas, and to a lesser extent, Burton and Minton–––who expressed the convic-
tion that segregation was rooted in and defensible only according to the supposition of white su-
premacy or black inferiority, i.e., animus. 
 Jackson followed his ruminations on separatism with two other comments worthy of spe-
cial note. The first points to limits on the judiciary’s capacity to effect social change: “This Court 
can not eradicate these fears, prides and prejudices on which segregation rests.” Any judicial vic-
tory would be fleeting: alone, the judiciary can treat only the symptoms, not the causes, of enforced 
segregation. The second comment clarifies that those causes are not merely regional in prevalence, 
but national: “[e]ven in the North these [attitudinal factors on which segregation rests] are latent 
and while they may not manifest themselves in legal discriminations, they do by outbreaks of racial 
rioting.” This explicit mention of race riots appears only in the second draft. In the first, Jackson 
said “they have been made manifest by outbreaks of violence rather more extensive than have 
occurred in the South,” and in the third, he omitted the reference entirely. Despite the fact that 
Jackson culled this line from his third and final versions, its presence in the first two evince that 
he viewed racism as a social problem of national scope. In fine, Jackson expressed skepticism 
about the Court’s capacity to reform the popular racial attitudes on which segregation rested, since 
such action was, in Jackson’s view, a necessary condition of truly uprooting the practice. 
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 Jackson next situated the meaning of segregation in the context of the “great white Amer-
ican conflict.” 
But in the South the negro not only suffers from racial suspicions and antagonisms present 
in other states and in other countries of the world, but also, I am convinced, has suffered 
great prejudice from the aftermath of the great American white conflict. The negro and his 
champions may justly resent the forces by which he has been held in subjection. But the 
white South retains in historical memory a deep resentment of the forces which, by con-
quest, imposed a fierce program of reconstruction and the deep humiliation of carpetbag 
government. The negro is the visible and reachable beneficiary and symbol of this unhappy 
experience. Thus, in the southern states he has not only to bear his own disadvantages but 
the burden engendered by white wars and the hostilities of white politics.379 
Jackson appeared yet again to demonstrate less righteous indignation, and more dispassion and, 
therefore, accuracy, than his fellow Brethren in contemplating the South’s motives for instituting 
segregation. Not satisfied merely with imputing the South’s behavior to irrational animus, Jackson 
instead stated that the South viewed its black population as a symbol its defeat and humiliation in 
a war with its Northern counterpart, which, as the more poorly reconstructed elements of the South 
might claim, forced it to remain in an unhappy marriage. If this view is not counter-productive, 
Jackson suggested, then it is at least understandable–––and must be understood if the Court is to 
have any chance of success in revamping Southern mores. Perhaps most importantly, and as a 
subtle warning to those Northerners champing at the bit for social reform in another region of the 
country, Jackson observed that the South was acutely sensitive to its recent history of being con-
quered in a “white war[]” as a consequence of “the hostilities of white politics.” The justice implied 
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that intervention by a national institution (which as a national and not a state institution would be 
invariably received in the South as a symbol of the North) in an area of life the South had long 
regarded (and was long led to regard by the Court) as a matter of state discretion and about which 
the South exhibited an unusual degree of defensiveness owing to “the emotional and traditional 
background which complicate” it, may begin yet another chapter in that history of “white wars.” 
It was a warning–––a psychological diagnosis, really–––that none of the Court’s Southerners ex-
pressed among their predictions of resistance to judicial desegregation, and it is true that Jackson 
only hinted at the warning in his memo, which he never distributed generally to the conference. 
With the benefit of hindsight, however, Jackson’s pronouncements captured a critical element of 
Southern psychology that the Court, in implementing desegregation, might have benefited enor-
mously from identifying and understanding. However, it must be acknowledged that the remarks’ 
true thrust–––like that of most of Jackson’s others in the draft memos–––counseled judicial non-
intervention. It is in struggling to overcome the preponderance of observations pointing to that 
outcome that we see the unusual and motivated character of Jackson’s effort to talk himself into 
going along with the emergent Brown majority. 
 Here, the third draft diverges appreciably from the first and second. The third transplants 
the discussion that occurs in the first two to a much later section of the memo and replaces it with 
a remark that originally appears later in the first and second drafts. Because the remark that the 
third draft moves up appears in a context in previous drafts that seems to be more revealing of the 
sentiments that produced it, I will consider that remark in the location at which it appears in the 
first two iterations. However, to mark this comment for future discussion, here is how it appears 
in Draft 3: 
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If we should regard the feelings and reactions of those who are coerced into segregation, I 
suppose we should also weigh the psychological effect on those who are coerced out of it. 
While the pro-segregation emotion may seem to us less rational than anti-segregation emo-
tion, we can hardly deny the sincerity and passion of those who think that their blood, birth 
and lineage are something worthy of protection by separatism.  
 
 All three drafts, finally, conclude section one of the memo with a warning that the judicial 
case for invalidating segregation suffers from certain “difficulties” that the Court should frankly 
address. Draft 1 rather succinctly reads: “But since it bears importantly upon the form and expe-
dition of the relief, this Court must face the difficulties in the way of honestly saying that the states 
which have segregated schools have not, until today, been justified in regarding their practice as 
lawful.” Draft 2 expounds upon this thought further. 
But we can not oversimplify this decision to be a mere expression of our personal opinion 
that school segregation is unwise or evil. We have not been chosen as legislators but as 
judges. Questions of method and standards of constitutional interpretation and of limitation 
on responsible use of judicial power in our federal system are as far reaching as any that 
have been before the Court since its establishment. This Court must face the difficulties in 
the way of honestly saying that the states which have segregated schools have not, until 
today, been justified in regarding their practice as lawful.380 And the thoughtful layman, 
as well as the trained lawyer, must wonder how it is that a supposedly stable organic law 
of our nation this morning forbids what for three quarters of a century it has allowed. I 
                                                
380 Italics added to indicate original statement of Draft 1. 
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think we individual justices may not, in justice to this Court as an institution and to our 
profession, brush off these problems. 
Like Frankfurter, Jackson understood his judicial role to impose a formal, which is not to say strict, 
separation between his private moral views and his interpretation of constitutional law. He also 
recognized that the biggest judicial obstacle to the conclusion the Court was trying to reach in 
Brown was precedent. But these comments illustrate that Jackson’s concern for precedent went far 
beyond a formulaic or habitual adherence to stare decisis. The problem for Jackson was not so 
much that the Court could not change its mind; it is that the Court required especially compelling 
reasons for doing so when its decisions had blessed, and their long duration had invited and per-
mitted the growth of, ways of life in the United States that would be wholly uprooted by a change 
in judicial approach. For Jackson, a determination that Plessy had grossly misconstrued the origi-
nal purpose and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment would probably have provided the neces-
sary warrant. But as Jackson acknowledged a few paragraphs hence, the Amendment’s history was 
not “inconclusive,” as Bickel and Frankfurter alleged; it simply did not support the outcome the 
Court sought. Without history at its back, all that seemed to be left to justify overturning segrega-
tion were the evolving moral standards of society or of the judges tasked with expounding the 
Constitution. Jackson concluded section 1 of his memos by implying that an evolution in moral 
opinion, no matter how profound or broad-based, was not, in 1954, an adequate reason to undo 
what the Court announced in 1896 and had sanctioned ever since. 
 Section 2 of the Jackson Brown memos is entitled “Basis in Existing Law for Decision” in 
the first two drafts, and (rather ominously) “Existing Law does Not Condemn Segregation” in the 
third. Draft 3 relocates and lightly modifies the lines quoted above from the end of Draft 2 to the 
 
261 
first paragraph of section 2. Draft 3 then proceeds by asking whether the “States which have main-
tained segregated schools have not, until today, been justified in regarding their practice as consti-
tutional?” Jackson’s reply: 
Of course it is true that all the time there has been visible the warning sign of the due 
process and particularly the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. These 
majestic and sweeping generalities standing alone can be read to require a full and equal 
racial partnership in all matters within the reach of the law. They can be read to virtually 
replace our federation with a unitary form of government. But neither of these clauses spe-
cifically mentions education or segregation. Any authority that they give to the judiciary 
to outlaw segregation has existed as to the State cases since 1868 and in the case of the 
District of Columbia since 1791. Yet, if these texts had such meaning to the age that wrote 
them, how could it be that the Fifth Amendment for half a century tolerated slavery in the 
District of Columbia. And how can it be that when those words were copied into the Four-
teenth Amendment and an equal protection clause added, that was not deemed to assure 
the Negro the right to vote for the Amendment goes on to provide a reduction of Congres-
sional representation for states which do not allow him to exercise the franchise. Nearly 
two years later (1870) it was found necessary to add the Fifteenth Amendment to assure 
him the vote, but even then, with the shortcomings of the Fourteenth Amendment obvious, 
nothing was provided either as to segregation or as to education. 
Jackson dismantled the proposition that the original purpose or understanding of the Fifth or Four-
teenth Amendments was to outlaw segregation. But that question is not alone dispositive of the 
Amendments’ meaning. In Draft 3, Jackson next remarked: “I suppose that the original will and 
purpose expressed in a constitutional document is at least relevant to its subsequent interpretation. 
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So much is implied by the [reargument] questions that we have asked of counsel.” But the versions 
that appeared in the earlier drafts are more revealing. In Draft 1, for example, in addition to the 
sentiments expressed in Draft 3 quoted above, Jackson proclaimed: “[t]oday it is well agreed, as 
Judge Cardozo reminded us, that these Constitutional generalities ‘have a content and a signifi-
cance that vary from age to age’. This brings us, however, squarely to the question whether we 
shall interpret these generalities as they were understood by the age that framed and adopted them 
or by the age that now reads them.” The rest of Jackson’s memo studiously avoids answering that 
question explicitly. But Jackson nonetheless sallied on to survey the Amendment’s history, going 
through the motions of what would be his usual judicial approach: 
In searching for the original will and purpose expressed in the Fourteenth Amendment, all 
that I can fairly get from the legislative debates is that it was a passionate, confused and 
deplorable era. Like most legislative history it has the misleading characteristic that its 
sponsors played down the consequence of their proposal in order to ease opposition to its 
passage, while its opponents exaggerated the consequences to frighten away support. 
Among the sponsors of the movement were a few who doubtless hoped that it would bring 
about complete social equality and early assimilation of the liberated Negro to an amalga-
mated race. But on every test of strength those of more moderate views prevailed. For 
example, no support for the abolition of segregation can be cited from the great Emancipa-
tor himself. The majority stopped with conferring upon the freed man certain very limited 
civil rights. Most of the leaders and spokesmen for the movement that carried the Civil 
War Amendments appear never to have reached a point in their thinking where they con-
sidered either the segregation or the education of the Negro to present pressing problems, 
let alone reaching any conclusion as to their solution. 
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Although Jackson’s dictum about Lincoln’s views is inapposite to the legislative debates over the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Bickel’s memorandum381 and subse-
quent research382 support the justice’s assertions that the Fourteenth Amendment was the handi-
work of the moderates of the 39th Congress, that “the majority” of that body “stopped with confer-
ring upon the freed man certain very limited civil rights,” and that “the segregation or the education 
of the Negro” were not understood to be objects of the Amendment or the Civil Rights Act. But, 
Jackson concluded, these considerations do not exhaust an inquiry into the legislative history of 
the Amendment. Turning to the practices of the 39th Congress and the ratifying states, Jackson 
wrote: 
If deeds rather than words evidence purpose, there is little to show that these Amendments 
were understood or intended in their own time to condemn the practice here in question. 
The very Congress that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment and all Congresses from that 
day to this have established or supported and maintained segregated schools in the District 
of Columbia. This system was notorious and must have been known to every Congressman 
who voted for District of Columbia appropriations down to this very day…. Turning from 
Congress to look to the behavior of the States, we find that equally difficult to reconcile 
with any understanding that the Amendment would prohibit segregation in schools. Nine 
states did not have segregated schools when the Amendment was submitted to them. Five 
did, but abandoned at about that time. Four, which had segregated schools, did not ratify 
the Amendment. Nine Northern States and two border States either established or contin-
ued segregated schools after ratifying the Amendment. The eight reconstructed states all 
                                                
381 See fn 158, supra / Bickel (1955) at 58-59. 
382 See, e.g., Berger ([1976] 1997). 
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established segregated schools. Down to the present day, seventeen states of the Union are 
maintaining legal separation of the races in the public schools. 
The latter evidence was evidently acquired from the extensive South Carolina and Virginia briefs 
in Briggs and Davis, but it is also probable that the Texas brief from Sweatt v. Painter, of which 
Jackson had written Fairman four years earlier, had left a lasting mark on Jackson. As he had 
remarked in his April 5, 1950 letter, the Texas brief “makes the most complete review of historical 
materials” and “seem[s] to have established” that the “proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment” 
had not intended “to interfere with the state school systems on the question of segregation,” and 
“that even those who wanted to see that accomplished acknowledged that it was not accomplished 
by the Amendment or the civil rights legislation.” It is unlikely that this “impression” had faded 
from Jackson’s mind, only to be re-activated or -instilled by the briefs in the Brown litigation a 
few years later. In any case, by this point in the memo, it seems that Jackson has decisively rebutted 
the proposition that the historical purpose of the Civil War Amendments was to forge “a single 
American society,” as Frankfurter argued, and five of the 1953 term justices believed, if that single 
American society was to require the elimination of racial discrimination in state legislation. But 
Jackson has not yet exhausted his attack on the soothing myths being bandied about the Court 
chambers. He next observed that the case for invalidating segregation under a historical reinter-
pretation of the Amendment was made weaker by the fact that segregation in the decades after the 
Civil War was a national, not merely a Southern phenomenon. 
It is easy as to the Southern States to smugly assume that segregation has been a projection 
of pro-slavery and secession sentiment, but that does not account for it in the larger number 
of Northern States where the same political party that sponsored the Amendments has a 
large part of the time in most of them also been predominant in the state administrations. 
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Plainly, there was no consensus among legislators or educators of the several states ratify-
ing the Amendments that it was to forbid segregation. 
The way Jackson phrased this thought in Draft 1 is as follows. 
 
At this time seventeen states of the Union are maintaining separation of the races 
in the public schools. Many of these were Northern states governed by the same 
currents of political opinion and by the same political party that had fought the war, 
freed the slaves and put through the Amendments. It is hard to charge their contin-
uance of the practice of segregation to mere perversity, prejudice or disregard for 
law. 
In other words, the fact that Northern states practiced segregation at the same time, and well after, 
they succeeded in foisting the Fourteenth Amendment on the vanquished rebel states, tends to 
refute the dual propositions that the South had somehow distorted the Amendment’s history and 
interpretation to spuriously legitimate segregation and that the Northern proponents of the Amend-
ment understood segregation to contravene its spirit or letter. 
 The final nail in the coffin of the historical argument against segregation, Jackson believed, 
was the role of Northern judges, many of whom fought in the Civil War, were presumably abreast 
of political developments in their day, and shared in the public understanding of the Amendment 
in sustaining segregation practices. Draft 1 reads: 
A long line of judicial precedents not only constitutes a usually respected source of law, 
but judicial decision made close to the time of the Amendment by judges who participated 
in the movement to enact it are not only entitled to respect as to opinions but as reflection 
of first hand knowledge of history. But neither in the state courts of the Northern States nor 
in this Court where Northern men predominated has there been any clear pronouncement 
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or line of decision that these clauses admittedly requiring equal opportunity for education 
prohibit a policy that each race should enjoy its rights apart rather than in co-partnership. 
The layman must wonder how it comes that the best informed judges who had risked their 
lives for these Amendments did not understand their meaning, while we at this remote time 
do understand them. 
Perhaps sensing this formulation was unhelpful to his purpose in composing the memo of seeing 
if a judicial opinion invalidating segregation “would write,” Jackson by Draft 3 revised the text to 
read: 
In the state courts of the North and in this Court where Northern men have predominated 
no understanding has prevailed that these clauses of their own force prohibit the States 
from deciding that each race must obtain its education apart rather than in co-partnership. 
Almost a century of decisional law rendered by judges, many of whom risked their lives 
for the cause that produced these Amendments, is almost unanimous in the view that the 
Amendment tolerated segregation by State action – at least in the absence of Congressional 
action to the contrary. 
At this point in the discussion, Draft 3 diverges sharply from Drafts 1 and 2. The latter round out 
section 2 with a meditation on the role of custom in lawmaking; the former presents the outline of 
a rational basis scrutiny argument that will comprise the foundation for the rest of the third draft, 
followed by an abridged soliloquy on the role of custom. Section 2 of Draft 1 concludes: 
Custom too, is a powerful lawmaker. Indeed not long ago we decided that custom has nul-
lified the Constitutional plan for independent Presidential electors. I doubt, as I then indi-
cated, that any custom could be allowed to override express provisions of the Constitution. 
But here we have the custom of segregation, which is not expressly forbidden and which 
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has prevailed in both Southern and many Northern states. It must be recognized that in the 
many judicial decisions which have sanctioned the custom of segregation the judges were 
following the ancient and well established process of regarding the long established usage 
of a people as the strongest kind of evidence of its law. But what we decide today is that a 
custom deeply anchored in our social system is contrary to law. 
Draft 2, in lieu of the last two sentences quoted above, concludes by incorporating the following 
revision: 
This Court, in common with courts everywhere, has recognized the force of long custom 
and has been reluctant to use judicial power to try to recast social usages. But we decide 
today that the unwritten law has long been contrary to a custom deeply anchored in our 
social system. Thus despite my personal satisfaction with the Court’s judgment, I simply 
can not find, in surveying all of the usual sources of law, anything which warrants me in 
saying that it is required by the original purpose and intent of the Fourteenth or Fifth 
Amendment. 
To summarize, in Section 2 of his drafts, Jackson concluded that: 
- the historical understanding of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as fully 
compatible with slavery; 
- the unequivocal refusal of the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment to provide blacks with 
political rights;  
- that Amendment’s apparent embodiment of the aims of the Moderates of the 39th Congress; 
- the evident minoritarian character and general unrepresentativeness, among sponsors of the 
Amendment, of the views of those who “hoped to bring about complete social equality and 
consequent early assimilation of the liberated Negro into an amalgamated race”; 
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- the rare or non-existent consideration of segregation in education as a factor in Congres-
sional and state ratification debates over the Fourteenth Amendment; 
- the acts of the 39th Congress to establish and perpetuate segregation in the District of Co-
lumbia; 
- the continuation of Congressional appropriations and support for that segregated system of 
education through 1954; 
- the refusal of the Reconstruction Congresses to require, as a condition of readmission to 
the Union, Southern states to make any changes with regard to local policies requiring 
segregation; 
- the “establish[ment] or continu[ance]” by nine Northern, two Border, and eight recon-
structed Southern states of segregated schools while or shortly after adopting the Amend-
ment; 
- the line of Northern state judicial cases following the Amendment’s adoption sustaining 
segregation in education; 
- the Supreme Court’s own precedents going back to Plessy; and finally 
- custom, “the strongest kind of evidence of [a people’s] law,” and which is “deeply an-
chored in our social system”; 
all point to the determination that segregation is constitutional. Section 3 of Jackson’s drafts, which 
contains the justice’s case for finding segregation unconstitutional, compares unfavorably to Sec-
tion 2–––an impression so obvious that even the March 15 final draft, whose case for overturning 
segregation is three times as long as the third section in Drafts 1 and 2, and is stated with far more 
conviction and persuasiveness than its predecessor versions, left E. Barrett Prettyman, Jackson’s 
1953 term clerk (and who had not seen the previous three drafts prior to reading the last) with the 
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impression that Jackson was “embarrassed” to reach the conclusion he evidently sought in writing 
the memo. However, because Draft 3 diverges so radically from Drafts 1 and 2 at this point, I will 
survey Section 3 of drafts 1 and 2 in tandem before examining Section 3 of Draft 3 separately. 
 Section 3 of Draft 1 is entitled “III. Sociological and Political Considerations” and features 
Jackson struggling for five pages to develop a dispositive rationale for overturning segregation. 
That subheading is deleted in Section 3 of Draft 2, which begins with only the number denoting 
the section. Drafts 1 and 2 are equal in length through the end of Section 2, but Section 3 of Draft 
2 is one page longer than that of Draft 1, mostly owing to the addition of a long paragraph enu-
merating possible precedents that might provide a precedential basis for Jackson’s claim, which 
appears solely in Draft 2, that “[i]t is neither novel nor radical doctrine that statutes once constitu-
tional may become invalid by changing conditions and those good in one state of facts may be bad 
in another.” This lengthy paragraph of precedents is, in turn, omitted entirely from Draft 3. 
 Section 3 of Draft 1 begins by acknowledging the enormous pressure the Court, and appar-
ently Jackson himself, felt to reach the moral or just conclusion in Brown. 
Various intangible and extra-legal criteria and sociological, psychological and even politi-
cal considerations are urged to persuade us that whatever was meant or purposed originally 
we should now decree segregation to end as an obsolete, unjust, and impolitic practice. It 
is said to be offensive to the best contemporary opinion here and damaging to our prestige 
abroad. It is said that segregation is based on a philosophy of inherent inequality of races 
and that it creates in the young negro children an inferiority complex which has a retarding 
effect on their education progress. 
But, Jackson asserted, these arguments are all political considerations, which is to say, properly 
the objects of legislative, not judicial contemplation. The adjudication of the only properly judicial 
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claim threaded among these questions of policy, in any case, rendered moot any judicial consider-
ation of the essentially legislative concerns urged upon the Court. 
All of these are arguments of policy with which, in the main as policy, I do not disagree. 
But if the Constitution forbids any classification for any purpose on the basis of color or 
race, these arguments are unnecessary and if it permits any classification on such a basis, 
then the occasion and justification for the classification would seem to present legislative 
problems for the States, not judicial questions. 
Jackson’s reference to the deontological anti-classification contention espoused at conference by 
Black, Douglas, Burton, and Minton, suggests that the argument had earlier caught his eye as pre-
senting the soundest prospective judicial grounds for invalidating segregation. The only problem 
for Jackson was, of course, that this command would have had to emanate from the Due Process 
or Equal Protection clauses, and he had found no evidence that those clauses had ever been in-
tended to constitutionalize the categorical imperative, and, what is much worse, a mountain of 
evidence to the contrary. However, the fastidious judicial approach adopted in the opening para-
graphs of Section 3 of his first draft was evidently too inflexible, for in the analogous section of 
his second draft, Jackson launched a slightly different line of attack. 
Today’s decision can not, with intellectual honesty, be grounded in anything other than the 
doctrine, of which Judge Cardozo reminded us, that these Constitutional generalities “have 
a content and a significance that vary from age to age.” Certainly no one familiar with his 
teachings would think this meant, what some people advocate, that we declare new consti-
tutional law with the freedom of a constitutional convention sitting continuously and with 
no necessity for submitting its innovations for approval of Congress, ratification by the 
states or approval of the people. 
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In other words, so long as the Court’s discretion was bounded, the Court could not be said to be a 
“constitutional convention sitting continuously.” Jackson appeared to have called forth this weak 
justification to assuage his worry, expressed at the Sweatt and McLaurin conference four years 
prior, and strongly evident at the beginning of Section 3 of Draft 1, that transforming the Court 
from constitutional arbiter to constitutional convention is precisely what would be required to 
reach the salutary or just outcome in Brown. The rationale according to which the Court in Brown 
would not be “amending the Constitution,” as Jackson said the Court was doing in Sweatt and 
McLaurin, is that “the Constitution must be a living instrument and can not be read as if written in 
a dead language. It is neither novel nor radical doctrine that statutes once constitutional may be-
come invalid by changing conditions and those good in one state of facts may be bad under an-
other.”  
 In support of this claim, Jackson adduces thirteen Court precedents. The first of these cases, 
Nashville C. & St. Louis Railway v. Walters,383 held that a federal statue requiring railway opera-
tors to pay for one half of the cost of grade separations related to transportation infrastructure 
development, when applied to a situation in which the improvements concerned the construction 
of highways for the passage of motor vehicles, amounted to an unconstitutional violation of the 
railway operator’s due process rights, since the improvements in no way related to the operations 
of the railways and in fact acted as a subsidy for the railway operators’ primary competitors: motor 
vehicle owners and operators. So far so good. Jackson was obviously trying to find precedents for 
the contention that findings of constitutionality can change with altered social and economic con-
ditions, but the analog to Brown is feeble. After all, the statute in question in the railroad case was 
written for a certain set of economic conditions that no longer obtained, by a Congress that had 
                                                
383 294 U.S. 405 (1935). 
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failed to foresee the technological changes that would obviate the circumstances for which the law 
was written, and under a set of new economic conditions the statute operated in a manner that its 
authors probably would not have intended. In contrast, it is hard to see how the guarantees of the 
Fourteenth Amendment would turn on the social conditions of the country, especially given the 
clear record of the proactive efforts of members of the 39th Congress to avoid language vulnerable 
to future “latitudinarian” abuses and of the widely shared understanding that those guarantees 
simply constitutionalized the Civil Rights Act of 1866. It is conceivable that the authors of the 
statute in the railway case would have regretted its unintended perverse effect in altered economic 
and technological circumstances, and agreed with the Court’s decision to alter their handiwork; it 
is inconceivable, however, that anything other than a tiny minority of the 39th Congress would 
have agreed that it was appropriate to use the language of Section 1 to overturn segregation and 
anti-miscegenation laws, both of which were equally pervasive and de rigueur in 1866. Perhaps in 
part due to the flimsy parallel between the cited cases and the course he sought to justify in Brown, 
Jackson ended up deleting this catalog of precedents from his third draft, while retaining the pref-
atory language that introduced the list in the second draft. He replaced the enumeration of cases 
itself with the sentence, “A multitude of cases, going back far into judicial history, attest to this 
doctrine.” 
 In Draft 2, Jackson affixed an addendum to his ruminations in Draft 1 on the imperative of 
avoiding incorporating into law “psychological and subjective factors.” First, Jackson followed 
Draft 2’s list of supporting precedents with a disclaimer stating the NAACP’s sociological argu-
ments were inadmissible to the judicial process: “But a good many considerations are urged upon 
us to decree an end to segregation regardless of what the Amendment originally meant or purposed 
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which I do not think appropriate for judicial appraisal or acceptance.” He then proceeded to survey 
the various arguments against segregation with which he commenced Section 3 of Draft 1. 
Extra-legal criteria from sociological, psychological and political sciences are proposed. 
Segregation is said to be offensive to the best contemporary opinion here and damaging to 
our prestige abroad. It is said to be based on a philosophy of inherent inequality of races, 
and that it creates in young Negro children an inferiority complex which retards their edu-
cation and embitters their attitudes to life. 
The most significant revision in these lines of the corresponding text in Draft 1 is the addition of 
“and embitters their attitudes to life,” to the contention that segregation depresses black educa-
tional achievement. This was probably done, as we will see, to extricate and highlight the emo-
tional valence of the sociological claims Jackson would proceed to critique at greater length as 
inappropriate inputs to the judicial process.  
 Jackson next remarked, “[t]hese are disputed contentions which I have little competence to 
judge as scientific matters but with which, for purposes of the case, I shall not disagree. I have no 
doubt that segregation has psychological consequences, and social consequences, but as I recall 
school life without segregation, the Negro still was greatly disadvantaged and must have felt its 
sting.” Interestingly, Jackson’s own school experiences with blacks who, though they may “have 
felt [the] sting” of segregation, were nonetheless not subject to it, did not appear to afford the 
justice any pause or grounds for skepticism of the sociological claims. Moreover, in the same 
breath that he admitted that he was not qualified to judge those assertions, he readily accepted 
them. The considerations Jackson presented in connection with the NAACP’s sociological con-
tentions do not point to their unqualified adoption. One would expect greater skepticism on Jack-
son’s part, both because his personal experience in non-segregated educational settings appeared 
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to contradict the NAACP’s central claim that segregation itself retarded blacks’ educational ad-
vancement, and since the expected consequence of a concession that one is not qualified to judge 
the veracity of sociological research would be agnosticism toward it, rather than uncritical ac-
ceptance.  
 Jackson’s paradoxical acceptance of (or more precisely, decision not to “disagree” with) 
the NAACP’s sociological arguments would cohere with my thesis that he was motivated to com-
pose a defensible judicial case for overturning segregation and the possibility that the motivated 
nature of the enterprise mediated his interpretation of the sociological evidence. If true, such 
would, of course, contradict Jackson’s explicit disclaimers that the judicial and legislative (or po-
litical / moral) questions posed by Brown were unconnected. Evidence for the claim that Jackson 
was motivated is his remark that the unsegregated blacks with whom he went to school nonetheless 
“must have felt [segregation’s] sting.” The statement implies that though those particular blacks 
were not segregated, the deleterious psychological effects that the NAACP sociology imputed to 
segregation per se must have somehow accounted for those students’ “greatly disadvantaged” ed-
ucational performance. In the absence of supporting anecdotal or other evidence (which Jackson 
surely believed inappropriate for use in a judicial opinion) this dictum smacks of motivated rea-
soning, for the justice seemed to afford the NAACP’s sociological claims maximum deference and 
sympathy by connecting those claims to a childhood experience that would appear to disconfirm 
them, since the students in question were integrated with whites. 
 Jackson, true to form, then returned to the purely judicial question before him. “I do not 
think we can import into the concept of equal protection of the law psychological and subjective 
factors,” he said in Draft 1. “I have no doubt that segregation has psychological consequences, but 
I know too that the woes of the colored child are by no means solved by forcing him into white 
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company.” Although this statement is omitted in this form from Draft 2, it is perhaps the prede-
cessor of the remark, just discussed, that in Jackson’s recollection the integrated “Negro was still 
greatly disadvantaged and must have felt [segregation’s] sting.” Returning to Draft 1, Jackson 
continued: 
And if we should regard the feelings and reactions of those who are coerced into segrega-
tion I suppose we should also weigh the effect of those who are coerced out of it. While 
the prosegregation emotion may seem to us less rational than antisegregation emotion, we 
can hardly deny the existence of sincerity and passion of those who think that their blood, 
birth and lineage are something worthy of protection by separatism. Such factors are not 
mensurable by the judicial process. Many classifications that are useful in governing may 
be disliked and have adverse effects on those classified – minority – are denied privileges 
that come with the mystic age of twenty-one, married persons are classified differently than 
single ones, sometimes to their advantage, sometimes not, veterans, even by compulsion, 
have a separate category in civil service. 
Here again, Jackson treated the “prosegregation emotion” with dispassion, and suggested that 
while it may not be as “rational” as the “antisegregation emotion,” it was at least worthy of judicial 
respect if its opposite was to be afforded the same. Jackson’s choice of the word “emotion” to 
describe the opposed sides in Brown is also telling. It calls to mind the remarks of his March 13, 
1950, letter to Fairman that the battle over segregation was fueled by passion, not reason; that the 
justices were susceptible to “unconscious emotional commitments of one sort or another”; and that 
reason or wisdom appeared to have little to do with the contentions of either side.384 The inextri-
cably emotive character of the moral and sociological arguments surrounding segregation, Jackson 
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concluded, should render those claims judicially non-cognizable. As he went on to elaborate in 
Draft 2: “elusive psychological and subjective factors” that are urged upon the Court as grounds 
for “forcing [colored children] into white company … are not determinable with satisfactory ob-
jectivity or mensurable with reasonable certainty. If we adhere to objective criteria the judicial 
process will still be capricious enough.” 
 Finally, in both drafts Jackson identifies Korematsu as a basis for not factoring psycholog-
ical harm into calculations of the constitutionality of government action. In Draft 2, Jackson de-
clared: 
Such criteria as hardship on those classified have been heretofore rejected by this Court. 
Not long ago it held that the Constitution does not prevent a classification of citizens by 
racial descent for seizure and transportation of the Nisi away from their West Coast homes 
during the war. Korematsu v. United States. U.S.       .     . Of course if the Court had taken 
counsel of the feelings or interests of the victims, or simple justice to them it could not 
have decided as it did. 
With these lines, Jackson seemed to emphasize the hypocrisy of those justices–––Black, Douglas, 
and Frankfurter–––who a decade before were happy “to rationalize[]” a military order that disre-
garded not only any psychological effects it would work on American citizens of Japanese descent, 
but those citizens’ Fifth Amendment rights to due process of law, in order “to show that [the order] 
conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalize[] the Constitution to show that the Constitution 
sanctions such an order.”385 Jackson thereby implied that any reliance by those justices, as a basis 
for disposing of Brown, upon quibbles concerning the psychological harms of state laws of a much 
older and more democratic provenance than the executive and military orders at question in 1944 
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would indeed be hard to square with their votes in Korematsu. As to all the other justices on the 
Court except Reed (whose vote to sustain the West Coast military exclusion order in 1944 was, at 
least in this respect, consistent with his rejection of the NAACP’s sociological arguments as a basis 
for a decision in Brown a decade hence), including himself, Jackson insinuated that there was the 
constraint of stare decisis. “While I did not agree with th[e] basis of classification [approved in 
Korematsu] as compatible with the concept of Due Process,” Jackson wrote in Draft 1, “I do not 
think we should read into the concept of equal protection the shadowy and changing doctrines 
relating to mental and emotional reactions.” Consequently, the Court in Korematsu was wrong 
about due process, but correct to disregard the supposition of deleterious psychological effects as 
a basis for invalidating the government’s actions on constitutional grounds. And, presumably, its 
benign neglect of such allegations establishes a precedent the Court would do well to follow a 
mere decade later in Brown. 
 The thrust of Jackson’s comments on the question of whether the judicial process should 
countenance “feelings and reactions” (Draft 1) and “psychological and subjective factors” (Draft 
2) is not just that such factors are not susceptible of precise measurement, but that much, if not all, 
legislation induces such effects in those persons it touches. Persons younger than 21 might dislike 
their minority status, married or single persons might resent the set of rights afforded exclusively 
to the other class, and so on. But if repealing laws to remedy feelings of resentment was to become 
a basis for judicial action, then the judiciary would come to find itself very busy indeed. Moreover, 
if the desires of blacks were to be an appropriate input to the judicial process, so too then must be 
the feelings of whites whose legislative majorities had excluded blacks from comingling with the 
white populations those legislators represented. Jackson seemed to conclude, in sum, that there 
were no a priori judicial criteria for assigning weights to the preferences of distinct classes of 
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citizens and then balancing those weighted preferences against each other. That, he implied, is 
what the representative process, and not the judicial one, was for. Finally, Jackson’s remarks 
pointed to the conclusion that urging “mental and emotional reactions” as a constitutional basis for 
invalidating legislation was a thinly veiled pretext for advancing naked policy goals, since that 
same rationale was never leveraged against other legislative classifications to which it was just as, 
if not more, applicable. 
 Jackson next examined whether the Court should consider public opinion when interpret-
ing the Constitution, and concluded that “responsible and rational”–––i.e., elite–––“public opin-
ion” was not an appropriate input to the judicial process. Here, Drafts 1 and 2 are substantially 
synonymous, but I will quote from Draft 2 exclusively since the language is slightly more polished. 
First, Jackson acknowledged the influence that the defeat of Nazi Germany and the postwar dis-
covery of its crimes had wrought upon American elite consciousness. 
No informed person can be insensitive to the fact that the past few years have witnessed a 
profound change in the responsible and rational public opinion toward segregation and all 
related problems. The awful consequences of racial prejudice revealed by the post mortem 
upon the Nazi Regime in Europe have caused a revulsion against the kind of racial feeling 
that was manifest in the Korematsu case. 
This observed change in “responsible and rational public opinion” and the “revulsion against the 
kind of racial feeling that was manifest in the Korematsu case” are allusions to the “liberalization 
of American attitudes toward race” of which Hockett386 so often speaks, and comprise the clearest 
direct evidence for it in any of the Brown primary source material. Indeed, it was precisely this 
shift in elite opinion that accounted for Jackson writing these memoranda in the first place, for 
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without that powerful and pervasive shift in attitudes, there likely would not have been five votes 
to invalidate segregation, and consequently no pressure on Jackson to rationalize a “congenial 
political” outcome for which, he was still struggling to develop a judicial basis. Furthermore, 
though Jackson abhorred the “racial conceits” that undergirded the Nazi regime, neither his role in 
Nuremburg nor his experience with “real racial antagonism” in Washington, D.C. had appeared 
drastically to impact his sentiments regarding the justice of segregation. He himself had not, in 
other words, undergone the “profound change” that he had observed in elite opinion, and which 
was now exerting itself upon him by way of the other justices’ confident proclamations in confer-
ence that segregation was immoral and unconstitutional. 
 However, Jackson reluctantly conceded, the will of elites was not enough to change the 
Constitution. 
But what part public opinion should consciously play in judicial decisions is another mat-
ter. If the matter be one of policy then, of course, the will of constituents should govern. 
But judges have no constituents and the representative branch of our government is the 
Congress. We have pondered this problem, as we have pondered no other in my experience 
on the Court, and have read the briefs of learned counsel for all parties and the lengthy 
research which rescues much obscure history from oblivion and have heard the arguments 
of the parties. If we consciously defer in our deliberation to those who have done none of 
these things, it means that the judicial process has counted for naught, and the judgment is 
made by those who have not heard the arguments instead of by those who have. The real 
question as I see it is whether the Constitution permits any classification or separation of 
Negro and White merely on the basis of color or racial ascent. If not these policy arguments 
are superfluous and, if so, they are for consideration of the legislatures not the courts. 
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Jackson’s use of “conscious” in the very first sentence of the above excerpt suggests that he enter-
tained the possibility that public opinion or the general moral atmosphere of a time and place might 
inexorably operate upon the decisions and reasoning of judges, no matter how strenuous their ef-
forts to insulate their decision-making process from the opinions of their fellows. Such a phenom-
enon was precisely what Jackson appeared to allude to when he remarked in his March 13, 1950 
letter to Fairman that the other justices all appeared to be under “conscious or unconscious emo-
tional commitments of one sort or another” regarding the questions posed in Sweatt and McLaurin. 
Moreover, we can safely assume that those questions were moral, not constitutional ones, for the 
public lacks the judicial training to make the latter judgments, but excels in making the former. 
Accordingly, we can conclude that Jackson was aware of and therefore on guard against the subtle 
ways in which public opinion on moral questions–––which, in the context he used it, really means 
elite opinion, i.e., the opinion of the D.C. social milieu in which he and the other justices were 
immersed–––may influence the judicial process without any judge ever intending it to do so, and 
indeed despite a judge’s fastidious precautions against the same. Jackson, finally, was certainly 
aware that Brown was a case in which that danger was more acute than ever: “[w]e have pondered 
this problem, as we have pondered no other in my experience on the Court.” 
 In his remark contrasting public opinion to the Court’s counsel-mediated study of the prob-
lems posed in Brown, Jackson implied that the judicial process is a technical one not properly 
susceptible of moral inputs cribbed from the opinions of persons unfamiliar with the judicial his-
tory, no matter how authoritative or compelling their views. This position is notably at odds with 
Frankfurter’s, who, as we have seen, managed to convince himself that “[t]he effect of changes in 
men’s feelings for what is right and just is equally relevant in determining whether a discrimination 
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denies the equal protection of the laws.” That, however, is a bridge Jackson never persuaded him-
self to cross–––at least not consciously. 
 At this point, Drafts 1 and 2 diverge sharply. I will examine the remaining two pages of 
Draft 1, and then the last three of Draft 2 that supplant those final pages of Draft 1. The most 
important difference between the two drafts, however, I will state upfront. Without ever firmly 
developing a constitutional case for overturning segregation, Jackson argued in the remainder of 
Draft 1 that Congress alone had the constitutional power, and should adopt legislation, to end 
segregation; the last pages of Draft 2, finalized some five weeks after Draft 1, contained the first 
version of an actual constitutional argument to overturn segregation. Thus, Jackson did not or 
could not conceive the judicial case against segregation until some time after he first tried his hand 
at an opinion whose apparent purpose was to see if such a rationale could be developed: Jackson 
conspicuously failed in his first attempt. But that all three drafts were obviously geared toward 
reaching a conclusion that was noticeably absent from the first attempt, and for which Jackson 
lacked a plausible rationale until the second draft of February 15, 1954, indicates that Jackson 
composed the memos in order to rationalize a conclusion for which he did not yet have firm judicial 
reasoning. There is proof more direct than this that Jackson’s constitutional case to overturn seg-
regation was motivated by a desire to reach that particular conclusion, not by constitutional rea-
soning that inexorably pointed to it: the conclusion that segregation was invalid preceded the con-
stitutional rationale he finally articulated in Draft 2 and further refined in Draft 3.  
 These facts fit squarely with the prediction of the social intuitionist model that judgment is 
incident to emotion or intuition, and reasoning to judgment. In Jackson’s case, the intuition as such 
was not the nakedly moral one many of the other justices–––notably Warren, Black, and Frank-
furter–––experienced, but most likely a perhaps equal or greater desire not to be on the wrong side 
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of history. First, Jackson desired not to be left out of the majority on such a seminal decision, 
whose outcome, he no doubt expected, would be ecstatically welcomed by all corners of “respon-
sible and rational” society. As a result of the second Brown conference, he almost certainly knew 
that the Court would reverse the lower courts that had applied Plessy, with or without his assent. 
Warren’s replacement of Vinson made five votes to reverse, and, given Frankfurter’s palpable 
moral energy regarding the matter and despite his overly effusive protests to the contrary, there 
was almost certainly a sixth in Frankfurter, who no doubt discussed the case at length with Jackson, 
his closest colleague on the Court. Furthermore, Clark’s comments at the second Brown as to the 
way in which a majority opinion should be written telegraphed that probably he too would even-
tually go along with the others. With Reed the only certain holdout, the best for which Jackson 
could reasonably hope was that Clark would join him and Reed in dissent; more likely, Jackson 
could count only on Reed remaining steadfast in dissent. That made a vote of 7 to 2 if Jackson 
demurred or 8 to 1 if he found a way to surmount his judicial qualms. Jackson probably did not 
relish the prospect of being a minority vote to sustain a practice that, whether or not he was emo-
tionally invested in it, was viewed with increasing opprobrium by judicial colleague and rational 
enlightened layman alike. 
 Second, there was the matter of inevitability. Recall that Fairman had told Jackson in reply 
to the latter’s interrogatories over what the Court’s role should be in ending segregation that  
The Negro hopes to establish the proposition that no segregated treatment can be fully 
“equal”. In thinking about these current cases I have come to believe that this proposition 
will sooner or later become the law of the Constitution, because I believe it is true and will 
become recognized as true. I am a good deal impressed by what I read on this point in the 
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briefs … not for any “authority” there found but because as I read it, I think, This must be 
true. 
Jackson himself appeared to share Fairman’s view that a Supreme Court decision abolishing seg-
regation was inevitable; as the justice acknowledged in Draft 2, “[w]hatever we may say the law 
is today, I have no doubt that within a generation segregation will be outlawed. As the twin forces 
of mortality and replacement operate on this bench that seems inevitable unless some dramatic and 
unforeseeable excess by the Negro and his friends shall cause reversal of present trends.” This 
revealing aside was omitted from Draft 3, probably because Jackson in Drafts 1 and 2 was still 
primarily thinking through the material as he wrote, but by Draft 3 he had begun editing out evi-
dence of the memo’s origins as essentially long form brainstorms, and refining the text to make 
the constitutional argument he brought into high relief in the third draft appear as inexorable as it 
was in fact rationalized. In any case, Jackson must have concluded that it made little sense to 
dissent when doing so would exert no practical influence on the outcome of the decision, and 
would relegate him to the ignominious position of defending a practice that others, like Fairman, 
whom he admired and respected were apparently hoping he would help dismantle. 
 Such must have been the considerations weighing on Jackson as he composed the last pages 
of Draft 1, which, after concluding that “constru[ing]” the Amendment “in the light of [contempo-
rary] public opinion” would be inappropriate, presented a solution to the problem of segregation 
that the Constitution explicitly countenanced.  
The Fourteenth Amendment does not contemplate a static and perpetual condition, but 
makes provision for recognizing and giving effect to changing conditions and currents of 
opinion in application of its principles to an expanding and developing society. Whatever 
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doubt and confusion may exist as to the meaning of other phrases of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, one thing is perfectly clear. It provides that “The Congress shall have power to en-
force, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this Article.” Thus, the Amendment does 
not attempt to speak the last word on the subjects with which it deals in such generalities, 
but anticipates that from time to time there will be necessity for supplemental and interpre-
tative action. If Congress were to find segregation an obstacle to achieving the purposes of 
the Amendment and that legislation to abolish it was therefore necessary and proper, I do 
not suppose any Justice would doubt the Constitutionality of such an act. Certainly if the 
Amendment condemns segregation without any implementation, it could not be less effec-
tive if it were implemented by a statute. So we have to assume that a complete and un-
doubted power to deal with this subject exists in a branch of the government co-ordinate 
with our own and one which is chosen by political methods and responsive to political    . 
Reflecting the political origins of his appointment to the Court in the war between the representa-
tive branches of government and the Court over the constitutional deference the latter should afford 
federal legislation, Jackson demonstrated his distinctive interpretive disposition, the fullest expres-
sion of which manifested itself in his opinion for the Court in Wickard v. Filburn.387 In a word, 
Jackson evidently believed that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment was a virtual blank check 
to Congress to legislate on social equality. This would be so, evidently, despite the evidence indi-
cating the Amendment’s framers intended the first four sections to act as constraints upon Con-
gress’ discretion. Jackson made a prudential allusion to the limits of judicial capacity to implement 
any decision purporting to do (as Jackson would have it) that which Congress alone possessed the 
undisputed constitutional license and political means to achieve. It is hard to say which concern, 
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if only one, is cause, and which, if any, pretext, but here is firm evidence that Jackson, alone among 
the justices, doubted the judiciary’s ability unilaterally and efficaciously to “forbid[] a custom 
deeply anchored in our social system.” 
 Jackson concluded Draft 1 with ruminations on the claim that Congress was deadlocked 
with respect to outlawing segregation and on the exhortation to the Court to act in the vacuum that 
Congress’ inaction had created. The Court could not assume, Jackson affirmed, that Congress did 
not take seriously its responsibility to implement the Fourteenth Amendment. And, if the Court 
were to conclude the opposite, then it must accept that Congress had determined that segregation 
was not inconsistent with “equal protection of the laws”: though it “has not expressly approved 
segregation, it has at least repeatedly tacitly supported it in the Nation’s Capital and has made no 
effort to outlaw it either in the federal territory or in the States.” Congress’ manifest interpretation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment–––through both action and inaction–––seemed dispositive to Jack-
son of the constitutional merits, at least in Draft 1: the ensuing sentences–––the last lines of the 
draft–––declared the Court’s hands are and must be tied. 
It is said, however, that the South has enough representation to prevent such a step. But 
that is to say that the Court should intervene to promulgate as a law that which our Consti-
tutional representative system will not enact. It means nothing less than that either Con-
gressional representation does not represent sentiment or public sentiment does not resent 
segregation. It means nothing less than that we must act because our representative system 
has failed. 
Jackson had not, at this very late hour in his judicial career, come to accept the theories of judicial 
intervention articulated in Carolene Products,388 or, as would be expressed some years hence, 
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Baker v. Carr389: the failure of the nation’s representative institutions, and any constitutional de-
sign flaws to which that breakdown pointed, were not, in Jackson’s view as of January, 1954, 
adequate reasons for judicial action in excess of judicial capacity. 
 To reiterate: that Jackson went back to the drawing board in the last three pages of Draft 2 
supports the hypothesis that he was motivated by a desire to find a judicial basis for segregation, 
one whose failure to emerge in Draft 1 is indicative of both the post hoc cast of that case and the 
struggle Jackson experienced in developing it. Indeed, not only had any kind of judicial case for 
overturning segregation failed to emerge, but the preponderance of considerations broached in the 
first Draft pointed decisively to judicial acquiescence in the constitutional status quo if not an 
outright affirmance of Plessy. Even with the novel rationale at the end of Draft 2 and its expansion 
and refinement in Draft 3, the preponderance of evidence pointing to affirmance rather than rever-
sal is a problem that conspicuously persists through all three drafts. 
 Draft 2 replaces Draft 1’s account of Congress’ role in ending segregation with a sketch of 
an argument that though segregation may not have been in the crosshairs of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment at the time of the latter’s adoption, subsequent changes in the black population, not ones in 
constitutional interpretation, had rendered segregation unconstitutional four score and six years 
later. “I think the change which warrants our decision,” Jackson concluded, “is not a change in the 
Constitution but in the Negro population.” 
Certainly in the 1860’s and throughout the nineteenth century the Negro population, as a 
whole, was a different people than today. Lately freed from bondage, they had no oppor-
tunity as yet to show their capacity for education or assimilation, or even a chance to 
demonstrate that they could be self-supporting or in our public life anything more than a 
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pawn for white exploiters. I can not say that it was an unreasonable assumption that negro 
educational problems were elementary, special and peculiar and their mass teaching an 
experiment not easily tied in with the education of pupils of more favored background. 
Nor, when we view the progress that has been made under it, can we honestly say that the 
practice of each race pursuing its education apart was wholly to the Negro’s disadvantage. 
His progress under these conditions has been spectacular. Whatever may have been true at 
an earlier period, the mere fact that one is in some degree colored no longer created a 
presumption that he is inferior, illiterate, retarded or indigent. 
In other words, segregation might have had a rational purpose when blacks were only recently 
freed from slavery and had not yet had an opportunity to demonstrate their equality white whites, 
but segregation lacked a rational relationship to public education in 1954, when blacks as a group 
had grown into a parity with whites–––a salutary development that the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment had not and perhaps could not have envisioned. 
 It is clear why this train of reasoning would have been attractive to Jackson. First, it did 
not require re-interpreting or (to use Jackson’s locution from the Sweatt and McLaurin conference) 
“amending” the Constitution. The Court could claim fidelity to the understanding and purposes of 
the Fourteenth Amendment at the same time as it reached an outcome that would almost certainly 
have offended the text’s framers if suggested as an implication of the provision in 1866, and could 
do so by claiming that the framers would have indeed targeted segregation had the American black 
population of 1866 reached the level of human attainment and development it would by 1954. If 
such counterfactuals were unconvincing, the Court could in any case argue that fidelity to (a none-
theless finessed version of) the framers’ understanding of the principle they espoused–––which, in 
its finessed form might be stated as “equal treatment for like individuals”––required taking notice 
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of the vastly different social conditions of almost nine decades’ remove when applying that prin-
ciple. It would follow that when so applied, the principle stood at odds with the social facts of 
1954, or rather, the social facts with it. 
 Second, Jackson’s rational basis argument might remove the discernible, specific inten-
tions of the Amendment’s framers from the judicial ledger, in the same way that Bickel intended 
his gloss on the Amendment’s history to authorize the justices to forget about it as “inconclusive” 
or count it among their reasons for overturning segregation. Bickel’s interpretation of the history, 
even in the immature form it assumed in the Prefatory Letter that actually reached all the justices, 
might well have exerted its influence here. Third, the interpretative avenue Jackson adopted at this 
late stage of Draft 2 would enable the Court to split the baby of precedent: at the same time as it 
might overrule Plessy, the Court could nonetheless hew to its longstanding rational basis test for 
equal protection, and therefore plausibly contend that what had changed was not the rule of law 
but the social circumstances to which that same law had always been and was now being faithfully 
and consistently applied. In sum, the rational basis argument that not the law but the social facts 
to which it appertained had changed would surmount many of the constraints Jackson evidently 
felt in developing a judicial basis for overturning segregation. 
 Of course, the obvious objections to Jackson’s putative argument are who gets to decide, 
under what circumstances, and on the basis of what criteria. As the justice himself stated in Draft 
1, the proper constitutional superintendent of social legislation for the nation, in terms of both 
legitimacy and capacity, is Congress; that the nation’s “Constitutional representative system” has 
failed is not a sufficient pretext for judicial action to address problems only Congress might actu-
ally succeed in fixing. Though Jackson omitted that contention in Draft 2, it is unlikely that he did 
so because he no longer subscribed to it; rather, he probably did so because it was unhelpful to the 
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judicial case he was developing. But deleting the contention from his memo would not have de-
leted it from his mind, and the argument evidently continued to weigh on him as he wrestled with 
developing a rationale for the Court “to promulgate as a law that which our Constitutional legisla-
tive system will not[.]” Finally, the criteria according to which the Court could declare that blacks 
had reached parity with whites probably also bothered Jackson. The selection and application of 
these criteria would seem to involve precisely the kind of sociological reasoning and evidence he 
disclaimed in all three drafts of his memos for involving “elusive psychological and subjective 
factors” that were not “determinable with satisfactory objectivity or mensurable with reasonable 
certainty.” As he concluded his discussion of sociological inputs to judicial decision-making in 
Draft 2: “[i]f we adhere to objective criteria the judicial process will still be capricious enough.” 
Jackson must have therefore thought, even as he constructed his rational basis case for ending 
segregation in the second and third drafts, that the central determination on which that case rested 
was inextricably and perhaps fatally subjective. 
 There is certainly evidence that Jackson felt uneasy about his rational basis claim in Draft 
2: after expounding it, he laid out two arguments that are basically inapposite to the rational basis 
case but were nonetheless adduced in support of his finding that segregation was or should be held 
unconstitutional. The first of these supporting contentions was that “mixture of blood” exacerbated 
the injustice of segregation. “[A]ssimilation is under way to a marked extent,” Jackson wrote. 
“Blush or shudder, as many will, mixture of blood has been making inroads on segregation faster 
than the courtroom. A line of separation between the races has become unclear and blurred and an 
increasing part of what is called colored population has as much claim to white as to colored blood. 
This development baffles any just segregation effort.” Jackson’s point here is that segregation’s 
rationality and the racial admixture of the segregated populations were inversely proportional: the 
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more racial boundaries were blurred, the less justifiable social legislation predicated on those 
boundaries would become. However, at bottom, this claim reflects a value judgment of the kind 
Jackson usually sought to exclude from the judicial process, an evaluation whose opposite conclu-
sion could just have surely, and perhaps more consistently with Jackson’s prior discussion of the 
respectability of the sentiments undergirding racial segregation, been proffered. Recall that earlier 
in his memos Jackson remarked, “[w]hile the prosegregation emotion may seem to us less rational 
than antisegregation emotion, we can hardly deny the existence of sincerity and passion of those 
who think that their blood, birth and lineage are something worthy of protection by separatism.” 
This view, applied to Jackson’s observation of increasingly blurred racial boundaries, could have 
produced precisely the opposite conclusion Jackson presented above; that is, that increasing racial 
admixture rendered segregation, from the perspective of those who with “sincerity and passion … 
think that their blood, birth and lineage are something worthy of protection by separatism,” in-
creasingly needful. This realization suggests, once more, that Jackson was struggling with what 
Tushnet generally described as the justice’s “deep[] ambivalen[ce] about the question of race.”390 
Another way to put this is that Jackson was motivated in Drafts 2 and 3 by a desire to develop a 
judicial case against segregation and to overcome his neutral personal sentiments toward segrega-
tion. That motivation accounts for the apparent slant evident in the Jackson’s analysis at this stage 
in the memo. 
 The second of the supporting contentions Jackson adduced to invalidate segregation fore-
shadows Warren’s distinguishing in the final Brown opinion of the “status of public education” in 
the 19th Century and the status of public education in the mid-20th Century. 
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Also relevant changes have occurred in the status of the public school. Education, even for 
the whites, was once regarded as a privilege bestowed on those fortunate enough to be able 
to take advantage of it and often was not compulsory. The concept today has changed. 
Education is not a privilege but a right and more than that a duty, to be performed not 
merely for one’s own advantage but for the security and stability of the nation. Access to 
educational facilities has been gradually transformed from a matter of grace into a right 
which may not be encumbered with unconstitutionally discriminatory or oppressive con-
ditions. And while education was long regarded as at most a local or state concern, far from 
the reach of federal authority, the federal judicial power especially, and the appropriative 
power of Congress has moved in to the local problems and made education a national con-
cern. 
Like the conclusion that increasing racial admixture “baffles any just segregation effort,” this too 
was clearly a motivated or instrumental argument. As pointed out in Chapter 2, when this claim 
was considered in the context of Chief Justice Warren’s decision for the Court, this assertion can-
not have been a defensible basis for a determination that segregation was constitutional, because 
at the time of Brown the Court had never even heard a case posing the question of whether public 
education was a constitutional right, and had certainly not found (and would not subsequently find, 
when it did squarely address the issue)391 that public education numbered among the constitutional 
rights of citizens. The declaration, therefore, that the “status” of public education has changed was 
simply a means of discounting the relevance of the arguments of those who would say that the 
history of the Fourteenth Amendment limited the scope of Section 1 to the narrow civil rights 
objectives of the Moderates of the 39th Congress, or, which is to say the same thing, a means of 
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neutralizing the specific pronouncements of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment on that 
Amendment’s scope and purpose. For where there is no support among the framers’ dicta for the 
proposition that the Amendment was intended or understood to ensure equality of social rights, 
the allegation that those statements do not control anyway because public education, such as it 
exists today, did not then exist, will suffice to dispense with the need for a historical justification 
for reinterpreting the Amendment to achieve the result the justices seek. 
 Jackson betrayed hints that he was aware of the weakness of his argument about the 
changed status of the role of public education in American society, at least insofar as it was relevant 
to the judicial process. For example, Jackson’s proclamation that “access to educational facilities 
has been gradually transformed from a matter of grace into a right which may not be encumbered” 
by discrimination implies that the Court had ruled that access to public educational facilities was 
a constitutional right when, of course, the Court had not. All it had found, in cases such as Sweatt 
and McLaurin, was that when the privilege (because allocated by the state according to legislative 
discretion) of a post-secondary education is offered to citizens by the state, it must be made avail-
able to all citizens on a substantially equal basis. Jackson was on firm footing if his contention that 
public education had by 1954 become “a right, and more than that, a duty” rather than “a matter 
of grace” referred to the emergence in the United States in the first half of the Twentieth Century 
of a general social consensus that primary and secondary education was to be free, public, and 
compulsory.392 But that the statement was written to imply more than it could support under scru-
tiny suggests Jackson may have been cognizant of  the weakness of these auxiliary arguments, and 
given the justice’s usual abhorrence for shaky reasoning, he must have felt acutely the pain of 
employing it himself. The same goes for the last sentence quoted above. Jackson could not argue 
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that the Court had declared public education to be a constitutional right, so the most he could say 
was that the federal judiciary had nonetheless been involved in public education. The intended 
implication, that the Court was thus empowered to end a “custom deeply embedded in our national 
life,” does not follow from the facts to which the statement empirically refers: that is, the deference 
the Court had until 1948 unequivocally extended to “deeply imbedded [] social custom[s] in a 
large part of this country” regarding segregation. 
 Jackson rounded out Draft 2 with an underdeveloped stab at remedy. “The Negro is not 
free of local educational control,” Jackson said. “He must meet the prescribed standards of learn-
ing, discipline and health. He may be treated on his individual merit as a pupil, attend schools set 
apart for those of his neighborhood. But he may not be included or excluded merely because he 
has Negro blood wholly or in part.” Jackson’s prescription was remarkably close to the remedy 
the Court would eventually promulgate in Brown II (“to admit the parties to these cases to public 
schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed” and to “effectuate [] tran-
sition[s] to racially nondiscriminatory school system[s]”393), all the more so because Jackson 
would not participate in Brown II, nor would any of his colleagues see the first two versions of 
Jackson’s memoranda on the Brown merits. The upshot of Jackson’s inchoate treatment, neverthe-
less, was that the remedy would be deontological, which is to say, colorblind. Though he would 
change his opinion on this score in Draft 3, that the first thought on remedy that apparently came 
to Jackson was deontological might be imputed to the conference comments of colleagues who 
spoke in favor of overturning Plessy (in deontological language, even if well-developed deonto-
logical arguments were lacking), and the NAACP’s 1952 term briefs, which requested a colorblind 
remedy in the cases. 
                                                
393 Brown v. Board of Education II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), at 294, 296. 
 
294 
 Returning to the point in the third draft at which that version diverges markedly from the 
first two, Section 3 of Draft 3 is entitled, “Limits of Judicial Action.” In the first paragraph of 
Section 3, Jackson presented a strategic case for the judiciary to overturn segregation. “In view of 
the deference habitually paid by other branches of the government to this Court’s interpretation of 
the Constitution,” Jackson observed, “it is not unlikely that a considerable part of the inertia of 
Congress and of the country has been due to the belief that the existing system is Constitutional.” 
Thus, Jackson recognized that the political position of those in Congress and the executive who 
favor desegregation would be drastically strengthened by a declaration by the Court that segrega-
tion is unconstitutional. At the very least, such a holding would break the “inertia,” and perhaps 
foment remedial action on the part, of a Congress that had not then acted to extend equal guarantees 
of social rights to blacks. 
 Much of the remainder of Section 3 of Draft 3 amounts to a refinement of the ideas ex-
pressed in the analogous section of Draft 2, so I will proceed focusing only on the major substan-
tive revisions. First, Jackson confirmed his Draft 2 suggestion that rational basis scrutiny is the 
appropriate analytic framework for deciding Brown by articulating the controversy posed in the 
case as follows: “[t]he real question to me is, assuming the same premises upon which earlier 
courts have reasoned as to the power of the State to make classifications based on real differences 
and to make reasonable distinctions in treatment based on those classifications, segregation can 
today be sustained.” Second, he reiterated his contention from Draft 2 that “[i]t is neither novel 
nor radical doctrine that statutes once held constitutional may become invalid by reason of chang-
ing conditions and those held to be good in one state of facts may be held to be bad in another,” 
though Jackson subsequently omitted the enumeration of supporting precedents that had appeared 
in the preceding memo draft. 
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 However, Jackson then elaborated considerably upon the paragraph that in Draft 2 had 
declared that “the fact that one is in some degree colored no longer creates a presumption” of 
inferiority. In Draft 3, Jackson added the following. 
Whatever may have been true at an earlier period, the mere fact that one is colored does 
not today create a reasonable presumption that he is inferior, retarded, or a special problem 
in education. Certainly in the 1860’s and throughout the nineteenth century the Negro pop-
ulation as a whole was a different people than today. Lately freed from bondage they had 
no opportunity as yet to show their capacity for education or assimilation or even a chance 
to demonstrate that they could be self-supporting or anything more in public life than a 
pawn for white exploiters. There was a strong belief in heredity and the Negro’s heritage 
was close to primitive. Likewise his environment from force of circumstance was not con-
ducive to his mental development. I do not find it necessary to stigmatize as hateful or 
unintelligent the early assumption that Negro education presented problems that were ele-
mentary, special and peculiar and that the mass teaching of Negroes was an experiment not 
easily tied in with the education of pupils of more favored background. Nor, when I view 
the progress that was made under it, can I confidently say that the practice of each race 
pursuing its education apart has been, up to now, wholly to the Negro’s disadvantage. From 
my little experience in a non-segregated school, it is clear to me that to mingle closely with 
White pupils does not fully solve the Negro’s psychological or educational problem. In-
deed, Negro progress, even under segregation, has been spectacular and tested by the pace 
of history, his rise is one of the swiftest and most dramatic advances in the annals of man. 




In this excerpt, Jackson continued to hammer home the salience of changed social circumstances 
to the outcome of rational basis scrutiny. Prior to the middle of the 20th Century, it was not “hateful 
or unintelligent” to view segregation as a rational means to a legitimate government purpose of 
accommodating the special educational needs that blacks presented. The obvious problem with 
this line of argument, though, is that providing for the special educational needs of black students 
was a rationalization: states sought to exclude blacks not because they wanted to help blacks, but 
because they didn’t want black pupils to “drag down” white ones, and generally wanted to preserve 
white “racial integrity.”394 More importantly, though, Jackson implicitly endorsed a theory of so-
ciological causality regarding black disadvantage–––that slavery prevented, and Jim Crow laws 
continue to prevent, blacks from attaining educational parity with whites–––perhaps even without 
recognizing that he had done so. After Jackson’s criticism at the Brown conference in 1952 that 
“Marshall’s brief starts and ends with sociology,” that line of sociological argumentation was vin-
dicated, if only rhetorically, by Jackson’s acceptance of its theory of causality.  
 Despite Jackson’s evident acceptance of the NAACP’s sociological claims, the justice pre-
sented evidence from his own life and observations that indicated that he might still have been of 
two minds on the question of causality. As in the earlier drafts, in Draft 3 Jackson observed that 
his personal experience with integrated schooling did not suggest that integration alone would 
solve blacks’ educational problems. This tends to belie the thrust of the NAACP’s sociological 
claims that environment was primarily responsible for educational outcome and that state-spon-
sored segregation discouraged black educational performance primarily by “psychological” path-
ways, that is, by symbolizing blacks’ inferiority, stigmatizing blacks as unfit to associate with 
                                                




whites, and thereby conveying a message to blacks that they are unwanted and inferior. Moreover, 
it is possible to interpret Jackson’s own analysis of the recent progress of blacks as contradicting 
his operating assumption that segregation had subordinated them: “Negro progress, even under 
segregation, has been spectacular and tested by the pace of history, his rise is one of the swiftest 
and most dramatic advances in the annals of man. It has enabled him to outgrow the system and to 
overcome the presumptions on which it was based.” At a bare minimum, this comment would 
indicate that Jackson had reason to exercise closer scrutiny of the NAACP’s sociological claims, 
whether or not he indeed did so. 
 Both Jackson’s remark about the inefficacy of integration and his comment about blacks’ 
recent “spectacular” progress point to the deeper problem of identifying the specific constitutional 
harm or offense that inheres in segregation and a theory of empirical causality to undergird it. Is 
the constitutional harm of segregation educational disadvantage (consequentialist) or (since state-
enforced segregation, as the rest of Jackson’s memo would claim, runs afoul of rational basis scru-
tiny analysis) classification on the basis of race (deontological)? If the former, is the theory of 
causality that de jure racial discrimination retards blacks’ educational performance as by, for ex-
ample, discouraging blacks from learning, or that physical separation from whites does, as by, for 
instance, ascribing a social stigma to blacks? The choice of theory of causality is inapposite to the 
deontological discrimination framework, since the anti-classification argument posits that the 
harm in segregation is primarily moral rather than empirical, although empirical harms might well 
issue too. 
 Jackson did not seem to have delved deeply into the social science and developed a well-
reasoned position on exactly what species of harms, and which harms specifically, segregation, 
state-sponsored or otherwise, inflicted on blacks. Yet that he treated the arguments as persuasive 
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suggests two mutually compatible possibilities: (1) Jackson was engaged in motivated reasoning 
to declare segregation unconstitutional, and needed every argument he could find in order to do 
so, including sociological ones of questionable (in Jackson’s view, as expressed in other contexts) 
judicial relevance, and (2) Jackson’s reasoning was mediated by ease of retrieval, that is, that “the 
implications of recalled content may be qualified by the ease or difficulty with which that content 
can be brought to mind.”395 It is possible that Jackson believed that the arguments advanced by the 
NAACP were of higher quality or persuasiveness precisely because they had been so frequently 
repeated, from the 1949 term on, by the NAACP counsel, the other justices, and even Jackson’s 
private acquaintances. Representative of this last category of inputs is, of course, Fairman’s March 
30, 1950 correspondence with Jackson (quoted above), in which Fairman stated forthrightly that 
“[i]n thinking about these current cases [Sweatt and McLaurin] I have come to believe that [] the 
proposition [that “no segregated treatment can be fully ‘equal’”] will sooner or later become the 
law of the Constitution, because I believe it is true and will become recognized as true.” In light 
of the fact that Jackson gave evidence in all of his draft memoranda of not having processed deeply 
the sociological arguments about segregation’s harms, ease of retrieval is a strong possible con-
tender for a mediating factor on Jackson’s reasoning. 
 Jackson stated the crux of his constitutional case against segregation in the next paragraph, 
which is unique to the third draft. There, he announced that there was no longer any rational basis 
for classifying on the basis of race in public education. 
The handicap of inheritance and environment has been too generally overcome today to 
warrant such a classification based on race alone. I do not say that every Negro everywhere 
is so advanced nor would I know whether the proportion who have shown educational 
                                                
395 Schwarz et al. (1991, 200). 
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capacity is or is not everywhere similar. But it is sufficiently general to require us to say 
that the mere possession of colored blood, in whole or in part, no longer affords a reason-
able basis for a classification for educational purposes and that each individual must be 
rated on his own merit. Retarded or subnormal ones, like the same kind of Whites, may be 
accorded separate educational treatment. All that is required is that they be classified as 
individuals and not as a race for their learning, aptitude and discipline. 
Without using the words “rational basis,” Jackson applied rational basis scrutiny and found that 
the recent advance of blacks rendered obsolete the assumptions on which Plessy, Gong Lum, and 
other cases were based–––assessments of blacks and American society that, Jackson implied, were 
valid, or at least arguably so, at the time they issued. In other words, Jackson’s solution to the 
segregation question mirrors Frankfurter’s: social changes can render unconstitutional today gov-
ernment treatment that was constitutional 60 or even 25 years ago. Frankfurter eventually con-
vinced himself that what compelled the judiciary to invalidate segregation were “changes in men’s 
feelings for what is right and just”; Jackson, in turn, concluded that “the change which warrants 
our decision is not a change in the Constitution but in the Negro population.” 
 Employing changes “in the Negro population” observable in the present day as a basis for 
overturning 58 years of precedent was a weak reed upon which to rest a judicial case for invalidat-
ing segregation, and Jackson almost certainly sensed this. For one, Jackson devoted only a single 
paragraph to the rationale disposing of segregation’s constitutionality. For another, the wording of 
the paragraph suggests timidity and uncertainty. His acknowledgment that “I do not say that every 
Negro everywhere is so advanced nor would I know whether the proportion who have shown ed-
ucational capacity is or is not everywhere similar” is not precisely a ringing, confident declaration 
that blacks have attained the parity with whites upon which Jackson’s constitutional argument 
 
300 
rests. Finally, Jackson made no effort to quantify whether the proportion of blacks “who have 
shown educational capacity” was similar to that of whites. Jackson’s assumptions seemed to be 
that any nontrivial proportion is sufficient, that it is not necessary to specify quantitatively what 
threshold divides the two, and that that proportion in any case need not be measured empirically. 
Accordingly, his ostensible conclusion was more a statement of discretionary, subjective impres-
sion than a deduction compelled by ironclad premises: “But it is sufficiently general to require us 
to say that the mere possession of colored blood, in whole or in part, no longer affords a reasonable 
basis for a classification for educational purposes and that each individual must be rated on his 
own merit.” Jackson’s conclusion appeared, in a word, to be motivated, rather than compelled by 
the strength of the evidence and logical considerations adduced to sustain it. 
 Now, after this pivotal paragraph of his third draft, Jackson went on to rehash the arguments 
at the end of his second draft (1) that increasingly common racial mixing “baffles any justice in a 
segregation effort” and (2) that “the concept of the place of public education has changed” from 
“a privilege” to “a right of the citizen and a duty enforced by compulsory education laws.” None-
theless, these considerations are non-judicial: Jackson did not purport to derive any constitutional 
or legal consequences from them. They are simply arguments that show that segregation is unjust, 
but not that segregation is thereby unconstitutional. In the end, Jackson’s judicial case for invali-
dating segregation rested entirely on the rational basis argument. 
PRETTYMAN’S RESPONSE 
 
 At some point in the spring of 1954, Jackson asked his sole law clerk, E. Barrett Prettyman, 
III, to read the final draft of the Brown memo and offer his thoughts. In response, Prettyman com-
posed an eight-page memorandum. Prettyman’s recurring themes were that Jackson’s memo 
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lacked conviction and that the justice should rewrite it to remove any doubts as to his sincerity or 
as to whether he had complete faith in the result he reached. Particularly troubling to Prettyman 
was the sheer amount of space that Jackson had devoted to all of the factors pointing to an affir-
mance of Plessy, an impression which could not, Prettyman argued, but have the effect of under-
mining Jackson’s case for finding that segregation was unconstitutional. “You have stated this 
position [Jackson’s rational basis argument for invalidating segregation] in only two out of 23 
pages, and these two pages are almost at the end of the opinion,” Prettyman observed. “They are 
almost an afterthought. It is one thing to have and express many doubts about a difficult decision, 
as any honest man would in this case; it is another to state them at such length and in such prece-
dence over your affirmative views that the result you reach is swallowed up in them.”396 Prettyman 
consequently encouraged Jackson to recast the memo to center upon the rational basis argument 
for invalidating segregation. “I think your opinion should begin, not with doubts and fears -- not 
with a negative attitude, but with a clear and affirmative statement of your legal position,”397 Pret-
tyman wrote. “I say this in all frankness: if you are going to reach the decision you do, you should 
not write as if you were ashamed to reach it.”398  
 Prettyman was working from a different version of the memo than any of the three I have 
analyzed here. Nonetheless, there is a clear correspondence between the outline Prettyman wrote 
of Jackson’s memorandum and the third draft examined here: the draft Prettyman scrutinized ap-
pears to have been reorganized, but is substantively similar to the March 1, 1954 draft (Draft 3) 
examined in this chapter. Prettyman’s outline is as follows. 
                                                
396 Undated Prettyman Memorandum, E. Barrett Prettyman, The Papers of E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., 1944-1982. 
Special Collections of the Arthur J. Morris Law Library, University of Virginia School of Law [emphasis in the 
original]. 
397 Ibid. 
398 Id., at 3. 
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(1) Pp. 1-4 are primarily a plea to the majority of the Court to understand the South’s po-
sition and not to act rashly. 
(2) Pp. 5-10 show that the history of the 14th Amendment is inconclusive, and that it does 
not support the conclusion that segregation has always been unconstitutional. 
(3) Pp. 11-17 concern enforcement of the Court’s decision. 
(4) Pp. 18-20 revert back to the idea that segregation has not been unconstitutional up to 
the present time. 
(5) Pp. 20-23 contain the meat of the opinion: there is no longer a legal basis for separate 
but equal facilities.399 
The correspondence between the draft Prettyman examined and the March 1, 1954 draft (Draft 3) 
is as follows: 
(1) same; 
(2) same; 
(3) corresponds to Section IV., “Judiciary No Medium of Social Transition” of 
Draft 3 (pp. 15-19), and Section V., “The Decree” of Draft 3 (pp. 19-23), 
detailed in Chapter 8, below; 
(4) corresponds to the first half of Section III, “Limits of Judicial Action” of Draft 
3 (pp. 10-12); 
(5) corresponds to the second half of Section III of Draft 3 (pp. 12-15). 
 
Using the above correspondence table, it is possible to ascertain to which sections of Draft 3 Pret-
tyman’s comments were directed. 
                                                
399 Id., at 2. 
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 Prettyman insisted that Jackson state his rational basis case for invalidating segregation 
(Draft 3, pp. 12-15) first and “expand your ideas.” “Right now,” Prettyman wrote, “this section is 
broken down into three basic premises: (a) the Negroes have overcome their old handicap; (b) the 
white and colored races are becoming assimilated; (c) public education is no longer for the privi-
leged view.” Prettyman recommended expounding upon the last point:  
More people are becoming educated at public expense (and otherwise) today than at any 
other time or in any other country. The United States has adopted Jefferson’s great dream 
-- lock, stock, and barrel. This is not a single experiment engendered by good times; it runs 
through our whole history and is perhaps the source of our greatest power. Mass education, 
for all people, is simply an established fact in this country today. 
“[A]gainst this background,” Prettyman contended, Jackson should contrast the educational and 
legal situation of blacks in the United States: “we face the assertion of some states that the races 
are so unequal and so distinct that they must receive this education separately.” This challenge can 
be met by “show[ing], as you do, that the races are no longer sufficiently unequal or distinct to 
warrant” segregation in education. Prettyman concluded, “[t]he fact that you cannot explain ex-
actly how you know the races are sufficiently equal or that you cannot say just when they reached 
sufficient equality should not make your opinion apologetic. Someone must make these decisions, 
and under our system the burden is on the courts.”400 
 This last comment demonstrates that Prettyman detected Jackson’s uncertainty about the 
memo’s rational basis scrutiny case for overturning segregation. By implying, in his straightfor-
ward endorsement of it, that the belief that many blacks had reached parity with whites was widely 
shared, and by stating explicitly that “the burden” of making such judgment calls in the American 
                                                
400 Id., at 3. 
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system falls “on the courts,” Prettyman evidently sought to assuage his boss’s discomfort with 
predicating an argument upon empirical claims that the justice himself could not measure or cor-
roborate. These reassurances, however, probably had little effect on Jackson’s view of his memo-
randum’s persuasiveness.401 Moreover, Prettyman’s subsequent analysis may have exacerbated 
Jackson’s doubts. Prettyman went on to say, correctly, that “the most important part of the opinion 
… is that dealing with the question whether there is any longer a valid basis for a classification 
based upon race alone.” The clerk stated that his boss had “hinted at a theory” in his rational-basis 
argument that Prettyman argued should be more fully developed. Trying his hand at such an elab-
oration, Prettyman wrote: 
We are dealing with a situation in which several millions of persons have been placed in 
one class for purposes of education. It is questionable whether you could demonstrate that 
a majority of these persons no longer have the attributes which were once thought to be a 
sufficient basis for separate classification. That’s a point which many Americans will feel 
weakens your case. Your answer can be this: The telling fact is not that some Negroes are 
still backward but that others are so highly advanced. Whether their progress has been 
because of or in spite of segregation, the fact is that they have arrived at a status on par 
with whites. If this is true, race alone indicated nothing in a field such as public education. 
It cannot be the yardstick, because it no longer marks any true differences between persons 
seeking an education. The colored people have shown that race is not a barrier, or is a 
barrier which can be overcome by the same type of endeavor practised by white persons. 
The advanced Negroes have proved that race alone is not what has kept back their fellows. 
                                                
401 See comment below by Frankfurter at fn 404. 
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That fact has finally become so demonstrable by the achievements of many Negroes that 
classification based upon race alone becomes inexcusable. 
 Prettyman’s concession in the second and third sentences is the one that must have most 
bothered Jackson: the empirical claims underlying the rational scrutiny argument were simply too 
open to contestation to serve as a secure basis for overthrowing as much precedent and history as 
segregation had behind it. Jackson likely sensed that to pronounce that he had, in his judicial om-
niscience, determined that blacks were now on par with whites, would not only present a totally 
unpersuasive claim to many Americans with deeply-rooted prejudices and opinions on the race 
question, but also rely on precisely the kind of “elusive psychological and subjective factors” that 
the justice had decried in the first two drafts of his Brown memorandum.402 Jackson probably could 
not escape the feeling that his rational basis argument rested on his own subjective impressions, 
and as such depended for its success upon factors “not determinable with satisfactory objectivity 
or mensurable with reasonable certainty.” It is probable that Jackson recognized that the logical 
crux of his draft concurrence could not escape the smack of rationalization or the appearance of a 
judicial deus ex machina.  
 Prettyman’s attempt to “answer” the objection he anticipated was no less convincing than 
the subjective personal impressions of the judge upon which the argument would be seen to de-
pend. Prettyman’s counterargument was unlikely to persuade anyone who objected to Jackson’s 
claim that blacks had reached parity with whites, for it did not directly refute the thrust of those 
demurrals: that is, that blacks on average had not attained educational or social parity with whites. 
                                                
402 As Jackson wrote in Draft 2, “if all the woes of colored children would be solved by forcing them into white 
company, I do not think we should import into the concept of equal protection of the law these elusive psychological 
and subjective factors. They are not determinable with satisfactory objectivity or mensurable with reasonable cer-
tainty. If we adhere to objective criteria the judicial process will still be capricious enough.” 
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“The telling fact is not that some Negroes are still backward but that others are so highly ad-
vanced…. If this is true, race alone indicated nothing in a field such as public education.” Regard-
less of accuracy, the argument was likely to “convince” only those who were already predisposed 
to accept it (i.e., fellow mid-century liberals), not those who would passionately resist integration, 
no matter how equal whites and blacks could be proven to be. Though Jackson did not leave behind 
any records indicating his reaction and response to Prettyman’s memo, he was certainly a suffi-
ciently wise man and adept political actor to have been aware of these problems. Perhaps the best 
evidence that Jackson found his clerk’s suggestions unconvincing is that he never revised the 
memo to incorporate them, although Jackson’s failure to do so is probably attributable in part to 
the heart attack that felled him a mere 15 days after the fourth and final draft was completed. 
 The beginning of Prettyman’s memo to his boss contained what was, in effect, the memo’s 
conclusion, so I have saved it for the end of my analysis. Prettyman wrote: 
To me, the single most important thing about the Court’s decision -- perhaps more im-
portant than what it holds -- is that the country as a whole accept it. I don’t mean “accept 
it” in the sense that the mass of people will immediately put it into practice; I’m not that 
unrealistic. I mean they should be made to feel that the decision is honestly arrived at, 
confidently espoused, and basically sound. They should feel that it expresses certain truths, 
even if they aren’t quite fully prepared to accept fully those truths themselves or to practice 
them. And they should feel, as far as possible, that it is a decision based upon law. If they 
receive the decision in this way, segregation should die in relatively short order, no matter 
how many legal skirmishes ensue. On the other hand, if the country feels that a bunch of 
liberals in Washington have finally foisted off their social views on the public, it will not 
only tolerate but aid circumvention of the decision. 
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This description captures, better than its author probably knew, the dilemma Jackson faced. Jack-
son was motivated to end desegregation, less because he was emotionally bound up in its injustice 
than because he wanted to be on the ascendant “side” of social and political developments, to “go 
along” with the purveyors, on the Court as well as in broader American society, of “responsible 
and rational public opinion.” This seems to be the net effect of his comments in his March 1950 
exchange with Fairman, at the Brown conference in 1953 that he was not “personally” opposed to 
desegregation, and in his memorandum drafts that “responsible and rational” moral opinion on 
race had evolved. At the same time, Jackson appeared to feel the pull of his judicial duty more 
powerfully than any justice other than perhaps Frankfurter. The judge, Jackson believed, engages 
in a characteristic and specialized activity known as the judicial process, and the legitimate sphere 
of inputs to that process is circumscribed to traditional “judicial” considerations, which do not 
include sociological theories or “changes in men’s feelings for what is right and just.” It is for this 
reason that Jackson attempted to take the only path–––rational basis scrutiny–––that his judicial 
temperament would allow with respect to overturning segregation. In invoking that judicial mech-
anism, Jackson felt compelled to articulate precisely what about segregation in 1954 ran afoul of 
the Court’s existing equal protection doctrine: that contemporary black progress toward parity with 
whites in all aspects of human endeavor belied a reasonable basis for differential treatment in 
education. Thus, Jackson engaged with the constitutional questions in Brown at a lower level of 
abstraction than that at which most of the other justices did. His resulting analysis was conse-
quently more traditionally “judicial”–––and less obviously mediated by simple moral intuitions 
that segregation is unjust and offensive–––than that of any other justice. 
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 Prettyman’s opening paragraph also provides a sample of the kinds of pressures and argu-
ments by which Jackson was no doubt being buffeted, pressures emanating from private acquaint-
ances with whom he discussed the case, from his fellow Brethren, and from two of his three law 
clerks403 in the two terms in which Brown was argued on the merits. “To me, the single most 
important thing about the Court’s decision -- perhaps more important than what it holds -- is that 
the country as a whole accept it.” Warren and Frankfurter–––who, along with Jackson, were two 
of the three central figures in the Brown decision-making process–––also superseded the goal of 
public acceptance to judicial reasoning and pursued the former by seeking unanimity at the ex-
pense of a less than maximally persuasive and perspicaciously reasoned opinion for the Court. But 
as the protracted negative reaction and resistance to Brown in many parts of the country suggests, 
the potency of judicial persuasion and public acceptance of a decision are not entirely uncorrelated. 
Though he never put that thought into written words that survive to the present, Jackson seemed 
to have intuitively sensed this fact. Although it is possible only to speculate about how Jackson 
might have proceeded with his Brown memorandum had he not been incapacitated by a heart attack 
at the end of March, my analysis suggests he would not have taken Prettyman up on his suggestion 
to feign belief in a judicial opinion that, because it betrayed too clearly Jackson’s ineradicable 
conception of the judicial process and his own judicial duty to abide it, could not yield a satisfac-
tory defense of the outcome Jackson sought. For Jackson the jurist, conviction, even if genuinely 
felt, could not substitute for judicial substance. The two went hand-in-hand. 
 Frankfurter, Jackson’s closest colleague on the Court, would remark of Jackson’s struggles 
in Brown in a 1958 letter to Judge Learned Hand: “[t]he fact of the matter is that Bob Jackson tried 
                                                
403 Donald Cronson in ’52 and Prettyman in ’53 although not–––as would famously emerge at Senate confirmation 
hearings in 1971–––William Rehnquist, the second of Jackson’s 1952 term clerks. 
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his hand at a justification for leaving the matter to §5 of Art. XIV, ‘The Congress shall have powers 
to enforce, etc.’ and he finally gave up.”404 This would seem to be an appropriate description of 
Jackson’s months-long attempt to produce a “judicial case,” circumscribed within the peculiar 
limits that he understood the judicial process to impose, for “a congenial political conclusion.” 
Jackson never published his memo as a concurrence or produced a draft that varied substantially 
from Draft 3, although he did have on hand the fourth and final memorandum draft of March 15, 
when Warren visited him in the hospital in May to discuss the Chief Justice’s draft Brown decision 
and request that Jackson join it. The central element of Jackson’s rational basis scrutiny case–––
the changed social conditions of blacks precipitated by their “spectacular” recent progress–––made 
its way into Warren’s final opinion for the Court, shorn of the rational basis significance Jackson 
had imputed to it in his memorandum drafts.405 The single sentence that Warren incorporated as a 
result of that hospital visit appears at the point in the Brown opinion at which Warren distinguished 
public education at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment from that of eighty 
years later. “Education of Negroes was almost non-existent, and practically all of the race were 
illiterate. In fact, any education of Negroes was forbidden by law in some states,” Warren wrote. 
Then: “Today, in contrast, many Negroes have achieved outstanding success in the arts and sci-
ences as well as in the business and professional world.” After two rounds of arguments over two 
years and two months of memorandum writing, Jackson’s single contribution to the final Brown 
opinion was a dictum that encapsulated the empirical crux of his own aborted judicial case for 
ending segregation. 
  
                                                
404 Schwartz (1983, 94). 
405 Kluger ([1976] 2004, at 701). 
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Chapter 8. Conclusion 
 The analysis of the preceding chapters has shown that eight of the nine justices who par-
ticipated in the 1953 term Brown decision-making process–––Chief Justice Warren and Justices 
Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Jackson, Burton, Clark, and Minton–––likely engaged in intuition-
mediated moral judgments to reach their conclusion that segregation violated the Due Process and 
Equal Protection guarantees of the Constitution. Most, although not all, of their behaviors were 
consistent with the predictions of Haidt’s model: that judgment of right or wrong (or constitutional 
or unconstitutional) would precede rationale, that the rationales adduced in support of the judgment 
would be weak relative to the strength of the judgment, and that the characteristic correlates of 
intuition-led judgment, such as confirmation bias and motivated reasoning, would be detectible in 
the justices’ decision-making processes. The eight justices whom I have identified were motivated 
to invalidate segregation, in whole or in part, due to psychological phenomena described by the SI 
model of moral decision-making.  
THE OUTLIER 
 While Justice Reed fits the SI model quite closely as well, the analysis thus far does not 
explain how he came to vote with the other justices, since he appeared from his conference com-
ments to wish to sustain, not overturn, enforced segregation. Like Frankfurter, Jackson, and Clark, 
Reed ended up joining the other justices once it became clear there was a majority to order deseg-
regation. Unlike Frankfurter, Jackson, and Clark, however, Reed took his time in doing so and 
evidently possessed a moral preference for segregation. Reed believed that segregation was basi-
cally benign in its effects on blacks and innocuous or even positive as a symbol of whites’ attitudes 
toward blacks; that, if segregation was to fall, Congress in its power to set social policy for the 
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nation, and not the Court in its power to expound the Constitution, should strike the fatal blow;406 
and, as would emerge in his conversations with his 1953 term law clerk John Fassett, if the Court 
nevertheless ignored Reed’s appeals to judicial restraint, that segregation should be invalidated on 
Due Process, not Equal Protection grounds.407 Ultimately, Reed was likely motivated to join the 
others, because, at least by the accounts of those who knew him, he was a “team player” and highly 
responsive to the pull of judicial solidarity. Some years before Brown, for example, Frankfurter 
had remarked that “Reed was a soldier and glad to do anything that the interest of the Court might 
require.”408 
 Fassett’s recollections of Reed’s actions in the 1953 term also suggest that Reed’s primary 
motivation for making a unanimous Court in Brown was his powerful sense of duty to the institu-
tion. For instance, Fassett recalled that once the outcome of the case became clear at the 1953 
conference, Reed stopped working on a draft dissent he had been preparing since the previous 
summer. Though Reed made it clear to the other justices that he disagreed with the outcome, Fas-
sett recounted, “I’m sure, if he had not expressly said so, he impliedly said so, to the other Justices, 
that he would go along if it was an opinion that was acceptable.”409 The consensus in the Brown 
scholarship that Reed ultimately joined the Warren opinion out of a sense of institutional loyalty 
seems, therefore, to be correct. Kluger, relying on an anecdote of Reed’s other 1953 term clerk, 
George Mickum, suggests that Reed refused to join the other justices until late April or early May 
of 1954, and was persuaded only after a dramatic meeting with Warren in which Warren high-
lighted Reed’s isolation. Warren is purported to have said, “Stan, you’re all by yourself in this 
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now. You’ve got to decide whether it’s really the best thing for the country.”410  However, Fassett 
contends that this meeting never took place. “The one supposed occurrence of Warren and Reed 
and a law clerk that appears in Dick Kluger’s book Simple Justice I’m convinced is erroneous,” 
Fassett said. “And the fellow who is identified there as doing it [Mickum], has denied that he said 
so.”411 Accordingly, contra the traditional Brown narrative that Reed was only persuaded to join 
the other justices in late April or May, it is possible that Reed had begun to signal that he would 
be willing to join the other justices shortly after the second Brown conference, provided the deci-
sion were written in an “acceptable” way. 
 It is highly probable that Reed’s opposition to the constitutional merits was softened, alt-
hough not extirpated, by the psychological phenomenon of group polarization. Warren, a highly 
charismatic master persuader and consummate political operator, was evidently familiar with this 
effect. In order to achieve unanimity, he deliberately tried to engineer group polarization among 
the justices (1) by not taking a vote on the merits until well after a consensus had congealed, (2) 
by pursuing a strategy of group luncheon persuasion with respect to Reed (and to a lesser extent, 
perhaps Clark), and (3) in the words of a December 17, 1953 entry in Harold Burton’s diary, by 
“direct[ing] discussion of segregation cases toward a decree,” i.e., remedy, “as providing now the 
best chance of unanimity in that phase.”412 Regarding the first point, twenty years after Brown 
Warren remarked to Kluger that “we decided not to make up our minds [on Brown] on that first 
conference day, but to talk it over, from week to week, dealing with different aspects of it – in 
groups, over lunches, in conference. It was too important to hurry it.”413 Too important, and, more 
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importantly, too likely to produce an outcome other than unanimity had the justices’ customary 
practice of stating their positions at conference been abided.  
 The second point is demonstrated by the lunch group that Warren put together and regularly 
convened throughout the 1953 term as a forum for discussing Brown and fomenting unanimity. 
According to Ulmer, Warren’s luncheons were regularly attended by Burton, Reed, Clark, Doug-
las, and Minton; “Frankfurter and Jackson never attended, and [] Black joined the group only in-
frequently.”414 Reed apparently lunched with Warren and Burton, the core members of this group, 
“at least 20 times” between the second Brown conference and May 8:415 a raw average frequency 
of once every eight days, though taking Court’s Christmas and New Year holidays and mid-Feb-
ruary breaks into account would drop that frequency to well within once per week. The member-
ship of that luncheon group included four justices (Warren, Douglas, Burton, and Minton) who 
had brooked no doubt at conference that segregation was unconstitutional. Then there was Clark, 
who, though he said he did not like segregation and would vote to invalidate it at the second Brown 
conference, would have benefited (from the perspective of unanimity) from the attitude consoli-
dation available by means of group polarization, especially as regarded his worries about the 
South’s reaction. Reed, finally, would have been totally outgunned in his reading of the history of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and segregation’s innocuousness. In light of the literature on group 
polarization, it is highly unlikely that these regular meetings did not move Reed’s position on 
segregation closer to those of the others. 
 Finally, by calling a conference to discuss remedy (as opposed to an additional meeting to 
further consider the Brown merits) on January 16, 1954, only a month after the 1953 Brown merits 
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conference, Warren sought to incorporate Reed into the overall Brown decision-making process 
despite Reed’s stated opposition to the outcome favored by the Court majority. The effect of this 
was to acclimate Reed to the normalcy and inevitability of the Court’s decision to overturn segre-
gation. “Continued discussion of the decision [on the merits] would only polarize potential con-
currers and dissenters, solidifying their intention to write separate opinions,” Schwartz observes. 
But, 
[b]y concentrating instead on the remedy, all the Brethren would work on the assumption 
that the decision itself would strike down segregation. They would endeavor jointly to work 
out a decree that would best effectuate such a decision. Those who, like Reed, found it 
most difficult to accept a decision abolishing segregation, would grow accustomed to what 
might at first have seen too radical a step.416 
A year after the Brown merits decision, Warren would step back and take stock of his own handi-
work. “The fact that we did not polarize ourselves at the beginning gave us more of an opportunity 
to come out unanimously on it than if we had done otherwise,” he told an interviewer.417 In a 
September, 1955 memo to the other justices, Frankfurter too highlighted the significance of the 
suspension of Court custom in Brown. That case was the only one “in which we postponed a vote 
after argument for further study. The exception is significant. Who will deny that this maturing 
process in the segregation cases full vindicated itself?”418 Warren and Frankfurter were thus cog-
nizant of the group polarization phenomenon, if only by effect, and sought to employ it to achieve 
unanimity in Brown. 
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 Over the course of its 13-page 1952 brief in the titular Brown case, the NAACP claimed in 
four separate places419 that enforced racial segregation violates both deontological and utilitarian 
moral principles. One representative statement occurs in the “Summary of Argument” section of 
the brief. 
Racial segregation in public schools reduces the benefits of public education to one group 
solely on the basis of race and color and is a constitutionally proscribed distinction. Even 
assuming that the segregated schools attended by appellants are not inferior to other ele-
mentary schools in Topeka with respect to physical facilities, instruction and courses of 
study, unconstitutional inequality inheres in the retardation of intellectual development and 
distortion of personality which Negro children suffer as a result of enforced isolation in 
school from the general public school population. Such injury and inequality are estab-
lished as facts on this appeal by the uncontested findings of the District Court.420 
Though it has consequentialist implications, the first sentence is a deontological argument: de jure 
racial segregation deprives blacks of equal opportunities and amounts to treating one group differ-
ently from another without a rational basis for doing so. The second sentence, on the other hand, 
argues that the violation of deontology entails consequentialist harms: the message of inferiority 
conveyed by segregation distorts blacks’ personalities and retards their educational achievement. 
The third sentence contends by way of summation that segregation produces both deontological 
and consequentialist harms. The enforced separation of blacks from whites on the basis of race 
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generates a feeling of inferiority, which is to say that segregation by law symbolizes blacks’ infe-
riority and communicates it to white and black students alike. This is a deontological argument: 
the symbolism or state endorsement of racial inequality cannot be reconciled with universalism 
and its moral core, the golden rule. The second part of the sentence is consequentialist: the proxi-
mate effects (“feelings of inferiority”) of such symbolism cascade to real-world harms to black 
children’s psyches and self-esteem, as well as, presumably, to their educational performance.  
 The NAACP’s dual deontological-consequentialist critique was adopted by Warren in his 
decision for the Court. As we have already seen, Warren contended that “[t]o separate [minority 
children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a 
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in 
a way unlikely ever to be undone.”421 Warren apparently lifted this language, with minor modifi-
cations, from another part of the 1952 NAACP brief in Brown. After quoting Finding of Fact No. 
8 of the Kansas federal trial court, which was also incorporated verbatim into the final Brown 
opinion,422 the NAACP brief declares: 
The testimony [in the Kansas federal trial court] further developed the fact that the enforce-
ment of segregation under law denies to the Negro status, power and privilege (R. 176); 
interferes with his motivation for learning (R. 171); and instills in him a feeling of inferi-
ority (R. 169) resulting in a personal insecurity, confusion and frustration that condemns 
him to an ineffective role as a citizen and member of society (R. 165). 
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This sentence was, no doubt, the basis for the dispositive passage in the Brown opinion that begins 
with “Such considerations [those espoused in Sweatt and McLaurin] apply with added force to 
children in grade and high schools,” and concludes with footnote 11.423 
 The paradox of Warren’s deployment of this line of argumentation in the final Brown opin-
ion is that, as Chapters 4, 6, and 7 of this work demonstrate, the psychological harms of segregation 
on blacks did not predominate among the objects of the justices’ concerns recorded in the surviving 
primary source record. Warren’s position at the 1953 conference reflected deontological, more 
than consequentialist sensibilities: Plessy and segregation can only be sustained on the basis of 
“white supremacy” and should be overturned for that reason, not because segregation necessarily 
concretely harms blacks. Black noted that he did “not need books”424 to tell him that segregation 
is predicated on the white Southerner’s belief in “Negro [] inferior[ity]”–––again, a symbolic or 
deontological argument without explicit reference to real-world harms on blacks. Reed emphati-
cally contended that segregation cannot be invalidated on utilitarian grounds, arguing it was benign 
in provenance and effect. With his anecdotal reference at the 1952 conference to the “trouble” 
Mexican boys and black girls sometimes find themselves in, Clark seemed to share Reed’s view 
of segregation’s benign character.  However, a year later, after changing his mind on which way 
he would vote, Clark presented no argument against segregation and limited himself to the pro-
nouncement that “he doesn’t like it.” Frankfurter was able to articulate what was so offensive about 
segregation–––its symbolism of black inferiority–––in the Henderson discussions425 but did not, 
so far as the primary source record shows, in the Brown decision-making process. Douglas ad-
duced the conclusion of a deontological anti-classification argument at both conferences but, as 
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was his wont, declined to bolster it with further reasoning or analysis. Jackson acknowledged the 
“disadvantaged” status of blacks he went to school with as a child and speculated that they “must 
have felt [segregation’s] sting” despite being not legally subject to it. This claim, of course, is more 
deontological than consequentialist: knowledge of de jure segregation demotivates because of its 
symbolism, but enforced segregation does not directly affect the blacks not subject to it. Last, 
Burton and Minton each employed anti-classification arguments at the conferences and, like War-
ren and Jackson, pointed to anecdata adduced to demonstrate that whites and blacks had achieved 
substantial “equality” in the real world. In sum, at the Brown merit conferences, seven of the jus-
tices (Warren, Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Jackson, Burton, and Minton) adduced deontological 
arguments against segregation; two (Clark, in 1952; Reed, at both conferences) advanced conse-
quentialist defenses of segregation that attempted to refute segregation’s harms. Yet Warren’s in-
vocation of the NAACP’s dual deontological/consequentialist reasoning, his recitation of Finding 
of Fact No. 8 of the Kansas federal trial court that first heard Brown, and his reference in Footnote 
11 to five psychological studies presented by the NAACP, elevate consequentialism from a latent 
afterthought of the justices’ conference discussions into the argumentative core of the Brown de-
cision. Why did Warren rely upon, and why did the other justices sign off on, a consequentialist 
constitutional rationale when the character of the justices’ reasoning in the actual decision phase 
of Brown focused more on segregation’s symbolism or violation of deontology than its practical 
harms?  
 I believe there are two reasons. The first is that the arguments employed in the final opinion 
were secondary, and not primary, concerns for all nine justices. This is a direct consequence of the 
fact that the justices’ decision-making conforms to the social intuitionist model and that model’s 
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implications for the provenance and character of judgment. For Warren, Black, Frankfurter, Doug-
las, Jackson, Burton, Clark, and Minton, the judgment that segregation was unconstitutional was 
likely caused by the moral intuitions those justices experienced regarding segregation’s injustice 
or immorality. The weakness and incompleteness of these justices’ judicial rationales for their 
decisions, in my view, demonstrates that moral intuitions or other affective responses, not reasoned 
or deductive analysis, caused those judgments in the first place. The constitutional or judicial “rea-
sons” that each justice presented to support the outcome therefore did not matter as much to the 
justice espousing them as the judgment itself, since the rationales were a consequence, not a cause, 
of the judgment. Accordingly, all the justices–––even Reed, who went along with the others not 
because he agreed on the merits, but out of institutional solidarity–––were extremely flexible on 
the question of rationale and were thus amenable to adopting constitutional reasoning in the Brown 
opinion that no justice had advanced in support of his position in conference. 
 It is revealing that every justice who spoke in favor of ending segregation (with the excep-
tion of Clark in 1953) attacked segregation as inconsistent with one or more deontological moral 
principles (universality, reciprocity, “reasonableness,” etc.), and two of the three justices who de-
fended segregation (Reed and Clark) did so on a consequentialist basis–––that is, by denying that 
segregation harmed blacks. Vinson, the third justice who spoke in favor of sustaining segregation, 
was the only one to confine himself to legalism and not take a position on segregation’s justice or 
morality. Of course, deontological moral decision-making usually has an affective basis,426 so the 
justices who presented deontological claims likely did so because of their moral intuitions. More-
over, that seven of the nine justices who decided Brown in 1954 adduced deontological reasons to 
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condemn segregation but then signed on to an opinion that spoke almost exclusively of its conse-
quentialist harms evinces the degree to which those deontological reasons were the reasons for and 
causes, as opposed to post hoc rationalizations,427 of the justices’ judgments. Of course, it might 
be objected that the justices’ willingness to ground Brown in consequentialism rather than deon-
tology does not necessarily indicate that the deontological arguments that the justices advanced at 
the Brown conferences did not cause the judgments the justices expressed there. That is true. But 
I contend the justices’ evident flexibility with respect to the rationale for overturning segregation 
in the final Brown opinion does show that the justices’ deontological conference arguments were 
not inextricable from and essential to the justices’ judgments of unconstitutionality. If those argu-
ments had been, the justices presumably would not have accepted a rationale very different the 
arguments expressed at conference. The inference that the justices’ conference arguments were 
not vital to the justices’ conference positions on the Brown merits, then, corroborates my conten-
tion that the social intuitionist model explains the justices’ underlying decision-making. 
 The second reason that consequentialism became the persuasive core of the final Brown 
opinion is that it alone permitted Warren to achieve his goals in writing the opinion. One of his 
goals was, obviously, to announce the result. A particularly prosaic and uninspiring statement of 
the outcome, which reveals more about the decision’s etiology than perhaps the statement was 
intended to, appears after the opinion’s reasoning has been exhausted: “We have now announced 
that such segregation [that is, in public education] is a denial of the equal protection of the laws.”428 
(Kurland cites this dictum as evidence of the Court’s unjustified reliance on its own “ipse dixit.”)429 
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Another of Warren’s goals, according to the brief cover memo affixed to the opinion drafts he 
circulated to the justices on May 8, 1954, was to write the Brown and Bolling opinions to be “short, 
readable by the lay public, non-rhetorical, unemotional and, above all, non-accusatory”430–––a 
strategy the Chief Justice believed would facilitate disposing of the cases with a “minimum of 
emotion and strife.”431 Essential to minimizing the “emotion and strife” that the decision was 
bound to precipitate was to write in a way, and incorporate reasoning, that would induce those who 
might disagree with the outcome to accept or at least acquiesce in it. Finally, and perhaps as the 
most important means of “minimi[zing] emotion and strife,” Warren sought to avoid explicitly 
overruling Plessy. Though there is no record of the justices discussing this goal in the spring of 
1954, Warren pursued it consciously. We know this because E. Barrett Prettyman related that dur-
ing a hospital visit to Jackson on May 10, Warren informed Jackson of his desire not to overrule 
Plessy or overturn segregation generally (outside of educational contexts) in the Brown opinion, 
and Jackson endorsed Warren’s strategy.432 As such, it is highly probable that a majority of the 
other justices knew about, discussed, and agreed to this approach as well. 
 A consequentialist framework was the only available judicial means of achieving these 
objectives. The justices must have recognized that virtually every deontological argument against 
segregation would threaten one or more of these goals, for any deontological rule capable of in-
validating segregation could not be circumscribed to enforced segregation in public primary and 
secondary schools. A deontological rationale would instead necessarily encompass race-conscious 
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government action, such as anti-miscegenation laws, that still enjoyed overwhelming public sup-
port due to deeply engrained prejudices. Klarman notes that opinion polls in the 1950s indicated 
that some 90% of whites in the United States as a whole, not just in the South, opposed mixed-
race marriages.433 For the Court to be perceived as overturning anti-miscegenation laws when a 
majority of whites was viscerally opposed to extending that degree of social equality to blacks 
might have seriously handicapped its already-limited institutional capacity to induce compliance 
with its eventual command of token desegregation in public schools.434 Given the strategic objec-
tives Warren harbored and the other justices evidently approved, and in light of the justices’ rela-
tive indifference to the judicial reasoning employed, a consequentialist approach was the obvious 
choice for the final Brown decision. 
 Warren’s procedure for composing opinions was in close keeping with the justices’ appar-
ent flexibility (or indifference) toward the ultimate reasoning employed in Brown. According to 
Schwartz, 
[a]fter the conference vote and assignment of opinions, Warren would discuss any opinion 
he had assigned to himself with the law clerk selected to draft that opinion, normally the 
clerk who had written the bench memo on the case. Warren would usually outline verbally 
(though in important cases he would dictate the outline to Ms. McHugh) the way he wanted 
the opinion drafted. Most of the time, the outline would summarize the facts and how the 
main points should be decided. The Chief would rarely go into particulars on the legal 
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theories involved in the case. The clerk was left with a great deal of discretion on the details 
of the opinion, particularly the reasoning and research supporting the decision.435 
This aspect of Warren’s approach to the judicial process reinforces the overwhelming impression 
that Warren’s “ultimate human values” method of judicial decision-making was reducible to the 
social intuitionist moral one. At the very least, traditional “judicial” or legalist considerations were 
not dominant inputs to Warren’s version of the judicial process. After receiving the clerk’s draft, 
“Warren would normally go over [it] with the clerk who had written it. Particularly where he was 
dissatisfied with a section, he would discuss it in detail.” Otherwise, his revisions were confined 
to stylistic changes. Reflecting upon Warren’s opinion-writing process, Schwartz contends that 
Warren never pretended to be a scholar interested in research and legal minutiae. These he 
left to his clerks, as well as the extensive footnotes which are part of panoply of the well-
crafted judicial opinion. One year the clerks snickered with delight when they ran across a 
learned law-review article, analyzing an important Warren opinion, in which the author 
saw great significance in the order in which Warren cited cases in the footnotes. The clerks 
knew that was utterly foolish, because nobody (and certainly not the Chief) had paid any 
attention to it.436 
 In accordance with what would prove to be his normal opinion-writing procedure, toward 
the end of April, 1954, Warren began composing an outline of the Brown and Bolling opinions; 
the Brown decision outline “contained some language that Warren wanted in the opinion,” includ-
ing the dual deontological-consequentialist statement quoted near the beginning of this discus-
sion,437 which made its way verbatim into the final Brown opinion. Warren then delegated the 
                                                
435 Id., at 68. 
436 Ibid. 
437 See fn 421, supra. 
 
324 
actual drafting of the opinions to his three law clerks. “Earl Pollock was to work on the opinion in 
the state cases; William Oliver was to have the primary responsibility for the case involving seg-
regation in the District of Columbia; Richard Flynn helped on both opinions, particularly in” add-
ing footnote citations.438 “The draft prepared by Pollock from Warren’s outline,” Schwarz ex-
plains, “was basically the opinion read by the Chief on May 17.”439 The presence and content of 
Footnote 11 were both Flynn’s ideas, although Warren of course accepted them.  
 From Saturday, May 8, to Saturday, May 15, the other justices read and discussed Warren’s 
drafts in Brown and Bolling. Jackson signed on to the opinions on May 10. After suggesting a few 
minor revisions to wording, the other seven justices joined the opinions at a justices’ conference 
on May 15. Two days later, on Monday, May 17, the Court’s unanimous decisions in Brown and 
Bolling came down. 
WHAT BROWN DECIDED 
… I ask the reader to ponder why the Brown opinion was so wanting in reason. For myself, 
I thought that the answer was to be found in the proposition that I have been reiterating: 
“Brown v. Board of Education was the beginning.” And so, the Court did not mean Brown 
to determine or even to suggest the answers to the myriad of legal problems that would 
flow from its revolutionary decision to strike down Jim Crow, at least in public school 
classrooms. Time and experience would be necessary for a fuller delineation of constitu-
tional principles.440 
––Philip Kurland 
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[T]he big picture of Brown was not just public school desegregation. It was the cornerstone 
for dealing with racial equality in all areas, and as a former corporate executive, for exam-
ple, what it meant in the employment patterns of companies. I had the first two black di-
rectors on my board of directors after I became the head of an electric company. And in 
politics, you see black people at the top level and in the legislatures. You see it in every 
area of our society. That all goes back to Brown v. Board of Education.441 
––John Fassett 
We sometimes hear comments that the promise of Brown v. Board has not been realized. 
You really have to ask the question, ‘Well, what was that promise?’ Brown did not promise 
the end of racism, although I think that Brown has had a profound effect in reducing racism 
as the separate walls have, to a great extent, at least when compelled by state law, have 
been broken down. Brown did not promise the end of discrimination, which is still, un-
doubtedly, a national plague that has to be addressed whenever we can. And Brown did not 
promise integration. What Brown was all about was a matter of attacking compelled seg-
regation under law. It was not aimed at creating racial balances in our institutions. It was 
not intended or designed as an end to the horrendous black poverty that continues. It had a 
very important target, which, I think, it very successfully addressed. And that is ending the 
blight of post-slavery segregation compelled by state law. So from my perspective, I think 
the promise of Brown has been now realized and that it, I think, deserves its prominence 
which we are celebrating here today as very possibly the most important decision in the 
history of the Supreme Court.442 
––Earl Pollack 
 The justices who participated in the Brown v. Board of Education decision-making process 
took their bearings not from any constitutional good, but from a moral evil: legally enforced racial 
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segregation. In identifying, discussing, and studying that moral evil, they reached the consensus 
that the Constitution commanded overcoming it. They did not, however, succeed in delimiting the 
precise contours of that moral evil, transformed by unanimous agreement into a constitutional one, 
or the commands or restrictions of the Constitution with respect to a host of comparable and asso-
ciated phenomena. This analysis has shown that the judicial observation of segregation’s psycho-
logical harms that seems to form the basis for the Brown decision was in fact a kind of useful 
strategic decoy chosen by the justices to enable them to invalidate legal racial segregation and go 
no further. Nevertheless, the negative orientation implied in starting from an evil and working 
one’s way backward to a constitutional good, does, I believe, tell us something more specific about 
Brown’s constitutional holding than can be gleaned from the words of the opinion alone. 
 If Brown’s negative orientation toward segregation mirrors Hobbes’ negative orientation 
toward violent death, then its constitutional holding parallels Locke’s imperative of substituting a 
common and impartial judge for the lawlessness of the state of nature. Brown announces, in other 
words, that the Court, not the people or their representatives, shall judge: judge what is and is not 
“equal protection of the laws”; judge what the remedies are to its violation; judge who wins and 
who loses in the gradual unfurling of the new equal protection regime. More than simply proclaim-
ing a clean slate in the law of equal protection, though, Brown announces, by its own example, 
how the Court will go about superintending the growth and periodic pruning of “equal protection 
of the laws.”  
 If Brown’s putative constitutional rationale was consequentialist, in contrast to the deonto-
logical arguments the justices propounded at conference, then the judicial decision-making process 
that produced the decision’s rationale was meta-consequentialist. The justices who decided Brown, 
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having arrived at their judgment that segregation was unconstitutional–––mostly by means of in-
tuition-mediated moral reasoning–––adopted whatever rationale would best combine and advance 
the moral consensus of the justices and institutional interests of the Court, instead of developing a 
judicial case that could act as a stable and rationally defensible basis for the new equal protection 
regime. The regime upon which the justices passed was one that might have convinced the public, 
in judicial terms, that it was more just and truer to the constitutional provisions it purported to 
expound than the regime it supplanted. Brown’s, in contrast, strategically served the justices’ view 
of the Court’s institutional interests. 
 Brown’s legal holding is that the Equal Protection Clause is an authorization for a conse-
quentialist judicial approach to constitutional law itself, as opposed to a warrant merely for judging 
specific cases before the Court by reference to a utilitarian calculus, as the written opinion implies. 
Brown announces that the judicial pursuit of racial equality and the Equal Protection Clause are 
one and the same. Brown thus inaugurates a new law of equal protection: that where there are not 
sufficient “judicial” resources to reach an outcome advancing the justices’ conception of racial 
equality, that paucity can be overcome for the sake of the new, higher law: the imperative to pursue 
racial equality. Thus, the Court in Brown effectively decided the constitutional ends justify the 
judicial means. That “principle,” it seems, is Brown’s judicial legacy. 
 This work has attempted to answer two questions. The first was, Why did the Brown deci-
sion lack a robust and generalizable theory of equal protection and refrain from articulating the 
specific constitutional rights that segregation violated? The answer is, because it was strategically 
advisable for the justices to go that route. My analysis shows, however, that the justices engaged 
in meta-consequentialist rationale-picking because they decided the constitutional question that 
 
328 
Brown posed by recourse to affective factors such as moral intuitions, which failed both to moti-
vate robust rationales and to link inextricably the weak rationales the intuitions did succeed in 
motivating to the moral judgment that segregation was immoral or unjust. Because outcome and 
reasoning were severable in the justices’ minds, the justices abjured their own initial deontological 
rationales and, in time for the Brown decision, found others that better served the strategic interests 
of the Court–––waiting in the briefs, courtesy of the NAACP. 
 The second question this work sought to answer is, What constitutional harms does Brown 
condemn? On its face Brown dooms only de jure segregation. But the justices’ intuitions, the real 
causes of the Brown outcome, condemned more: they censured the symbolism of racial inequality. 
As we have seen, seven of the nine justices expressed that opprobrium in deontological terms. But 
that is most likely because (1) deontological “reasoning” is in fact driven by affect, and therefore 
constitutes the most natural form of argumentation for people whose decision-making is driven by 
moral intuitions, and (2) per the social intuitionist model, when the justices grasped for available 
“concept resources,” i.e., pre-existing, articulable rationales, to justify their judgments to each 
other, the primary ones available at the time were colorblind, deontological arguments. Inci-
dentally, this would also explain why the NAACP at the time deployed colorblind legal theories: 
there were no other discrimination-enervating “argument-weapons” available. As soon as such 
concept-resources began emerging in the mid-1960s, however, the NAACP dropped the colorblind 
ruse and adopted a newly-minted “argument-weapon” that much more directly and precisely ad-
vanced its eponymous organizational objective of “Advanc[ing] Colored People”: the contention 
that morality, Brown, and Congressional civil rights legislation all commanded special class-spe-
cific protections and provisions for the victims of racial discrimination, as opposed merely to the 
eradication of discrimination by law. 
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 In like fashion, the justices in Brown recurred to deontology in their conference discussions 
both because their judgments were driven by affect and because there were no concept-resources 
that could more precisely and directly end segregation while advancing the Court’s strategic inter-
ests. The paucity of such resources in the mid-1950s, as Jack Balkin noted, was due to the fact that 
“lawyers, judges, and legal scholars” had not yet “come up with novel and sophisticated theo-
ries,”443 i.e., the persuasive, custom-tailored concept-resources or argument-weapons that the 
Court could have employed to reach its preferred outcome both as to the immediate facts and as to 
future action, while enshrining that outcome in the cloak of constitutional inevitability. The mod-
ern concept-resource the justices lacked in Brown, but most likely would have most desired, is the 
“anti-subordination principle” Balkin helpfully articulates. Had the anti-subordination principle 
been available to the justices who decided Brown, I have no doubt they would have used it in lieu 
of the actual reasoning Warren employed, for Balkin’s principle is perfectly compatible with the 
Brown’s consequentialist constitutional rationale, and, more important, with the meta-consequen-
tialist judicial approach the justices took to develop Brown’s consequentialist constitutional basis. 
After all, Balkin’s anti-subordination principle is simply the meta-consequentialist reality of 
Brown given the imprimatur and sophisticated rebranding of legal scholars who have had decades 
to develop what the justices in Brown had only 18 months to produce. The Brown Court would 
have benefited from having the antisubordination principle, or concept-resource, in its arsenal. 
Thus, because the deontological arguments the justices propounded at the Brown conferences were 
simply post hoc rationalizations (as demonstrated by the fact the justices readily abandoned those 
reasons for the eventual consequentialist rationale deployed in Brown) and because the anti-sub-
ordination principle condemns the species of stimuli–––i.e., apparently, stigmatizing treatment of 
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blacks–––that elicited the justices’ moral intuitions that segregation was unjust, while leaving open 
a wide arena of judicial discretion, Brown espouses the antisubordination principle. 
 That this question nevertheless continues to be hotly debated today is due in part to a his-
torical misconception of Brown dating back to Judge John Parker’s dictum in the remanded Briggs 
litigation that the Court in Brown had limited its ruling to the determination that the “Constitution 
. . . does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimination . . . [i.e.,] the use of governmental 
power to enforce segregation.”444 Modern conservative legal scholars view Brown as announcing 
precisely these principles (in their most universal forms) and as thereby enshrining the deontolog-
ical principle of colorblindness. While there is little doubt that the ultimate widespread acceptance 
of Brown by America’s white majority turned upon Judge Parker’s reading of the decision, the 
claim that Brown announces a rule of colorblindness is a mistake–––one that, if not deliberately 
engineered by the Court in the Brown decision itself, has nevertheless served the Court’s institu-
tional interests beautifully for decades. For that mistake induced public acceptance and eventually 
sacralization of what is effectively a judicial carte blanche to improve the station and advance the 
interests of racial minorities as the Court judges prudent and proper. Brown does not stand for a 
constitutional rule of colorblindness any more than it stands for the idea that “separate but equal” 
remains permissible outside of public education. The Court did not say explicitly, but insinuated 
to those who were listening, that there was another way to pursue racial equality than by telling 
government to turn a blind eye to race. 
 Whether or not the Court intentionally misrepresented Brown’s holding to the lower courts 
it tasked with enforcing desegregation (later integration), the Brown II remedy decree contained 
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language that made Judge Parker’s interpretation of Brown initially a plausible one. The first sen-
tence of the decree reads, “Racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional and all 
provisions of federal, state or local law requiring or permitting such discrimination must yield to 
this principle.”445 The Court told the lower courts to which the cases were remanded to “take such 
proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and 
proper to admit the parties to these cases to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis 
with all deliberate speed.”446 The term “racially nondiscriminatory” appears four times in the de-
cree and accompanying opinion, and was the shorthand by which the Court referred to its holding 
on the Brown merits the year before. These are the dicta from which Judge Parker derived his 
interpretation, and those upon which colorblind constitutionalists latch as evidence of Brown’s 
deontological provenance. Of course, the instructive contrast is the absence of such language in 
the Brown merits opinion itself. 
 When the Court realized in the mid-1960s that desegregation with “all deliberate speed” 
meant racial separation “indefinitely” in the South, the justices decided to supplant Brown II’s 
anemic colorblind attack on de jure segregation with a forceful frontal assault on enduring racial 
separation in formerly de jure segregated school districts. It was at this point that the Court revised 
and expanded the Brown-era meaning of “segregation” to refer to any racial separation that might 
be linked to state action.447 The Court consequently began finding that various colorblind remedies 
were insufficient for achieving integration. In Green v. County School Board, the Court, hewing 
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to its informal tradition of unanimity in school desegregation cases begun in 1954, announced that 
the time for “all deliberate speed” was up. “The burden on a school board today is to come forward 
with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now,”448 Justice 
Brennan wrote for the majority. The Court also drew an equivalence between the segregation 
Brown condemned and the racial separation that existed in New Kent County schools. 
The pattern of separate ‘white’ and ‘Negro’ schools in the New Kent County school system 
[which had implemented a “freedom of choice” pupil placement system] established under 
compulsion of state laws is precisely the pattern of segregation to which Brown I and 
Brown II were addressed, and which Brown I declared unconstitutionally denied Negro 
school children equal protection of the laws.449 
To so claim was a stretch–––but Brown blessed such judicial flexibility in the interest of advancing 
salutary constitutional ends under the aegis of equal protection. In privileging the pursuit of justice 
to the demands of candor and judicial reasoning, Brown signaled that decisions such as Green 
would be coming, when and as political and social circumstances permitted. Such decisions would 
be and are eminently justified by Brown as a model for judicial decision-making and as a consti-
tutional precedent. 
 Three years later, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,450 the Court 
announced that the country’s political and social circumstances were now ripe to permit district-
wide busing to achieve racial balance as a remedy in de jure segregated southern school districts. 
Two years after Swann, in Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver,451 the Court extended integration 
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by busing to school districts that had never been compelled or authorized by state law to segregate 
on the basis of race. “This is not a case,” Justice Brennan wrote (again for the majority), “where a 
statutory dual system has ever existed. Nevertheless, where plaintiffs prove that the school author-
ities have carried out a systematic program of segregation affecting a substantial portion of the 
students, schools, teachers, and facilities within the school system, it is only common sense to 
conclude that there exists a predicate for a finding of the existence of a dual school system.”452 
Though Brennan’s common sense was not as widely shared as his words suggested, the Court 
aggressively authorized and prosecuted a nationwide plan of racial integration by judicial decree. 
 The most recent revealing debate over Brown’s meaning occurred between Chief Justice 
John Roberts and Justice Stephen Breyer in the Seattle, Washington and Louisville, Kentucky 
busing cases subsumed under Parents Involved v. Seattle School District No. 1.453 Writing for a 
four-justice plurality (joined in various places by Justice Anthony Kennedy to make a decision for 
the Court), Roberts contended that a school district’s voluntary busing of students in order to 
achieve racial integration in the district’s schools was unconstitutional because it failed “strict 
scrutiny”–––the most stringent of the “scrutiny rules” to which Balkin’s model refers–––by not 
being “narrowly tailored,” one of strict scrutiny’s requirements. To show that the Constitution is 
colorblind, Roberts returned to the fount of the modern constitutional regime of equal protection. 
The parties and their amici debate which side is more faithful to the heritage of Brown, but 
the position of the plaintiffs in Brown was spelled out in their brief and could not have been 
clearer: “[T]he Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from according differential treat-
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ment to American children on the basis of their color or race.” . . . . As counsel who ap-
peared before this Court for the plaintiffs in Brown put it: “We have one fundamental con-
tention which we will seek to develop in the course of this argument, and that contention 
is that no State has any authority under the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to use race as a factor in affording educational opportunities among its citi-
zens.” There is no ambiguity in that statement. And it was that position that prevailed in 
this Court, which emphasized in its remedial opinion that what was “[a]t stake is the per-
sonal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon as practicable on a 
nondiscriminatory basis," and what was required was "determining admission to the public 
schools on a nonracial basis” . . . (emphasis added).454 
As we can see, though Roberts tried to go back to Brown, he did not quite make it: the closest he 
got to the opinion itself was the Brown II remedy order and the NAACP’s 1952 briefs. There might 
not have been any ambiguity in Robert Carter’s statement to the Court on the first day of the Brown 
oral arguments in December, 1952, but there was more than enough ambiguity in the Court’s de-
cision in Brown on May 17, 1954, and, in any case, the Court elected not to take any of the con-
stitutional paths the NAACP suggested to it. Brown II doesn’t clarify Brown’s meaning any more 
than the words of Brown itself does. The keys to understanding Brown that Roberts lacked are in 
the theory presented and primary source record collated in this work. 
 Breyer’s response to Roberts is truer to Brown’s meaning and purpose. After noting that 
the tools that the Seattle and Louisville school districts used to foment racial balance in their 
schools had been pioneered by the federal judiciary to remedy racial imbalance in de jure segre-
gated schools in the 60s and 70s, Breyer proclaimed: 
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All of those plans represent local efforts to bring about the kind of racially integrated edu-
cation that Brown v. Board of Education, long ago promised–––efforts that this Court has 
repeatedly required, permitted, and encouraged local authorities to undertake. . . . In this 
Court’s finest hour, Brown v. Board of Education challenged this history [of segregation] 
and helped to change it. For Brown held out a promise. It was a promise embodied in three 
Amendments designed to make citizens of slaves. It was the promise of true racial equality–
––not as a matter of fine words on paper, but as a matter of everyday life in the Nation’s 
cities and schools. It was about the nature of a democracy that must work for all Americans. 
It sought one law, one Nation, one people, not simply as a matter of legal principle but in 
terms of how we actually live.455 
Brown promised all those things and more. What it promised most was to convert the law of equal 
protection into a meta-consequentialist authorization for prudential judicial efforts to improve the 
position of racial minorities in American society. The forces that the justices marshalled in order 
to decide Brown did not abide the traditional judicial requirement of incisive reasoning. But the 
regime of equal protection inaugurated in Brown has provided more than adequate justification for 
the judicial means to which the justices felt themselves compelled to resort in the founding. They 
believed, and were correct in their “belief [,] that progress, called history, would validate their 
course, and that another generation, remembering its own future, would imagine them favorably. 
Such a faith need not conflict with, but [] overrides standards of analytical reason and scientific 
inquiry as warrantors of the validity of judgment.”456 
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 Since the close of the Civil War the United States has been “hesitating between two 
worlds – one dead – the other powerless to be born”. War and military measures brought an old 
order to an end but as usual proved unequal to founding a new one. The reunited country neither 
in North in South has been willing really to adapt its practices to its professions on the subject of 
negro equality. 
 I must admit to little personal experience or firsthand knowledge by which to test many 
of the arguments advanced in these cases. One reared in the North and attending public schools 
where not even a thought was given to segregating the very few negro pupils, finds it difficult to 
understand the emotional and traditional background of the present problem. Racial tensions 
which manifest themselves in various forms of legal segregation seem most intense where the 
ratio of colored to white passes a point where the latter vaguely feel themselves, for some reason, 
insecure. 
 It seems instinctive with every race, faith, state or culture to resort to some isolating de-
vice to protect and perpetuate those qualities which it particularly values in itself. Separatism, ei-
ther by voluntary withdrawal or imposed segregation, has been practiced in some degree by 
many religions, nationalities, [2] and races and by many – one can almost say all – governments 
to alleviate tensions, prevent subversions, and to quell or forestall violence. No decision by this 
Court can eradicate these fears, prides and prejudiced on which segregation rests. Even in the 
North these are latent and while they may not manifest themselves in legal discriminations, they 
have been made manifest by outbreaks of violence rather more extensive than have occurred in 
the South. 
 But in the South the negro not only suffers from racial suspicions and antagonisms pre-
sent in other states and in other countries of the world, but also, I am convinced, has suffered 
great prejudice from the aftermath of the great American white conflict. The negro and his cham-
pions may justly resent the forces by which he has been held in subjection. But the white South 
retains in historical memory a deep resentment of the forces which, by conquest, imposed a 
fierce program of reconstruction and the deep humiliation of carpetbag government. The negro is 
the visible and reachable beneficiary and symbol of this unhappy experience. Thus, in the south-
ern states he has not only to bear his own disadvantages but the burden engendered by white 
wars and the hostilities of white politics. 
 Even so, tested by the pace of history, the rise of the negro in the South, as well as the 
North, is one of the swiftest and [3] most dramatic advances in the annals of man. Economic and 
social forces seem to mark discrimination for extinction even faster than legal measures. It is 
easy, however, to sympathize with the impatience of those who smart under the remaining dis-
criminatory practices. But whether a sentiment and a practice that seems on its way out will be 
accelerated or retarded by what many are likely to regard as a ruthless use of judicial power is a 
question that I cannot and need not answer. 
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 The conclusion that negro segregation in schools has outlived whatever justification it 
ever had and is incompatible with our current conception of equality before the law, is congenial 
to my own background and views of fair and wise public policy. While I candidly have great dif-
ficulty in finding that segregation is contrary to any law the presently exists, I have no doubt that 
it is contrary to the law as it will be within a generation. As mortality and replacement operate on 
this Bench, it seems not only futile but duplicitous to longer lead the southern states to believe 
that they may prudently spend their revenues or plan their affairs in reliance upon the continual 
approval by this Court of segregation. But since it bears importantly upon the form and expedi-
tion of the relief, this Court must face the difficulties in the way of honestly saying that the states 
which have segregated schools have not, until [4] today, been justified in regarding their practice 
as lawful. 
 II. Basis in Existing Law for Decision. 
 The Thoughtful layman, as well as the trained lawyer, must wonder how it is that this 
morning the Constitution suddenly has come to forbid a widespread custom which for three-
quarters of a century it has notoriously tolerated. We cannot over simplify this case to be a mere 
decision as to whether segregation in school is, in our opinion, wise or unwise, good or evil. 
Questions of method in Constitutional interpretation and of power in our federal system are per-
haps as far reaching as any that have been before this Court since its foundation. They must be 
faced and not avoided or ignored if we are to make a responsible exercise of our power. 
 Our authority to promulgate this decision in the State cases is the due process and equal 
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment adopted in 1868, while the District of Columbia 
case can invoke only the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment adopted in 1791. The text 
of neither of these days anything specifically about education or about segregation. But they are 
majestic and sweeping generalities which, standing apart from the history of their times, can well 
indicate a full and unqualified and co-mingled racial partnership. Yet, if these texts has such 
meaning how could it be that for more than a half century from the adoption of the Fifth [5] 
Amendment to the Emancipation Proclamation, it was never suggested that the Due Process 
Clause even prohibited negro slavery. And how can it be explained that when these words were 
copied into the Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause was added to them, that 
Amendment still stopped far short of anything like equal rights for it did not assure even the 
equal right of the franchise to the negro, but goes on to provide a reduction of Congressional rep-
resentation for states which deny the negro’s right to vote. Nearly two years later (1870) it was 
found necessary to add the Fifteenth Amendment to prohibit the states from denying the right to 
vote on account of color. But even when enlarging the assurance of equal rights to include the 
franchise, nothing was said of education or of the right to co-mingle with white pupils in the pub-
lic educational system. 
 Today it is well agreed, as Judge Cardozo reminded us, that these Constitutional generali-
ties “have a content and a significance that vary from age to age”. This brings us, however, 
squarely to the question whether we shall interpret these generalities as they were understood by 
the age that framed and adopted them or by the age that now reads them. It is implied in the 
questions which we asked and on which all of the litigants have bestowed extensive research that 
the original public will that struggled for expression in these [6] Constitutional phrases is at least 
relevant to our decision. 
 All that I can fairly get from the legislative debates in searching for the original will and 
purpose expressed in the Amendment, is that it was a passionate, confused, and deplorable era. 
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As often is characteristic of legislative history, the sponsors played down the consequences of 
the legislation they were proposing in order to ease its passage, while the opponents exaggerate 
the consequences in order to frighten away support. I find in the debates no sound foundation for 
a conclusion. It is, of course, easy to show that there were those among the sponsors of the 
movement who hoped for complete social equality and consequent early assimilation of the lib-
erated negro into an amalgamated race. It is equally easy to point to those who thought they took 
no step in that direction beyond conferring upon the freed man very limited civil rights. The most 
of the leaders and spokesmen for the movement that put the Civil War Amendment through ap-
pear never to have reached a point in their thinking where either negro education or negro segre-
gation was a serious or foreseeable problem, let alone reaching any conclusion as to a solution. 
The legislative debates, as I read them, result in either a blank or a match. 
 But if deeds, rather than words, count as evidence of understanding, there is little indeed 
to show that these Amendments [7] condemn the practice here in question. How otherwise shall 
we explain such facts as these: The Congress that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment and all 
Congresses since have established and maintained segregated schools in the District of Colum-
bia. This system was so open and notorious that it must have been known to every Congressman 
who voted for District of Columbia Appropriations down to this very day. Sporadic protests were 
made but disregarded. Congress has legislated concerning some negro civil rights, such as the 
right to sit upon juries, but has never touched the segregation question, either in the States or in 
the Federal City. It readmitted representatives of the Confederate reconstructed states to the Un-
ion, requiring them to accept the Fourteenth Amendment, but not requiring any provision on this 
subject. When we turn to the deeds of the States, we find them equally difficult to reconcile with 
a purpose to end segregation in schools. Nine states did not have segregated schools when the 
Amendment was submitted to them. Five did have but abandoned them about the time of the 
Amendment. Four had segregated schools but did not ratify the Amendment. Two border states 
ratified and continued segregated schools. Nine Northern states, either established or continued 
segregated schools after ratifying the Amendment. The eight reconstructed states all established 
segregated schools. At this time seventeen states of the Union are maintaining [8] separation of 
the races in the public schools. Many of these were Northern states governed by the same cur-
rents of political opinion and by the same political party that had fought the war, freed the slaves 
and put through the Amendments. It is hard to charge their continuance of the practice of segre-
gation to mere perversity, prejudice or disregard for law. Plainly, there was no consensus among 
legislators and administrators or the public of the several states that segregation was forbidden by 
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 A long line of judicial precedents not only constitutes a usually respected source of law, 
but judicial decision made close to the time of the Amendment by judges who participated in the 
movement to enact it are not only entitled to respect as to opinions but as reflection of first hand 
knowledge of history. But neither in the state courts of the Northern States nor in this Court 
where Northern men predominated has there been any clear pronouncement or line of decision 
that these clauses admittedly requiring equal opportunity for education prohibit a policy that each 
race should enjoy its rights apart rather than in co-partnership. The layman must wonder how it 
comes that the best informed judges who had risked their lives for these Amendments did not un-
derstand their meaning, while we at this remote time do understand them. 
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 [9] Custom too, is a powerful lawmaker. Indeed not long ago we decided that custom has 
nullified the Constitutional plan for independent Presidential electors. I doubt, as I then indi-
cated, that any custom could be allowed to override express provisions of the Constitution. But 
here we have the custom of segregation, which is not expressly forbidden and which has pre-
vailed in both Southern and many Northern states. It must be recognized that in the many judicial 
decisions which have sanctioned the custom of segregation the judges were following the ancient 
and well established process of regarding the long established usage of a people as the strongest 
kind of evidence of its law. But what we decide today is that a custom deeply anchored in our so-
cial system is contrary to law. 
 III. Sociological and Political Considerations 
 Various intangible and extra-legal criteria and sociological, psychological and even polit-
ical considerations are urged to persuade us that whatever was meant or purposed originally we 
should now decree segregation to end as an obsolete, unjust, and impolitic practice. It is said to 
be offensive to the best contemporary opinion here and damaging to our prestige abroad. It is 
said that segregation is based on a philosophy of inherent inequality of races and that it creates in 
the young negro children an inferiority complex [10] which has a retarding effect on their educa-
tion progress. 
 All of these are arguments of policy with which, in the main as policy, I do not disagree. 
But if the Constitution forbids any classification for any purpose on the basis of color or race, 
these arguments are unnecessary and if it permits any classification on such a basis, then the oc-
casion and justification for the classification would seem to present legislative problems for the 
States, not judicial questions. 
 I do not think we can import into the concept of equal protection of the law psychological 
and subjective factors. I have no doubt that segregation has psychological consequences, but I 
know too that the woes of the colored child are by no means solved merely by forcing him into 
white company. And if we should regard the feelings and reactions of those who are coerced into 
segregation I suppose we should also weigh the effect of those who are coerced out of it. While 
the prosegregation emotion may seem to us less rational than antisegregation emotion, we can 
hardly deny the existence of sincerity and passion of those who think that their blood, birth and 
lineage are something worthy of protection by separatism. Such factors are not mensurable by 
the judicial process. Many classifications that are useful in governing may be disliked and have 
adverse effects on those classified – minority    – [11] are denied privileges that 
come with the mystic age of twenty-one, married persons are classified differently than single 
ones, sometimes to their advantage, sometimes not, veterans, even by compulsion, have a sepa-
rate category in civil service. Not long ago this Court held that the Due Process Clause does not 
prevent the federal government from making a racial classification of citizens when it sanctioned 
the removal of the Japanese descended population from the West Coast during the war. While I 
did not agree with that basis of classification as compatible with the concept of Due Process, I do 
not think we should read into the concept of equal protection the shadowy and changing doc-
trines relating to mental and emotional reactions. 
 No informed person can be insensitive to the fact that the past few years have witnessed a 
profound change in the responsible and rational public opinion toward segregation and all related 
problems. The awful consequences of racial prejudice revealed by the post mortem upon the 
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Nazi Regime in Europe have caused a revulsion against the kind of racial feeling that was mani-
fest in the Korematsu case. But what part public opinion should consciously play in judicial deci-
sions is another matter. 
 A judicial determination as to what the law is may be supposed to represent learning, 
judgment and reason, rather than mere choice from will or inclination. If we, who have pondered 
[12] this problem, as we have pondered no other in my experience on the Court, and have read 
the briefs of learned counsel for all parties and the lengthy research which rescues much ob-
scured history from oblivion and have heard the arguments of the parties, consciously defer in 
our deliberations to those who have done none of these things, it means that the judicial process 
has counted for naught. If the matter were one of policy, of course, the will of constituents 
should govern, but judges should have no constituents. And the Amendment, if construed in the 
light of public opinion, would mean that it was being construed by those who have not had the 
advantage of studying an argument instead of by those who had. 
 The Fourteenth Amendment does not contemplate a static and perpetual condition, but 
makes provision for recognizing and giving effect to changing conditions and currents of opinion 
in application of its principles to an expanding and developing society. Whatever doubt and con-
fusion may exist as to the meaning of other phrases of the Fourteenth Amendment, one thing is 
perfectly clear. It provides that “The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legis-
lation, the provisions of this Article.” Thus, the Amendment does not attempt to speak the last 
word on the subjects with which it deals in such generalities, but anticipates that from time to 
time there will be necessity for supplemental and [13] interpretative action. If Congress were to 
find segregation an obstacle to achieving the purposes of the Amendment and that legislation to 
abolish it was therefore necessary and proper, I do not suppose any Justice would doubt the Con-
stitutionality of such an act. Certainly if the Amendment condemns segregation without any im-
plementation, it could not be less effective if it were implemented by a statute. So we have to as-
sume that a complete and undoubted power to deal with this subject exists in a branch of the gov-
ernment co-ordinate with our own and one which is chosen by political methods and responsive 
to political  . 
 Apparently the country suffers a schizophrenic division – it elects Presidents who oppose 
segregation and a Congress that favors or tolerates it. We have to assume that Congress is not op-
posed to segregation and does not consider it an obstacle to the achievement of the purposes of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. We are not at liberty to assume that Congress disregards its duty. If 
Congress has not expressly approved segregation, it has at least repeatedly tacitly supported it in 
the Nation’s Capital and has made no effort to outlaw it either in the federal territory or in the 
States. It is said, however, that the South has enough representation to prevent such a step. But 
that is to say that the Court should intervene to promulgate as a law that which our Constitutional 
representative system will not enact. It means nothing less than [14] that either Congressional 
representation does not represent sentiment or public sentiment does not resent segregation. It 
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 I. 
 Since the close of the Civil War the United States has been “hesitating between two 
worlds – one dead – the other powerless to be born”. War brought an old order to an end but as 
usual force proved unequal to founding a new one. Neither North nor South has been willing re-
ally to adapt its racial practices to its professions. The race problem would be quickly solved if 
some way could be found to make us all live up to our hypocrisies. 
 It seems instinctive with every race, faith, state or culture to resort to some isolating de-
vice to protect and perpetuate those qualities, real or fancied, which it particularly values in it-
self. Separatism, either by voluntary withdrawal or by imposed segregation, has been practiced in 
some degree by many religions, nationalities, and races and by many – one almost can say all – 
governments to alleviate tensions, prevent subversions, and to quell or forestall violence. This 
Court can not eradicate these fears, prides and prejudices on which segregation rests. Even in the 
North these are latent and while they may not manifest themselves in legal discriminations, they 
do by outbreaks of racial rioting. 
 [2] Racial tensions seem to develop wherever the ratio of colored population to white 
passes a point where the latter vaguely feel themselves, for some reason, insecure. But in the 
South the Negro not only suffers from racial suspicions and antagonisms present in other states 
and in other countries, but also, I am convinced, has suffered great prejudice from the aftermath 
of the great American white conflict. The white South retains in historical memory a deep resent-
ment of the forces which, after conquest, imposed a fierce program of reconstruction and the 
deep humiliation of carpetbag government. The Negro is the visible and reachable beneficiary 
and symbol of this unhappy experience, on whom many visit their natural desire for retaliation. 
 I must admit to little personal experience to teach the insight necessary to test many of 
the arguments advanced in these cases. One taught in the public schools in a part of the North, 
where not even a thought was given to segregating the very few Negro pupils, finds it difficult to 
understand the emotional and traditional background which complicate the present problem. 
 Tested by the pace of history, the rise of the Negro in the South, as well as the North, is 
one of the swiftest and [3] most dramatic advances in the annals of man. Economic and social 
forced seem to mark discrimination for extinction even faster than legal measures. It is easy, 
however, to understand that historical process may do the contemporary individual no good for 
his life moves faster than society. But whether a real abolition of segregation will be accelerated 
or retarded by what many are likely to regard as a ruthless use of federal judicial power is a ques-
tion that I cannot and need not answer. 
 That Negro segregation in the schools has outlived whatever original justification it may 
have had and is no longer wise or fair public policy is a conclusion congenial to my background 
and social and political views. Economic, social and political considerations seem to mark it for 
certain and early, if gradual extinction. Whatever we may say the law is today, I have no doubt 
that within a generation segregation will be outlawed. As the twin forces of mortality and re-
placement operate on this bench that seems inevitable unless some dramatic and unforeseeable 
excess by the Negro and his friends shall cause reversal of present trends. 
 But we can not oversimplify this decision to be a mere expression of our personal opinion 
that school segregation is unwise or evil. We have not been chosen as legislators but as [4] 
judges. Questions of method and standards of constitutional interpretation and of limitation on 
 
342 
responsible use of judicial power in our federal system are as far reaching as any that have been 
before the Court since its establishment. This Court must face the difficulties in the way of hon-
estly saying that the states which have segregated schools have not, until today, been justified in 
regarding their practice as lawful. And the thoughtful layman, as well as the trained lawyer, must 
wonder how it is that a supposedly stable organic law of our nation this morning forbids what for 
three quarters of a century it has allowed. I think we individual justices may not, in justice to this 
Court as an institution and to our profession, brush off these problems. 
 II. Basis in Existing Law for Decision 
 Any authority of the judiciary to promulgate this decision has existed in the State cases 
has existed since 1868 and in the case of the District of Columbia since 1791. The due process 
and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the due process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment are the respective texts for interpretation. Neither of these says anything about 
education or about segregation. But they are majestic and sweeping generalities which, standing 
alone can be read to require a full and [5] equal racial partnership. Yet, if these texts had such 
meaning to the age that wrote them, how could it be that for more than a half century from the 
adoption of the Fifth Amendment to the Emancipation Proclamation, it was never suggested that 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment even prohibited negro slavery in the District of 
Columbia? And how can it be explained that when these words were copied into the Fourteenth 
Amendment plus its Equal Protection Clause did not assure even the equal right of franchise to 
the Negro, but goes on to provide a reduction of Congressional representation for states which 
deny the Negro’s right to vote. Nearly two years later (1870) it was found necessary to add the 
Fifteenth Amendment to assure him the vote but even then nothing was provided as to the right 
to education or to co-mingle with white pupils in the public educational system. 
 There is controversy as old as the Republic as to whether the courts apply constitutional 
generalities in the sense that they were understood by the age that framed them or by the later 
age that reads them. It is implied in our questions on which all of the litigants have bestowed ex-
tensive research that the original public will that struggled for expression in these Constitutional 
phrases is at least relevant to our decision. 
 [6] In searching for the original will and purpose expressed in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, all that I can fairly get from the legislative debates is that it was a passionate, confused, 
and deplorable era. As often is characteristic of legislative history, its sponsors played down the 
consequences of their proposal to order to ease it passage, while its opponents exaggerated the 
consequences to frighten away support. It appears that among the sponsors of the movement 
were a few who hoped to bring about complete social equality and consequent early assimilation 
of the liberated Negro into an amalgamated race. But on every test of strength those of more 
moderate views prevailed. No support for that view for example can be cited from the great 
Emancipator himself. The majority stopped at conferring upon the freed man very limited civil 
rights. Most of leaders and spokesmen for the movement that carried the Civil War Amendments 
appear never to have reached a point in their thinking where they foresaw either Negro education 
or Negro segregation as serious foreseeable problems, let alone any conclusion as to their solu-
tion. 
 If deeds, rather than words, count as evidence, there is little indeed to show that these 
Amendemnts were understood in their own time to condemn the practice here in question. The 
[7] Congress that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment and all Congresses to this day have estab-
lished and maintained segregated schools in the District of Columbia. This system was so open 
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and notorious that it must have been known to every Congressman who voted for District of Co-
lumbia Appropriations down to this very day. Only a few sporadic protests were made but they 
were disregarded. Congress has legislated concerning some Negro civil rights, such as the right 
to sit upon juries, but has never touched the segregation question. It readmitted to the Union rep-
resentatives of the “reconstructed” Confederate States, requiring them to accept the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but heedless of the omission of any provision on this subject. 
 When we look to the behavior of the States, we find them equally difficult to reconcile 
with an understanding that the Amendment prohibited segregation in schools. Nine states did not 
have segregated schools when the Amendment was submitted to them. Five had segregation but 
abandoned it about the time of the Amendment. Four which had segregated schools did not ratify 
the Amendment. This might plausibly score nine states on the side of abolition. But on the other 
side nine Northern states either established or continued segregated schools after ratifying the 
Amendment and two border states also ratified and continued segregated schools. The [8] eight 
reconstructed states all established segregated schools. At this time seventeen states of the Union 
are maintaining separation of the races in the public schools. Northern states have been largely 
governed by the same political party and by the same currents of political opinion that had fought 
the war, freed the slaves and put through the Amendments. Plainly, there was no concensus 
among legislators or educators of the several states that segregation was forbidden by the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
 A long line of judicial decisions beginning close to the time of the Amendment made by 
Northern judges who participated in the movement to enact it are not only entitled to respect for 
their legal scholarship but also as a reflection of their first hand knowledge of history and the 
conditions of those times. Neither in the state courts of the North nor in this Court where North-
ern men predominated has understanding prevailed that these clauses prohibit the states from de-
ciding that each race should enjoy its rights apart rather than in co-partnership. Almost a century 
of decisional law rendered by informed judges, many of whom had risked their lives for the 
cause the produced these Amendments, is almost unanimous in the view that the matter was one 
left to solution by each state – at least in the absence of Congressional action. 
 [9] This practice of legislators and educators and opinions of the Courts has been rein-
formed by custom, a powerful lawmaker. Indeed not long ago we decided that custom had nulli-
fied the Constitutional plan for independent Presidential electors. But here the custom of segre-
gation is not contrary to any express provision, has prevailed in all Southern and many Northern 
states, and has been recognized in many judicial decisions. This Court, in common with courts 
everywhere, has recognized the force of long custom and has been reluctant to use judicial power 
to try to recast social usages. But we decide today that the unwritten law has long been contrary 
to a custom deeply anchored in our social system. Thus despite my personal satisfaction with the 
Court’s judgment, I simply can not find, in surveying all of the usual sources of law, anything 
which warrants me in saying that it is required by the original purpose and intent of the Four-
teenth or Fifth Amendment. 
 III. 
 Today’s decision can not, with intellectual honesty, be grounded in anything other than 
the doctrine, of which Judge Cardozo reminded us, that these Constitutional generalities “have a 
content and a significance that vary from age to age.” Certainly no one familiar with his teach-
ings would think this meant, what some people [10] advocate, that we declare new constitutional 
law with the freedom of a constitutional convention sitting continuously and with no necessity 
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for submitting its innovations for approval of Congress, ratification by the states or approval of 
the people. 
 Of course the Constitution must be a living instrument and can not be read as if written in 
a dead language. It is neither novel nor radical doctrine that statutes once constitutional may be-
come invalid by changing conditions and those good in one state of facts may be bad under an-
other. Among the multitude of cases to this effect are Nashville C. & St. Louis Railway v. Wal-
ters, 294 U.S. 405 at 414 (1935); Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 US. 765, 772 (1931); citing 
Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Company, 282 U.S. 133, 162; Allen v. St. Louis Iron Mountain 
and Southern Railway Co., 230 U.S. 553, 555, 556; Lincoln Gas and Electric Co. v. City of Lin-
coln, 250 U.S. 256, 268; Chastieton Corporation v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547; Perrin v. United 
States, 232 U.S. 478, 487; Kansas City Railway v. Anderson, 233 U.S. 325, 329; Poindexter v. 
Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 295; Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249; 
Dahnke-Walker Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 289; Withnell v. Ruecking Construction Co., 
249 U.S. 63 at 71; Chicago, Terre Haute & Southwestern Railway v. Anderson, 242 U.S. 283. 
 [11] But a good many considerations are urged upon us to decree an end to segregation 
regardless of what the Amendments originally meant or purposed which I do not think appropri-
ate for judicial appraisal or acceptance. Extra-legal criteria from sociological, psychological and 
political sciences are proposed. Segregation is said to be offensive to the best contemporary 
opinion here and damaging to our prestige abroad. It is said to be based on a philosophy of inher-
ent inequality of races, and that it creates in young Negro children an inferiority complex which 
retards their education and embitters their attitudes to life. These are disputed contentions which 
I have little competence to judge as scientific matters but with which, for purposes of the case, I 
shall not disagree. I have no doubt that segregation has psychological consequences, but as I re-
call school life without segregation, the Negro still was greatly disadvantaged and must have felt 
its sting. 
 However that may be, and if all the woes of colored children would be solved by forcing 
them into white company, I do not think we should import into the concept of equal protection of 
the law these elusive psychological and subjective factors. They are not determinable with satis-
factory objectivity or mensurable with reasonable certainty. If we adhere to objective criteria the 
[12] judicial process will still be capricious enough. 
 Such criteria as hardship on those classified have been heretofore rejected by this Court. 
Not long ago it held that the Constitution does not prevent a classification of citizens by racial 
descent for seizure and transportation of the Nisi away from their West Coast homes during the 
war. Korematsu v. United States. U.S.  . Of course if the Court had taken counsel of the 
feelings or interests of the victims, or simple justice to them it could not have decided as it did. 
Also in this case if we should regard the feelings and reactions of those who are coerced into seg-
regation, I suppose we should also weigh the effect of those who are coerced out of it. While the 
prosegregation emotion may seem to us less rational than antisegregation emotion, we can hardly 
deny the existence of sincerity and passion of those who think that their blood, birth and lineage 
are something worthy of protection by separatism. 
 No informed person can be insensitive to the fact that the past few years have witnessed a 
profound change in the responsible and rational public opinion toward segregation and all related 
problems. The awful consequences of racial prejudice revealed by the post mortem on the Nazi 
Regime in Europe have caused a revulsion against the kind of racial feeling that produced the 
[13] Korematsu case. But what part public opinion should consciously play in judicial decisions 
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is another matter. If the matter be one of policy then, of course, the will of constituents should 
govern. But judges have no constituents and the representative branch of our government is the 
Congress. We have pondered this problem, as we have pondered no other in my experience on 
the Court, and have read the briefs of learned counsel for all parties and the lengthy research 
which rescues much obscure history from oblivion and have heard the arguments of the parties. 
If we consciously defer in our deliberation to those who have done none of these things, it means 
that the judicial process has counted for naught, and the judgment is made by those who have not 
heard the arguments instead of by those who have. 
 The real question as I see it is whether the Constitution permits any classification or sepa-
ration of Negro and White merely on the basis of color or racial ascent. If not these policy argu-
ments are superfluous and, if so, they are for consideration of the legislatures not the courts. 
 I think the change which warrants our decision is not a change in the Constitution but in 
the Negro population. Certainly in the 1860’s and throughout the nineteenth century the Negro 
population, as a whole, was a different people than today. Lately [14] freed from bondage, they 
had no opportunity as yet to show their capacity for education or assimilation, or even a chance 
to demonstrate that they could be self-supporting or in our public life anything more than a pawn 
for white exploiters. I can not say that it was an unreasonable assumption that negro educational 
problems were elementary, special and peculiar and their mass teaching an experiment not easily 
tied in with the education of pupils of more favored background. Nor, when we view the pro-
gress that has been made under it, can we honestly say that the practice of each race pursuing its 
education apart was wholly to the Negro’s disadvantage. His progress under these conditions has 
been spectacular. 
 Whatever may have been true at an earlier period, the mere fact that one is in some de-
gree colored no longer created a presumption that he is inferior, illiterate, retarded or indigent. 
Moreover, assimilation is under way to a marked extent. Blush or shudder, as many will, mixture 
of blood has been making inroads of segregation faster than the courtroom. A line of separation 
between the races has become unclear and blurred and an increasing part of what is called col-
ored population has as much claim to white as to colored blood. This development baffles any 
just segregation effort. 
 [15] Also relevant changes have occurred in the status of the public school. Education, 
even for the whites, was once regarded as a privilege bestowed on those fortunate enough to be 
able to take advantage of it and often was not compulsory. The concept today has changed. Edu-
cation is not a privilege but a right and more than that a duty, to be performed not merely for 
one’s own advantage but for the security and stability of the nation. Access to educational facili-
ties has been gradually transformed from a matter of grace into a right which may not be encum-
bered with unconstitutionally discriminatory or oppressive conditions. And while education was 
long regarded as at most a local or state concern, far from the reach of federal authority, the fed-
eral judicial power especially, and the appropriative power of Congress has moved in to the local 
problems and made education a national concern. 
 The Negro is not free of local educational control. He must meet the prescribed standards 
of learning, discipline and health. He may be treated on his individual merit as a pupil, attend 
schools set apart for those of his neighborhood. But he may not be included or excluded merely 
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I. 
 Since the close of the Civil War, the United States has been “hesitating between two 
worlds – one dead – the other powerless to be born”. Even the North has never fully conformed 
its racial practices to its professions. 
 As one whose formative years were spent in the public schools in a part of the North 
where Negro pupils were very few and not even a thought was given to segregating them, I sup-
pose I am predisposed to the conclusion that Negro segregation in the schools in most parts of 
the country at least has outlived whatever justification it may have had. Economic, social and po-
litical considerations, which prevented it from gaining a foothold in some parts of the North, 
seem to mark it for certain and early extinction elsewhere. That within a generation it will also be 
outlawed by Constitutional interpretation, whatever we may say today, also appears certain. As 
the forces of mortality and replacement operate on this bench, it seems certain that the political 
forces represented by the Executive branch rather than the inertia represented by the Congres-
sional branch of the government will eventually make itself felt in law. 
 [2] These would be simple cases if they could be decided by a mere expression of our 
personal opinion that school segregation is morally, economically intellectually or even legally 
indefensible. It is deeply imbedded in social custom in a large part of this country and its eradica-
tion by legal process involves nothing less than a reconstruction of society. It persists because it 
rests on fears, prides and prejudices which this Court cannot eradicate and which, even in the 
North, are latent and tends to develop tensions wherever the ratio of colored population to white 
passes a point where the latter vaguely feel themselves for some reason insecure. 
 It has seemed almost instinctive with every race, faith, state or culture to resort to some 
isolating device to protect and perpetuate those qualities, real or fancied, which it especially val-
ues in itself. Separatism, either by voluntary withdrawal or by imposed segregation, has been 
practiced in some degree by many religions, nationalities and races and by many – one almost 
can say all – governments to alleviate tensions, prevent subversions and to quell or forestall vio-
lence. Even this Court has but recently declared it to be consistent with the Constitution for the 
Federal Government to classify citizens for removal and internment according to their racial an-
cestry and to leave the [3] judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of treatment based on 
the classifications to the other branches of government. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 
214. 
 It seems clear to me that in the South the Negro not only suffers from the antagonisms 
present in other states and countries, but also from the aftermath of the great American white 
conflict. The White South retains in historical memory a deep resentment of the forces which, 
after conquest, imposed a fierce program of reconstruction and the deep humiliation of carpetbag 
government. Whatever the motivation of the reconstruction measures, the Negro was made their 
visible symbol and reachable beneficiary by the North, with the natural consequence that the de-
sire for retaliation was directed against him because of his association. 
 If we should regard the feelings and reactions of those who are coerced into segregation, I 
suppose we should also weigh the psychological effect on those who are coerced out of it. While 
the pro-segregation emotion may seem to us less rational than anti-segregation emotion, we can 
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hardly deny the sincerity and passion of those who think that their blood, birth and lineage are 
something worthy of protection by separatism. 
 Whether a use of judicial power, which many will regard [4] as unjustifiable, will dimin-
ish or increase the stresses and strains of racial relations, I cannot and need not answer. I must 
admit to little personal experience to test many of the considerations involved in that matter. 
However, I am confident that if the use of judicial power were also needlessly ruthless and in-
considerate of the conditions which have brought about and continued this custom it may defeat 
the purposes of the decision. 
 Because these considerations bear importantly upon the scope and form of remedy to be 
allowed in these cases, I think the Court must face the questions of method and standards of con-
stitutional interpretation and of the limitations on responsible use of judicial power in a federal 
system which are implicit in these cases and are as far reaching as any that have been before the 
Court since its establishment. 
II. EXISTING LAW DOES NOT CONDEMN SEGREGATION 
 The thoughtful layman, as well as the trained lawyer, must wonder how it is that the or-
ganic law of our nation this morning forbids what for three-quarters of a century it has tolerated 
or approved. He must further wonder how it is that this conclusion is reached by the branch of 
the government that is supposed only to declare existing laws and which has exactly the same 
legislative and constitutional materials that have been before the Court for [5] many years. Can 
we honestly say that the States which have maintained segregated schools have not, until today, 
been justified in regarding their practice as constitutional? 
 Of course it is true that all the time there has been visible the warning sign of the due pro-
cess and particularly the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. These majestic 
and sweeping generalities standing alone can be read to require a full and equal racial partnership 
in all matters within the reach of the law. They can be read to virtually replace our federation 
with a unitary form of government. But neither of these clauses specifically mentions education 
or segregation. Any authority that they give to the judiciary to outlaw segregation has existed as 
to the State cases since 1868 and in the case of the District of Columbia since 1791. Yet, if these 
texts had such meaning to the age that wrote them, how could it be that the Fifth Amendment for 
half a century tolerated slavery in the District of Columbia. And how can it be that when those 
words were copied into the Fourteenth Amendment and an equal protection clause added, that 
was not deemed to assure the Negro the right to vote for the Amendment goes on to provide a 
reduction of Congressional representation for states which do not allow him to exercise the fran-
chise. Nearly two years later (1870) it was [6] found necessary to add the Fifteenth Amendment 
to assure him the vote, but even then, with the shortcomings of the Fourteenth Amendment obvi-
ous, nothing was provided either as to segregation or as to education. 
 I suppose that the original will and purpose expressed in a constitutional document is at 
least relevant to its subsequent interpretation. So much is implied by the questions that we have 
asked of counsel. In searching for the original will and purpose expressed in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, all that I can fairly get from the legislative debates is that it was a passionate, con-
fused and deplorable era. Like most legislative history it has the misleading characteristic that its 
sponsors played down the consequence of their proposal in order to ease opposition to its pas-
sage, while its opponents exaggerated the consequences to frighten away support. Among the 
sponsors of the movement were a few who doubtless hoped that it would bring about complete 
social equality and early assimilation of the liberated Negro to an amalgamated race. But on 
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every test of strength those of more moderate views prevailed. For example, no support for the 
abolition of segregation can be cited from the great Emancipator himself. The majority stopped 
with conferring upon the freed man certain very limited civil rights. [7] Most of the leaders and 
spokesmen for the movement that carried the Civil War Amendments appear never to have 
reached a point in their thinking where they considered either the segregation or the education of 
the Negro to present pressing problems, let alone reaching any conclusion as to their solution. 
 If deeds rather than words evidence purpose, there is little to show that these Amend-
ments were understood or intended in their own time to condemn the practice here in question. 
The very Congress that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment and all Congresses from that day to 
this have established or supported and maintained segregated schools in the District of Columbia. 
This system was notorious and must have been known to every Congressman who voted for Dis-
trict of Columbia appropriations down to this very day. Occasionally a protest was made but they 
were always disregarded. Congress has legislated concerning some Negro civil rights, such as 
the right to sit upon juries but never has touched the segregation question. Congress re-admitted 
to the Union representatives of the “reconstructed” Confederate States, requiring them to accept 
the Fourteenth Amendment but not requiring any provision on this subject. 
 Turning from Congress to look to the behavior of the States, we find that equally difficult 
to reconcile with any [8] understanding that the Amendment would prohibit segregation in 
schools. Nine states did not have segregated schools when the Amendment was submitted to 
them. Five did, but abandoned at about that time. Four, which had segregated schools, did not 
ratify the Amendment. Nine Northern States and two border States either established or contin-
ued segregated schools after ratifying the Amendment. The eight reconstructed states all estab-
lished segregated schools. Down to the present day, seventeen states of the Union are maintain-
ing legal separation of the races in the public schools. It is easy as to the Southern States to 
smugly assume that segregation has been a projection of pro-slavery and secession sentiment, but 
that does not account for it in the larger number of Northern States where the same political party 
that sponsored the Amendments has a large part of the time in most of them also been predomi-
nant in the state administrations. Plainly, there was no consensus among legislators or educators 
of the several states ratifying the Amendments that it was to forbid segregation. 
 In the state courts of the North and in this Court where Northern men have predominated 
no understanding has prevailed that these clauses of their own force prohibit the States from de-
ciding that each race must obtain its education apart [9] rather than in co-partnership. Almost a 
century of decisional law rendered by judges, many of whom risked their lives for the cause that 
produced these Amendments, is almost unanimous in the view that the Amendment tolerated 
segregation by State action – at least in the absence of Congressional action to the contrary. 
 The fundamental premise of the judicial reasoning which prevailed in the early days is 
important as the basis of the reasoning which prevails today. It was that the requirement of equal 
protection does not disable the State from making reasonable classifications of its inhabitants nor 
impose the obligation to accord identical treatment to all. All that it requires is that the classifica-
tions of different groups rest upon real and not upon feigned distinctions, that the distinction 
have some rational relation to the subject matter for which the classification is adopted, and that 
the differences in treatment between classes shall not go beyond what is reasonable in the light of 
the relevant differences. These premises are valid and repeatedly applied today. But the early 
judges also reasoned, influenced largely by precedents that antedated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, that there were such differences between the Negro and the White races viewed as a whole 
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as warranted separate classification and differences that were relevant not only for [10] their edu-
cational facilities but also for marriage, for access to public places of recreation, amusement or 
service and as passengers on common carriers and as the right to buy and own real estate. 
 The custom of the people has always been recognized as a powerful lawmaker and cus-
tom reinforced the practice of legislators and educators and the opinions of the courts as those 
practices reinforced custom. This Court, in common with courts everywhere, has recognized the 
force of long custom and has been reluctant to use judicial power to try to recast social usages 
established among the people. Indeed, not long ago, we decided that custom has nullified the 
constitutional plan for independent Presidential electors. Today’s decision is that the Constitution 
forbids a custom deeply anchored in our social system. 
III. LIMITS OF JUDICIAL ACTION 
 The justification that I see for judicial action on this subject is the doctrine concerning it 
which is already on our books. In view of the deference habitually paid by other branches of the 
government to this Court’s interpretation of the Constitution, it is not unlikely that a considerable 
part of the inertia of Congress and of the country has been due to [11] the belief that the existing 
system is Constitutional. If it was a mistake to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment was more 
than an abling act to empower Congress to act on the subject, that mistake was made long ago 
and we should probably not now retreat from it. If the Court was right to declare that the Amend-
ment was self-executing to the extent of requiring equal if separate facilities, there is the same 
power and duty to say whether, under present conditions, that doctrine still is valid. 
 The real question to me is, assuming the same premises upon which earlier courts have 
reasoned as to the power of the State to make classifications based on real differences and to 
make reasonable distinctions in treatment based on those classifications, segregation can today 
be sustained. 
 Of course the Constitution must be construed as a living instrument and cannot be read as 
if written in a dead language. It is neither novel nor radical doctrine that statutes once held con-
stitutional may become invalid by reason of changing conditions and those held to be good in 
one state of facts may be held to be bad in another. A multitude of cases, going back far into ju-
dicial history, attest to this doctrine. 
 It is not in my opinion necessary or true to say that these earlier judges, many of whom 
were as sensitive to human [12] values as any of us, were wrong in their time. But in recent times 
the practical result of decisions has been to nullify the classifications for many of the purposes as 
to which it was originally held valid. 
 Whatever may have been true at an earlier period, the mere fact that one is colored does 
not today create a reasonable presumption that he is inferior, retarded, or a special problem in ed-
ucation. Certainly in the 1860’s and throughout the nineteenth century the Negro population as a 
whole was a different people than today. Lately freed from bondage they had no opportunity as 
yet to show their capacity for education or assimilation or even a chance to demonstrate that they 
could be self-supporting or anything more in public life than a pawn for white exploiters. There 
was a strong belief in heredity and the Negro’s heritage was close to primitive. Likewise his en-
vironment from force of circumstance was not conducive to his mental development. I do not 
find it necessary to stigmatize as hateful or unintelligent the early assumption that Negro educa-
tion presented problems that were elementary, special and peculiar and that the mass teaching of 
Negroes was an experiment not easily tied in with the education of pupils of more favored back-
ground. Nor, when I view the progress that was made under it, can I confidently say that the 
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practice of each race pursuing its education apart has been, up to now, wholly [13] to the Negro’s 
disadvantage. From my little experience in a non-segregated school, it is clear to me that to min-
gle closely with White pupils does not fully solve the Negro’s psychological or educational prob-
lem. Indeed, Negro progress, even under segregation, has been spectacular and tested by the pace 
of history, his rise is one of the swiftest and most dramatic advances in the annals of man. It has 
enabled him to outgrow the system and to overcome the presumptions on which it was based. 
 The handicap of inheritance and environment has been too generally overcome today to 
warrant such a classification based on race alone. I do not say that every Negro everywhere is so 
advanced nor would I know whether the proportion who have shown educational capacity is or is 
not everywhere similar. But it is sufficiently general to require us to say that the mere possession 
of colored blood, in whole or in part, no longer affords a reasonable basis for a classification for 
educational purposes and that each individual must be rated on his own merit. Retarded or sub-
normal ones, like the same kind of Whites, must be accorded separate educational treatment. All 
that is required is that they be classified as individuals and not as a race for their learning, apti-
tude and discipline. 
 Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that assimilation [14] today has progressed to a very 
market extent beyond where it was at the earlier periods. Blush or shudder, as many will, mixture 
of blood has been making inroads on segregation faster than change in law. No clear line of sepa-
ration between the races exists, it has become unclear and blurred and more and more a large 
population with as much claim to white blood as to colored blood baffles any justice in a segre-
gation effort. 
 Nor can we ignore the fact that the concept of the place of public education has markedly 
changed. Once a privilege conferred on those fortunate enough to take advantage of it, it is now 
regarded as a right of a citizen and a duty enforced by compulsory education laws. Any thought 
of public education as a privilege which may be given or withheld as a matter of grace has long 
since passed out of American thinking. 
 For these reasons I am convinced that we should strike from our books the doctrine of 
separate but equal facilities and must strike down provisions of State constitutions, statutes, or 
customs which classify persons for separate treatment in matters of education based solely on 
possession of colored blood. 
 However, the problem of introducing and enforcing a widespread change in the social 
customs and habits of the people presents a further problem which this Court must face in view 
of [15] the limitations upon the nature of the judicial process. To pervert the federal judiciary 
from its constitutional purposes is too high a price to pay for expediting a movement that is al-
ready progressing with great rapidity. 
 IV. JUDICIARY NO MEDIUM OF SOCIAL TRANSITION. 
 Our decision today striking down State statutes which authorized or require segregation 
will not produce a social transition nor is the judiciary the agency to which the people should 
look for that result. Our decisions may end segregation in Delaware and Kansas where it lingers 
by a tenuous lease of life. But where the practice really is entrenched it exists independently of 
any statute or decision as a local usage and deep-seated custom sustained by the prevailing senti-
ment of the community. Striking down state statutes will not end the local practice of segrega-
tion. 
 The futility of effective reform of our society by judicial decree is demonstrated by the 
history of this very matter. For many many years this Court has pronounced the doctrine that 
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while separate facilities are permissible in accordance with the plain words of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, they must be equal for the races. 
 Our pronouncement to that effect has remained a dead [15] letter in a large part of the 
country. A casual traveller in many sections can see that for himself. Why has the separate but 
equal doctrine declared by this Court so long been a mere promise to the colored ear to be broken 
to the 
 It has remained an empty pronouncement because the judicial department has no power 
to enforce its general declarations of law upon masses of people but only upon those before it in 
a particular litigation. Our pronouncement today has no concrete force as to any particular school 
district until some Negro of that districts brings an action to enforce his individual rights. Con-
tempt proceedings as to those who disobey the Court’s order may be available but only against 
those who were parties to the action. This costly, time-consuming litigation of a magnitude im-
possible for disadvantaged people is the judicial process. 
 What reason have we to believe that a pronouncement that segregation is unconstitutional 
will be anymore self-executing or anymore efficiently executed. An individual action must be 
maintained in every school district which shows persistent recalcitrance. Even then if it is delib-
erately disobeyed, contempt proceedings in many cases would require a jury trial, before juries 
drawn from the very community that resists the decree. The fact is that we are initiating a change 
in the social system [17] of a large part of the United States. With no machinery except that of 
the courts to put the power of the government behind it seems likely to result in a failure that will 
bring the Court into contempt and the judicial process into discredit. 
 The Fourteenth Amendment does not contemplate a static and perpetual condition. It 
makes provision for recognizing and giving effect to changed conditions and public opinion in a 
developing society. Its history is convincing that, like most organic acts, it was not a code detail 
but a transfer of power to the federal government. One thing it clearly provides “the Congress 
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this Article.” Thus the 
Amendment does not attempt to speak the last word on the subjects with which it deals in such 
generalities. It was, above all, an enabling Act which anticipated that from time to time there 
would be necessity for supplemental measures to make it complete and effective. What it em-
powered in general, it authorized Congress to complete in detail. 
 Any constructive policy for abolishing educational segregation must come from Con-
gress. It can delegate its supervisions to some administrative body provided with standards for 
determining the conditions under which complete abolition should [18] be ordered and the 
measures by which it should be approached. It can make provisions for federal funds where 
changes required are beyond the means of the community. We must not forget that the changes 
will require extensive changes in physical plans and will impose the largest burden on some of 
the lowest income regions of the Nation. Moreover, Congress can lift the heavy burden of private 
litigation from disadvantaged people and make the investigation and administrative proceedings 
against recalcitrant districts the function of some public agency that would secure enforcement of 
the policy. Its legislation can provide the rule and standard of conduct binding on everyone in the 
country in contrast with the judicial process which binds only the parties to a particular litigation. 
 Up to now, Congress was justified in assuming that segregation does not offend the Four-
teenth Amendment. It is no longer justified in that assumption. We are urged, however, to supply 
various means of supervision of the transition of the country from segregated to non-segregated 
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schools upon the basis that Congress may or will refuse to act. That assumes nothing less than 
that we must act because our representative system has failed. 
 Apparently the country suffers a schizophrenic division [19] while it elects executives 
who oppose segregation it returns a Congress that favors or tolerates it. We must assume from 
this action in reference to the District of Columbia that Congress is not opposed to segregation 
and does not consider it an obstacle to the achievement of the purposes of our Constitution. 
Whether it will continue in that belief remains to be seen. 
V. THE DECREE 
 It is a mere matter of essay writing to put down an opinion holding that the State statutes, 
on which the Courts below have relied in these cases, are unconstitutional. If, however, that is 
the result in anything more constructive or practical than an essay followed by a century of litiga-
tion, a gigantic administrative job has to be undertaken. While our decision may invalidate exist-
ing laws and regulations governing the school, the Court cannot substitute constructive laws and 
regulations for their governance. Local or state or federal action will have to build the integrated 
school system if they are to exist. 
 The Department of Justice, while urging a decree condemning segregation, concedes that 
uniform and immediate enforcement is impossible. It points out that school districts may have to 
be consolidated or divided or their boundaries [20] revised and the teachers and pupils may have 
to be transferred. The Government points out that placing White children under Colored teachers 
is an essential part of the plan unless Colored teachers are to be dismissed in some areas where 
they have been hired in large numbers. This is one of the most controversial problems of adjust-
ment. Financial problems are also obviously involved. In some regions the White schools are 
good the Negro schools poor. If both classes are to be accommodated in both schools it would 
require White pupils to shift to the Negro schools, a measure which is likely to be accompanied 
by great opposition. New facilities are necessarily to be provided and that involves taxation, the 
sale of bonds, and the votes of taxpayers and affirmative actions by public bodies. It is impossi-
ble to now anticipate all of the difficulties or to determine the time necessary in any particular 
area to overcome them. 
 The Government advises that we remand these cases to the District Courts under instruc-
tions to proceed with enforcement as rapidly as conditions make it appear practicable. This casts 
upon the lower courts a burden of continued litigation and subjects judges in the locality to local 
pressures and provides them with no standards to justify their decisions to their neighbors whose 
opinions they must resist. The Department offers us no standards [21] for practicable proceed-
ings and none exist in the law. 
 It is apparent that our decision begins, it does not end, the struggle over segregation. The 
representatives of the Negroes point out with great force that many are denied the right to enter 
White schools and that it is a present and personal right to do so and that deferred relief may be a 
denial of rights to those pupils who meanwhile pass school age. Counsel for the States contend 
that if segregation is abolished at all, the process must be adapted to varying local conditions 
which will require time and consideration and varying periods of adjustment. They point out that 
in building their present administrative, educational and physical structures they have relied on 
the teachings of this Court and the attitudes of Congress. 
 That these controversies on a local basis will persist over a long period of time and re-
quire consideration in great detail is apparent. 
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 The Government also proposes what appears to me to go far beyond the settlement of the 
rights of the parties to these litigations which is the limit of the judicial function as I see it. It pro-
poses that we affirmatively direct the District Courts to obtain from the local school authorities 
and approve “an effective program for accomplishing transition to a non-segregated [22] system” 
“in passing upon such a program, the lower court could receive the views not only of the parties 
but of interested persons and groups in the community.” It seems to me that this proposal that the 
District Courts supervise the educational authorities with the aid of town meetings exceeds any 
authority that I know of in this Court. Our sole function is to decide an existing case or contro-
versy between the parties to the case. It seems to me that the proposal that the Court embark 
upon a supervised revamping of the educational system of the South proposed what is manifestly 
beyond judicial power or functions. Nothing has raised more doubt in my mind as to the wisdom 
of our decision than the character of the decree which the Government conceives to be necessary 
to execute it. 
 Questions as to the contents of a decree have been shunned by both of the parties to the 
contest, although neither of them accept the Government’s proposals. It would obviously be in-
consistent with the position of the parties to discuss the contents of a decree which would be un-
satisfactory to them lest they appear to be acquiescing in it. 
 I favor at the moment going no farther than to enter a decree that the State statutes requir-
ing or authorizing segregation merely on account of race or color are unconstitutional. I would 
order a reargument on the contents of the decree to be [23] entered and request the Government 
and each of the parties to submit detailed proposed decrees designed to do justice in these partic-
ular cases. I have no doubt of the power of a Court of Equity to condition its remedies to justice 
to both parties and I have no doubt that the circumstances under which a large part of the country 
has grown into this unfortunate position are such that only a considerate decree would be a just 
one. And in the long run I think only a reasonably considerate decree would be an expedient one 
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